Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India

AIR 1978 SC 597

Cited by 2 decisions in this library

Decision date: 25 January, 1978
Text availability: Full text
Bench: 7-Judge Bench
Judges: M.H. Beg, N.L. Untwalia, P.N. Bhagwati, P.S. Kailasam, S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, V.R. Krishna Iyer, Y.V. Chandrachud

Source: landmark_precedents seed ↗

Case summary

Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment; the principle of reasonableness pervades Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence. | Procedure established by law under Article 21 must be just, fair, and reasonable, not arbitrary or fanciful. Established the Golden Triangle connecting Articles 14, 19, and 21.

Principle

Connected provisions and cases

Related judgments

Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala · (1973) 4 SCC 225 · 1973 · 20 shared provisions
Shayara Bano v. Union of India · (2017) 9 SCC 1 · 2017 · 19 shared provisions
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India · (2017) 10 SCC 1 · 2017 · 16 shared provisions
Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India · (2018) 10 SCC 1 · 2018 · 13 shared provisions
Minerva Mills v. Union of India · (1980) 3 SCC 625 · 1980 · 12 shared provisions

Judgment text

### Supreme Court of India ## Mrs. Maneka Gandhi vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Anr. on 25 January, 1978 ### Equivalent citations: AIR1978SC597, (1978)1SCC248, \[1978\]2SCR621, AIR 1978 SUPREME COURT 597, 1978 2 SCJ 312, 1978 2 SCR 621, 1978 (1) SCC 248 ### Author: [M.H. Beg](/search/?formInput=authorid:m-h-beg) ### Bench: [M.H. Beg](/search/?formInput=benchid:m-h-beg), [N.L. Untwalia](/search/?formInput=benchid:n-l-untwalia), [P.N. Bhagwati](/search/?formInput=benchid:p-n-bhagwati), [P.S. Kailasam](/search/?formInput=benchid:p-s-kailasam), [S. Murtaza Fazal Ali](/search/?formInput=benchid:s-m-ali), [V.R. Krishna Iyer](/search/?formInput=benchid:v-r-iyer), [Y.V. Chandrachud](/search/?formInput=benchid:y-v-chandrachud) JUDGMENT M.H. Beg, C.J. 1\. The case before us involves questions relating to basic human rights. On such questions I believe that multiplicity of views giving the approach of each member of this Court is not a disadvantage if it clarifies our not infrequently differing approaches. It should enable all interested to appreciate better the significance of our Constitution.

2\. As I am in general agreement with my learned brethren Bhagwati and Krishna Iyer. I will endeavour to confine my observations to an indication of my own approach on some matters for consideration now before us. This seems to me to be particularly necessary as my learned brother Kailasam, who has also given us the benefit of his separate opinion, has a somewhat different approach. I have had the advantage of going through the opinions of each of my three learned brethren. 3\. It seems to me that there can be little doubt that the right to travel and to go outside the country, which orders regulating issue, suspension or impounding, and cancellation of passports directly affect, must be included in rights to "personal liberty" on the strength of decisions of this Court giving a very wide ambit to the right to personal liberty (see : [Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D. Ramarathnam, Assistant Passport Officer, Government of India](/doc/1747577/), New Delhi and Ors. , Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. and Ors. . 4\. [Article 21](/doc/1199182/) of the Constitution reads as follows : > Protection of life and personal liberty. No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.

Supreme Court of India

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India

AIR 1978 SC 597

Cited by 2 decisions in this library

Decision date: 25 January, 1978
Text availability: Full text
Bench: 7-Judge Bench
Judges: M.H. Beg, N.L. Untwalia, P.N. Bhagwati, P.S. Kailasam, S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, V.R. Krishna Iyer, Y.V. Chandrachud

Source: landmark_precedents seed ↗

Case summary

Principle

Connected provisions and cases

Related judgments

Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala · (1973) 4 SCC 225 · 1973 · 20 shared provisions
Shayara Bano v. Union of India · (2017) 9 SCC 1 · 2017 · 19 shared provisions
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India · (2017) 10 SCC 1 · 2017 · 16 shared provisions
Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India · (2018) 10 SCC 1 · 2018 · 13 shared provisions
Minerva Mills v. Union of India · (1980) 3 SCC 625 · 1980 · 12 shared provisions

Judgment text

10\. In [A. K. Gopalan](/doc/1857950/)'s case (supra), what was at issue was whether the tests of valid procedure for deprivation of personal liberty by preventive detention must be found exclusively in [Article 22](/doc/581566/) of the Constitution or could we gather from outside it also elements of any "due process of law" and use them to test the validity of a law dealing with preventive detention. Our Constitution makers, while accepting a departure from ordinary norms, by permitting making of laws for preventive detention without trial for special reasons in exceptional situations also provided quite elaborately, in [Article 22](/doc/581566/) of the Constitution itself, what requirements such law, relating to preventive detention, must satisfy. The procedural requirements of such laws separately formed parts of the guaranteed fundamental rights. Therefore, when this Court was called upon to judge the validity of provisions relating to preventive detention it [laid down, in](/doc/1857950/) [Gopalan](/doc/1857950/)'s case (supra), that the tests of "due process", with regard to such laws, are to be found in [Article 22](/doc/581566/) of the Constitution exclusively because this article constitutes a self-contained code for laws of this description. That was, in my view, the real ratio decidendi of [Gopalan](/doc/1857950/)'s case (supra). It appears to me, with great respect, that other observations relating to the separability of the subject matters of [Articles 21](/doc/1199182/) and [19](/doc/1218090/) were mere obiter dicta. They may have appeared to the majority of learned Judges in [Gopalan](/doc/1857950/)'s case to be extensions of the logic they adopted with regard to the relationship between [Article 21](/doc/1199182/) and [22](/doc/581566/) of the Constitution. But, the real issue there was whether, in the face of [Article 22](/doc/581566/) of the Constitution, which provides all the tests of procedural validity of a law regulating preventive detention, other tests could be imported from [Article 19](/doc/1218090/) of the Constitution or elsewhere into "procedure established by law". The majority view was that this could not be done. I think, if I may venture to conjecture what opinions learned Judges of this Court would have expressed on that occasion had other types of law or other aspects of personal liberty, such as those which confronted this Court in either [Satwant Singh](/doc/1747577/)'s case (supra) or Kharak Singh's case (supra) were before them, the same approach or the same language would not have been adopted by them. It seems to me that this aspect of [Gopalan](/doc/1857950/)'s case (supra) is important to remember if we are to correctly understand what was [laid down in](/doc/1857950/) that ease.

