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The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. | Judgment | Law on Tips

Supreme Court of India

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

2025 INSC 481 · [2025] 4 S.C.R. 985

Decision date: 2025-04-08
Text availability: Full text
Judges: J. B. Pardiwala

Source: Indian Supreme Court Judgments, AWS Open Data (CC BY 4.0)

Case summary

a. What courses of action are available to the Governor in exercise of his powers under Article 200 of the Constitution. b. Whether the Governor can reserve a Bill for the consideration of the President when it is presented to him for assent after being reconsidered in accordance with the first proviso to Article 200, more particularly, when he had not reserved it for the consideration of the President in the first instance. c. Whether there is an express constitutionally prescribed time limit within which the Governor is required to act in the exercise of his powers under Article 200 of the Constitution. d. Whether the Governor in the exercise of his powers under Article 200 of the Constitution can only act in accordance with the aid and advice tendered to him by the State Council of Ministers or whether he has discretion in discharge of his functions under the provision. e. Whether the exercise of discretion by the Governor in discharge of his functions under Article 200 of the Constitution could be said to be subject to judicial review? If yes, what are the parameters for such judicial review. f. What is the manner in which the President under Article 201 of the Constitution is required to act once a Bill has been reserved for his consideration by the Governor under Article 200 of the Constitution. * Author 986 [2025] 4 S.C.R. Supreme Court Reports

Connected provisions and cases

No further provision or case links are recorded.

Judgment text

[2025] 4 S.C.R. 985 : 2025 INSC 481 The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. (Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1239 of 2023) 08 April 2025 [J.B. Pardiwala* and R. Mahadevan, JJ.] Issue for Consideration a. What courses of action are available to the Governor in exercise of his powers under Article 200 of the Constitution. b. Whether the Governor can reserve a Bill for the consideration of the President when it is presented to him for assent after being reconsidered in accordance with the first proviso to Article 200, more particularly, when he had not reserved it for the consideration of the President in the first instance. c. Whether there is an express constitutionally prescribed time limit within which the Governor is required to act in the exercise of his powers under Article 200 of the Constitution. d. Whether the Governor in the exercise of his powers under Article 200 of the Constitution can only act in accordance with the aid and advice tendered to him by the State Council of Ministers or whether he has discretion in discharge of his functions under the provision. e. Whether the exercise of discretion by the Governor in discharge of his functions under Article 200 of the Constitution could be said to be subject to judicial review? If yes, what are the parameters for such judicial review.

f. What is the manner in which the President under Article 201 of the Constitution is required to act once a Bill has been reserved for his consideration by the Governor under Article 200 of the Constitution. * Author 986 [2025] 4 S.C.R. Supreme Court Reports Headnotes† Constitution of India – Article 200 – The Governor has three enumerated options when a bill is presented to him under Article 200 – Governor can either assent, withhold or reserve the bill for consideration of the President – Pocket veto is not available to the Governor while exercising powers under Article 200 – The Governor cannot keep the bill with him without deciding on the assent:

Supreme Court of India

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

2025 INSC 481 · [2025] 4 S.C.R. 985

Decision date: 2025-04-08
Text availability: Full text
Judges: J. B. Pardiwala

Source: Indian Supreme Court Judgments, AWS Open Data (CC BY 4.0)

Case summary

Connected provisions and cases

No further provision or case links are recorded.

Judgment text

Held: There are only three courses of action available to the Governor to choose from when a bill is presented to him for assent under Article 200 – The first proviso is not an independent fourth course of action but intrinsically attached to the option of withholding of assent – In other words, the first proviso is clarificatory and only elaborates the procedure to be followed in case the option of withholding of assent is invoked by the Governor – The use of the expression “shall” in the substantive part of Article 200 read with the expression “as soon as possible” used in the first proviso indicates that there is no pocket veto available to the Governor while he is exercising the powers under Article 200 – Inaction on part of the Governor to take a decision when a bill is presented to him under Article 200 is grossly violative of the constitutional scheme of expediency which permeates the provision – The Governor, in exercise of his powers under Article 200, also does not possess any absolute veto – He is mandated to take a decision from among the three options that are provided in the substantive part of the Article 200 – In case of withholding of assent, the Governor is bound to follow the procedure prescribed under the first proviso and assent to the bill if it is ultimately presented to him for assent after being repassed by the State legislature – The Governor may also reserve certain bills for the consideration of the President – However, in no case has the Governor been conferred with the power to veto a bill which is presented to him – He is envisaged as an intermediary stop in the journey of the bill towards becoming an Act – When a bill comes to the Governor, he may forthwith assent to it, or postpone the grant of assent by exercising the option of withholding of assent but only for so long till the bill comes back to him after reconsideration, or he may forward the bill to the President whereupon the procedure prescribed under Article 201 is to be followed – Thus, in none of these cases can the Governor permanently keep a bill with him without according assent to it, nor can he declare a simpliciter withholding of assent thereby killing the bill. [Paras 194-198] [2025] 4 S.C.R. 987

