[2026] 3 S.C.R. 103 : 2026 INSC 148 State of Odisha & Ors. v. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School (Special Leave Petition (C) Diary No. 54941 of 2025) 09 February 2026 [Dipankar Datta and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Issue arose as regards the applications for condonation of delay in filing the special leave petition and condonation of delay in re-filing the same. Headnotes† Limitation Act, 1963 – Condonation of delay – Respondent-Managing Committee of the School filed application for release of grant-in-aid – Tribunal allowed the application by directing the State and the Director to release grant-in-aid in favour of the teaching and non-teaching staff of the school – State filed appeal which was time-barred as also not accompanied by the certified copy of the impugned order – For a period of 8 years, the State did not file the certified copy of the impugned order – High Court dismissed the appeal for failure to file the certified copy of the tribunal’s order – Thereafter, the State obtained the certified copy of the tribunal’s order and filed application seeking recall of the order by the High Court, alongwith the application for condonation of delay of 291 days – High Court rejected the application for condonation of delay resulting in the application for recall being dismissed as time-barred – Challenge to:

Held: Condonation of delay cannot be claimed as a matter of right – It is entirely the discretion of the Court whether or not to condone delay – No cause, much less sufficient cause, has been shown for exercise of discretion in favour of the State of Odisha – Nature of explanation in the application for condonation of delay is such that with much ado, the proceedings could be closed – However, since the expression ‘sufficient cause’ employed by the legislature in s.5 is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice and in view of the submission made, the matter was considered in some 104 [2026] 3 S.C.R. Supreme Court Reports depth – State of Odisha utterly lethargic, tardy and indolent not only before the High Court but also before this Court – Notwithstanding that its appeal was dismissed as time-barred by the High Court, this Court was approached by the State of Odisha four months after expiry of the period of limitation – Despite all the latitude shown to a “State”, the cause sought to be shown here by the State of Odisha is not an explanation but a lame excuse – No case for exercise of discretion set up – Applications for condonation of delay in filing the special leave petition and condonation of delay in re-filing the same, rejected, and the special leave petition dismissed as time-barred – Odisha Education Act, 1969. [Paras 12, 13, 20-22] Case Law Cited

Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst Katiji [1987] 2 SCR 387 : (1987) 2 SCC 107; G. Ramegowda v. Land Acquisition Officer [1988] 3 SCR 198 : (1988) 2 SCC 142; Postmaster General v. Living Media India Limited [2012] 1 SCR 1045 : (2012) 3 SCC 563; University of Delhi v. Union of India [2019] 16 SCR 1259 : (2020) 13 SCC 745; Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Collector(LA) [2024] 4 SCR 241 : (2024) 12 SCC 336; Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India [2023] 13 SCR 743 : (2023) 10 SCC 531; Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay v. Amateur Riders Club, Bombay (1994) Supp. 2 SCC 603 – referred to. List of Acts Odisha Education Act, 1969; Limitation Act, 1963. List of Keywords Condonation of delay in filing the special leave petition; Condonation of delay in re-filing; Release of grant-in-aid; Certified copy of the order; Recall of the order by High Court; Expression ‘sufficient cause’. Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition (C) Diary No. 54941 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 21.02.2025 and 26.04.2023 of the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack in IA No. 126 of 2025 in FAO No. 582 of 2015, respectively [2026] 3 S.C.R. 105 State of Odisha & Ors. v. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Petitioner(s): Ms. Sanjana Saddy, Ms. Shailja Singh. Advs. for the Respondent(s): Nagendra Kasana, Mahendra Kumar Sahoo, A Deb Kumar, Mrs. A Deepa, Mrs. Neeta Kasana, Mrs. Anjana Kasana, Binod Ch Sabat.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Order 1. Respondent-Managing Committee of Namatara Girls’ High School1 had approached the State Education Tribunal2, Bhubaneswar, Odisha with an application3 under Section 24B of the Odisha Education Act, 1969 for release of grant-in-aid. 2. By an order dated 30th December, 2013, the Tribunal allowed the application by directing the State of Odisha and the Director of Secondary Education, Odisha to release grant-in-aid in favour of the teaching and non-teaching staff of the school in the manner as directed. 3. The order dated 30th December, 2013 was carried in appeal4 by the State of Odisha before the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack5 on 16th October, 2015. The appeal was time-barred. Not only that, the appeal was not accompanied by the certified copy of the impugned order. Since presentation of the appeal, for a period of 8 years to be precise, the State of Odisha had not filed the certified copy of the impugned order. By an order dated 26th April, 2023, the High Court dismissed the appeal citing failure to file the certified copy of the Tribunal’s order as the reason. 4. Stung by such order, the State of Odisha woke up from its slumber. It obtained the certified copy of the Tribunal’s order dated 30th December, 2013 on 13th February, 2024. A week later, the State of 1 school 2 Tribunal 3 G.I.A. Case No.623 of 2011 4 FAO No. 582 of 2015 5 High Court 106 [2026] 3 S.C.R. Supreme Court Reports