27\. The tests of reason and justice cannot be abstract. They cannot be divorced from the needs of the nation. The tests have to be pragmatic. Otherwise, they would cease to be reasonable. Thus, I think: that a discretion left to the authority to impound a passport in public interest cannot invalidate the law itself. We cannot, out of fear that such power will be misused, refuse to permit Parliament to entrust even such power to executive authorities as may be absolutely necessary to carry out the purposes of a validly exercisable power. I think it has to be necessarily left to executive discretion to decide whether, on the facts and circumstances of a particular case, public interest will or will not be served by a particular order to be passed under a valid law subject, as it always is to judicial supervision. In matters such as grant, suspension, impounding or cancellation of passports, the possible dealings of an individual with nationals and authorities of other States have to be considered. The contemplated or possible activities abroad of the individual may have to be taken into account. There may be questions of national safety and welfare which transcend the importance of the individual's inherent right to go where he or she pleases to go. Therefore, although we may not deny the grant of wide discretionary power to the executive authorities as unreasonable in such cases, yet, I think we must look for and find procedural safeguards to ensure that the power will not be used for purposes extraneous to the grant of the power before we uphold the validity of the power conferred. We have to insist on procedural proprieties the observance of which could show that such a power is being used only to serve what can reasonably and justly be regarded as a public or national interest capable of overriding the individual's inherent right of movement or travel to wherever he or she pleases in the modern world of closer integration in every sphere between the peoples of the world and the shrunk time-space relationships.

41\. The interplay of diverse articles of the Constitution guaranteeing -various freedoms has gone through vicissitudes which have been elaborately traced by Brother Bhagwati. The test of directness of the impugned law as contrasted with its consequences was thought in [A. K. Gopalan](/doc/1857950/) (supra) and Ram Singh \[1951\] SCR 451 to be the true approach for determining whether a fundamental right was infringed. A significant application of that test may be perceived in Naresh S. Mirajkar where an order passed by the Bombay High Court prohibiting the publication of a witness's evidence in a defamation case was up-held by this Court on the ground that it was passed with the object of affording protection to the witness in order to obtain true evidence and its impact on the right of free speech and expression guaranteed by [Article 19(1)(a)](/doc/1378441/) was incidental. N. H. Bhagwati J. in Express Newspapers \[1959\] SCR 12 struck a modified note by evolving the test of proximate effect and operation of the statute. That test saw its fruition in Sakal Papers where the Court, giving precedence to the direct and immediate effect of the order over its form and object, struck down the Daily Newspapers (Price and Page) Order, 1960 on the ground that it violated [Article 19(1)(a)](/doc/1378441/) of the Constitution. The culmination of this thought process came in the Bank Nationalisation Case (supra) where it was held by the majority, speaking through Shah J., that the extent of protection against impairment of a fundamental right is determined by the direct operation of an action upon the individual's rights and not by the object of the legislature or by the form of the action. In Bennett Coleman the Court, by a majority, reiterated the same position by saying that the direct operation of the Act upon the rights forms the real test. It struck down the newsprint policy, restricting the number of pages of newspapers without the option to reduce the circulation, as offending against the provisions of [Article 19(1)(a).](/doc/1378441/) "The action may have a direct effect on a fundamental right although its direct subject matter may be different" observed the Court, citing an effective instance of a law dealing with the Defence of India or with defamation and yet having a direct effect on the freedom of speech and expression. The measure of directness, as held by Brother Bhagwati, is the 'inevitable' consequence of the impugned statute. These then are the guidelines with the help of which one has to ascertain whether [Section 10(3)(c)](/doc/123270/) of the Passport Act which authorizes the passport authority to impound a passport or the impugned order passed thereunder violates the guarantee of free speech and expression conferred by [Article 19(1)(a).](/doc/1378441/)

58\. The question immediately arises : does the procedure prescribed by the [Passports Act, 1967](/doc/229269/) for impounding a passport meet the test of this requirement ? Is it 'right or fair or just' ? The argument of the petitioner was that it is not, because it provides for impounding of a passport without affording reasonable opportunity to the holder of the passport to be heard in defence. To impound the passport of a person, said the petitioner, is a serious matter, since it prevents him from exercising his constitutional right to go abroad and such a drastic consequence cannot in fairness be visited without observing the principle of audi alterant partem. Any procedure which permits impairment of the constitutional right to go abroad without giving reasonable opportunity to show cause cannot but be condemned as unfair and unjust and hence, there is in the present case clear infringement of the requirement of [Article 21.](/doc/1199182/) Now, it is true that there is no express provision in the [Passports Act, 1967](/doc/229269/) which requires that the audi alteram partem rule should be followed before impounding a passport, but that is not conclusive of the question. If the statute makes itself clear on this point, then no more question arises. But even when the statute is silent, the law may in a given case make an implication and apply the principle stated by Bytes, J., in Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works \[1863\] 14C B.N.S. 180. "A long course of decisions, beginning with Dr. Bentley's case and ending with some very recent cases, establish that, although there are no positive words in the statute requiring that the party shall be heard, yet the justice of the common law will supply the omission off the legislature". The principle of audi alterant partem, which mandates that no one shall be condemned unheard, is part of the rules of natural justice. In fact, there are two main principles in which the rules of natural justice are manifested, namely, Nemo Judex in Sua Causa and audi alterant partem. We are not concerned here with the former, since there is no case of bias urged here. The question is only in regard to the right of hearing which involves the audi alterant partem rule. Can it be imported in the procedure for impounding a passport ?

> Thus, the soul of natural justice is 'fair play in action' and that is why it has received the widest recognition, throughout the democratic world; In the United States, the right to an administrative hearing is regarded as essential requirement of fundamental fairness. And in England too it has been held that 'fair play in action' demands that before any prejudicial or adverse action is taken against a person, he must be given an opportunity to be heard. The rule was stated by Lord Denning, M.R. in these terms in Schmidt v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs \[1969\] 2 Chancery Division 149 :-where a public officer has power to deprive a person of his liberty or his property, the general principle is that it has not to be done without his being given an opportunity of being heard and of making representations on his own behalf". The same rule also prevails in other Commonwealth countries like Canada, Australia and New Zealand. It has even gained access to the United Nations. Vide American Journal of International Law, Vol. 67, page 479. Magarry, J., describes natural" justice "as a distillate of due process of law". Vide Fontaine v. Chesterton (1968) 112 Solicitor General 690. It is the quintessence of the process of justice inspired and guided by fair play in action'. If we look at the speeches of the various law Lords in [Wiseman](/doc/1004041/)'s case, it will be seen that each one of them asked the question "whether in the particular circumstances of the case, the Tribunal acted unfairly so that it could be said that their procedure did not match with what justice demanded", or, was the procedure adopted by the Tribunal 'in all the circumstances unfair' ? The test adopted by every law Lord was whether the procedure followed was "fair in all the circumstances" and 'fair play in action' required that an opportunity should be given to the tax payer "to see and reply to the counter-statement of the Commissioners" before reaching the conclusion that "there is a prima facie case against him." The inquiry must, therefore, always be : does fairness in action demand that an opportunity to be "heard should be given to the person affected ?