180. The crux of the controversy as regards whether the first proviso provides an independent course of action to the Governor lies in the use of the expression “in which case the Bill falls through unless the procedure indicated in the first proviso is followed”. However, what is interesting to note is that this expression did not come to be used for the first time in Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary (supra). Much prior to the said decision, Justice S.R. Das (as his lordship then was), in a concurring opinion in State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga reported in (1952) 1 SCC 528 observed as follows: “235. [...] The procedure to be followed after a Bill is passed by the State Assembly is laid down in Article 200. Under that article the Governor can do one of three things, namely, he may declare that he assents to it, in which case the Bill becomes a law, or he may declare that he withholds assent therefrom, in which case the Bill falls through unless the procedure indicated in the proviso is followed, or he may declare that he reserves the Bill for the consideration of the President, in which case the President will adopt the procedure laid down in Article 201. Under that article the President shall declare either that he assents to the Bill in which case the Bill will become law or that he withholds assent therefrom, in which case the Bill falls through unless the procedure indicated in the proviso is followed. Thus it is clear that a Bill passed by a State Assembly may become a law if the Governor gives his assent to it or if, having been reserved by the Governor for the consideration of the President, it is assented to by the President. In the latter event happening, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners will require that what has become a law by the assent of the President will, in order to be effective, have to be again reserved for the consideration of the President a curious conclusion I should be loath to reach unless I am compelled to do so. Article 200 does not contemplate a second reservation by the Governor. [...]” (Emphasis supplied)

194. There is one another way of looking at Article 200. The procedure, as prescribed under the scheme of the provision, involves and envisages the actual motion of a bill from one constitutional authority to another. The Article starts with the requirement of the bill having to be mandatorily presented to the Governor after it has been passed by the State legislature. Thereafter, there is an obligation on the Governor to make a choice from one of the three options provided in the substantive part of the Article and also declare such a decision. Here, if assent is declared, then the bill becomes an Act and the Government may thereafter take steps to notify the same in the official Gazette. If the Governor declares that bill is being reserved for consideration of the President as per the second proviso or otherwise, then the bill travels from the Governor to the President, whereupon Article 201 comes into play. The mechanism provided in the first proviso also envisages the movement of the bill from the Governor to the State legislature and then back to the Governor upon being passed again. The expression “as soon as possible” appearing in the first proviso infuses a sense of urgency and expediency in the mechanism of returning of bills by the Governor. It goes without saying that the scheme of Article 200 is characterized by the movement of the bill from one constitutional authority to another and that too with a sense of expediency. It is trite to say that Article 200 occupies an important role of giving the bills passed by the State legislature the authority of an Act. Without the procedure envisaged under Article 200, the bills remain mere pieces of paper, skeletons without any flesh or lifeblood flowing through their veins, mere documentation of the aspirations of the people without any possibility of bringing them to fruition. The only way by which the option of withholding of assent provided in the substantive part of Article 200 can be reconciled with the scheme permeating the remainder of the provision is by reading it in conjunction with the first proviso. It is only when the withholding of assent is tempered with the requirement of following the procedure prescribed in the first proviso that the constitutional object of ensuring that the law-making machinery at the State level keeps on running unhindered can be fulfilled.