Odisha filed an application6 seeking recall of the order dated 26th April, 2023. Together with such application was filed an application for condonation of delay7 seeking condonation of 291 days’ delay. 5. The application for condonation of delay was taken up for consideration by the High Court on 21st February, 2025. Having noted that the certified copy of the impugned order was filed only on 13th February, 2024, the High Court correctly observed that the appeal filed on 16th October, 2015 was inherently defective and the delay in presenting the appeal is in excess of 11 years. Considering the aforesaid position, the application for condonation of delay was rejected resulting in the application for recall being dismissed as time-barred. 6. The order of the High Court dated 21st February, 2025 is challenged by the State of Odisha in this special leave petition.

7. It is noted that there is a delay of 123 days in filing the special leave petition and a further delay of 96 days in re-filing the same after curing defects. In the application for condonation of delay8, the State of Odisha seeks to explain the delay by pleading as follows: “3. It is submitted that the Petitioner on receipt of order of the Hon’ble High Court vide order dated 26.04.2023 and order dated 21.02.2025 in F.A.O. No. 582 of 2015 and in I.A. No. 126 of 2025 in F.A.O. No. 582 of 2015 the petitioner considered the matter and sent it to the law department opined that it is a fit case for filing the present SLP against the impugned judgements dated 26.04.2023 and order dated 21.02.2025. 4. That the delay in filing the appeal was on account of procedural delay in obtaining approval from the higher authority. The delay caused is not deliberate and intentional.” 8. Ms. Sanjana Saddy, learned counsel appearing for the State of Odisha, submits that the delay in presenting the special leave petition is not deliberate and having regard to the long line of decisions of 6 I.A. No.165 of 2024 7 I.A. No.126 of 2025 8 I.A No.34867 of 2026 [2026] 3 S.C.R. 107 State of Odisha & Ors. v.

Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School this Court advocating a liberal approach when an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution is the petitioner seeking condonation of delay, she urges that the delay be condoned and this Court may direct the High Court to examine the challenge to the order dated 30th December, 2013 of the Tribunal on merits, upon revival of the appeal. 9. We had, upon hearing Ms. Sanjana, started dictating an order of dismissal of the special leave petition. It was then that she prayed for withdrawal of the special leave petition. We had so recorded. However, when we were about to rise for the day, Ms. Sanjana prayed for recall of the order of dismissal of the special leave petition as withdrawn; she also submitted, on instructions, that the State of Odisha would invite a detailed order with reasons in support of dismissal of the special leave petition. 10. We recalled the order dismissing the special leave petition as withdrawn and, instead, dismissed the same as time-barred considering paragraphs 3 and 4 of the application for condonation of delay, excerpted above, with the observation that reasons would follow. 11. We now proceed to assign our reasons. 12. No cause, much less sufficient cause, has been shown for exercise of discretion in favour of the State of Odisha. The nature of explanation in the application for condonation of delay is such that with much ado, the proceedings could be closed.

13. However, since there is a long line of decisions of this Court propounding the law that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ employed by the legislature in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice and in view of the submission of Ms. Sanjana, we have considered it appropriate to consider the matter in some depth. 14. Almost four decades back, in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst Katiji9, a coordinate Bench noting that the justifiably liberal approach which this Court has been adopting in matters 9 (1987) 2 SCC 107 108 [2026] 3 S.C.R. Supreme Court Reports instituted before it is not being followed by the courts lower in the hierarchy, mandated that a justice oriented approach is indeed called for when a ‘State’ seeks condonation of delay as distinguished from ‘a private party’. 15. Close on the heels of Katiji (supra), Hon’ble Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah speaking for the coordinate Bench in G. Ramegowda v. Land Acquisition Officer10 had referred to Katiji (supra) in paragraph 14 and quoted the following passage therefrom: “When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay …

It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.” Immediately thereafter, in paragraphs 15 to 17, it was held as under: 15. In litigations to which Government is a party there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals. 16. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it. 10 (1988) 2 SCC 142 [2026] 3 S.C.R. 109 State of Odisha & Ors. v. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School

17. Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes “sufficient cause” for purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the government. Governmental decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have “a little play at the joints”. Due recognition of these limitations on governmental functioning — of course, within reasonable limits — is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision-making process. In the opinion of the High Court, the conduct of the law officers of the Government placed the Government in a predicament and that it was one of those cases where the mala fides of the officers should not be imputed to Government. It relied upon and trusted its law officers. …

16. Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda (supra) were consistently followed by this Court until adoption of a different and seemingly strict approach while dealing with applications for condonation of delay during the last decade and a half became discernible starting with the decision in Postmaster General v. Living Media India Limited11, where a delay of 427 days in filing the relevant special leave petition was not condoned. University of Delhi v. Union of India12 is another decision (of a three-Judge Bench of this Court) where delay of 916 days was not condoned. While upholding the decision of the relevant high court under challenge refusing to condone the delay of 5659 days in presentation of an appeal under Section 54 of the 11 (2012) 3 SCC 563 12 (2020) 13 SCC 745 110 [2026] 3 S.C.R. Supreme Court Reports Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by the heirs of a deceased landowner, a coordinate Bench in Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Collector(LA)13 very recently reiterated that the law of limitation is founded on public policy, the object is that a legal remedy is put to an end so that no litigation remains pending for an indefinite period. It was also held, departing from the earlier view, that the merits of the case cannot be considered at the stage of considering the application for condonation of delay.

17. Indeed, one of us [Dipankar Datta] in Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India14 authoring the judgment for a coordinate Bench adopted the view taken in Katiji (supra), Ramegowda (supra) and a host of other decisions following the same while not interfering with an order of condonation of delay passed by the relevant high court. However, it was observed that a distinction ought to be drawn between an ‘explanation’ and an ‘excuse’ that is proffered as cause for condonation of delay. It was also emphasized that a different approach has to be adopted while this Court is considering an application for condonation of delay in presentation of an appeal/application and when it sits in appeal over a discretionary order of the high court granting the prayer for condonation of delay. In the case of the former, whether to condone or not would be the only question whereas in the latter, whether there has been proper exercise of discretion in favour of grant of the prayer for condonation has to be examined.

18. However, what perhaps remained unnoticed in any of the decisions post Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda (supra) adopting a liberal approach is the exasperation and consequent lament expressed by none other than Hon’ble M.N. Venkatachaliah, CJI. in course of authoring a brief order in Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay v. Amateur Riders Club, Bombay15 and admonishing officers of the “revenue” in not acting with promptitude. This order was made within six years of the decision in Ramegowda (supra). We can do no better than quoting the same in its entirety hereunder: 1. We have heard Shri S.C. Manchanda, learned senior counsel for the Revenue. 13 (2024) 12 SCC 336 14 (2023) 10 SCC 531 15 (1994) Supp. 2 SCC 603 [2026] 3 S.C.R. 111 State of Odisha & Ors. v. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School 2. This special leave petition filed on November 16, 1993 is delayed by 264 days. For quite some time in the past, this Court has been making observations as to the grave prejudice caused to public interest by appeals brought on behalf of the Government being lost on the point of limitation. Such observations have been made for over a few years in the past. But there seems to be no conspicuous improvement as is apparent in the present petition which is filed in November 1993. The explanation for the delay, had better be set out in petitioner’s own words:

“(g) The Advocate-on-Record got the special leave petition drafted from the drafting Advocate and sent the same for approval to the Board on June 24, 1993 along with the case file. (h) The Board returned the case file to the Advocate-on-Record on July 9, 1993 who re-sent the same to the Board on September 20, 1993 requesting that draft SLP was not approved by the Board. The Board after approving the draft SLP sent this file to CAS on October 1, 1993.”