64\. Now, here, the power conferred on the Passport Authority is to impound a passport and the consequence of impounding a passport would be to impair the constitutional right of the holder of the passport to go abroad during the time that the passport is impounded. Moreover, a passport can be impounded by the Passport Authority only on certain specified grounds set out in Sub-section (3) of [Section 10](/doc/827607/) and the Passport Authority would have to apply its mind to the facts and circumstances of a given case and decide whether any of the specified grounds exists which would justify impounding of the passport. The Passport Authority is also required by Sub-section (5) of [Section 10](/doc/827607/) to record in writing a brief statement of the reasons for making an order impounding a passport and, save in certain exceptional situations, the Passport Authority is obliged to furnish a copy of the statement of reasons to the holder of the passport. Where the Passport Authority which has impounded a passport is other than the Central Government, a right of appeal against the order impounding the passport is given by [Section 11](/doc/1526429/), and in the appeal, the validity of the reasons given by the Passport Authority for impounding the passport can be canvassed before the Appellate Authority. It is clear on a consideration of these circumstances that the test [laid down in](/doc/485924/) the decisions of this Court for distinguishing between a quasi-judicial power and an administrative power is satisfied and the power conferred on the Passport Authority to impound a passport is quasi-judicial power. The rules of natural justice would, in the circumstances, be applicable in the exercise of the power of impounding a passport even on the orthodox view which prevailed prior to [A. K. Kraipak](/doc/639803/)'s case. The same result must follow in view of the decision in [A. K. Kraipak](/doc/639803/)'s case, even if the power to impound a passport were regarded as administrative in character, because it seriously interferes with the constitutional right of the holder of the passport to go abroad and entails adverse civil consequences.

72\. We may now examine the challenge based, on [Article 19(1)(a)](/doc/1378441/) in the light of this background. [Article 19(1)(a)](/doc/1378441/) enshrines one of the most cherished freedoms in a democracy, namely, freedom, of speech and expression. The petitioner, being a citizen, has undoubtedly this freedom guaranteed to her, but the question is whether [Section 10(3)(c)](/doc/123270/) or the impugned Order unconstitutionally takes away or abridges this freedom. Now, prima facie, the right, -which is sought to be restricted by [Section 10(3)(c)](/doc/123270/) and the impugned Order, is the right to go abroad and that is not named as a fundamental right or included in so many words in [Article 19(1)(a)](/doc/1378441/), but the argument of the petitioner was that the right to go abroad is an integral part of the freedom of speech and expression and whenever State action, be it law or executive fiat, restricts or interferes with the right to go: abroad, it necessarily involves curtailment of freedom of speech and expression, and is, therefore required to meet the challenge of [Article 19(1)(a).](/doc/1378441/) This argument was sought to be answered by the Union of India by a two-fold contention. The first limb of the contention was that the right to go abroad could not possibly be comprehended within freedom of speech and expression, because the right of free speech and expression guaranteed under [Article 19(1)(a)](/doc/1378441/) was exercisable only within the territory of India and the guarantee of its exercise did not extend outside the country and hence State action restricting or preventing exercise of the right to go abroad could not be said to be violative of freedom of speech and expression and be liable to be condemned as invalid on that account. The second limb of the contention went a little further and challenged the very premise on which the argument of the petitioner was based and under this limb, the argument put forward was that the right to go abroad was not integrally connected with the freedom of speech and expression, nor did it partake of the same basic nature and character and hence it was not included in the right of free speech and expression guaranteed under [Article 19(1)(a)](/doc/1378441/) and imposition of restriction on it did not involve violation of that Article. These were broadly the rival contentions urged on behalf of the parties and we shall now proceed to consider them.

74\. It is true that the right of free speech and expression enshrined in [Article 19(1)(a)](/doc/1378441/) can be enforced only if it sought to be violated by any action of the State and since State action cannot have any extra territorial operation, except perhaps incidentally in case of Parliamentary legislation, it is only violation within the territory of India that can be complained of by an aggrieved person. But that does not mean that the right of free speech and expression is exercisable only in India and not outside. State action taken within the territory of India can prevent or restrict exercise of freedom of speech and expression outside India. What [Article 19(1)(a)](/doc/1378441/) does is to declare freedom of speech and expression as a fundamental right and to protect it against State action. The State cannot by any legislative or executive action interfere with the exercise of this right, except in so far as permissible under [Article 19(2).](/doc/493243/) The State action would necessarily be taken in India but it may impair or restrict the exercise of this right elsewhere. Take for example a case where a journalist is prevented by a law or an executive order from sending his despatch abroad. The law or the executive order would operate on the journalist in India but what it would prevent him from doing is to exercise his freedom of speech and expression abroad. Today in the modern world with vastly developed science and technology and highly improved and sophisticated means, of communication, a person may be able to exercise freedom of speech and expression abroad by doing something within the country and if this is published or restricted, his freedom of speech and expression would certainly be impaired and [Article 19(1)(a)](/doc/1378441/) violated. Therefore, merely because State action is restricted to the territory of India, it does not necessarily follow that the right of free speech and expression is also limited in its operation to the territory of India and does not extend outside.

78\. That takes us to the next question arising out of the second limb of the contention of the Government. Is the right to go abroad an essential part of freedom of speech and expression so that whenever there is violation of the former, there is impairment of the latter involving infraction of [Article 19(1)(a)?](/doc/1378441/) The argument of the petitioner was that while it is true that the right to go abroad is not expressly included as a fundamental right in any of the clauses of [Article 19(1)](/doc/1142233/), its existence is necessary in order to make the express freedoms mentioned in [Article 19(1)](/doc/1142233/) meaningful and effective. The right of free speech and expression can have meaningful content and its exercise can be effective only if the right to travel abroad is ensured and without it, freedom of speech and expression would be limited by geographical constraints. The impounding of the passport of a person with a view to preventing him from going abroad to communicate his ideas or share his thoughts and views with others or to express himself through song or dance or other forms and media of expression is direct interference with freedom of speech and expression. It is clear, so ran the argument, that in a complex and developing society, where fast modes of transport and communication have narrowed down distances and brought people living in different parts of the world together, the right to associate with like minded persons in other parts of the globe for the purpose of advancing social, political or other ideas and policies is indispensable and that is part of freedom of speech and expression which cannot be effectively implemented without the right to go abroad. The right to go abroad, it was said, is a peripheral right emanating from the right to freedom of speech and expression and is, therefore, covered by [Article 19(1)(a).](/doc/1378441/) This argument of the petitioner was sought to be supported by reference to some recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. We shall examine these decisions a little later, but let us first consider the question on principle.