to the procedure prescribed under Articles 200 and 201 respectively, the Court noted that both the Articles do not prescribe a time-limit within which the Governor or President are required to come to a decision on the bill presented to him unlike other provisions in the Constitution where it was felt necessary and expedient to prescribe a time-limit such as Articles 197(1)(b) and (2)(b) respectively. This, in the opinion of the Court, necessarily meant that the omission in prescribing a time-limit within which the Governor or the President should reach a decision under Articles 200 and 201 respectively suggests that the framers of the Constitution knew that a bill pending the assent of the Governor or the President does not stand the risk of getting lapsed on the dissolution of the Assembly. Any other contrary view would lead to a chilling effect whereby a fair number of bills which may have been passed by the Assembly during the last months of its existence, may be exposed to the risk of lapse, consequent to the dissolution of the Assembly, unless assent is either withheld or granted before the date of the dissolution, which could not have been the intention in the absence of a time-limit under Articles 200 and 201 respectively. The relevant observations read as under: “15. It is clear that if a Bill pending the assent of the Governor or the President is held to lapse on the dissolution of the Assembly it is not unlikely that a fair number of Bills which may have been passed by the Assembly, say during the last six months of its existence, may be exposed to the risk of lapse consequent on the dissolution of the Assembly, unless assent is either withheld or granted before the date of the dissolution. If we look at the relevant provisions of Articles 200 and 201 from this point of view it would be significant that neither Article provides for a time limit within which the Governor or the President, should come to a decision on the Bill referred to him for his assent. Where it appeared necessary and expedient to prescribe a time limit the Constitution has made appropriate provisions in that behalf (vide : Article 197(1)(b) and (2)(b)). In fact the proviso to Article 201 requires that the House to which the Bill is remitted with a message from the President shall reconsider it accordingly within a period of six months from the date of the receipt of such message. Therefore, the failure to make any provision as to the time within which the Governor or [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1131

268. It was his belief that while the method of nomination was the most appropriate one, a convention of appointing Governors in consultation with the State government would grow. This, when read with the other discussions which took place in the Constituent Assembly, indicate that the framers of the Constitution reposed trust that the Governor would not be a cipher of the Central government, would be a person above party politics and would not attempt to override the State government with his actions. He also supported the idea of having nominated Governors on the ground that the intervention of the Governor would be required only in extraordinary situations, and an elected Governor may come in conflict with the provincial Cabinet by trying to override their decisions. His words are reproduced below: “I see no objection to the appointment of the Governor being left to the President of the Union who has necessarily to act on the advice of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet. A convention, of consulting the provincial Cabinet might easily grow up. Such a convention, as the House is aware, has grown up in the appointment of Governors in Canada. In Australia too, though under a different Constitution, a similar convention has grown up and the Governor of a State is appointed on the advice of the provincial Cabinet. […] There is another aspect also which the House might take into consideration. In our Constitution we must try every method by which harmony could be secured between the Centre and the provinces. If you have a person who is not elected by the province or the State but you have a person appointed by the President of the Union with the consent, I take it, of the provincial Cabinet, you will add a close link between the Centre and the provinces and a clash between the provinces and the Centre will be avoided which will otherwise occasionally result. Then there is another point. It is said that the Governor may occasionally have to use his extraordinary powers. This point is more in favour of nomination rather than in favour of election. If the person who is elected on the basis of universal suffrage is to come into clash with the provincial Cabinet and if he is to set himself above the provincial Cabinet, there will be a greater constitutional danger. Even if circumstances arise when intervention by the Governor is necessary it will be 1144 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

