[2023] 7 S.C.R. 403 403 AISH MOHAMMAD A v. STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. (Civil Appeal No. 4044 of 2023) JUNE 14, 2023 B [VIKRAM NATH AND AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, JJ.] Service Law: Punjab Police Rules, 1934 – rr.8.18 and 16.28 – Power to review proceedings – Compulsorily retirement –Adverse remarks entered into appellant’s Annual Credential Report-ACR, C due to which Departmental Enquiry held and the appellant reverted from the post of Head Constable to the post of Constable – Reversion order modified to stoppage of one increment – Adverse remarks entered into ACR, expunged by the Inspector General of Police for a partial period – In a suit, the civil judge interfered with the stoppage of one increment, but not with the ACR – Appellant again filed a D representation before the Inspector General of Police, for expunction of adverse remarks, and the adverse remarks were expunged – However, the Director General of Police issued a Show-Cause Notice to the appellant that the adverse remarks were wrongly expunged, which made the appellant escape compulsory retirement – Thereafter, E

the appellant was retired – Thereafter, in a petition, the Single Judge of the High Court held that the Director General of Police could not have passed the said order, as it amounted to a review of an order passed by his predecessor-in-office – Division Bench set aside the order holding that the order passed by the DGP to compulsorily retire the appellant as correct – On appeal, held: ‘Review’ F contemplated in r. 16.28 is by a superior authority and not the same authority – Review is a re-look at an order passed by the same authority which passed the original order, be it a Court oran executive officer – Heading to the rule is a misnomer inasmuch as no power of ‘review’ is created or conferred, as manifest from are G ading of (1), (2) and (3) of r. 16.28 – Director General of Police rightly show-caused the appellant and took subsequent action thereupon – Considering the chain of events, the consequential action, cannot be said to be arbitrary or shocking the conscience of the Court, so as to warrant interference – For a person in uniformed service, like the police, adverse entry relating to his/her H 403 404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R. A integrity and conduct is to be adjudged by the superior authority(ies) who record and approve such entry – Personnel having such remarks being compulsorily retired as per the statutory provisions under the 1934 Rules, is not an action this Court would like to interdict – Thus, no inclination to interfere with the order impugned

– Punjab Civil Services Rules, 1934 – r. 3.26(d). B Punjab Police Rules, 1934: Hierarchy of police force – Rules, originally framed in 1934, contemplated the authorities as Inspector-General, Deputy Inspector-General, and Superintendent of Police – Inspector-General of that time headed the State Police – However, today the Inspector-General of Police is administratively C subordinate to the Director-General of Police and the Additional Director-General of Police – Thus, the Rules, have not kept pace with the times – It cannot be appreciated why the authorities concerned unable to update/amend the Rules with at least the correct official description of posts to obviate confusion. D Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD : 1.1 The ‘review’ contemplated in Rule 16.28 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1936 empowers a superior authority to ‘call for the records of awards made by their subordinates and confirm, enhance, modify or annul the same, or make further E investigation or direct such to be made before passing orders.’ As such, the ‘review’ is by a superior authority and not the same authority. [Para 18][414-B-C] 1.2 The factual premise noted by the Single Judge itself was wrong, inasmuch as it was the Inspector General of Police, F who had, in effect, ‘reviewed’ an order passed by his predecessor-in-office by expunging the adversere marks, which was previously declined by his predecessor-in-office. [Para 17][413-E]

1.3 The incongruity has crept in the Rules due to passage of time, legally and in fact. To a judicially or legally trained mind, G it is obvious that ‘review’ carries a specific connotation, but the same is not the case herein. Put simply, review is a re-look at an order passed by the same authority which passed the original order, be it a Court or an executive officer. The heading to the rule above is a misnomer inasmuch as no power of ‘review’ is H AISH MOHAMMAD v. STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. 405 created or conferred, as manifest from are ading of (1), (2) and A (3) of Rule 16.28. For completeness, Rule 16.29 is entitled “Right of appeal” and Rule16.32 is labelled “Revision”. This is one part of the issue. [Para 19][414-C-E] 1.4 The Rules, originally framed in 1934, contemplated the authorities as “The Inspector-General, a Deputy Inspector-General, B and a Superintendent of Police”. The “Inspector-General” of that time [when the service was called Imperial/Indian Police] headed the State Police, but is today known as, in most States and Union Territories, barring a handful, in the hierarchy of the State Police, as the Director-General of Police, an officer drawn from the Indian CPolice Service, who sits at the apex of the state police machinery. In fact, today the Inspector-General of Police is administratively subordinate to the Director-General of Police and the Additional Director-General of Police. [Para 20][414-F-G]

1.5 The Rules were also framed at a time when the system Dof Ranges and Commissionerates had not been established. Indubitably, the Rules, for better or for worse (worse, we hazard) have not kept pace with the times. It cannot be appreciated why the authorities concerned are unable to update/amend the Rules with at least the correct official description of posts to obviate confusion. [Para 21][414-G-H; 415-A] E 1.6 The Division Bench has not approached the issue in the manner it was required to. The reason given for interference with the Single Judge’s view is that it was highly improbable and unwarranted for the Inspector General of Police to have expunged the adverse remarks when there was a judicial verdict by the F civil court refusing to do so. The said reasoning was employed despite noting the fact that even if there was any power of review, in the extant circumstances, it was wholly arbitrary. It was further observed that a judicial verdict by the civil court should have been respected. Such reasoning is also erroneous. The fact Gremained that, rightly or wrongly, the civil court had granted this opportunity to the appellant to move again for expunction of adverse remarks, which the appellant did. Having said that, firstly, the authorities were exercising the power conferred on them by H 406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.

A statute, and secondly, any order which amounts to ‘review’ (in the legal sense of the word) of an earlier order by the same authority cannot be undertaken, unless specifically so conferred by the relevant statute. [Para 23][415-D-F] 1.7 The civil judge found no ground to interfere with the B adverse remarks yet granted liberty to the appellant to move for expunction thereof. The civil court erred in assuming that it had the power to do so, in the absence of any such provision in the Punjab Police Rules, 1934. There may be cases where a High Court under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India or this Court in exercise of its constitutional powers may specifically C direct for fresh consideration of a representation, even in the absence of specific provisions. [Para 24][415-G-H] 1.8 The observation by the civil court that the appellant could approach the authority, cannot be taken to mean that the appellant was granted carte blanche liberty in law to approach D the same authority. What the civil court lost sight of was that no provision permitted the course of action suggested by it.

Examined from another lens, even if the civil court’s view was to be read in the appellant’s favour, at best, he may have had some justification in approaching the Director General of Police, E Haryana, being a superior authority, but the same authority could not have been approached again. On this line of reasoning, it becomes clear that even though the appellant had a window to move before the authorities again and dehors the civil court not interfering, but the same should have been to the superior authority and not the same authority, which had earlier refused F expunction. [Para 26][417-B-D] 1.9 As far back as in 1971, directions were issued by the State Government that repeated representations would not be entertained as it would be contrary to Government Letter No. 2784-3S-70 dated 22.03.1971 mandating that a second G representation against adverse remarks would not lie and which clarified the position that the same authority did not have any power of review for an order passed by its predecessor-in-office. [Para 27][417-E] H AISH MOHAMMAD v. STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. 407 1.10 The Director General of Police rightly show-caused A the appellant and took subsequent action thereupon. Considering the chain of events, the consequential action, cannot be said to be arbitrary or shocking the conscience of the Court, so as to warrant interference. For a person in uniformed service, like the police, adverse entry relating to his/her integrity and conduct is B

to be adjudged by the superior authority(ies) who record and approve such entry. Personnel having such remarks being compulsorily retired as per the statutory provisions under the Punjab Civil Services Rules, 1934, in the instant facts, is not an action this Court would like to interdict. There is no inclination to interfere with the order impugned, though for entirely different C reasons than what were considered by and prevailed with the Division Bench. [Para 28][417-F-H] High Court of Tripura v. Tirtha Sarathi Mukherjee (2019) 16 SCC 663 : [2019] 2 SCR 692; B S Hari Commandant v Union of India 2023 SCC OnLine SC D 413; Sanjay Dubey v State of Madhya Pradesh 2023 SCC OnLine SC 610 – referred to. Case Law Reference [2019] 2 SCR 692 referred to Para 24 E CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4044 of 2023. From the Judgment and Order dated 25.04.2011 of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in LPA No. 406 of 2011. Yogesh Swaroop, Pramod Tiwari, Vivek Tiwari, Ms. Priyanka F Dubey, Dr. Vinod Kumar Tewari, Advs. for the Appellant. Nikhil Goel, AAG, Samar Vijay Singh, Keshav Mittal, Ms. Amrita Verma, Ms. Sabarni Som, Advs. for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by G AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J. Heard learned counsel for the parties finally on the basis of the available record. The Respondents are represented through counsel and have filed written submissions. Delay condoned, in these peculiar H

408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R. A facts and circumstances, in the interest of justice. I.A. 72995/2022 [seeking condonation of delay in refiling/curing the defects] is formally allowed. 2. Leave granted. 3. The sole appellant has moved this Court being aggrieved by the B Final Judgment and Order dated 25.04.2011 (hereinafter referred to as the “Impugned Judgment”) [2011 SCC OnLine P&H 4687 | ILR (2012) 2 P&H 747] passed by a learned Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh (hereinafter referred to as the “High Court”) in Letters Patent Appeal No.406 of 2011 (O & M), whereby the learned Division Bench allowed the appeal preferred by C the respondent-State and set aside the Order dated 27.01.2010 [2010 SCC OnLine P&H 1193] passed by the learned Single Judge in Civil Writ Petition No.19128 of 2006. THE FACTUAL PRISM:

4. The appellant joined as Constable in Haryana Police on D 15.01.1973 and promoted as Head Constable on 06.12.1993. One Assistant Sub-Inspector Basant Pal made a complaint against the appellant. This led to a departmental enquiry, where the appellant was held guilty and ordered to be reverted from Head Constable to Constable. A representation was filed by the appellant before the Inspector General of Police, Gurgaon Range against the said reversion order, resultantly E whereof, by order dated 28.04.2001, the Inspector General of Police, Gurgaon Range, modified the order of reversion to stoppage of one increment. The Controlling Officer of the appellant recorded adverse remarks against him for the periods between 11.10.1999 to 31.03.2000 and 01.04.2000 to 29.12.2000. Initially, the representation filed apropos F the period between 01.04.1999 to 31.03.2000 was rejected by orders dated 19.02.2002 and 27.06.2001. However, the representation pertaining to the period from 01.04.2000 to 29.12.2000 was partly accepted by order dated 20.07.2002. Thereafter, the appellant preferred a second consolidated representation for the aforesaid periods, which was accepted on 28.01.2005. This second representation by the appellant was pursuant G

to judgment dated 27.09.2004 in Civil Suit No.168 of 2002 (filed on 06.08.2002) before the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), whereby the stoppage of one increment was set aside and the respondents were directed to release the same. However, his prayer for expunging the adverse remarks was not accepted, yet liberty to prefer a fresh H representation was granted by the learned Civil Court. AISH MOHAMMAD v. STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. 409 [AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.] 5. Challenge to judgment dated 27.09.2004 supra by the A respondent-State was dismissed by the learned District Judge, Gurgaon, and the same has attained finality. The appellant, in terms of observations made by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) Gurgaon in the judgment dated 27.09.2004, preferred a consolidated representation before the Inspector General of Police, Gurgaon Range for expunction of adverse B

remarks, on 07.01.2005. The Inspector General of Police, Gurgaon Range, Gurgaon vide order dated 28.01.2005 expunged all the adverse remarks. Thereafter, the appellant received a Show-Cause Notice dated 05.09.2006 from the Director General of Police, Haryana stating that undue benefit had been given to the appellant by expunction of remarks and why the same should not be restored and an order of compulsory C retirement be passed against him, indicating thereby, that due to expunction of these adverse remarks, he had escaped being retired from service compulsorily and also became eligible for further promotion. The appellant filed his Reply to the Show-Cause Notice on 22.09.2006. The Director General of Police, Haryana by order dated 30.10.2006 directed D reconstruction of the Annual Confidential Report [hereinafter referred to as “ACR” (in singular) and “ACRs” (in plural)] for the aforesaid period.

6. Aggrieved by the order dated 30.10.2006, the appellant filed Civil Writ Petition No.19128 of 2006 before the High Court. During the pendency of this writ petition, the appellant received notice for retirement E issued by the Superintendent of Police, Mewat, Nuh dated 08.09.2008, informing him that his service was not required by the department beyond the age of 55 years, in public interest and he was to stand retired from service under the State of Haryana in terms of Rule 3.26(d) of the Punjab Civil Services Rules, 1934 Vol-I Part I and Rule 8.18 of the Punjab F Police Rules, 1934 as applicable to the State of Haryana. This was followed by the order of the Superintendent of Police, Palwal dated 27.10.2008 directing his retirement with effect from 30.11.2008. The learned Single Judge by judgment dated 27.01.2010 in Civil Writ Petition No.19128 of 2006 [2010 SCC OnLine P&H 1193] allowed the Writ Petition and the order for reconstruction of the adverse ACRs and G compulsory retirement was quashed. The learned Single Judge also held that the appellant was entitled to all consequential benefits. The relevant part of the said judgment1 notes: 1 The extract is from the SCC OnLine version. It is noted that the cited portion from Ram Niwas (supra) seems to be grammatically incorrect. H 410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R. A “…

I have heard learned counsel for the parties. The controversy involved in these writ petitions is covered by a judgment in the case of Amarjit Kaur v. State of Punjab and others, 1988 (4) SLR 199 and a Division Bench judgment of this Court B dated 26.5.2006 passed in CWP No. 8356 of 2006 (Ram Niwas v. State of Haryana) as also a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rathi Alloys and Steel Ltd. v. C.C.E. (1990) 2 SCC 324. In the case of Ram Niwas (supra), following observations have been made:-C “….Firstly, in law there is administrative hierarchy which was not to be respect and any successor cannot set aside the order passed by his predecessor. Secondly, there is no provision under the Punjab Police Rules, 1934, as applicable to Haryana or in any instructions or subordinate legislation providing for review of an order D passed by the predecessor in office. It is well settled that power or review cannot be exercised unless it is expressly provided by the Statute. In this regard, reliance may be placed on a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rathi Alloys and Steel Ltd. v. C.C.E., (1990) 2 SCC E 324. Our view also finds support from the judgment of this Court in the case of Amarjit Kaur v. State of Punjab and others, 1988 (4) SLR 199….”

Following the aforesaid judgment, CWP No. 9973 of 2007 and CWP No. 12095 of 2007 were allowed by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 23.3.2009. Ratio of all F these judgments is that the predecessor of an Officer in the hierarchy of service has no authority to review his orders.” (sic) 7. Evincibly, the learned Single Judge concluded, in essence, that G the original expunction could not be held to be illegal, and the subsequent reconstruction of the remarks would be incorrect in view of the pronouncements of law referred to by him. 8. The respondent-State, aggrieved, preferred Letters Patent Appeal No.406 of 2011 (O & M) which was allowed by judgment dated H 25.04.2011 [2011 SCC OnLine P&H 4687] setting aside judgment AISH MOHAMMAD v. STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. 411 [AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.] dated 27.01.2010 of the learned Single Judge, thereby restoring the order A of the Director General of Police, Haryana dated 30.10.2006. The judgment of the learned Division Bench is impugned before us. SUBMISSIONS BY THE APPELLANT:

9. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the judgment Bimpugned is unsustainable for the reason that the main ground for allowing the appeal of the respondent-State was that the Order of the Inspector General of Police dated 28.01.2005was completely against the verdict of the learned Civil Court refusing to expunge the adverse remarks, which was not only highly improper but totally unwarranted and the Director General of Police rightly set aside the order of his C subordinate. It was submitted that the learned Division Bench failed to consider that the Director General of Police did not have any power of review as per the Punjab Police Rules, 1934 which applied to the State of Haryana. 10. Moreover, reiterating that the basic reasoning of the learned D Division Bench for allowing the appeal of the State, as noted supra, was that the learned Civil Court had refused to interfere in expunging the remarks passed by the Controlling Officer and thus, the Inspector General of Police had no authority to pass an order for expunction, was highly improper and totally unwarranted. Learned counsel submitted that Eunder similar circumstances, a co-ordinate Single Bench had interfered to hold that the Director General of Police had no power to review an order passed by the predecessor-in-office. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE OFFICIAL RESPONDENTS-R1 to R7: F

11. Per contra, learned counsel for the State of Haryana and the other official respondents (R2, R3, R4, R5, R6 and R7) submitted that the present case had been refiled after an inordinate delay of 11 years. It was submitted that even though the ground of delay is sought to be explained, being the unfortunate death of the appellant’s son, the same took place in 2011 and thus, re-filing having been done only in 2022 i.e., G 10 years after such incident, would not entitle the appellant to the benefit of condonation for such long and unexplained delay. He submitted that the view taken in the Impugned Judgment, that the Inspector General of Police could not have over-reached the judgment of the learned Civil Court, is correct. Moreover, it was submitted that the adverse entry in H 412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R. A the ACR of the appellant was on account of serious charges – viz. Corruption, insubordination and dereliction of duty. 12. Learned counsel summed up his arguments by taking the stand that the appellant, having been compulsorily retired, the same not being a ‘punishment’, the principles of natural justice would not be B applicable. ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION: 13. Having considered the rival submissions, the Court would note that both the learned Single Judge and the learned Division Bench did not appreciate the legal position in the correct perspective of the factual C background.

14. The undisputed position is that adverse remarks were entered into the ACR of the appellant for the period(s) in question, due to which initially an order of departmental enquiry was passed based on a complaint; in the departmental enquiry, an order came to be passed, and D the appellant was reverted from the post of Head Constable to the post of Constable. The appellant challenged such reversion. The reversion order was modified to stoppage of one increment. For expunction of the adverse remarks, he moved before the Inspector General of Police, Gurgaon Range, which was initially rejected for the entire period in question. On further representation, the Inspector General of Police, E Gurgaon Range, on 20.07.2002, expunged the remarks partially for the period of 01.04.2000 to 29.12.2000. 15. The appellant filed Civil Suit No.168 of 2002 against the order of stoppage of one increment as also the adverse entry(ies)/ remark(s) in his ACR, which was finally decided by the learned Civil F Judge (Junior Division), Gurgaon by judgment and order dated 27.09.2004, interfering with the stoppage of one increment, but not interfering with the ACR aspect. However, in the said judgment, it was observed as under: “If at all, plaintiff feels that recording remarks was the result G

of above adverse said departmental proceedings and result thereof, then in the wake of setting aside of the impugned order by this court, plaintiff, if so advised may again file a representation with the competent authority against the adverse remarks which shall be decided by said authority expeditiously. H In the totality of circumstances, this court is not inclined to AISH MOHAMMAD v. STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. 413 [AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.] interfere with the satisfaction of competent authority to record A adverse remarks in the ACR of plaintiff. Hence, no relief whatsoever regarding expunction of adverse remarks can be granted in favour of plaintiff. Accordingly, issue No.2 is hereby decided against plaintiff and in favour of defendants.” (sic) B

16. This permitted the appellant to again file a representation before the Inspector General of Police, Gurgaon Range, for expunction of adverse remarks, which was disposed favourably, and the adverse remarks were expunged. However, the Director General of Police issued a Show-Cause Notice to the appellant that the adverse remarks were C wrongly expunged, which made the appellant escape compulsory retirement. Thereafter, the appellant was retired having crossed the age of 55 years, in terms of such power being conferred on the competent authority under the Punjab Civil Services Rules. The matter then came before the High Court, initially before the learned Single Judge who, Drelying on certain precedents, recorded that the Director General of Police could not have passed the order impugned therein, as it amounted to a review of an order passed by his predecessor-in-office. 17. The Court would pause at this juncture to indicate that the factual premise noted by the learned Single Judge itself was wrong, Einasmuch as it was the Inspector General of Police, who had, in effect, ‘reviewed’ an order passed by his predecessor-in-office by expunging the adverse remarks, which was previously declined by his predecessor-in-office. Volume II of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934 provides as under: “16.28. Powers to review proceedings F

(1) The Inspector-General, a Deputy Inspector-General, and a Superintendent of Police may call for the records of awards made by their subordinates and confirm, enhance, modify or annul the same, or make further investigation or direct such to be made before passing orders. G (2) If an award of dismissal is annulled, the officer annulling it shall state whether it is to be regarded as suspension followed by reinstatement, or not. The order should also state whether service previous to dismissal should count for pension or not. H 414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R. A (3) In all cases in which officers propose to enhance an award they shall, before passing final orders, give the defaulter concerned an opportunity of showing cause, either personally or in writing, why his punishment should not be enhanced.” (emphasis supplied) B 18. Clearly, the ‘review’ contemplated in Rule 16.28 empowers a superior authority to ‘call for the records of awards made by their subordinates and confirm, enhance, modify or annul the same, or make further investigation or direct such to be made before passing orders.’ As such, the ‘review’ is by a superior authority and not the C same authority.

19. Before adverting to the merits, we may at once highlight the incongruity that has crept in the Rules (supra) due to passage of time, legally and in fact. To a judicially or legally trained mind, it is obvious that ‘review’ carries a specific connotation, but the same is not the case herein. Put simply, review is a re-look at an order passed by the same D authority which passed the original order, be it a Court or an executive officer. The heading to the rule above is a misnomer inasmuch as no power of ‘review’ is created or conferred, as manifest from a reading of (1), (2) and (3) of Rule 16.28. For completeness, Rule 16.29 is entitled “Right of appeal” and Rule 16.32 is labelled “Revision”. This is one E part of the issue. 20. The next part is that the Rules, originally framed in 1934, contemplated the authorities as “The Inspector-General, a Deputy Inspector-General, and a Superintendent of Police”. The “Inspector-General” of that time [when the service was called Imperial/Indian F Police] headed the State Police, but is today known as, in most States and Union Territories, barring a handful, in the hierarchy of the State Police, as the Director-General of Police, an officer drawn from the Indian Police Service, who sits at the apex of the state police machinery. In fact, today the Inspector-General of Police is administratively subordinate to the Director-General of Police and the Additional Director- G General of Police.

21. The Rules were also framed at a time when the system of Ranges and Commissionerates had not been established. Indubitably, the Rules, for better or for worse (worse, we hazard) have not kept pace with the times. We do not appreciate why the authorities concerned H AISH MOHAMMAD v. STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. 415 [AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.] are unable to update/amend the Rules with at least the correct official A description of posts to obviate confusion. 22. In the case at hand, the Director General of Police, Haryana, had never passed any order earlier and for the first time when the issue was brought to his notice, a Show-Cause Notice was issued to the appellant as to why the adverse remarks be not reconstructed; as due to B such expunction, he had escaped from being retired from service compulsorily. Thus, the order passed by the learned co-ordinate Single Judge in CWP No.9973 of 2007 and CWP No.12095 of 2007 dated 23.03.2009 had no applicability in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Be that as it was, the State of Haryana moved in appeal Cagainst the judgment of the learned Single Judge herein, which was allowed in favour of the respondent-State.

23. This Court finds that the learned Division Bench has not approached the issue in the manner it was required to. The reason given for interference with the learned Single Judge’s view is that it was highly Dimprobable and unwarranted for the Inspector General of Police to have expunged the adverse remarks when there was a judicial verdict by the learned Civil Court refusing to do so. The said reasoning was employed despite noting the fact that even if there was any power of review, in the extant circumstances, it was wholly arbitrary. It was further observed that a judicial verdict by the learned Civil Court should have been E respected. This Court would note that such reasoning is also erroneous. The fact remained that, rightly or wrongly, the learned Civil Court had granted this opportunity to the appellant to move again for expunction of adverse remarks, which the appellant did. Having said that, this Court would now look at the issue from a totally legal point of view – firstly, Fthe authorities were exercising the power conferred on them by statute, and secondly, any order which amounts to ‘review’ (in the legal sense of the word) of an earlier order by the same authority cannot be undertaken, unless specifically so conferred by the relevant statute.

24. Moreover, the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) found no Gground to interfere with the adverse remarks yet granted liberty to the appellant to move for expunction thereof. The learned Civil Court erred in assuming that it had the power to do so, in the absence of any such provision in the Punjab Police Rules, 1934. There may be cases where a High Court under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India or this Court in exercise of its constitutional powers may specifically direct for H 416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R. A fresh consideration of a representation, even in the absence of specific provisions. In High Court of Tripura v Tirtha Sarathi Mukherjee, (2019) 16 SCC 663, the question that arose was whether, in the absence of a statutory provision, a writ petitioner could seek re-evaluation of examination answer scripts? Answering, this Court held:

B “20. The question however arises whether even if there is no legal right to demand re-valuation as of right could there arise circumstances which leave the Court in any doubt at all. A grave injustice may be occasioned to a writ applicant in certain circumstances. The case may arise where even though there is no provision for re-valuation it turns out that C despite giving the correct answer no marks are awarded. No doubt this must be confined to a case where there is no dispute about the correctness of the answer. Further, if there is any doubt, the doubt should be resolved in favour of the examining body rather than in favour of the candidate. The wide power D under Article 226 may continue to be available even though there is no provision for re-valuation in a situation where a candidate despite having giving correct answer and about which there cannot be even the slightest manner of doubt, he is treated as having given the wrong answer and consequently the candidate is found disentitled to any marks. E

21. Should the second circumstance be demonstrated to be present before the writ court, can the writ court become helpless despite the vast reservoir of power which it possesses? It is one thing to say that the absence of provision for re-valuation will not enable the candidate to claim the right of F evaluation as a matter of right and another to say that in no circumstances whatsoever where there is no provision for re-valuation will the writ court exercise its undoubted constitutional powers? We reiterate that the situation can only be rare and exceptional.” G (emphasis supplied) 25. The unique nature of power bestowed on the High Courts under Article 226 has very recently been commented upon in B S Hari Commandant v Union of India, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 413. In Sanjay Dubey v State of Madhya Pradesh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC H AISH MOHAMMAD v. STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. 417 [AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.] 610, while declining to interfere with the order impugned therein, a reason A which weighed was that a High Court had passed the said order, and not a Court of Session. This again emphasised the special nature of the High Courts, including that they are Constitutional Courts.

26. Thus, the observation by the learned Civil Court that the appellant could approach the authority, cannot be taken to mean that the B appellant was granted carte blanche liberty in law to approach the same authority. What the learned Civil Court lost sight of was that no provision permitted the course of action suggested by it. Examined from another lens, even if we were to read the learned Civil Court’s view in the appellant’s favour, at best, he may have had some justification in Capproaching the Director General of Police, Haryana, being a superior authority, but the same authority could not have been approached again. On this line of reasoning, it becomes clear that even though the appellant had a window to move before the authorities again and dehors the learned Civil Court not interfering, but the same should have been to the superior authority and not the same authority, which had earlier refused expunction. D In any event, we need not dilate on this further. 27. As far back as in 1971, directions were issued by the State Government that repeated representations would not be entertained as it would be contrary to Government Letter No. 2784-3S-70 dated 22.03.1971 mandating that a second representation against adverse E remarks would not lie and which clarified the position that the same authority did not have any power of review for an order passed by its predecessor-in-office.

28. As such, the Director General of Police had rightly show-caused the appellant and taken subsequent action thereupon. Considering F the chain of events, the consequential action, in our considered view, cannot be said to be arbitrary or shocking the conscience of the Court, so as to warrant interference. For a person in uniformed service, like the police, adverse entry relating to his/her integrity and conduct is to be adjudged by the superior authority(ies) who record and approve such Gentry. Personnel having such remarks being compulsorily retired as per the statutory provisions under the Punjab Civil Services Rules, 1934, in the instant facts, is not an action this Court would like to interdict. We are hence not inclined to interfere with the order impugned, though as discussed above, for entirely different reasons than what were considered by and prevailed with the learned Division Bench. H 418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R. A 29. Accordingly, the instant appeal stands dismissed. 30. Parties are left to bear their own costs. ADDITIONAL DIRECTION(S): 31. Copies of this judgment be communicated to the (a) the Chief B Secretaries, Governments of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh; (b.1) the Principal Secretary, Department of Home Affairs and Justice, Government of Punjab and (b.2) the Additional Chief Secretary, Home, Government of Haryana, and (c) the Directors General of Police, Punjab and Haryana by the Registry.

32. Steps be taken forthwith in line with the observations recorded C at Paragraphs 19 to 21. Nidhi Jain Appeal dismissed. (Assisted by : Tamana, LCRA) D E F G H

[2023] 7 S.C.R. 403 403 AISH MOHAMMAD A v. STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. (Civil Appeal No. 4044 of 2023) JUNE 14, 2023 B [VIKRAM NATH AND AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, JJ.] Service Law: Punjab Police Rules, 1934 – rr.8.18 and 16.28 – Power to review proceedings – Compulsorily retirement –Adverse remarks entered into appellant’s Annual Credential Report-ACR, C due to which Departmental Enquiry held and the appellant reverted from the post of Head Constable to the post of Constable – Reversion order modified to stoppage of one increment – Adverse remarks entered into ACR, expunged by the Inspector General of Police for a partial period – In a suit, the civil judge interfered with the stoppage of one increment, but not with the ACR – Appellant again filed a D representation before the Inspector General of Police, for expunction of adverse remarks, and the adverse remarks were expunged – However, the Director General of Police issued a Show-Cause Notice to the appellant that the adverse remarks were wrongly expunged, which made the appellant escape compulsory retirement – Thereafter, E

the appellant was retired – Thereafter, in a petition, the Single Judge of the High Court held that the Director General of Police could not have passed the said order, as it amounted to a review of an order passed by his predecessor-in-office – Division Bench set aside the order holding that the order passed by the DGP to compulsorily retire the appellant as correct – On appeal, held: ‘Review’ F contemplated in r. 16.28 is by a superior authority and not the same authority – Review is a re-look at an order passed by the same authority which passed the original order, be it a Court oran executive officer – Heading to the rule is a misnomer inasmuch as no power of ‘review’ is created or conferred, as manifest from are G ading of (1), (2) and (3) of r. 16.28 – Director General of Police rightly show-caused the appellant and took subsequent action thereupon – Considering the chain of events, the consequential action, cannot be said to be arbitrary or shocking the conscience of the Court, so as to warrant interference – For a person in uniformed service, like the police, adverse entry relating to his/her H 403 404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R. A integrity and conduct is to be adjudged by the superior authority(ies) who record and approve such entry – Personnel having such remarks being compulsorily retired as per the statutory provisions under the 1934 Rules, is not an action this Court would like to interdict – Thus, no inclination to interfere with the order impugned

– Punjab Civil Services Rules, 1934 – r. 3.26(d). B Punjab Police Rules, 1934: Hierarchy of police force – Rules, originally framed in 1934, contemplated the authorities as Inspector-General, Deputy Inspector-General, and Superintendent of Police – Inspector-General of that time headed the State Police – However, today the Inspector-General of Police is administratively C subordinate to the Director-General of Police and the Additional Director-General of Police – Thus, the Rules, have not kept pace with the times – It cannot be appreciated why the authorities concerned unable to update/amend the Rules with at least the correct official description of posts to obviate confusion. D Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD : 1.1 The ‘review’ contemplated in Rule 16.28 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1936 empowers a superior authority to ‘call for the records of awards made by their subordinates and confirm, enhance, modify or annul the same, or make further E investigation or direct such to be made before passing orders.’ As such, the ‘review’ is by a superior authority and not the same authority. [Para 18][414-B-C] 1.2 The factual premise noted by the Single Judge itself was wrong, inasmuch as it was the Inspector General of Police, F who had, in effect, ‘reviewed’ an order passed by his predecessor-in-office by expunging the adversere marks, which was previously declined by his predecessor-in-office. [Para 17][413-E]

1.3 The incongruity has crept in the Rules due to passage of time, legally and in fact. To a judicially or legally trained mind, G it is obvious that ‘review’ carries a specific connotation, but the same is not the case herein. Put simply, review is a re-look at an order passed by the same authority which passed the original order, be it a Court or an executive officer. The heading to the rule above is a misnomer inasmuch as no power of ‘review’ is H AISH MOHAMMAD v. STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. 405 created or conferred, as manifest from are ading of (1), (2) and A (3) of Rule 16.28. For completeness, Rule 16.29 is entitled “Right of appeal” and Rule16.32 is labelled “Revision”. This is one part of the issue. [Para 19][414-C-E] 1.4 The Rules, originally framed in 1934, contemplated the authorities as “The Inspector-General, a Deputy Inspector-General, B and a Superintendent of Police”. The “Inspector-General” of that time [when the service was called Imperial/Indian Police] headed the State Police, but is today known as, in most States and Union Territories, barring a handful, in the hierarchy of the State Police, as the Director-General of Police, an officer drawn from the Indian CPolice Service, who sits at the apex of the state police machinery. In fact, today the Inspector-General of Police is administratively subordinate to the Director-General of Police and the Additional Director-General of Police. [Para 20][414-F-G]

1.5 The Rules were also framed at a time when the system Dof Ranges and Commissionerates had not been established. Indubitably, the Rules, for better or for worse (worse, we hazard) have not kept pace with the times. It cannot be appreciated why the authorities concerned are unable to update/amend the Rules with at least the correct official description of posts to obviate confusion. [Para 21][414-G-H; 415-A] E 1.6 The Division Bench has not approached the issue in the manner it was required to. The reason given for interference with the Single Judge’s view is that it was highly improbable and unwarranted for the Inspector General of Police to have expunged the adverse remarks when there was a judicial verdict by the F civil court refusing to do so. The said reasoning was employed despite noting the fact that even if there was any power of review, in the extant circumstances, it was wholly arbitrary. It was further observed that a judicial verdict by the civil court should have been respected. Such reasoning is also erroneous. The fact Gremained that, rightly or wrongly, the civil court had granted this opportunity to the appellant to move again for expunction of adverse remarks, which the appellant did. Having said that, firstly, the authorities were exercising the power conferred on them by H 406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.

A statute, and secondly, any order which amounts to ‘review’ (in the legal sense of the word) of an earlier order by the same authority cannot be undertaken, unless specifically so conferred by the relevant statute. [Para 23][415-D-F] 1.7 The civil judge found no ground to interfere with the B adverse remarks yet granted liberty to the appellant to move for expunction thereof. The civil court erred in assuming that it had the power to do so, in the absence of any such provision in the Punjab Police Rules, 1934. There may be cases where a High Court under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India or this Court in exercise of its constitutional powers may specifically C direct for fresh consideration of a representation, even in the absence of specific provisions. [Para 24][415-G-H] 1.8 The observation by the civil court that the appellant could approach the authority, cannot be taken to mean that the appellant was granted carte blanche liberty in law to approach D the same authority. What the civil court lost sight of was that no provision permitted the course of action suggested by it.

Examined from another lens, even if the civil court’s view was to be read in the appellant’s favour, at best, he may have had some justification in approaching the Director General of Police, E Haryana, being a superior authority, but the same authority could not have been approached again. On this line of reasoning, it becomes clear that even though the appellant had a window to move before the authorities again and dehors the civil court not interfering, but the same should have been to the superior authority and not the same authority, which had earlier refused F expunction. [Para 26][417-B-D] 1.9 As far back as in 1971, directions were issued by the State Government that repeated representations would not be entertained as it would be contrary to Government Letter No. 2784-3S-70 dated 22.03.1971 mandating that a second G representation against adverse remarks would not lie and which clarified the position that the same authority did not have any power of review for an order passed by its predecessor-in-office. [Para 27][417-E] H AISH MOHAMMAD v. STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. 407 1.10 The Director General of Police rightly show-caused A the appellant and took subsequent action thereupon. Considering the chain of events, the consequential action, cannot be said to be arbitrary or shocking the conscience of the Court, so as to warrant interference. For a person in uniformed service, like the police, adverse entry relating to his/her integrity and conduct is B

to be adjudged by the superior authority(ies) who record and approve such entry. Personnel having such remarks being compulsorily retired as per the statutory provisions under the Punjab Civil Services Rules, 1934, in the instant facts, is not an action this Court would like to interdict. There is no inclination to interfere with the order impugned, though for entirely different C reasons than what were considered by and prevailed with the Division Bench. [Para 28][417-F-H] High Court of Tripura v. Tirtha Sarathi Mukherjee (2019) 16 SCC 663 : [2019] 2 SCR 692; B S Hari Commandant v Union of India 2023 SCC OnLine SC D 413; Sanjay Dubey v State of Madhya Pradesh 2023 SCC OnLine SC 610 – referred to. Case Law Reference [2019] 2 SCR 692 referred to Para 24 E CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4044 of 2023. From the Judgment and Order dated 25.04.2011 of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in LPA No. 406 of 2011. Yogesh Swaroop, Pramod Tiwari, Vivek Tiwari, Ms. Priyanka F Dubey, Dr. Vinod Kumar Tewari, Advs. for the Appellant. Nikhil Goel, AAG, Samar Vijay Singh, Keshav Mittal, Ms. Amrita Verma, Ms. Sabarni Som, Advs. for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by G AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J. Heard learned counsel for the parties finally on the basis of the available record. The Respondents are represented through counsel and have filed written submissions. Delay condoned, in these peculiar H

408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R. A facts and circumstances, in the interest of justice. I.A. 72995/2022 [seeking condonation of delay in refiling/curing the defects] is formally allowed. 2. Leave granted. 3. The sole appellant has moved this Court being aggrieved by the B Final Judgment and Order dated 25.04.2011 (hereinafter referred to as the “Impugned Judgment”) [2011 SCC OnLine P&H 4687 | ILR (2012) 2 P&H 747] passed by a learned Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh (hereinafter referred to as the “High Court”) in Letters Patent Appeal No.406 of 2011 (O & M), whereby the learned Division Bench allowed the appeal preferred by C the respondent-State and set aside the Order dated 27.01.2010 [2010 SCC OnLine P&H 1193] passed by the learned Single Judge in Civil Writ Petition No.19128 of 2006. THE FACTUAL PRISM:

4. The appellant joined as Constable in Haryana Police on D 15.01.1973 and promoted as Head Constable on 06.12.1993. One Assistant Sub-Inspector Basant Pal made a complaint against the appellant. This led to a departmental enquiry, where the appellant was held guilty and ordered to be reverted from Head Constable to Constable. A representation was filed by the appellant before the Inspector General of Police, Gurgaon Range against the said reversion order, resultantly E whereof, by order dated 28.04.2001, the Inspector General of Police, Gurgaon Range, modified the order of reversion to stoppage of one increment. The Controlling Officer of the appellant recorded adverse remarks against him for the periods between 11.10.1999 to 31.03.2000 and 01.04.2000 to 29.12.2000. Initially, the representation filed apropos F the period between 01.04.1999 to 31.03.2000 was rejected by orders dated 19.02.2002 and 27.06.2001. However, the representation pertaining to the period from 01.04.2000 to 29.12.2000 was partly accepted by order dated 20.07.2002. Thereafter, the appellant preferred a second consolidated representation for the aforesaid periods, which was accepted on 28.01.2005. This second representation by the appellant was pursuant G

to judgment dated 27.09.2004 in Civil Suit No.168 of 2002 (filed on 06.08.2002) before the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), whereby the stoppage of one increment was set aside and the respondents were directed to release the same. However, his prayer for expunging the adverse remarks was not accepted, yet liberty to prefer a fresh H representation was granted by the learned Civil Court. AISH MOHAMMAD v. STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. 409 [AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.] 5. Challenge to judgment dated 27.09.2004 supra by the A respondent-State was dismissed by the learned District Judge, Gurgaon, and the same has attained finality. The appellant, in terms of observations made by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) Gurgaon in the judgment dated 27.09.2004, preferred a consolidated representation before the Inspector General of Police, Gurgaon Range for expunction of adverse B

remarks, on 07.01.2005. The Inspector General of Police, Gurgaon Range, Gurgaon vide order dated 28.01.2005 expunged all the adverse remarks. Thereafter, the appellant received a Show-Cause Notice dated 05.09.2006 from the Director General of Police, Haryana stating that undue benefit had been given to the appellant by expunction of remarks and why the same should not be restored and an order of compulsory C retirement be passed against him, indicating thereby, that due to expunction of these adverse remarks, he had escaped being retired from service compulsorily and also became eligible for further promotion. The appellant filed his Reply to the Show-Cause Notice on 22.09.2006. The Director General of Police, Haryana by order dated 30.10.2006 directed D reconstruction of the Annual Confidential Report [hereinafter referred to as “ACR” (in singular) and “ACRs” (in plural)] for the aforesaid period.

6. Aggrieved by the order dated 30.10.2006, the appellant filed Civil Writ Petition No.19128 of 2006 before the High Court. During the pendency of this writ petition, the appellant received notice for retirement E issued by the Superintendent of Police, Mewat, Nuh dated 08.09.2008, informing him that his service was not required by the department beyond the age of 55 years, in public interest and he was to stand retired from service under the State of Haryana in terms of Rule 3.26(d) of the Punjab Civil Services Rules, 1934 Vol-I Part I and Rule 8.18 of the Punjab F Police Rules, 1934 as applicable to the State of Haryana. This was followed by the order of the Superintendent of Police, Palwal dated 27.10.2008 directing his retirement with effect from 30.11.2008. The learned Single Judge by judgment dated 27.01.2010 in Civil Writ Petition No.19128 of 2006 [2010 SCC OnLine P&H 1193] allowed the Writ Petition and the order for reconstruction of the adverse ACRs and G compulsory retirement was quashed. The learned Single Judge also held that the appellant was entitled to all consequential benefits. The relevant part of the said judgment1 notes: 1 The extract is from the SCC OnLine version. It is noted that the cited portion from Ram Niwas (supra) seems to be grammatically incorrect. H 410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R. A “…

I have heard learned counsel for the parties. The controversy involved in these writ petitions is covered by a judgment in the case of Amarjit Kaur v. State of Punjab and others, 1988 (4) SLR 199 and a Division Bench judgment of this Court B dated 26.5.2006 passed in CWP No. 8356 of 2006 (Ram Niwas v. State of Haryana) as also a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rathi Alloys and Steel Ltd. v. C.C.E. (1990) 2 SCC 324. In the case of Ram Niwas (supra), following observations have been made:-C “….Firstly, in law there is administrative hierarchy which was not to be respect and any successor cannot set aside the order passed by his predecessor. Secondly, there is no provision under the Punjab Police Rules, 1934, as applicable to Haryana or in any instructions or subordinate legislation providing for review of an order D passed by the predecessor in office. It is well settled that power or review cannot be exercised unless it is expressly provided by the Statute. In this regard, reliance may be placed on a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rathi Alloys and Steel Ltd. v. C.C.E., (1990) 2 SCC E 324. Our view also finds support from the judgment of this Court in the case of Amarjit Kaur v. State of Punjab and others, 1988 (4) SLR 199….”

Following the aforesaid judgment, CWP No. 9973 of 2007 and CWP No. 12095 of 2007 were allowed by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 23.3.2009. Ratio of all F these judgments is that the predecessor of an Officer in the hierarchy of service has no authority to review his orders.” (sic) 7. Evincibly, the learned Single Judge concluded, in essence, that G the original expunction could not be held to be illegal, and the subsequent reconstruction of the remarks would be incorrect in view of the pronouncements of law referred to by him. 8. The respondent-State, aggrieved, preferred Letters Patent Appeal No.406 of 2011 (O & M) which was allowed by judgment dated H 25.04.2011 [2011 SCC OnLine P&H 4687] setting aside judgment AISH MOHAMMAD v. STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. 411 [AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.] dated 27.01.2010 of the learned Single Judge, thereby restoring the order A of the Director General of Police, Haryana dated 30.10.2006. The judgment of the learned Division Bench is impugned before us. SUBMISSIONS BY THE APPELLANT:

9. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the judgment Bimpugned is unsustainable for the reason that the main ground for allowing the appeal of the respondent-State was that the Order of the Inspector General of Police dated 28.01.2005was completely against the verdict of the learned Civil Court refusing to expunge the adverse remarks, which was not only highly improper but totally unwarranted and the Director General of Police rightly set aside the order of his C subordinate. It was submitted that the learned Division Bench failed to consider that the Director General of Police did not have any power of review as per the Punjab Police Rules, 1934 which applied to the State of Haryana. 10. Moreover, reiterating that the basic reasoning of the learned D Division Bench for allowing the appeal of the State, as noted supra, was that the learned Civil Court had refused to interfere in expunging the remarks passed by the Controlling Officer and thus, the Inspector General of Police had no authority to pass an order for expunction, was highly improper and totally unwarranted. Learned counsel submitted that Eunder similar circumstances, a co-ordinate Single Bench had interfered to hold that the Director General of Police had no power to review an order passed by the predecessor-in-office. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE OFFICIAL RESPONDENTS-R1 to R7: F

11. Per contra, learned counsel for the State of Haryana and the other official respondents (R2, R3, R4, R5, R6 and R7) submitted that the present case had been refiled after an inordinate delay of 11 years. It was submitted that even though the ground of delay is sought to be explained, being the unfortunate death of the appellant’s son, the same took place in 2011 and thus, re-filing having been done only in 2022 i.e., G 10 years after such incident, would not entitle the appellant to the benefit of condonation for such long and unexplained delay. He submitted that the view taken in the Impugned Judgment, that the Inspector General of Police could not have over-reached the judgment of the learned Civil Court, is correct. Moreover, it was submitted that the adverse entry in H 412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R. A the ACR of the appellant was on account of serious charges – viz. Corruption, insubordination and dereliction of duty. 12. Learned counsel summed up his arguments by taking the stand that the appellant, having been compulsorily retired, the same not being a ‘punishment’, the principles of natural justice would not be B applicable. ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION: 13. Having considered the rival submissions, the Court would note that both the learned Single Judge and the learned Division Bench did not appreciate the legal position in the correct perspective of the factual C background.

14. The undisputed position is that adverse remarks were entered into the ACR of the appellant for the period(s) in question, due to which initially an order of departmental enquiry was passed based on a complaint; in the departmental enquiry, an order came to be passed, and D the appellant was reverted from the post of Head Constable to the post of Constable. The appellant challenged such reversion. The reversion order was modified to stoppage of one increment. For expunction of the adverse remarks, he moved before the Inspector General of Police, Gurgaon Range, which was initially rejected for the entire period in question. On further representation, the Inspector General of Police, E Gurgaon Range, on 20.07.2002, expunged the remarks partially for the period of 01.04.2000 to 29.12.2000. 15. The appellant filed Civil Suit No.168 of 2002 against the order of stoppage of one increment as also the adverse entry(ies)/ remark(s) in his ACR, which was finally decided by the learned Civil F Judge (Junior Division), Gurgaon by judgment and order dated 27.09.2004, interfering with the stoppage of one increment, but not interfering with the ACR aspect. However, in the said judgment, it was observed as under: “If at all, plaintiff feels that recording remarks was the result G

of above adverse said departmental proceedings and result thereof, then in the wake of setting aside of the impugned order by this court, plaintiff, if so advised may again file a representation with the competent authority against the adverse remarks which shall be decided by said authority expeditiously. H In the totality of circumstances, this court is not inclined to AISH MOHAMMAD v. STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. 413 [AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.] interfere with the satisfaction of competent authority to record A adverse remarks in the ACR of plaintiff. Hence, no relief whatsoever regarding expunction of adverse remarks can be granted in favour of plaintiff. Accordingly, issue No.2 is hereby decided against plaintiff and in favour of defendants.” (sic) B

16. This permitted the appellant to again file a representation before the Inspector General of Police, Gurgaon Range, for expunction of adverse remarks, which was disposed favourably, and the adverse remarks were expunged. However, the Director General of Police issued a Show-Cause Notice to the appellant that the adverse remarks were C wrongly expunged, which made the appellant escape compulsory retirement. Thereafter, the appellant was retired having crossed the age of 55 years, in terms of such power being conferred on the competent authority under the Punjab Civil Services Rules. The matter then came before the High Court, initially before the learned Single Judge who, Drelying on certain precedents, recorded that the Director General of Police could not have passed the order impugned therein, as it amounted to a review of an order passed by his predecessor-in-office. 17. The Court would pause at this juncture to indicate that the factual premise noted by the learned Single Judge itself was wrong, Einasmuch as it was the Inspector General of Police, who had, in effect, ‘reviewed’ an order passed by his predecessor-in-office by expunging the adverse remarks, which was previously declined by his predecessor-in-office. Volume II of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934 provides as under: “16.28. Powers to review proceedings F

(1) The Inspector-General, a Deputy Inspector-General, and a Superintendent of Police may call for the records of awards made by their subordinates and confirm, enhance, modify or annul the same, or make further investigation or direct such to be made before passing orders. G (2) If an award of dismissal is annulled, the officer annulling it shall state whether it is to be regarded as suspension followed by reinstatement, or not. The order should also state whether service previous to dismissal should count for pension or not. H 414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R. A (3) In all cases in which officers propose to enhance an award they shall, before passing final orders, give the defaulter concerned an opportunity of showing cause, either personally or in writing, why his punishment should not be enhanced.” (emphasis supplied) B 18. Clearly, the ‘review’ contemplated in Rule 16.28 empowers a superior authority to ‘call for the records of awards made by their subordinates and confirm, enhance, modify or annul the same, or make further investigation or direct such to be made before passing orders.’ As such, the ‘review’ is by a superior authority and not the C same authority.

19. Before adverting to the merits, we may at once highlight the incongruity that has crept in the Rules (supra) due to passage of time, legally and in fact. To a judicially or legally trained mind, it is obvious that ‘review’ carries a specific connotation, but the same is not the case herein. Put simply, review is a re-look at an order passed by the same D authority which passed the original order, be it a Court or an executive officer. The heading to the rule above is a misnomer inasmuch as no power of ‘review’ is created or conferred, as manifest from a reading of (1), (2) and (3) of Rule 16.28. For completeness, Rule 16.29 is entitled “Right of appeal” and Rule 16.32 is labelled “Revision”. This is one E part of the issue. 20. The next part is that the Rules, originally framed in 1934, contemplated the authorities as “The Inspector-General, a Deputy Inspector-General, and a Superintendent of Police”. The “Inspector-General” of that time [when the service was called Imperial/Indian F Police] headed the State Police, but is today known as, in most States and Union Territories, barring a handful, in the hierarchy of the State Police, as the Director-General of Police, an officer drawn from the Indian Police Service, who sits at the apex of the state police machinery. In fact, today the Inspector-General of Police is administratively subordinate to the Director-General of Police and the Additional Director- G General of Police.

21. The Rules were also framed at a time when the system of Ranges and Commissionerates had not been established. Indubitably, the Rules, for better or for worse (worse, we hazard) have not kept pace with the times. We do not appreciate why the authorities concerned H AISH MOHAMMAD v. STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. 415 [AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.] are unable to update/amend the Rules with at least the correct official A description of posts to obviate confusion. 22. In the case at hand, the Director General of Police, Haryana, had never passed any order earlier and for the first time when the issue was brought to his notice, a Show-Cause Notice was issued to the appellant as to why the adverse remarks be not reconstructed; as due to B such expunction, he had escaped from being retired from service compulsorily. Thus, the order passed by the learned co-ordinate Single Judge in CWP No.9973 of 2007 and CWP No.12095 of 2007 dated 23.03.2009 had no applicability in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Be that as it was, the State of Haryana moved in appeal Cagainst the judgment of the learned Single Judge herein, which was allowed in favour of the respondent-State.

23. This Court finds that the learned Division Bench has not approached the issue in the manner it was required to. The reason given for interference with the learned Single Judge’s view is that it was highly Dimprobable and unwarranted for the Inspector General of Police to have expunged the adverse remarks when there was a judicial verdict by the learned Civil Court refusing to do so. The said reasoning was employed despite noting the fact that even if there was any power of review, in the extant circumstances, it was wholly arbitrary. It was further observed that a judicial verdict by the learned Civil Court should have been E respected. This Court would note that such reasoning is also erroneous. The fact remained that, rightly or wrongly, the learned Civil Court had granted this opportunity to the appellant to move again for expunction of adverse remarks, which the appellant did. Having said that, this Court would now look at the issue from a totally legal point of view – firstly, Fthe authorities were exercising the power conferred on them by statute, and secondly, any order which amounts to ‘review’ (in the legal sense of the word) of an earlier order by the same authority cannot be undertaken, unless specifically so conferred by the relevant statute.

24. Moreover, the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) found no Gground to interfere with the adverse remarks yet granted liberty to the appellant to move for expunction thereof. The learned Civil Court erred in assuming that it had the power to do so, in the absence of any such provision in the Punjab Police Rules, 1934. There may be cases where a High Court under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India or this Court in exercise of its constitutional powers may specifically direct for H 416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R. A fresh consideration of a representation, even in the absence of specific provisions. In High Court of Tripura v Tirtha Sarathi Mukherjee, (2019) 16 SCC 663, the question that arose was whether, in the absence of a statutory provision, a writ petitioner could seek re-evaluation of examination answer scripts? Answering, this Court held:

B “20. The question however arises whether even if there is no legal right to demand re-valuation as of right could there arise circumstances which leave the Court in any doubt at all. A grave injustice may be occasioned to a writ applicant in certain circumstances. The case may arise where even though there is no provision for re-valuation it turns out that C despite giving the correct answer no marks are awarded. No doubt this must be confined to a case where there is no dispute about the correctness of the answer. Further, if there is any doubt, the doubt should be resolved in favour of the examining body rather than in favour of the candidate. The wide power D under Article 226 may continue to be available even though there is no provision for re-valuation in a situation where a candidate despite having giving correct answer and about which there cannot be even the slightest manner of doubt, he is treated as having given the wrong answer and consequently the candidate is found disentitled to any marks. E

21. Should the second circumstance be demonstrated to be present before the writ court, can the writ court become helpless despite the vast reservoir of power which it possesses? It is one thing to say that the absence of provision for re-valuation will not enable the candidate to claim the right of F evaluation as a matter of right and another to say that in no circumstances whatsoever where there is no provision for re-valuation will the writ court exercise its undoubted constitutional powers? We reiterate that the situation can only be rare and exceptional.” G (emphasis supplied) 25. The unique nature of power bestowed on the High Courts under Article 226 has very recently been commented upon in B S Hari Commandant v Union of India, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 413. In Sanjay Dubey v State of Madhya Pradesh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC H AISH MOHAMMAD v. STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. 417 [AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.] 610, while declining to interfere with the order impugned therein, a reason A which weighed was that a High Court had passed the said order, and not a Court of Session. This again emphasised the special nature of the High Courts, including that they are Constitutional Courts.

26. Thus, the observation by the learned Civil Court that the appellant could approach the authority, cannot be taken to mean that the B appellant was granted carte blanche liberty in law to approach the same authority. What the learned Civil Court lost sight of was that no provision permitted the course of action suggested by it. Examined from another lens, even if we were to read the learned Civil Court’s view in the appellant’s favour, at best, he may have had some justification in Capproaching the Director General of Police, Haryana, being a superior authority, but the same authority could not have been approached again. On this line of reasoning, it becomes clear that even though the appellant had a window to move before the authorities again and dehors the learned Civil Court not interfering, but the same should have been to the superior authority and not the same authority, which had earlier refused expunction. D In any event, we need not dilate on this further. 27. As far back as in 1971, directions were issued by the State Government that repeated representations would not be entertained as it would be contrary to Government Letter No. 2784-3S-70 dated 22.03.1971 mandating that a second representation against adverse E remarks would not lie and which clarified the position that the same authority did not have any power of review for an order passed by its predecessor-in-office.

28. As such, the Director General of Police had rightly show-caused the appellant and taken subsequent action thereupon. Considering F the chain of events, the consequential action, in our considered view, cannot be said to be arbitrary or shocking the conscience of the Court, so as to warrant interference. For a person in uniformed service, like the police, adverse entry relating to his/her integrity and conduct is to be adjudged by the superior authority(ies) who record and approve such Gentry. Personnel having such remarks being compulsorily retired as per the statutory provisions under the Punjab Civil Services Rules, 1934, in the instant facts, is not an action this Court would like to interdict. We are hence not inclined to interfere with the order impugned, though as discussed above, for entirely different reasons than what were considered by and prevailed with the learned Division Bench. H 418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R. A 29. Accordingly, the instant appeal stands dismissed. 30. Parties are left to bear their own costs. ADDITIONAL DIRECTION(S): 31. Copies of this judgment be communicated to the (a) the Chief B Secretaries, Governments of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh; (b.1) the Principal Secretary, Department of Home Affairs and Justice, Government of Punjab and (b.2) the Additional Chief Secretary, Home, Government of Haryana, and (c) the Directors General of Police, Punjab and Haryana by the Registry.

32. Steps be taken forthwith in line with the observations recorded C at Paragraphs 19 to 21. Nidhi Jain Appeal dismissed. (Assisted by : Tamana, LCRA) D E F G H