79\. We may begin the discussion of this question by first considering the nature and significance of the right to go abroad. It cannot be disputed that there must exist a basically free sphere for man, resulting from the nature and dignity of the human being as the bearer of the highest spiritual and moral values. This basic freedom of the human being is expressed at various levels and is reflected in various basic rights. Freedom to go abroad is one of such rights, for the nature of man is a free agent necessarily involves free movement on his part. There can be no doubt that if the purpose and the sense of. the State is to protect personality and its development, as indeed it should be of any liberal democratic State, freedom to go abroad must be given its due place amongst the basic rights. This right is an important basic human right for it nourishes independent and self-determining creative character of the individual, not only by extending his freedoms of action, but also by extending the scope of his experience. It is a right which gives intellectual and creative workers in particular the. opportunity of extending their spiritual and intellectual horizon through study at foreign universities, through contact with foreign colleagues and through participation in discussions and conferences. The right also extends to private life : marriage, family and friendship are humanities which can be rarely affected through refusal of freedom to go abroad and clearly show that this freedom is a genuine human right. Moreover, this freedom would be highly valuable right where man finds himself obliged to flee (a) because he is unable to serve his God as he wished at the previous place of residence, (b) because his personal freedom is threatened for reasons which do not constitute a crime in the usual meaning of the word and many were such cases during the emergency, or (c) because his life is threatened either for religious or political reasons or through the threat to the maintenance of minimum standard of living compatible with human dignity. These reasons suggest that freedom to go abroad incorporates the important function of an ultimum refunium libertatis when other basic freedoms are refused. To quote the words of Mr. Justice Douglas in Kent v. Dulles 357 U.S. 116 : 2 L.ed. 2d 1204 freedom to go abroad has much social value and represents a basic human right of great significance. It is in fact incorporated as an inalienable human right in [Article 13](/doc/134715/) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But it is not specifically named as a fundamental right in [Article 19(1).](/doc/1142233/) Does it mean that on that account it cannot be a fundamental right covered by [Article 19(1) ?](/doc/1142233/)

82\. The second decision on which reliance was placed on behalf of the petitioner was Apthekar v. Secretary of Stated 378 U.S. 500 : 12 L. ed. 2d 992. The question which arose for determination in this case related to the constitutional validity of Section 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act, 1950. This section prohibited the use of passports by communists following a final registration order by the Subversive Activities Control Board under [Section 7](/doc/592305/) and following the mandate of this section, the State Department revoked the existing passports of the appellants. After exhausting all administrative remedies, the appellants sued for declarative and injunctive relief before the District Court which upheld the validity of the section. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment by a majority of six against three and held the section to be invalid. The Supreme Court noted first that the right to travel abroad is an important aspect of the citizens' liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and [Section 6](/doc/652529/) substantially restricts that right and then proceeded to apply the strict standard of judicial review which it had till then applied only in cases involving the so-called preferred freedoms of the first Amendment, namely, that "a governmental purpose-may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms". The Supreme Court found on application of this test that the section was "overly broad and unconstitutional on its face" since it omitted any requirement that the individual should have knowledge of the organisational purpose to establish a communist totaliatarian dictatorship and it made no attempt to relate the restriction on travel to the individual's purpose of the trip or to the security-sensitivity of the area to be visited. This decision again has no relevance to the present argument except for one observation made by the Court that "freedom of travel is a constitutional liberty closely related to rights of free speech and association". But this observation also cannot help because the right to foreign travel was held to be a right arising not out of the first Amendment but inferentially out of the liberty guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment and this observation was meant only to support the extension of the strict First Amendment test to a case involving the right to go abroad.

93\. Then it was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the Minister for External Affairs, who made the impugned Order on behalf of the Central Government, did not apply his mind and hence the impugned Order was bad. We find no basis or justification for this contention. It has been stated in the affidavit in reply that the Minister for External Affairs applied his mind to the relevant material and also to the confidential information received from the intelligence sources that there was likelihood of the petitioner attempting to leave the country and then only he made the impugned Order. In fact, the Ministry of Home Affairs had forwarded to the Ministry of External Affairs as far back as 9th May, 1977 a list of persons whose presence, in view of their involvement or connection or position or past antecedents, was likely to be required in connection with inquiries to be carried out by the Commissions of Inquiry and the name of the petitioner was included in this list. The Home Ministry had also intimated to the Ministry of External Affairs that since the inquiries were being held by the Commissions of Inquiry in public interest, consideration of public interest would justify recourse to [Section 10(3)(c)](/doc/123270/) for impounding the passports of the persons mentioned in this list. This note of the Ministry of Home Affairs was considered by the Minister for External Affairs and despite the suggestion made in this note, the passports of only eleven persons, out of those mentioned in the list, were ordered to be impounded and no action was taken in regard to the passport of the petitioner. It is only on 1st July, 1977 when the Minister for External Affairs received confidential information that the petitioner was likely to attempt to leave the country that, after applying his mind to the relevant material and taking into account confidential information, he made the impugned Order. It is, therefore, not possible to say that the Minister for External Affairs did not apply his mind and mechanically made the impugned Order.