the Governor by the Constitution are not a matter of prerogative but a constitutional responsibility and its exercise, a matter of performance of an official duty of the highest sanctity, and thus, unquestionably amenable to judicial review. It observed that the sufficiency of the attending facts and circumstances necessitating the exercise of such powers is to be decided by the President or the Governor. However, the question of whether such exercise is predicated upon all relevant cogent materials and falls within the limitations of the constitutional scheme and is not a result of an arbitrary or malafide exercise, would be subject to the judicial review of the courts. Placing reliance on Maru Ram (supra) it held that the exercise of such powers by the President only carries with it a notional presumption of a careful and proper exercise based on objective considerations, but, by no stretch of imagination can it be construed to confer an immunity from judicial review. It further explained, in the context of Article 72 of the Constitution, the standard of judicial review that the courts are expected to apply when scrutinizing the exercise of such power by the President. It held that where reasons have been given for the exercise of such power, there the courts may interfere only if the reasons are based on irrelevant or extraneous considerations. However, where no reasons have been given, there the courts may interfere only if the exercise is vitiated by a flawed understanding of the ambit of such power by misjudgment or is otherwise arbitrary, discriminatory or malafide. The relevant observations read as under: -“76. This Court has examined in several cases, the scope of judicial review with reference to another prerogative power—power of the President/Governor to grant pardon, etc. and to suspend, remit or commute sentences. The view of this Court is that the power to pardon is a part of the constitutional scheme, and not an act of grace as in England. It is a constitutional responsibility to be exercised in accordance with the discretion contemplated by the context. It is not a matter of privilege but a matter of performance of official duty. All public power including constitutional power, shall never be exercisable arbitrarily or mala fide. While the President or the Governor may be the sole judge of the sufficiency of facts and the propriety of granting pardons and reprieves, the power being an enumerated power in the Constitution, its limitations must [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1195

74. The mere forwarding of a copy of the Bill may obviate, if at all, only the need to refer to each one of the provisions therein in detail in the requisition sent or the letter forwarding it, but not obliterate the necessity to point out specifically the particular Central law or provisions with reference to which, the predominance is claimed or purported to be claimed. The deliberate use of the word “consideration” in clause (2) of Article 254, in my view, not only connotes that there should be an active application of mind, but also postulates a deliberate and careful thought process before taking a decision to accord or not to accord the assent sought for. If the object of referring the State law for consideration is to have the repugnancy resolved by securing predominance to the State law, the President has to necessarily consider the nature and extent of repugnancy, the feasibility, practicalities and desirabilities involved therein, though may not be obliged to write a judgment in the same manner, the courts of law do, before arriving at a conclusion to grant or refuse to grant or even grant partially, if the repugnancy is with reference to more than one law in force made by Parliament. Protection cannot be claimed for the State law, when questioned before courts, taking cover under the assent, merely asserting that it was in general form, irrespective of the actual fact whether the State claimed for such protection against a specific law or the attention of the President was invited to at least an apprehended repugnancy vis-à-vis the particular Central law. In the teeth of innumerable Central laws enacted and in force on concurrent subjects enumerated in List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, and the hoard of provisions contained therein, artificial assumptions based on some supposed knowledge of all those provisions and the presumed regularity of official acts, cannot be blown out of proportion, to do away with an essential exercise, to make the “assent” meaningful, as if they are empty formalities, except at the risk of rendering Article 254 [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1215

The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. actually exercised by the President, at any rate under Articles 31-A, 31-C, 254(2) and 304(b) are a special constituent power vested with the Head of the Union, as the protector and defender of the Constitution and safety valve to safeguard the fundamental rights of citizens and federal structure of the country’s polity as adopted in the Constitution. A genuine, real and effective consideration would depend upon specific and sufficient information being provided to him inviting, at any rate, his attention to the Central law with which the State law is considered or apprehended to be repugnant, and in the absence of any effort or exercise shown to have been undertaken, when questioned before courts, the State law cannot be permitted or allowed to have predominance or an overriding effect over that Central enactment of Parliament to which no specific reference of the President at all has been invited to. This, in my view, is a must and an essential requirement to be satisfied; in the absence of which the “consideration” claimed would be one in a vacuum and really oblivious to the hoard of legislations falling under the Concurrent List in force in the country and enacted by Parliament. To uphold as valid the claim for any such blanket assent or all-round predominance over any and every such law — whether brought to the notice of the President or not, would amount to legitimization of what was not even in the contemplation or consideration on the basis of some assumed “consideration”. In order to find out the real state of affairs as to whether the “assent” in a given case was after a due and proper application of mind and effective “consideration” as envisaged by the Constitution, this Court as well as the High Court exercising powers of judicial review are entitled to call for the relevant records and look into the same. This the courts have been doing, as and when considered necessary, all along. No exception therefore could be taken to the High Court in this case adopting such a procedure, in discharge of its obligations and exercise of jurisdiction under the Constitution of India.”