3. This explanation is incapable of furnishing a judicially acceptable ground for condonation of delay. After the earlier observations of this Court made in several cases in the past, we hoped that the matters might improve. There seems to be no visible support for this optimism. There is a point beyond which even the courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant is Government which is itself under the shackles of bureaucratic indifference. Having regard to the law of limitation which binds everybody, we cannot find any way of granting relief. It is true that Government should not be treated as any other private litigant as, indeed, in the case of the former the decisions to present and prosecute appeals are not individual but are institutional decisions necessarily bogged down by the proverbial red-tape. But there are limits to this also. Even with all this latitude, the explanation offered for the delay in this case merely serves to aggravate the attitude of indifference of the Revenue in protecting its common interests. The affidavit is again one of the stereotyped affidavits making it susceptible to the criticism that the Revenue does not seem to attach 112 [2026] 3 S.C.R. Supreme Court Reports any importance to the need for promptitude even where it affects its own interest. 4. The application for condonation of delay is, accordingly, dismissed. The special leave petition is, therefore, dismissed as barred by time. (emphasis ours)

19. Reading Ramegowda (supra) and Amateur Riders (supra), one after the other, leaves none in doubt that it did not take much time for this Court to lose hope. It is absolutely clear that the law was laid down in Ramegowda (supra), following Katiji (supra), with much optimism that matters would improve. Their Lordships, however, found no visible support for such optimism and the Court’s patience having been tested to the extreme limit, held that there is a point beyond which even the courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant labouring under the shackles of bureaucratic indifference is the Government. 20. We have found the State of Odisha to be utterly lethargic, tardy and indolent not only before the High Court but also before this Court. Notwithstanding that its appeal was dismissed as time-barred by the High Court, this Court has been approached by the State of Odisha four months after expiry of the period of limitation. 21. Condonation of delay cannot be claimed as a matter of right. It is entirely the discretion of the Court whether or not to condone delay. Despite all the latitude that is shown to a “State”, we are of the clear opinion that the cause sought to be shown here by the State of Odisha is not an explanation but a lame excuse. No case for exercise of discretion has been set up.

22. The applications for condonation of delay in filing the special leave petition and condonation of delay in re-filing the same, thus, stand rejected, with the result that the special leave petition stands dismissed as time-barred. Result of the case: Special Leave Petition dismissed. †Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain

[2026] 3 S.C.R. 103 : 2026 INSC 148 State of Odisha & Ors. v. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School (Special Leave Petition (C) Diary No. 54941 of 2025) 09 February 2026 [Dipankar Datta and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Issue arose as regards the applications for condonation of delay in filing the special leave petition and condonation of delay in re-filing the same. Headnotes† Limitation Act, 1963 – Condonation of delay – Respondent-Managing Committee of the School filed application for release of grant-in-aid – Tribunal allowed the application by directing the State and the Director to release grant-in-aid in favour of the teaching and non-teaching staff of the school – State filed appeal which was time-barred as also not accompanied by the certified copy of the impugned order – For a period of 8 years, the State did not file the certified copy of the impugned order – High Court dismissed the appeal for failure to file the certified copy of the tribunal’s order – Thereafter, the State obtained the certified copy of the tribunal’s order and filed application seeking recall of the order by the High Court, alongwith the application for condonation of delay of 291 days – High Court rejected the application for condonation of delay resulting in the application for recall being dismissed as time-barred – Challenge to:

Held: Condonation of delay cannot be claimed as a matter of right – It is entirely the discretion of the Court whether or not to condone delay – No cause, much less sufficient cause, has been shown for exercise of discretion in favour of the State of Odisha – Nature of explanation in the application for condonation of delay is such that with much ado, the proceedings could be closed – However, since the expression ‘sufficient cause’ employed by the legislature in s.5 is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice and in view of the submission made, the matter was considered in some 104 [2026] 3 S.C.R. Supreme Court Reports depth – State of Odisha utterly lethargic, tardy and indolent not only before the High Court but also before this Court – Notwithstanding that its appeal was dismissed as time-barred by the High Court, this Court was approached by the State of Odisha four months after expiry of the period of limitation – Despite all the latitude shown to a “State”, the cause sought to be shown here by the State of Odisha is not an explanation but a lame excuse – No case for exercise of discretion set up – Applications for condonation of delay in filing the special leave petition and condonation of delay in re-filing the same, rejected, and the special leave petition dismissed as time-barred – Odisha Education Act, 1969. [Paras 12, 13, 20-22] Case Law Cited

Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst Katiji [1987] 2 SCR 387 : (1987) 2 SCC 107; G. Ramegowda v. Land Acquisition Officer [1988] 3 SCR 198 : (1988) 2 SCC 142; Postmaster General v. Living Media India Limited [2012] 1 SCR 1045 : (2012) 3 SCC 563; University of Delhi v. Union of India [2019] 16 SCR 1259 : (2020) 13 SCC 745; Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Collector(LA) [2024] 4 SCR 241 : (2024) 12 SCC 336; Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India [2023] 13 SCR 743 : (2023) 10 SCC 531; Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay v. Amateur Riders Club, Bombay (1994) Supp. 2 SCC 603 – referred to. List of Acts Odisha Education Act, 1969; Limitation Act, 1963. List of Keywords Condonation of delay in filing the special leave petition; Condonation of delay in re-filing; Release of grant-in-aid; Certified copy of the order; Recall of the order by High Court; Expression ‘sufficient cause’. Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition (C) Diary No. 54941 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 21.02.2025 and 26.04.2023 of the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack in IA No. 126 of 2025 in FAO No. 582 of 2015, respectively [2026] 3 S.C.R. 105 State of Odisha & Ors. v. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Petitioner(s): Ms. Sanjana Saddy, Ms. Shailja Singh. Advs. for the Respondent(s): Nagendra Kasana, Mahendra Kumar Sahoo, A Deb Kumar, Mrs. A Deepa, Mrs. Neeta Kasana, Mrs. Anjana Kasana, Binod Ch Sabat.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Order 1. Respondent-Managing Committee of Namatara Girls’ High School1 had approached the State Education Tribunal2, Bhubaneswar, Odisha with an application3 under Section 24B of the Odisha Education Act, 1969 for release of grant-in-aid. 2. By an order dated 30th December, 2013, the Tribunal allowed the application by directing the State of Odisha and the Director of Secondary Education, Odisha to release grant-in-aid in favour of the teaching and non-teaching staff of the school in the manner as directed. 3. The order dated 30th December, 2013 was carried in appeal4 by the State of Odisha before the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack5 on 16th October, 2015. The appeal was time-barred. Not only that, the appeal was not accompanied by the certified copy of the impugned order. Since presentation of the appeal, for a period of 8 years to be precise, the State of Odisha had not filed the certified copy of the impugned order. By an order dated 26th April, 2023, the High Court dismissed the appeal citing failure to file the certified copy of the Tribunal’s order as the reason. 4. Stung by such order, the State of Odisha woke up from its slumber. It obtained the certified copy of the Tribunal’s order dated 30th December, 2013 on 13th February, 2024. A week later, the State of 1 school 2 Tribunal 3 G.I.A. Case No.623 of 2011 4 FAO No. 582 of 2015 5 High Court 106 [2026] 3 S.C.R. Supreme Court Reports

Odisha filed an application6 seeking recall of the order dated 26th April, 2023. Together with such application was filed an application for condonation of delay7 seeking condonation of 291 days’ delay. 5. The application for condonation of delay was taken up for consideration by the High Court on 21st February, 2025. Having noted that the certified copy of the impugned order was filed only on 13th February, 2024, the High Court correctly observed that the appeal filed on 16th October, 2015 was inherently defective and the delay in presenting the appeal is in excess of 11 years. Considering the aforesaid position, the application for condonation of delay was rejected resulting in the application for recall being dismissed as time-barred. 6. The order of the High Court dated 21st February, 2025 is challenged by the State of Odisha in this special leave petition.

7. It is noted that there is a delay of 123 days in filing the special leave petition and a further delay of 96 days in re-filing the same after curing defects. In the application for condonation of delay8, the State of Odisha seeks to explain the delay by pleading as follows: “3. It is submitted that the Petitioner on receipt of order of the Hon’ble High Court vide order dated 26.04.2023 and order dated 21.02.2025 in F.A.O. No. 582 of 2015 and in I.A. No. 126 of 2025 in F.A.O. No. 582 of 2015 the petitioner considered the matter and sent it to the law department opined that it is a fit case for filing the present SLP against the impugned judgements dated 26.04.2023 and order dated 21.02.2025. 4. That the delay in filing the appeal was on account of procedural delay in obtaining approval from the higher authority. The delay caused is not deliberate and intentional.” 8. Ms. Sanjana Saddy, learned counsel appearing for the State of Odisha, submits that the delay in presenting the special leave petition is not deliberate and having regard to the long line of decisions of 6 I.A. No.165 of 2024 7 I.A. No.126 of 2025 8 I.A No.34867 of 2026 [2026] 3 S.C.R. 107 State of Odisha & Ors. v.

Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School this Court advocating a liberal approach when an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution is the petitioner seeking condonation of delay, she urges that the delay be condoned and this Court may direct the High Court to examine the challenge to the order dated 30th December, 2013 of the Tribunal on merits, upon revival of the appeal. 9. We had, upon hearing Ms. Sanjana, started dictating an order of dismissal of the special leave petition. It was then that she prayed for withdrawal of the special leave petition. We had so recorded. However, when we were about to rise for the day, Ms. Sanjana prayed for recall of the order of dismissal of the special leave petition as withdrawn; she also submitted, on instructions, that the State of Odisha would invite a detailed order with reasons in support of dismissal of the special leave petition. 10. We recalled the order dismissing the special leave petition as withdrawn and, instead, dismissed the same as time-barred considering paragraphs 3 and 4 of the application for condonation of delay, excerpted above, with the observation that reasons would follow. 11. We now proceed to assign our reasons. 12. No cause, much less sufficient cause, has been shown for exercise of discretion in favour of the State of Odisha. The nature of explanation in the application for condonation of delay is such that with much ado, the proceedings could be closed.

13. However, since there is a long line of decisions of this Court propounding the law that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ employed by the legislature in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice and in view of the submission of Ms. Sanjana, we have considered it appropriate to consider the matter in some depth. 14. Almost four decades back, in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst Katiji9, a coordinate Bench noting that the justifiably liberal approach which this Court has been adopting in matters 9 (1987) 2 SCC 107 108 [2026] 3 S.C.R. Supreme Court Reports instituted before it is not being followed by the courts lower in the hierarchy, mandated that a justice oriented approach is indeed called for when a ‘State’ seeks condonation of delay as distinguished from ‘a private party’. 15. Close on the heels of Katiji (supra), Hon’ble Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah speaking for the coordinate Bench in G. Ramegowda v. Land Acquisition Officer10 had referred to Katiji (supra) in paragraph 14 and quoted the following passage therefrom: “When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay …

It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.” Immediately thereafter, in paragraphs 15 to 17, it was held as under: 15. In litigations to which Government is a party there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals. 16. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it. 10 (1988) 2 SCC 142 [2026] 3 S.C.R. 109 State of Odisha & Ors. v. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School

17. Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes “sufficient cause” for purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the government. Governmental decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have “a little play at the joints”. Due recognition of these limitations on governmental functioning — of course, within reasonable limits — is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision-making process. In the opinion of the High Court, the conduct of the law officers of the Government placed the Government in a predicament and that it was one of those cases where the mala fides of the officers should not be imputed to Government. It relied upon and trusted its law officers. …

16. Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda (supra) were consistently followed by this Court until adoption of a different and seemingly strict approach while dealing with applications for condonation of delay during the last decade and a half became discernible starting with the decision in Postmaster General v. Living Media India Limited11, where a delay of 427 days in filing the relevant special leave petition was not condoned. University of Delhi v. Union of India12 is another decision (of a three-Judge Bench of this Court) where delay of 916 days was not condoned. While upholding the decision of the relevant high court under challenge refusing to condone the delay of 5659 days in presentation of an appeal under Section 54 of the 11 (2012) 3 SCC 563 12 (2020) 13 SCC 745 110 [2026] 3 S.C.R. Supreme Court Reports Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by the heirs of a deceased landowner, a coordinate Bench in Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Collector(LA)13 very recently reiterated that the law of limitation is founded on public policy, the object is that a legal remedy is put to an end so that no litigation remains pending for an indefinite period. It was also held, departing from the earlier view, that the merits of the case cannot be considered at the stage of considering the application for condonation of delay.