100\. We are directly concerned, as fully brought out in Shri Justice Bhagwati's judgment, with the indefinite immobilisation of the petitioner's passport, the reason for the action being strangely veiled from the victim and the right to voice an answer being suspiciously withheld from her, the surprising secrecy being labelled, 'public interest'. Paper curtains wear ill on good governments. And, cutely to side one's grounds under colour of statute, is too sphinx-like an art for an open society and popular regime. As we saw the reasons which the learned Attorney General so unhesitatingly disclosed, the question arises : 'wherefore are these things hid ?'. The catch-all expression 'public interest' is sometimes the easy temptation to cover up from the public which they have a right to know, which appeals in the short run but avenges in the long run Since the only passport to this Court's jurisdiction in this branch of passport law is the breach of a basic freedom, what is the nexus between a passport and a Part III right ? What are the ambience and amplitude, the desired effect and direct object of the key provisions of the [Passports Act, 1967](/doc/229269/) ? Do they crib or cut down unconstitutionally, any of the guarantees under [Articles 21](/doc/1199182/)[, 19](/doc/1218090/) and [14...?](/doc/367586/) Is the impugned [Section 10](/doc/827607/), especially [Section 10(3)(c)](/doc/123270/), capable of circumscription to make it accord with the Constitution ? Is any part ultra vires, and why ? Finally, granting the Act to be good, is the impounding order bad ? Such, in the Writ Petition, is the range of issues regaled at the bar, profound, far-reaching, animated by comparative scholarship and fertilised by decisional erudition. The frontiers and funeral of freedom, the necessities and stresses of national integrity, security and sovereignty, the interests of the general public, public order and the like figure on occasions as forensic issues. And, in such situations, the contentious quiet of the court is the storm-center of the nation. Verily, while hard cases tend to make bad law, bad cases tend to blur great law and courts must beware.

138\. While dealing with Art 19 vis a vis freedom to travel abroad, we have to remember one spinal indicator. True, high constitutional policy has harmonised individual freedoms with holistic community good by inscribing exceptions to [Article 19(1)](/doc/1142233/) in [Article 19(2)](/doc/493243/) to (6). Even so, what is fundamental is the freedom, not the exception. More importantly, restraints are permissible only to the extent they have nexus with the approved object. For instance, in a wide sense, 'the interests of the general public' are served by a family planning programme but it may be constitutional impertinence to insist that passports may be refused if sterilisation certificates were not produced. Likewise, it is in public interest to widen streets in cities but monstrous to impound a passport because its holder has declined to demolish his house which projects' into the street line. Sure, the security of State is a paramount consideration but can Government, totalitarian fashion, equate Party with country and refuse travel document because, while abroad, he may criticise the conflicting politics of the Party-in-power or the planning economics of the government of the day? Is it conceivable that an Indian will forfeit his right to go abroad because his flowing side-burns or sartorial vagaries offend a high-placed authority's sense of decency ? The point is that liberty can be curtailed only if the grounds listed in the saving sub-articles are directly, specifically, substantially and imminently attracted so that the basic right may not be stultified. Restraints are necessary and validly made by statute, but to paint with an over-broad brush a power to blanket-ban travel abroad is to sweep overly and invade illicitly. 'The law of fear' cannot reign where the proportionate danger is containable. It is a balancing process, not over-weighted one way or the other. Even so, the perspective is firm and fair. Courts must not interfere where the order is not perverse, unreasonable, mala fide or supported by no material. Under our system, court writs cannot run government, for, then, judicial review may tend to be a judicial coup. But 'lawless' law and executive excess must be halted by judge-gower lest the Constitution be subverted by branches deriving credentials from the Constitution. An imperative guideline by which the Court will test the soundness of legislative and executive constraint is, in the language of V. C. Row \[1952\] S.C.R. 597 this :

139\. What characterises the existence and eclipse of the right of exit? 'Breathes there the man with soul so dead' who, if he leaves, will not return to his own 'native land' ? Then, why restrict ? The question, presented so simplistically, may still have overtones of security sensitivity and sovereignty complexity and other internal and external factors, and that is why the case which we are deciding has spread the canvas wide. I must express a pensive reflection, sparked off by submissions at the bar, that, regardless of the 'civil liberty' credentials or otherwise of a particular government and mindless of the finer phraseology of a restrictive legislation, eternal vigilance by the superior judiciary and the enlightened activists who are the catalysts of the community, is the perpetual price of the preservation of every freedom we cherish. For, if unchecked, 'the greater the power, the more dangerous the abuse.' To deny freedom of travel or exit to one untenably is to deny it to any or many likewise, and the right to say 'Aye' or 'nay' to any potential traveller should, therefore, not rest with the minions or masters of government without being gently and benignly censored by constitutionally sanctioned legislative norms if the reality of liberty is not be drowned in the hysteria of the hour or the hubris of power. It is never trite to repeat that where laws end, tyranny begins', and law becomes un-law even if it is legitimated by three legislative readings and one assent, if it is, not in accord with constitutional provisions, beyond abridgement by the two branches of government. In the context of scray expressions like 'security' 'public order', 'public interest' and 'friendly foreign relations', we must warn ourselves that not verbal labels but real values are the governing considerations in the exploration and adjudication of constitutional prescriptions and proscriptions. Governments come, and go, but the fundamental rights of the people cannot be subject to the wishful value-sets of political regimes of the passing day.

155\. The petitioner submitted that the order is without jurisdiction and not 'in the interests of general public' The validity of the order was challenged on various grounds. It was submitted that there was contravention of [Article 14](/doc/367586/) of the Constitution, that principles of natural justice were violated; that no opportunity of hearing as implied in [Section 10(3)](/doc/83644/) of the Act was given and that the with-holding of the reasons for the order under [Section 10(5)](/doc/75497/) is not justified in law. On July 8, 1977 the petitioner prayed for an exparte ad interim order staying the operation of the order of the respondents dated July 2, 1977 and for making the order of stay absolute after hearing the respondents. On behalf of the Union of India, Shri N. K. Ghose, I.F.S., Director (P.V.) Ministry of External Affairs, filed a counter affidavit. It was stated in the counter affidavit that on May 11, 1977, the Minister of External Affairs approved the impounding of the passport of 11 persons and on May 19, 1977 an order was passed by the Minister impounding the passports of 8 persons out of 11 persons that on July 1, 1977 the authorities concerned informed the Ministry of External Affairs that the petitioner and her husband had arrived at Bombay on the after-noon of July 1, 1977 and that information had been received that there was likelihood of the petitioner leaving the country. The authorities contacted the Ministry of External Affairs and Minister after going through the relevant papers approved the impounding of the passport of the petitioner on the evening of July 1, 1977 in the interests of general public under [Section 10(3)(c)](/doc/123270/) of the Passports Act, 1967. On July 2,. 1977 Regional Transport Officer on instructions from the Government of India informed the petitioner about the Central Government's decision to impound her passport in public interest and requested her to surrender her passport. In the counter affidavit various allegations, made in the petition were denied and it was stated that the order was perfectly justified and that the petition is without merits and should be dismissed. The rejoinder affidavit was filed by the petitioner on July 16, 1977.

170\. The restriction of the right to move freely throughout the territory of India and the right to reside and stay in any part of the territory of India is strongly relied upon as indicating that in the absence of such restrictions the. other rights are not confined to the territory of India. The provisions in [Article 19(1)(d)](/doc/1024002/) and (e) i.e. the right to move freely throughout the territory of India and to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India have historical significance. In [A. K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras](/doc/1857950/) \[1950\] S.C.R. 88, Kania C.J., said that in the right "to move freely throughout the territory of India" the emphasis was not on the free movement but on the right to move freely throughout the territory of India. The intention was to avoid any restriction being placed by the States hampering free movement throughout the territory of India. It is a historical fact that there were rivalries between the various States and the imposition of restraint on movement from State to State by some States was not beyond possibility. In the two clauses 19(1)(d) and (e) the right "to move freely throughout the territory of India" and "to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India" the "territory of India" is mentioned with the purpose of preventing the States from imposing any restraint. From the fact that the words "territory of India" are found in these two clauses the contention that the other freedoms are not limited to the territory of India for their operation cannot be accepted. In [Virendra v. The State of Punjab and Anr.](/doc/1475436/) \[1958\] S.C.R. 308, S. R. Das, C. J., who spoke on behalf of the Constitution Bench stated : "The point to be kept in view is that several rights of freedom guaranteed to the citizens by [Article 19(1)](/doc/1142233/) are exercisable by them throughout and in all parts of the territory of India". The view that the rights under [Article 19(1)](/doc/1142233/) is exercisable in the territory of India has not been discussed. Far from [Article 19(1)](/doc/1142233/) expressing any intention expressly or impliedly of extra territorial operation the context would indicate that its application is intended to be only territorial. The right under [Article 19(b)](/doc/1218090/) and (c) to assemble peaceably and without arms and to form associations or unions could not have been intended to have any extraterritorial application as it will not be in accordance with the accepted principles of international law. As the rights under [Articles 19(b)](/doc/1218090/) and (c) cannot be enforced outside India the inference is that no extraterritorial application was intended. So also regarding the rights conferred under [Articles 19(f)](/doc/1218090/) and (g) i.e. to acquire, hold and dispose of property; and to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business, would not have been intended to be applicable outside India.

173\. In vain one looks to the American law to find whether the citizens are granted any right of freedom of speech and expression beyond the territory of the United States. The First Amendment provides for freedom of speech and press along with freedom of religion. Liberty of speech and liberty of press are substantially identical. They are freedom to utter words orally and freedom to write, print and circulate words. But this freedom of expression would be meaningless if people were not permitted to gather in groups to discuss mutual problems and communicate their feelings and opinions to governmental officers. The First Amendment therefore provides that the people have the right to assemble peaceably and petition the government for redress of grievances. The petition for redress can only be confined to the United States of America. In a recent address on Human Rights Warren Christopher, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State reproduced in Shan, October 1977, stated before the American Bar Association in Chicago that the promotion of human rights has become a fundamental tenet of the foreign policy of the Carter Administration. In explaining the conception of human rights and its practice in America the Deputy Secretary stated that the efforts should be directed to the most fundamental and important human rights all of which are internationally recognised in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which the United Nations approved in 1948. While emphasising the three categories of human rights (1) the right to be free from the governmental violation of the integrity of the person; (2) the right to fulfilment of such vital needs as food, shelter, health care and education, and (3) the right to enjoy civil and political liberties,, he stated that the freedom of thought, of religion, of assembly, of speech, of the press, freedom of movement within the outside one's own country; freedom to take part in government, were liberties which American enjoy so fully, and too often take for granted, are under assault in many places. It may be noted that while freedom of movement is referred to as both within and outside one's own country the other rights such as freedom of thought, of religion, of assembly of speech, of press, are not stated to be available outside one's own country. It is thus seen that except the right to movement outside one's own country other rights are not available extra-territorially even in America.

180\. [Article 19](/doc/1218090/) to 22 appear under the title "Right to freedom". [Article 19](/doc/1218090/) confers freedoms on the citizens whereas [Article 20](/doc/655638/) to 22 are not limited to citizens but apply to all persons. [Article 19](/doc/1218090/) does not deal with the right to life which is dealt with under [Article 21.](/doc/1199182/) While [Article 19](/doc/1218090/) provides for freedoms which a citizen is entitled to, [Articles 20](/doc/655638/) to 22 restrain the State from doing certain things. Though the right to life and personal liberty is not dealt with under [Article 19](/doc/1218090/), as it is mentioned in [Article 21](/doc/1199182/) though in a negative form, the right to life and personal liberty is secured and the State can deprive it only according to the procedure established by law. While the rights guaranteed under [Article 19(1)](/doc/1142233/) are subject to restrictions that may be placed by [Articles 19(2)](/doc/493243/) to (6), the right not to be deprived of life and personal liberty is subject to its deprivation by procedure established by law. The scope of the words "personal liberty" was considered by Mukherjea, J. in [Gopalan](/doc/1857950/)'s case (supra.) The learned Judge observed : "[Article 19](/doc/1218090/) gives a list of individual liberties and prescribes in the various clauses the restrictions that may be placed upon them by law so that they may not conflict with the public welfare or general morality. On the other hand, [Articles 20](/doc/655638/)[, 21](/doc/1199182/) and [22](/doc/581566/) are primarily concerned with penal enactments or other law under which personal safety or liberty of persons would be taken away in the interest of society and the set down the limits within which the State control should be exercised the right to the safety of one's life and limbs and to enjoyment of personal liberty, in the sense of freedom from physical restrain and coercion of any sort, are the inherent birth rights of a man. The essence of these rights consists in restraining others from interfering with them and hence they cannot be described in terms of "freedom" to do particular things...." The words "personal liberty" take their colour from the words "deprivation of life".' It means liberty of the person, that is freedom from personal restraint. [Article 21](/doc/1199182/) is one of the Articles along with [Articles 20](/doc/655638/) and [22](/doc/581566/) which deal with restraint on the person. According to Dicey :

193\. [Article 19(1)(f)](/doc/258019/) and [Article 31(2)](/doc/108209556/) are not mutually exclusive and the law providing for acquisition of property for public purpose could be tested for its validity on the ground that it imposes limitation on the right to property which were not reasonable; so tested the provision of the Act transferring undertaking of the named banks and prohibiting practically from carrying banking business violates the guarantee under [Article 19(1)(f)](/doc/258019/) and (g). In dealing with this contention, the court held that [Articles 19(1)(f)](/doc/258019/) and [Article 31(2)](/doc/108209556/) are not mutually exclusive. The court observed that the principle underlying the opinion of the majority in [Gopalan](/doc/1857950/)'s case was extended to the protection of the freedom in respect of property and it was held that [Article 19(1)(f)](/doc/258019/) and [31(2)](/doc/108209556/) were mutually exclusive in their operation and that substantive provisions of law relating to acquisition of property were not liable to be challenged on the ground that it imposes unreasonable restrictions on the right to hold property. After mentioning the two divergent lines of authority, the court held that "the guarantee under [Article 31(1)](/doc/27622490/) and [(2)](/doc/1456610/) arises out of the limitations imposed on the authority of the State, by law, to take over the individual's property. The true character of the limitation of the two provisions is not different. Clause (1) of [Article 19](/doc/1218090/) and Clause (1) and (2) of [Article 31](/doc/354224/) are part of the similar [Article 19(1)(f)](/doc/258019/) enunicating the object specified and [Article 19(1)](/doc/1142233/) and [31](/doc/354224/) deal with the limitation which may be placed by law subject to which the rights may be exercised. Formal compliance with the conditions of [Article 31(2)](/doc/108209556/) is not sufficient to negative protection of guarantee to the rights to property. The validity of law which authorises deprivation of property and the law which authorises compulsory acquisition of the property for a public purpose must be adjudged by the application of the same test. Acquisition must be under the authority of a law and the expression law means a law which is within the competence of the legislature and does not impair the guarantee of the rights in Part III.

> Thus the observation in [Gopalan](/doc/1857950/)'s case extending the principle [laid down in](/doc/1857950/) the majority judgment to freedom in respect of property was reiterated by Das, J. in [Chiranjit Lal Chowduri](/doc/487667/)'s case ([supra) and Subodh Gopal](/doc/973363/)'s case. The principle was given more concrete shape in [State of Bombay v. Bhanjit Munji](/doc/41574/) case wherein it was held that 'if there is no property which can be acquired held or disposed of no restriction can be placed on the exercise of the right to acquire, hold or dispose it of, and as Clause (5) contemplates the placing of reasonable restrictions of the exercise of those rights it must follow that the Article postulates the existence of property over which the rights are to be exercised." This view was accepted in the later cases. [Dabu Barkya Thakur v. State of Bombay](/doc/463201/) and Smt. Sitabati Debi and Anr. v. State of West Bengal \[1967\] 2 S.C.R. 940. The Court proceeded further after referring to some cases to note that. "With the decision in [K. K. Kochuni](/doc/1857950/)'s case there arose two divergent lines of authority (1) "authority of law" in [Article 31(1)](/doc/27622490/) is liable to be tested on the ground that it violates other fundamental rights and freedoms including the right to hold property guaranteed by [Article 19(1)(f)](/doc/258019/) and [(2) "](/doc/1456610/)authority of law" within the meaning of [Article 31(2)](/doc/108209556/) is not liable to be tested on the ground that it impairs the guarantee of [Article 19(1)(f)](/doc/258019/) in so far as it imposes substantive restrictions though it may be tested on the ground of impairment of other guarantees." Later in the decision of [State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ranoiro Shinde](/doc/1963913/) the Supreme Court opined that the validity of law in Clause (2) of [Article 31](/doc/354224/) may be adjudged in the light of [Article 19(1)(f).](/doc/258019/) But the Court [in that case](/doc/1963913/) did not consider the previous catena of authorities which related to the inter-relation between [Article 31(2)](/doc/108209556/) and [Article 19(1)(f).](/doc/258019/)

198\. After expressing its conclusion, the Court proceeded to state that it is found necessary to examine the rationale of the two lines of authority and determine whether there is anything in the Constitution which justifies this apparently inconsistent development of the law. While stating that in its judgment the assumption in [A. K. Gopalan](/doc/1857950/)'s case that certain articles exclusively deal with specific matters and in determining whether there is infringement of the individual's guaranteed rights, the object and the form of State action alone need be considered, and effect of laws on fundamental rights of the individuals in general will be ignored cannot be accepted as correct. To this extent the Court specifically over ruled the view that the; object and form of the State action alone need be considered. It proceeded "We hold the validity "of law" which authorities deprivation of property and "a low" which authorises compulsory acquisition of property for public purpose must be adjudged by the application of the same tests." It will thus be seen that the entire discussion by the Court in [Bank Nationalisation](/doc/1781810/) case related to the interrelation between [Article 31(2)](/doc/108209556/) and [Article 19(1)(f).](/doc/258019/) In dealing with the question the Court has no doubt extracted passages from the judgments of learned Judges in [Gopalan](/doc/1857950/)'s case but proceeded only to consider the extension of the principle underlying the majority judgment to the protection of the freedom in respect of property, particularly, the judgment of Justice Das. After stating; that two views arose after [Kochuni](/doc/1431786/)'s case the Court concerned itself only in determining the rationale of the two lines of authority. The view taken in [Gopalan](/doc/1857950/)'s case that the objection and the form of State action: has to be considered was over ruled and it was laid down that it is the effect and action upon the right of the person that attracts the jurisdiction of the Court to grant relief. It is no doubt true that certain passing observations have been made regarding the liberty of persons, such as at page 576 :

202\. Before proceeding to consider the test of validity of a legislation as [laid down in](/doc/1781810/) Bennet Colomon's case following the [Bank Nationalisation](/doc/1781810/) case the decisions which followed the [Bank Nationalisation](/doc/1781810/) case holding on the erroneous premises that the majority in [Gopalan](/doc/1857950/)'s case held that [Article 22](/doc/581566/) was a self-contained Code, may be shortly referred to. In [S. N. Sarkar v. West Bengal](/doc/770615/) , the Supreme Court held that in [Gopalan](/doc/1857950/)'s case the majority Court held that [Article 22](/doc/581566/) was a self-contained Code and, therefore, the law or preventive detention did not have to satisfy the requirement of [Articles 19](/doc/1218090/)[, 14](/doc/367586/) and [20.](/doc/655638/) In the [Bank Nationalisation](/doc/1781810/) case the aforesaid premise in Gopalan was disapproved and, therefore, it no longer holds the field. [Though the Bank Nationalisation](/doc/1781810/) case dealt with in relation to [Article 19](/doc/1218090/) and [31](/doc/354224/), the basic approach considering the fundamental rights guaranteed in the different provisions of the Constitution adopted in this case held the major premises of the majority in the [Gopalan](/doc/1857950/) case was erroneous. The view taken in this case also suffers from the same infirmities referred to in [Bank Nationalisation](/doc/1781810/) case. Later, in the case of Khundiram v. West Bengali , a Bench of four Judges again erroneously stated that [Gopalan](/doc/1857950/)'s case had taken the view that [Article 22](/doc/581566/) was a complete Code. After referring to [Bank Nationalisation](/doc/1781810/) case and S. N. Sarkar's and to the case of H. Sana v. State of West Bengali , the Court regarded the question as concluded and a final seal put on this controversy and held that in view of the decision, it is not open to any one now to contend that the law of preventive detention which falls in [Article 22](/doc/581566/) does not have to meet the requirement of [Article 14](/doc/367586/) or [Article 19."](/doc/1218090/)

214\. The decisions of the Supreme Court wherein the right of person to travel abroad has been dealt with may be noticed. In [Satwant Singh V. Assistant Passport Officer, Delhi](/doc/1747577/) \[1967\] 2 S.C.R. 525 the Court held that though a passport was not required for leaving, for practical purposes no one can leave or enter into India without a passport. Therefore, a passport is essential for leaving and entering India. The Court held the right to travel is part of personal liberty and a person could not be deprived of it except according to the procedure [laid down by](/doc/1747577/) law. The view taken by the majority was that the expression "personal liberty" in [Article 21](/doc/1199182/) only excludes the ingredients of liberty enshrined in [Article 19](/doc/1218090/) of the Constitution and the exression 'personal liberty' would take in the right to travel abroad. This right to travel abroad is not absolute and is liable to be restricted according to the procedure established by law. The decision has made it clear that "personal liberty" is not one of the rights secured under [Article 19](/doc/1218090/) and, therefore, liable to be restricted by the legislature according to the procedure established by law. The right of an American citizen to travel is recognised. In Kent v. Dulles 357 U.S. page 116, at page 127 (1958), the Court observed that the right to travel is a part of the 'liberty' of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment. "The freedom of movement across the frontiers in either direction, and inside frontiers as well, as a part of our heritage, Travel abroad, like travel within the country. may be as close to the heart of the individual as the choice of what he eats or wears, or reads. Freedom of movement is basic in our scheme of values." In a subsequent decision- Zemel v. Rusk ) 381 U.S. (1) at page 14 the Court sustained against due process attacks the Government's refusal to issue passports for travel to Quba because the refusal was grounded on foreign policy\* considerations affecting all citizens. "The requirements of due process are a function not only of the extent of the governmental restriction imposed, but also of the extent of the necessity for the restriction."

227\. It was submitted on behalf of the state that an order under Sub-clause 10(3)(c) is on the subjective satisfaction of the passport authority and that as the decision is purely administrative in character it cannot be questioned in a court of law except on very limited grounds. Though the courts had taken the view that the principle of natural justice is inapplicable to administrative orders, there is a change in the judicial opinion subsequently. The frontier between judicial or quasi judicial determination on the one hand and an executive or administrative determination on the other has become blurred. The rigid view that principles of natural justice applied only to judicial and quasi judicial acts and not to administrative acts no longer holds the field. The views taken by the courts on this subject are not consistent. While earlier decisions were in favour of administrative convenience and efficiency at the expense of natural justice the recent view is in favour of extending the application of natural justice and the duty to act fairly with a caution that the principle should not be extended to the extreme so as to affect adversely the administrative efficiency. In this connection it is useful to quote the oft-repeated observations of Lord Justice Tucker in Russell v. Duke of Norfolk \[1949\] 1 All E.R. 109, 118 "The requirements of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject matter that is being dealt with, and so forth...but, whatever standard is adopted, one essential is that the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case." In R. v. Gaming Board Ex. p. Benaim \[1970\] 2 Q.B. 417 Lord Denning held that the view that the principle of natural justice applied only to judicial proceedings and not to administrative proceedings has been over-ruled in Ridge v. Baldwin \[1964\] A.C. 40. The guidance that was given to the Gaming Board was that they should follow the principles laid down in the case of immigrants namely that they have no right to come in, but they have a right to be heard. The Court held in construing the words the Board "Shall have regard only" to the matter specified, the Board has a duty to act fairly and it must give the applicant an opportunity of satisfying them of the matter specified in the section. They must let him know what their impressions are so that he can disabuse them. The reference to the cases of immigrants is to the decisions of Chief Justice Parker in Re H. K. (An infant) \[1967\] 2 Q.B. 617, at 630. In cases of immigrants though they had no right to come into the country it was held that they have a right to be heard. These observations apply to the present case and the plea of the petitioner that the authority should act fairly and that they must let her know what their impressions are so that, if possible, she can disabuse them, is sound.

229\. On a consideration of various authorities it is clear that where the decision of the authority entails civil consequence's and the petition is prejudicially affected he must be given an opportunity to be heard and present his case. This Court in [Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board](/doc/1748256/) \[1966\] Supp. [S.C.R. 311 and Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. S. D. Agrawal](/doc/443837/) , has held that a limited judicial scrutiny of the impugned decision on the point of rational and reasonable nexus was open to a court of law. An order passed by an authority based on subjective satisfaction is liable to judicial scrutiny to a limited extent has been [laid down in](/doc/443837/) V.P. Electric Co. v. State of U.P. wherein construing the provisions of [Section 3(2)(e)](/doc/16467/) of the Indian Electricity Act 9 of 1910 as amended by the U.P. Act 30 of 1961, where the language used is. similar to [Section 10(3)(c)](/doc/123270/) of the Passport Act, this Court held that when the Government exercises its power on the ground that it "deems such supply necessary in public interest" if challenged, the Government must make out that exercise of the power was necessary in the public interest. The Court is not intended to sit in appeal over the satisfaction of the Government. If there is prima facie evidence on which a reasonable body of persons may hold that it is in the public interest to supply energy to consumers the requirements of the statute are-fulfilled. "In our judgment, the satisfaction of the Government that the supply is necessary in the public interest is in appropriate cases not excluded from judicial review." The decisions cited are clear authority for the proposition that the order passed under [Section 10(3)(c)](/doc/123270/) is subject to a limited judicial scrutiny. An order under [Section 10(3)(c)](/doc/123270/) though it is held to be an administrative order passed on the subjective satisfaction of the authority cannot escape judicial scrutiny. The Attorney General fairly conceded that an order under [Section 10(3)(c)](/doc/123270/) is subject to a judicial scrutiny and that it can be looked into by the court to the limited extent of satisfying itself whether the order passed has a rational and reasonable nexus to the interests of the general public.