17. Indeed, one of us [Dipankar Datta] in Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India14 authoring the judgment for a coordinate Bench adopted the view taken in Katiji (supra), Ramegowda (supra) and a host of other decisions following the same while not interfering with an order of condonation of delay passed by the relevant high court. However, it was observed that a distinction ought to be drawn between an ‘explanation’ and an ‘excuse’ that is proffered as cause for condonation of delay. It was also emphasized that a different approach has to be adopted while this Court is considering an application for condonation of delay in presentation of an appeal/application and when it sits in appeal over a discretionary order of the high court granting the prayer for condonation of delay. In the case of the former, whether to condone or not would be the only question whereas in the latter, whether there has been proper exercise of discretion in favour of grant of the prayer for condonation has to be examined.

18. However, what perhaps remained unnoticed in any of the decisions post Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda (supra) adopting a liberal approach is the exasperation and consequent lament expressed by none other than Hon’ble M.N. Venkatachaliah, CJI. in course of authoring a brief order in Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay v. Amateur Riders Club, Bombay15 and admonishing officers of the “revenue” in not acting with promptitude. This order was made within six years of the decision in Ramegowda (supra). We can do no better than quoting the same in its entirety hereunder: 1. We have heard Shri S.C. Manchanda, learned senior counsel for the Revenue. 13 (2024) 12 SCC 336 14 (2023) 10 SCC 531 15 (1994) Supp. 2 SCC 603 [2026] 3 S.C.R. 111 State of Odisha & Ors. v. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School 2. This special leave petition filed on November 16, 1993 is delayed by 264 days. For quite some time in the past, this Court has been making observations as to the grave prejudice caused to public interest by appeals brought on behalf of the Government being lost on the point of limitation. Such observations have been made for over a few years in the past. But there seems to be no conspicuous improvement as is apparent in the present petition which is filed in November 1993. The explanation for the delay, had better be set out in petitioner’s own words:

“(g) The Advocate-on-Record got the special leave petition drafted from the drafting Advocate and sent the same for approval to the Board on June 24, 1993 along with the case file. (h) The Board returned the case file to the Advocate-on-Record on July 9, 1993 who re-sent the same to the Board on September 20, 1993 requesting that draft SLP was not approved by the Board. The Board after approving the draft SLP sent this file to CAS on October 1, 1993.”

3. This explanation is incapable of furnishing a judicially acceptable ground for condonation of delay. After the earlier observations of this Court made in several cases in the past, we hoped that the matters might improve. There seems to be no visible support for this optimism. There is a point beyond which even the courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant is Government which is itself under the shackles of bureaucratic indifference. Having regard to the law of limitation which binds everybody, we cannot find any way of granting relief. It is true that Government should not be treated as any other private litigant as, indeed, in the case of the former the decisions to present and prosecute appeals are not individual but are institutional decisions necessarily bogged down by the proverbial red-tape. But there are limits to this also. Even with all this latitude, the explanation offered for the delay in this case merely serves to aggravate the attitude of indifference of the Revenue in protecting its common interests. The affidavit is again one of the stereotyped affidavits making it susceptible to the criticism that the Revenue does not seem to attach 112 [2026] 3 S.C.R. Supreme Court Reports any importance to the need for promptitude even where it affects its own interest. 4. The application for condonation of delay is, accordingly, dismissed. The special leave petition is, therefore, dismissed as barred by time. (emphasis ours)

19. Reading Ramegowda (supra) and Amateur Riders (supra), one after the other, leaves none in doubt that it did not take much time for this Court to lose hope. It is absolutely clear that the law was laid down in Ramegowda (supra), following Katiji (supra), with much optimism that matters would improve. Their Lordships, however, found no visible support for such optimism and the Court’s patience having been tested to the extreme limit, held that there is a point beyond which even the courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant labouring under the shackles of bureaucratic indifference is the Government. 20. We have found the State of Odisha to be utterly lethargic, tardy and indolent not only before the High Court but also before this Court. Notwithstanding that its appeal was dismissed as time-barred by the High Court, this Court has been approached by the State of Odisha four months after expiry of the period of limitation. 21. Condonation of delay cannot be claimed as a matter of right. It is entirely the discretion of the Court whether or not to condone delay. Despite all the latitude that is shown to a “State”, we are of the clear opinion that the cause sought to be shown here by the State of Odisha is not an explanation but a lame excuse. No case for exercise of discretion has been set up.

22. The applications for condonation of delay in filing the special leave petition and condonation of delay in re-filing the same, thus, stand rejected, with the result that the special leave petition stands dismissed as time-barred. Result of the case: Special Leave Petition dismissed. †Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain