[2017] 12 S.C.R. 933 SREI INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE LIMITED A v. TUFF DRILLING PRIVATE LIMITED (Civil Appeal No. 15036 of2017) SEPTEMBER 20, 2017 B [A. K. SIKRI AND ASHOK BHUSHAN, JJ.)

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - s.25(a) - Arbitral tribunal appointed with the consent of the parties, directed the respondent-claimant to file its statement of claim - Statement of claim cnot filed by respondent -Arbitral tribunal tem1inated the proceedings uls.25(a) - Application filed by respondent before arbitral tribunal praying for recall of order terminating the proceedings, stating the reasons for non-filing of the statement of claim - Appellant questioned the maintainability of said application on the ground that arbitral tribunal has become functus officio in view of temiination D of the proceedings u/s.25(a), hence the arbitral tribunal cannot recall its order terminating the proceedings - Arbitral tribunal accepted the preliminary objection raised by appellant and rejected respondents application holding that in view of the order terminating the proceedings, he cannot pass an order recommencing E the arbitration proceedings - Revision petition filed by respondent, allowed by High Court which held that arbitral tribunal has power to recall its own order and remitted the matter back to arbitral tribunal to decide the application filed by respondent on merits -On appeal, held: Arbitra/ tribunal does not become functus officio after passing order u/s.25(a) - There is no lack of jurisdiction in F arbitral tribunal to recall the earlier order, terminating the proceedings, on sufficient cause being shown - Jn the instant case, arbitral tribunal committed error in holding that it has no jurisdiction to recall its order terminating the proceedings u/s.25(a) - Arhitral tribunal to consider the application filed by respondent for recall G of order terminating the proceedings.

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - ss.23(1), 25(a) -Non-filing of statement of claim by claimant within the time as contemplated u/s.23(1) - Arbitral Tribunal if obligated to terminate the proceedings -Held: On sufficient cause being shown by a H 933 934 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R. - A claimant, even though the time to file the statement of claim u!s.23(1) has expired, it is not obligatory for the arbitral tribunal to terminate the proceedings u!s.25(a). Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Proceedings under - Nature of - Held: Arbitration is a quasi judicial proceeding, B equitable in nature or character which differs from a litigation in a Court. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Arbitral Tribunals -Constitution of - Discussed. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, I 996 - Object of enactment c - Discussed. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Arbitral Tribunals -· Procedural review - Power of - Held: A quasi-judicial authority is vested with the power to invoke procedural review.

D Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Termination of proceedings u!s. 25(a), if covered u!s.32(2)(c) - Held: Cl. (c) of sub.sec.(2) of s.32 contemplates two grounds for termination, i.e.,(i) where arbitral tribunal find~ that the continuation of proceedings has become unnecessary or (ii) impossible- Howeve1~ s.25 contemplates a situation where arbitration proceedings have not E been started as the claimant fails to file his statement of claim -Thus, the eventuality as contemplated uls.32 shall arise only when the claim is not terminated u!s.25(a) and proceeds further -There.fore, the words 'unnecessary' or 'impossible' as used in s.32(2)(c) cannot be said to be covering a situation where F proceedings are terminated in de.fault of the claimant uls.25(a). Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Or.9, 1'.l 3- Setting aside decree ex-parte against defendant - Applicability of, to arbitration proceedings - Arbitral tribunal appointed with the consent of the parties - On the first sitting of the arbitral tribunal, it directed the G respondent-claimant to file its statement of claim - Respondent neither present on the next date nor filed the statement of claim -Further time granted by arbitral tribunal - Respondent did not appear on the next date as well nor filed the statement of claim -Arbitral tribunal terminated the proceedings uls.25(a) - Held: Principles underlying Or.9, d 3 can be invoked by the arbitrator -H SREI INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE LIMITED v. TUFF 935

DRILLING PRIVATE LIMITED Further. in the instant case, there is nothing on record to indicate A that parties agreed to the contrary - Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - s.19. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - s.19 - Interpretation of- Held: S.19 provides that arbitral tribunal shall not be bound by the rules of procedure as contained in Civil Procedure Code, B however, it cannot be read to mean that arbitral tribunal is incapacitated in drawing sustenance from any provisions of Civil Procedure Code - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1 The arbitration is a quasi judicial proceeding, C equitable in nature or character which differs from a litigation in a Court. The power and functions of arbitral tribunal arc statutorily regulated. Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code vests into the Civil Court jurisdiction to entertain and determine any civil dispute. The constitution of tribunals has been with intent and D purpose to take out different categories of litigation into the special tribunal for speedy and effective determination of disputes in the interest of the society. Whenever, by a legislative enactment jurisdiction exercised by ordinary civil court is transferred or entrusted to tribunals such tribunals are entrusted with statutory power. The arbitral tribunals in the Arbitration and Conciliation E Act, 1996 arc no different, they decide the lis between the parties, follows Rules and procedure conforming to the principle of natural justice, the adjudication has finality subject to remedy provided under the 1996 Act. Section 8 of the 1996 Act obliges a judicial authority in a matter which is a subject of an agreement to refer F the parties to arbitration. The reference to arbitral tribunal thus can be made by judicial authority or an arbitrator can be appointed in accordance with the arbitration agreement under Section 11 of the 1996 Act. [Para 12) [944-G-H, A-CJ

1.2 Section 25 contemplates a situation when the claimant G fails to communicate his statement of claim within the time as envisaged by Section 23, the arbitral tribunal has to terminate the proceedings. This section thus contemplates a situation where arbitration proceeding has not been started. The most important words contained in Section 25 are "where without showing H 936 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 12 S.C.R.

A · sufficient cause - the claimant fails to communicate his statement of claim". Under Section 23(1), the claimant is to state the facts supporting his claim within the period of time agreed upon by the parties or determined by the arbitral tribunal. The question of termination of proceedings thus arises only after the time agreed B upon between the parties or determined by the arbitral tribunal comes to an end. When the time as contemplated under Section 23(1) expires and no sufficient cause is shown by the claimant the arbitral tribunal shall terminate the proceedings. The question of showing sufficient cause will arise only when the claimant is asked to show cause as to why he failed to submit his claim within C the time as envisaged under Section 23(1) or the claimant, on his own, before the order is passed under Section 25(a) to terminate the proceedings comes before the arbitral tribunal showing sufficient cause for not being able to submit his claim within the time. In both the circumstances, i.e. when a show-cause notice is issued to the claimant or claimant of his own shows cause for o· non-filing the claim within the time the, arbitral tribunal shall take a call on terminating the proceedings. In the event, the claimant shows a sufficient cause, the arbitral tribunal can accept the statement of claim even after expiry of the time as envisaged under Section 23(1) or grant further time to the claimant to file a E claim. Thus, on sufficient cause being shown by a claimant even though time has expired under Section 23(1), it is not obligatory for the arbitral tribunal to terminate the proceedings. The conjunction of the wording "where without showing sufficient cause" and "the claimant fails to communicate his statement of claim" would indicate that it is a duty of the arbitral tribunal to F inform the claimant that he has failed to communicate his claim on the date fixed for that and requires him to show-cause why the arbitral proceedings should not be terminated? Opportunity to show sufficient cause for his failure to communicate his claim statement can only be given after he has actually failed to do so. G · [Para 19] [947-B-H; 948-A)

Whether in a case, as in the present case, where claimant failed to file a statement of claim and has failed also to show-cause before an order of termination of proceedings is passed, claimant is entitled to show-cause subsequent to the termination of H proceedings? SREI INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE LIMITED v. TUFF 937 DRILLING PRIVATE LIMITED 1.3 When the arbitral tribunal without sufficient cause being A shown by the claimant to file the claim statement can terminate the proceedings, subsequent to termination of proceedings, if the sufficient cause is shown, there is no impediment in the power of the arbitral tribunal to accept the show-cause and permit the claimant to file the claim. The Scheme of Section 25 of the Act Bclearly indicates that on sufficient cause being shown, the statement of claim can be permitted to be filed even after the time as fixed by Section 23(1) has expired. Thus, even after passing the order of terminating the proceedings, if sufficient cause is shown, the claims of statement can be accepted by the arbitral tribunal by accepting the show-cause and there is no lack C of the jurisdiction in the arbitral tribunal to recall the earlier order on sufficient cause being shown. [Para 20)948-C-D)

1.4 After terminating the proceedings under Section 25(a), the arbitral tribunal can recall the said order on sufficient cause being shown and the arbitral tribunal docs not become functus D officio after passing an order under Section 25(a). The arbitral tribunal can recall the order terminating the proceedings under Section 25(a) and re-commence the proceedings. [Paras 30, 32] [954-B-C, D-E) Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited v. Jyothi Turbopower E Services Private Limited & Ors. 2017 (1) Arb. LR 289 (Madras); Awasthi Construction Co. v. Govt. Of NCT of Delhi & Am: 2013 (l) Arb. LR 70 (Delhi)(DB); ATV Projects India Ltd. v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. & Am: 200 (2013) DLT 553 (DB) - approved. F Whether termination of proceedings, in the present case, under Section 25(a) can be treated to be covered bv Section 32(2)(c) ? 2.1 Section 32 contains a heading "Termination of Proceedings". Sub-section(2) enumerates the circumstances when the arbitral tribunal shall issue an order for the termination Gof the arbitral proceedings. Sub-clause(c) contemplates two grounds for termination, i.e.; (i) the arbitral tribunal finds that the continuation of the proceedings has for any other reason become unnecessary or (ii) impossible. The eventuality as contemplated under Section 32 shall arise only when the claim is H 938 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A not terminated under Section 25(a) and proceeds further. The word 'unnecessary' or 'impossible' as used in clause (c) of Section . 32(2) cannot be said to be covering a situation where proceedings are terminated in default of the claimant. The word unnecessary or impossible has been used in different contexts than to one of default as contemplated under Section 25(a). Sub-section (3) of B Section 32 further provides that the mandate of the arbitral tribunal shall terminate with the termination of the arbitral proceedings subject to Section 33 and sub-section (4) of Section

34. Section 33 is the power of the arbitral tribunal to correct any computation errors, any clerical or typographical errors or any c other errors of a similar nature or to give an interpretation af a specific point or part of the award. Section 34(4) reserves the power of the Court to adjourn the proceedings in order to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings or to take such other action as in the opinion of arbitral tribunal will eliminate the grounds for setting aside the D arbitral award. On the termination of proceedings under Sections 32(2) and 33(1), Section 33(3) further contemplates termination of the mandate of the arbitral tribunal, whereas the aforesaid words are missing in Section 25. When the legislature has used the phrase "the mandate of the arbitral tribunal shall terminate" E in Section 32(3), non-use of such phrase in Section 25(a) has to be treated with a purpose and object. The purpose and object can only be that if the claimant shows sufficient cause, the proceedings can be re-commenced. [Para 21) [948-E-H; 949-A-C) Power of procedural review of arbitral tribunals. Applicabilitv of F Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to arbitration proceedings.

3.1 When a review is sought due to a procedural defect, such power inheres in every tribunal. A quasi-judicial authority is vested with the power to invoke procedural review. There cannot be a dispute that the power exercised by the arbitral G tribunal is quasi-judicial. In view of the provisions of the 1996 Act, which confers various statutory powers and obligations on the arbitral tribunal, no distinction is found between the statutory tribunal constituted under the statutory provisions or Constitution in so far as the power of procedural review is concerned. Section 19 provides that arbitral tribunal shall not be bound by the rules H of procedure as contained in Civil Procedure Code. The words SREI INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE LIMITED v. TUFF 939 DRILLING PRIVATE LIMITED

"arbitral tribunal shall not be bound" are the words of amplitude A and not of a restriction. These words do not prohibit the arbitral tribunal from drawing sustenance from the fundamental principles underlining the Civil Procedure Code or Indian Evidence Act but the tribunal is not bound to obsen·e the provisions of Code with all of its rigour. Section 19 cannot be read to mean that B arbitral tribunal is incapacitated in drawing sustenance from any provisions of Code of Civil Procedure. Arbitral tribunal has power to review on sufficient cause being shown. As per sub-clause (2) of Section 19 the parties arc free to agree on the procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal in conducting its proceedings. Principles underlying Order 9 Rule 13, Code of Civil Procedure, C 1908 can very well be invoked by the arbitrator. There is nothing on record to indicate that parties agreed to the contrary. [Paras 14, 23-26) [950-A-D; 951-E-F; 952-A; 945-F-G] Mis. Senbo Engineering Ltd. v. State of Bihar & Ors. AIR 2004 Patna 33 - approved. D Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal & Ors., (1980) Supp SCC 420; Kapra Mazdoor Ekta Union v. Bir/a Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. & Am: (2005) 13 sec 777; Nahar Industrial Enterprises Limited v. Hong Kong and E Shanghai Banking Corporation (2009) 8 SCC 646 -relied on.

3.2 In the present case, the arbitral tribunal had rejected the application of the claimant seeking recall of order terminating the proceedings taking the view that after an order is passed by F him terminating the proceedings, he cannot pass the order recommencing the arbitration proceedings. The arbitral tribunal committed an error in holding that it has no jurisdiction to recall an order terminating the proceedings under Section 25(a). [Para 33) (954-E-F] G PMA Shukkur v. Muthoot Vehicle (2010) Arb. LR 121 (Kcrala) - not ap1>roved. Anil Sood v. Presiding Office1; Labour Court II (2001) 10 sec 534; La/it Kumar V. Sanghavi v. Dharamdas V. Sanghavi & Ors. (2014) 7 SCC 255 - referred to. H 940 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R. A Case Law Reference AIR 2004 Patna 33 approved Para 26 c2014) 7 sec 255 referred to Para 7 (1980) Supp sec 420 relied on Para 21 B· (2005) 13 sec 111 relied on Para 24 (2009) 8 sec 646 relied on Para 25 AIR 2004 Patna 33 approved Para 26 c2001) 10 sec 534 referred to Para 27 c 2013 (I) Arb. LR 70 (Dclhi)(DB) approved Para 28 2007 (2013) D LT 553 (DB) approved Para 9 2017 (1) Arb. LR 289 (Madras) approved Para 30 (2010) Arb. LR 121 (Kerala) not approved Para 30 D CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 15036 of2017. From the final Judgment and Order dated 13.02.2015 of the High Court at Calcutta in C.O. No. 3190 of 2012. E. Jayant Bhushan, Sr. Adv., Shantanu Ghosh, Raghunath Ghosh, S.K. Verma, Advs. for the Appellant.

Rakesh Dwivedi, Sr. Adv.( AC), Ms. Sansriti Pathak, Adv. for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by F ASHOK BHUSHAN, J. Leave granted. I. This appeal has been filed against the judgment dated 13.02.2015 of the Calcutta High Court by which the High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution oflndia has set aside G the Order passed by the arbitral tribunal by which the arbitral tribunal had refused to recall its Order dated 12.12.20 l l terminating the arbitration proceedings on account of non filing of the claim by the claimant. 2. The undisputed facts of the case are: -The respondent filed an application under Section 11 of the H · Arbitration and Conciliation Act, I 996 (hereinafter referred to as "the SREI INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE LIMITED v. TUFF 941 DRILLING PRIVATE LIMITED [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.] 1996 Act") for referring the dispute to arbitrator on the strength of contract A entered with appellant. Dw·ing pcndency of the application under Section 11 with consent of the parties, Sri Baskar Sen, Senior Advocate, Bar-at-Law was appointed as Arbitrator. The application under Section 11 of the 1996 Act was thus dismissed as not pressed. One-man arbitral tribunal entered into reference and called for the first sitting of the arbitral tribunal 8on 27.08.2011. Both the parties appeared on 27.08.20 l l on which date m:bitral tribunal had directed the respondent to file the statement of claim.

3. Subsequently, 19th November was fixed on which date the claimant was absent. The arbitral tribunal directed for filing statement of claim by 9th December. On 9th December, the claim could not be filed by respondent and by order dated 12.12.2011, tribunal terminated C the proceedings under Section 25(a) by making the following observations: - ·· ... It appears that the claimant is not interested to proceed with the reference. No cause has been shown as to why they have not filed their Statement of Claim in spite of repeated D opportunities being given to them. ]11 view of Section 25(a) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 the Arbitrator, therefore, has 110 alternative but to terminate the proceedings. The arbitration proceedings in respect of the dispute in which Tuff Drilling Private Limited is the claimant which arose out E of the agreement dated 21st January, 2008 pertaining to 1500 HP diesel electric rig is thus terminated. .. "

4. The Claimant filed an application dated 20.01.2012 praying for recall of the order dated 12.12.2011 with further prayer to condone the delay in filing the statement of claim by granting necessary extension of time. In the application, reasons for non-filing of the statement of the F claim and for non-appearance of the claimant on 19.11.2011 and 12.12.2011 were stated in detail. The application filed by the claimant was objected by the appellant. The appellant questioned the maintainability of the application dated 20.01.2012 on the ground that arbitral tribunal has become functus officio in view of termination of the proceedings G under Section 25(a), hence the arbitral tribunal cannot recall its order terminating the proceedings. The arbitral tribunal heard both the parties and by an order dated 26.04.2012 accepted the preliminary objections of the appellant holding that in view of order terminating the proceedings, he cannot pass an order recommencing the arbitration proceedings. The application of the respondent claimant was thus rejected. Aggrieved by H 942 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A the order of the arbitral tribunal dated 26.04.2012, the claimant approached the Calcutta High Court in its revisionary jurisdiction by filing C.0.No.3190 of2012. The appellant before the High Court objected the maintainability of the application under Article 227 of the Constitution. It was further contended before the High Court that after terminating B the proceedings arbitral tribunal had become fimctus officio and had no power to recall the order dated 12.12.201 l. The High Court after considering the submissions of parties came to the conclusion that arbitral tribunal enjoys the power to recall its own order relying on the Patna High Court judgment reported in Mis S11ebo E11gi11eering Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar and Ors., AIR 2004 Patna 33. The High Court also overruled C the objections of appellant that application under Article 227 by the claimant challenging the order dated 12.12.2011 was not maintainable. The High Court after entertaining the application under Article 227 held that arbitral tribunal has power to recall its own order. The High Court set aside the order of the arbitral tribunal and remitted the matter back D to the arbitral tribunal to decide the application dated 20.01.2012 filed by the respondent on merits. The appellant aggrieved by the judgment of Calcutta High Cow"t has come up in this appeal.

5. This court on 07.07.2015 issued notice and in the meantime stayed the operation of the order passed by the Calcutta High Court. Although, the respondent was served but none appeared on behalf of E the respondent. While hearing the matteron 29 .08.2017, this court noticed that question oflaw raised in this case is important one and since no one has appeared on behalf of respondent, this court requested Shri Rakesh · Dwivedi, Senior Advocate, to assist the court in deciding the issue. 6. We have heard Shri Jayant Bhushan, learned senior counsel, F assisted by Shri Santanu Ghosh, learned counsel for the appellant. Shri Rakesh Dwivedi, learned senior counsel assisted by Ms. Sansriti Pathak, learned counsel, has been heard as amicus curiae. 7. Learned Counsel for the appellant submits that the arbitral tribunal had terminated the proceedings on 12.12.2011 due to non-filing G of claim by the claimant in spite ofopportunities having been granted to it. The arbitral tribunal had becomejimctus officio and had no jurisdiction to recall the order dated 12.12.2011 on the application filed by the respondent claimant to recall the said order. It is further contended that against the order dated 12.12.2011 terminating the proceeding application H under Article 227 of the Constitution of India was not maintainable. SREI INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE LIMITED v. TUFF 943 DRILLING PRIVATE LIMITED [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

Learned counsel for the appellant has relied on judgment of this Court A reported in La/it Kumar V. Sanghavi Vs. Dharamdas V. Sanghavi & Ors., 2014(7) SCC 255 in support of the submissions that Writ Petition was not maintainable against the order of arbitral tribunal. It is further submitted by the appellant that remedy if any available to claimant was to file an application under Section 34 of 1996 Act for setting aside the Border dated 12.12.2011.

8. Shri Rakcsh Dwivedi, learned amicus curiae, submits that the termination of proceedings under Section 25(a) and termination of proceedings under Section 32(2) arc two different eventualities. When the proceedings are terminated under Section 32(2), the mandate of the carbitral tribunal also terminates whereas no such consequence can be read in termination of proceedings tmder section 25(a). Under section 25(a), proceedings arc terminated on default of the claimant to file the statement of claim. Section 32(3) would not apply to case falling under section 25(a) of the 1996 Act. The Arbitration Act, 1996 docs not provide for remedy against the order wider section 25(a). He contends the remedy D under Section 34 is not available against such an order unless the order under Section 25(a) is also treated as an award. Learned amicus curiae submits that there seems to be legislative gap with respect to 25(a) and 32(2)(c ). He submits that it is more appropriate that Order under Section 25(a) be treated as an award so as to make it amenable under Section E34. On the submissions that whether arbitral tribunal can exercise the power akin to principle underlying under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C. Learned amicus curiae submits that arbitral tribunal can recall an order passed under Section 25(a) on the principles underlying Order IX Ruic 13 C.P.C. Learned amicus curiae in support of above submissions has also referred to j udgmcnts of Patna High Court, Delhi High Court, Madras High Court F & Bombay High Court which shall be referred to while considering the submissions in detail.

9. Referring to this court's judgment in SPP Vs. Patet E11gi11eeri11g, it is submitted that the said case has no applicability when Section 34 and 3 7 of the 1996 Act are not applicable. It was pointed out G by learned amicus curiae that La/it Kumar was a case where proceedings were terminated under Section 32(2)(c). Learned amicus curiae has lastly submitted that legislative gap as is apparent in context of provisions of Section 25(a), 32 and 34 need to be stitched up in light of the object of the legislation. H 944 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R. A 10. We have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the appellant and learned amicus curiae and have perused the record. From the submissions, following issues arise for consideration in this Civil Appeal:- !) Whether arbitral tribunal which has terminated the proceeding B under Section 25( a) due to non filing of claim by claimant has jurisdiction to consider the application for recall of the order terminating the proceedings on sufficient cause being shown by the claimant? 2) Whether the order passed by the arbitral tribunal under Section 25(a) terminating the proceeding is amenable to jurisdiction of High Court c . under Article 227 of the Constitution ofindia'! 3) Whether the Order passed under Section 25( a) terminating the proceeding is an award under the 1996 Act so as to amenable to the remedy under Section 34 of the Act?

11. The law of Arbitration was earlier governed by the Arbitration D Act, l 940. The Law Commission ofindia and several other organisations expressed opinion that the 1940 Act needs extensive amendments to make it more responsive to contemporary requirements. In the wake of rise in commercial litigation both at domestic and international level, a need was felt for a comprehensive law to deal the subject. The United E Nations Organisation on International Trade Law (UNCILTRAL) adopted a Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration in the year 1985. Taking into consideration domestic arbitration as well as international commercial arbitration, Parliament enacted the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Main objective for introducing the legislation was to make provision for an arbitral procedure which is fair, efficient F and capable of meeting the needs of the specific arbitration. In Section 2 of the Act, arbitral tribunal has been defined to mean a sole arbitrator or a panel ofarbitrators. The arbitral tribunal was entrusted with various statutory functions, obligations by the enactment.

12. The arbitration is a quasi judicial proceeding, equitable in nature G or character which differs from a litigation in a Court. The power and functions of arbitral tribunal arc statutorily regulated. The tribunals are special arbitration with institutional mechanism brought into existence by or under statute to decide dispute arising with reference to that particular statute or to determine controversy referred to it. The tribunal H may be a statutory tribunal or tribunal constituted under the provisions of SREI INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE LIMITED v. TUFF 945 DRILLING PRIVATE LIMITED [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

the Constitution ofindia. Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code vests A into the Civil Court jurisdiction to entertain and determine any civil dispute. The constitution of tribunals has been with intent and purpose to take out different categories oflitigation into the special tribunal for speedy and effective determination of disputes in the interest of the society. Whenever, by a legislative enactment jurisdiction exercised by ordinary ci vii court is Btransferred or entrusted to tribunals such tribunals are entrusted with statutory power. The arbitral tribunals in the statute of 1996 are no different, they decide the !is between the parties, follows Rules and procedure conforming to the principle ofnaturaljustice, the adjudication has finality subject to remedy provided under the 1996 Act. Section 8 of the 1996 Act obliges a judicial authority in a matter which is a subject of C an agreement to refer the parties to arbitration. The reference to arbitral tribunal thus can be made by judicial authority or an arbitrator can be appointed in accordance with the arbitration agreement under Section 11 of the 1996 Act. 13. After noticing the objective of the enactment, we now reve1t D to issues which have arisen in these appeals. Issue No. I

14. Chapter V of the Act deals with the conduct of arbitral proceedings. Section 18 provides "the parties shall be treated with equality and each party shall be given a full opportunity to present his E case. Section 18 contains the principle of natural justice to give full opportunity to paities to present their case. 15. Section 19 of the Act provides for determination of rules of procedure. Sub-clause (1) of Section 19 provides that the arbitral tribunal shall not be bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or the Indian F Evidence Act, 1872. The words "arbitral tribunal shall not be bound" arc the words of amplitude and not of a restriction. These words do not prohibit the arbitral tribunal from drawing sustenance from the fundamental principles underling the Civil Procedure Code or Indian Evidence Act but the tribunal is not.bound to observe the provisions of G Code with all of its rigour. As per sub-clause (2) of Section 19 the parties are free to agree on the procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal in conducting its proceedings. 16. Section 23 deals with claim and defence. Section 24 deals with hearing and written proceedings. H 946 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 12 S.C.R. A 17. Section 25 deals with default of a party which provision is up for interpretation in this case and is as follows: "25. Default of a party.-Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, where, without showing St!fJlcient cause,-

(a) the claimant faifs to communicate his statement of claim B in accordance with sub-section (1) of section 23, the arbitral tribunal shall terminate the proceedings; (b) the respondent fails to communicate his statement of defence in accordance with sub-section (1) of section 23, the arbitral tribunal shall continue the proceedings without c treating that failure in itself as an admission of the allegations by the claimant and shall have the discretion to treat the right of the respondent to file such statement of defence as having been forefeited; (c) a party fails to appear at an oral hearing or to produce D documentary evidence. the arbitral tribunal may continue the proceedings and make the arbitral award on the evidence before it." 18. Chapter VI deals with Making of Arbitral Award and Termination of Proceedings. Section 32 deals with Termination of E Proceedings which is quoted as below:-"32. Termination of proceedings.-( 1) The arbitral proceedings shall be terminated by the final arbitral award or by an order. of the arbitral tribunal under sub- section (2). (2) The arbitral tribunal shall issue an order for the termination of F the arbitral proceedings where-

( a) the claimant withdraws his claim, unless the respondent objects to the order and the arbitral tribunal recognises a legitimate interest on his part in obtaining a final settlement of the dispute, G (b) the parties agree on the termination of the proceedings, or ( c) the arbitral tribunal finds that the continuation ofthe proceedings has for any other reason become unnecessary or impossible. (3) Subject to section 33 and sub-section (4) of section 34, the mandate of the arbitral tribunal shall tenninate with the termination H of the arbitral proceedings." SREI INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE LIMITED v. TUFF 947 DRILLING PRNATE LIMITED [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

19. In the present case, proceedings were terminated vide Order A dated 12.12.2011 under Section 25(a). After termination of proceedings, application to recall the said order was filed by claimant on 20.01.2012, which was rejected by arbitral tribunal on the ground that it has no jurisdiction to re-commence the arbitration proceedings. Section 25 contemplates a situation when the claimant fails to communicate his Bstatement of claim within the time as envisaged by Section 23, the arbitral tribunal has to terminate the proceedings. This section thus contemplates a situation where arbitration proceeding has not been started. The most important words contained in Section 25 are "where without showing sufficient cause - the claimant fails to communicate his statement of claim''. Under Section 23(1), the claimant is to state the facts supporting c his claim within the period of time agreed upon by the parties or determined by the arbitral tribunal. The question of termination of proceedings thus arises only after the time agreed upon between the parties or determined by the arbitral tribunal comes to an end. When the time as contemplated w1der Section 23( 1) expires and no sufficient cause Dis shown by the claimant the arbitral tribunal shall terminate the proceedings. The question of showing sufficient cause will arise only when the claimant is asked to show cause as to why he failed to submit his claim within the time as envisaged under Section 23( I) or the claimant, on his own, before the order is passed under Section 25(a) to terminate the proceedings comes before the arbitral tribunal showing sufficient E cause for not being able to submit his claim within the time. In both the circumstances, i.e. when a show-cause notice is issued to the claimant as observed above or claimant ofhis own shows cause for non-filing the claim within the time the arbitral tribunal shall take a call on terminating the proceedings. It is easy to comprehend that in the event, the claimant Fshows a sufficient cause, the arbitral tribunal can accept the statement of claim even after expiry of the time as envisaged under Section 23( 1) or grant further time to the claimant to file a claim. Thus, on sufficient cause being shown by a claimant even though time has expired under Section 23(1), it is not obligatory for the arbitral tribunal to terminate the proceedings. The conjunction of the wording "where without showing G sufficient cause" and "the claimant fails to communicate his statement of claim" would indicate that it is a duty of the arbitral tribunal to inform the claimant that he has failed to communicate his claim on the date fixed for that and requires him to show-cause why the arbitral proceedings should not be terminated'? Opportunity to show sufficient cause for his H

948 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 12 S.C.R. A failure to communicate his claim statement can only be given after he has actually failed to do so. Whether in a case where claimant failed to file a statement of claim and has failed also to show-cause before an order of termination of proceedings· is passed, claimant is entitled to show-cause subsequent to the termination is the question which has fallen for consideration. B 20. When the arbitral tribunal without sufficient cause being shown by the claimant to file the claim statement can terminate the proceedings, subsequent to termination of proceedings, ifthe sufficient cause is shown, wc see no impediment in the power of the arbitral tribunal to accept the c show-cause and permit the claimant to file the claim. The Scheme of Section 25 of the Act clearly indicates that on sufficient cause being shown, the statement of claim can be permitted to be filed even after the time as fixed by Section 23( 1) has expired. Thus, even after passing the order of terminating the proceedings, if sufficient cause is shown. the claims of statement can be accepted by the arbitral tribunal by accepting D the show-cause and there is no lack of the jurisdiction in the arbitral tribunal to recall the earlier order on sufficient cause being shown.

21. Section 32 contains a heading "Termination of Proceedings". Sub-section ( 1) provides that the arbitral proceedings shall be terminated by the final arbitral award or by an order of the arbitral tribunal under E sub-section(2). Sub-section(2) enumerates the circumstances when the arbitral tribunal shall issue an order for the termination of the arbitral proceedings. The situation as contemplated under Section 32(2)(a) and 32(2)(b) are not attracted in the facts of this case. Whether termination of proceedings in the present case can be treated to be covered by Section 32(2)(c) is the question to be considered. Sub-clause(c) F contemplates two grounds for termination, i.e.: (i) the arbitral tribunal finds that the continuation of the proceedings has for any other reason become unnecessary or (ii) impossible. The eventuality as contemplated under Section 32 shall arise only when the claim is not terminated under Section 25(a) and proceeds further. The word 'unnecessary' or G 'impossible' as used in sub-clause (c) of Section 32(2) cannot be said to be covering a situation where proceedings are terminated in default of the claimant. The word unnecessary or impossible has been used in different contexts than to one of default as contemplated under Section 25(a). Sub-section (3) of Section 32 fm1her provides that the mandate of the arbitral tribunal shall terminate with the termination of the arbitral H SREI INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE LIMITED v. TUFF 949

DRILLING PRIVATE LIMITED [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.] proceedings subject to Section 33 and sub-section (4) of Section 34. A Section 33 is the power of the arbitral tribunal to correct any computation errors, any clerical or typographical errors or any other errors of a similar nature or to give an interpretation of a specific point or part of the award. Section 34(4) reserves the powerofthe Court to adjourn the proceedings in order to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral Bproceedings or to take such other action as in the opinion of arbitral tribunal will eliminate the grounds for setting aside the arbitral award. On the termination of proceedings under Sections 32(2) and 33(1 ), Section 33(3) fu1iher contemplates termination of the mandate of the arbitral tribunal, whereas the aforesaid words are missing in Section 25. When the legislature has used the phrase "the mandate of the arbitral tribunal c shall terminate" in Section 32(3 ), non-use of such phrase in Section 25(a) has to be treated with a purpose and object. The purpose and object can only be that if the claimant shows sufficient cause, the proceedings can be re-commenced.

22. Learned amicus curiae has referred to judgment of this Court D in Grindl<tys B"'ik Ltd. Vs. Central Government Industrial Trib1111al & Ors., 1980 (Supp) SCC 420. In that case this Court was considering the power of industrial tribunal to set aside its cx-parte award on being satisfied that there was sufficient cause. The Comi also noticed that there was no specific express provision in the Act or the Rules giving Ethe tribunal jurisdiction to do so. In Para 6, following was held:-"6. We are of the opinion that the Tribunal had the power to pass the impugned order if it thought fit in the interest of justice. It is true that there is no express provision in the Act or the rules framed thereumler giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to do so. But it is a well F known rule of statutory construction that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as arc necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. In a case of this nature, we are of the view that the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there G is any indication in the statute to the contrary. We do not find any such statutory prohibition. On the other hand, there are indications to the contrary." 23. It is true that power of review has to be expressly conferred by a Statute. This Court in Paragraph 13 has also stated that the word H

950 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R. A review is used in two distinct senses. This Court further held that when a review is sought due to a procedural defect, such power inheres in every tribunal. In Paragraph 13, following was observed:-13 ..... The expression "'review'" is used in the two distinct senses, namely (I) a procedural review which is either inherent or implied B in a court or Tribunal to set aside a palpably erroneous order passed under a misapprehension by it, and (2) a review on merits when the error sought to be corrected is one of law and is apparent on the face of the record. It is in the latter sense that the comt in Patel Narshi Thakershi case held that no review lies on merits c unless a statute specifically provides for it. Obviously when a review is sought due to a procedural defect, the inadvertent error committed by the Tribunal must be corrected ex debito justitiae to prevent the abuse of its process, and such power inheres in every court or Tribunal." 24. In Kapra 11-fazdoor Ekta Union Vs. Bir/a Cotton Spinning D and Weaving Mills Ltd. & Am~, (2005) 13 SCC 777, this Court again held that a quasi-judicial authority is vested with the power to invoke procedural review. In Paragraph 19 of the judgment, following was laid down:-

" 19. Applying these principles it is apparent that where a court or E quasi-judicial authority havingjurisdiction to adjudicate on merit proceeds to do so, its judgment or order can be reviewed on merit only if the court or the quasi-judicial authority is vested with power of review by express provision or by necessary implication. The procedural review belongs to a different category. In such a review, the court or quasi-judicial authority havingjurisdiction to adjudicate F proceeds to do so, but in doing so commits (sic ascertains whether it has committed) a procedural illegality which goes to the root of the matter and invalidates the proceeding itself, and consequently the order passed therein. Cases where a decision is rendered by the court or quasi-judicial authority without notice to the opposite G party or under a mistaken impression that the notice had been served upon the opposite party, or where a matter is taken up for hearing and decision on a date other than the date fixed for its hearing, are some illustrative cases in which the power of procedural review may be invoked. In such a case the party seeking review or recall of the order does not have to substantiate the H SREI INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE LIMITED v. TUFF 951 DRILLING PRIVATE LIMITED [ASHOK BHUSHAN.• J.]

ground that the order passed suffers from an error apparent on A the face of the record or any other ground which may justify a review. He has to establish that the procedure followed by the court or the quasi-judicial authority suffered from such illegality that it vitiated the proceeding and invalidated the order made therein, inasmuch as the opposite party concerned was not heard B for no fault of his, or that the matter was heard and decided on a date other than the one fixed for hearing of the matter which he could not attend for no fault of his. In such cases, therefore, the matter has to be reheard in accordance with law without going into the merit of the order passed. The order passed is liable to be recalled and reviewed not because it is found to be erroneous, but c because it was passed in a proceeding which was itself vitiated by an error of procedure or mistake which went to the root of the matter and invalidated the entire proceeding. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal5 it was held that once it is established that the respondents were prevented from D appearing at the hearing due to sufficient cause, it followed that the matter must be reheard and decided again."

25. There cannot be a dispute that the power exercised by the arbitral tribunal is a quasi-judicial. In view of the provisions of the 1996 Act, which confers various statutory powers and obligations on the arbitral Etribunal, we do not find any such distinction between the statutory tribunal constituted under the statutory provisions or Constitution in so far as the power of procedural review is concerned. We have already noticed that Section 19 provides that arbitral tribunal shall not be bound by the rules of procedure as contained in Civil Procedure Code. Section 19 cannot be read to mean that arbitral tribunal is incapacitated in drawing F sustenance from any provisions of Code of Civil Procedure. This was clearly laid down in Nahar /11d11strial E11terprises Limited Vs. Ho11g Ko11g a11d Slumgltai Banking Corporatio11, (2009) 8 SCC 646. In Paragraph 98(n), following was state.d:-"(n) It is not bound by the procedure laid down under the Code. It G may however be noticed in this regard that just because the Tribunal is not bound by the Code, it does not mean that it would not have jurisdiction to exercise powers of a court as contained in the Code. "Rather, the Tribunal can travel beyond the Code of Civil Procedure and the only fetter that is put on its powers is to H 952 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 12 S.C.R. A observe the principles of natural justice." (See Industrial Credit and Investment Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Grapco Industries Ltd.)"

26. We thus are of the view that principles underlying Order 9 Rule 13 can very well be invoked by the arbitrator. There is nothing on · record to indicate that parties have agreed to the contrary. The issue, B which has arisen for consideration has engaged attention of different High Courts from time to time. Patna High Court in Mis. Senbo E11gineering Ltd. Vs. State of Biflar & Ors., AIR 2004 Patna 33, had occasion to consider the order terminating the proceeding.~ under Section 25(a). Patna High Court after considering the provision has held that arbitral tribunal has power to review on sufficient cause being C shown. In paragraph 32, following has been laid down:-"32. I find the submissions of Mr. Chatterjee well founded. Mr. Chatterjee has relied upon the provisions of the Act itself (that is to say, the internal aids to interpretation) in support of the point that on sufficient cause being shown, the arbitral tribunal has full D authority and power to recall an order under Section 25(a) of the Act. I think that one would arrive at the same conclusion on the basis of some extemal aids to interpretation." 27. Referring to judgment of this Coui1 in Gri11dlays Bank Ltd. (supm) t111dAnil Sood Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court II, (2001) E 10 SCC 534, Patna High Court fm1her laid down in Paragraph 39 as given below:-

"39. The two Supreme Court decisions under the Industrial Disputes Act are also a pointer in the direction that the arbitral tribunal must be held to have the power of procedural review and F the authority to recall, on sufficient cause being shown, an order terminating the proceeding under Section 25(a) of the Act. The second question too is, thus, answered in the affirmative and in favour of the petitioner." 28. Delhi High Court in Awtisthi Construction Co. Vs. Govt. Of G NCT ofDelhi & Anr., 2013 (I) Arb. LR 70 (Delhi)(DB) has elaborately considered this issue. In Paragraph 17 and 18, following has been held:-"17. We may in this regard also notice that the legislature, in Section 25, has not provided for termination of proceedings automatically on default by a party but has vested the discretion H SREI INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE LIMITED v. TUFF 953 DRILLING PRIVATE LIMITED [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

in the arbitral tribunal to, on sufficient cause being shown condone A such default. We are of the view that no distinction ought to be drawn between showing such sufficient cause before the proceedings are terminated and after the proceedings are terminated. If the arbitral tribunal is empowered to condone default on sufficient cause being shown, it matters not when the same is B shown. It may well nigh be possible that the sufficient cause itself is such which prevented the party concerned from showing it before the proceedings terminated. It would be a pedantic reading of the provision to hold that the arbitral tribunal in such cases also stands denuded. Once the legislature has vested the arbitral tribunal with such power, an order of termination cannot be allowed to c come in the way of exercise thereof.

18. There is another reason for us to hold so. The emphasis of the Arbitration Act is to provide an alternative dispute resolution mechanism. The provisions of the Act ought to be interpreted in a manner that would make such adjudication effective and not in a D manner that would make arbitration proceedings cumbersome. A view that the arbitral tribunal is precluded, even where sufficient cause exists, from reviving the arbitral proceedings and the only remedy available to a party is a writ petition and which remedy is available only in the High Court often situated at a distance from E the place where the parties are located, would be a deterrent to arbitration. It is also worth mentioning that Section 19(2) of the Act permits the parties to agree on the procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal. The parties may, while so laying down the procedure, provide for the remedy of review/revival of arbitral proceedings and which agreement would be binding on the arbitral F tribunal. If the arbitral tribunal in such a situation would be empowered to, on sufficient cause being shown, revive the arbitral proceedings, we see no reason to, in the absence of such an agreement hold the arbitral tribunal to be not empowered to do so. If it were to be held that such power of review/recall is not G available to an arbitral tribunal, the arbitral tribunal would not be competent to set aside an order wider Section 25(b) also, compelling the respondent against whom proceedings have been continued, to file a writ petition, making the continuation of proceedings before the arbitral tribunal a useless exercise." H

954 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R. A 29. The Delhi High Court again reiterated the same principle in ATV Projects India Ltd. Vs. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. & Anr., 200(2013) Delhi Law Times 553 (DB). 30. The Madras High Court in Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited Vs. Jyothi Turbopower Services Private Limited & Ors., 2017(1) B Arb. LR 289 (Madras) again took the view that after terminating the proceedings under Section 25(a), the arbitral tribunal can recall the said · order on sufficient cause being shown and the arbitral tribunal does not become functus officio after passing an order under Section 25(a). The Madras High Court has agreed with the view expressed by the Division c Bench of the Delhi High Comt as noticed above. 31. A contrary view has also been expressed by certain High Courts. The Kerala High Court in PMA Shukkur v.:~.111uthoot Vehicle, (2010) Arb. LR 121 (Kera/a), held that the power to set aside an ex-partc award vests in the Court, and the arbitrator does not have any concurrent power to set aside an ex-parte award. D 32. We endorse the views of Patna High Court, Delhi High Court and Madras High Court as noted above, in so far as they have held that the arbitral tribunal after termination of proceedings under Section 25(a) on sufficient cause being shown can recall the order and re-commence the proceedings. E

33. In the present case, the arbitral tribunal has rejected the . application of the claimant by order dated 26.04.2012 taking the view that after an order is passed by him terminating the proceedings, he cannot pass the order recommencing the arbitration proceedings. In view of the above discussions, we are of the view that the arbitral tribunal F committed an error in holding that it has no jurisdiction to recall an order terminating the proceedings under Section 25(a). The arbitral tribunal having not considered the cause shown by the claimant in its application, it is in the ends of justice that the arbitrnl tribunal be asked to consider the application filed by the claimant dated 20.01.20 l Z·praying for recall G of the order dated 12.12.2011 and to grant extension for filing the statement of claim. 34. Coming to Issue No. 2 and 3, in view of what we have said regarding Issue No. 1 that arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction to consider an application for recall of order terminating the proceedings under Section H 25(a), it is not necessary for us to enter into Issue No. 2 and 3 for SREI INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE LIMITED v. TUFF 955 DRILLING PRIVATE LIMITED [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.] purposes of this case. For deciding the present Ci vii Appeal, our answer A to Issue No.l is sufficient to dispose of the matter.

35. In result, the appeal is dismissed. The interim order dated 07.07.2015, granting stay on the operation of order dated 13.02.2015 passed by the High Com1 stands discharged and the arbitral tribunal shall now proceed to decide the application of claimant-respondent dated B 20.01.2012 expeditiously. The parties shall bear their own costs. 36. We place on record our appreciations for the valuable assistance rendered by Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, Sr. Advocate appearing as amicus. Divya Pandey Appeal dismissed.

[2017] 12 S.C.R. 933 SREI INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE LIMITED A v. TUFF DRILLING PRIVATE LIMITED (Civil Appeal No. 15036 of2017) SEPTEMBER 20, 2017 B [A. K. SIKRI AND ASHOK BHUSHAN, JJ.)

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - s.25(a) - Arbitral tribunal appointed with the consent of the parties, directed the respondent-claimant to file its statement of claim - Statement of claim cnot filed by respondent -Arbitral tribunal tem1inated the proceedings uls.25(a) - Application filed by respondent before arbitral tribunal praying for recall of order terminating the proceedings, stating the reasons for non-filing of the statement of claim - Appellant questioned the maintainability of said application on the ground that arbitral tribunal has become functus officio in view of temiination D of the proceedings u/s.25(a), hence the arbitral tribunal cannot recall its order terminating the proceedings - Arbitral tribunal accepted the preliminary objection raised by appellant and rejected respondents application holding that in view of the order terminating the proceedings, he cannot pass an order recommencing E the arbitration proceedings - Revision petition filed by respondent, allowed by High Court which held that arbitral tribunal has power to recall its own order and remitted the matter back to arbitral tribunal to decide the application filed by respondent on merits -On appeal, held: Arbitra/ tribunal does not become functus officio after passing order u/s.25(a) - There is no lack of jurisdiction in F arbitral tribunal to recall the earlier order, terminating the proceedings, on sufficient cause being shown - Jn the instant case, arbitral tribunal committed error in holding that it has no jurisdiction to recall its order terminating the proceedings u/s.25(a) - Arhitral tribunal to consider the application filed by respondent for recall G of order terminating the proceedings.

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - ss.23(1), 25(a) -Non-filing of statement of claim by claimant within the time as contemplated u/s.23(1) - Arbitral Tribunal if obligated to terminate the proceedings -Held: On sufficient cause being shown by a H 933 934 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R. - A claimant, even though the time to file the statement of claim u!s.23(1) has expired, it is not obligatory for the arbitral tribunal to terminate the proceedings u!s.25(a). Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Proceedings under - Nature of - Held: Arbitration is a quasi judicial proceeding, B equitable in nature or character which differs from a litigation in a Court. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Arbitral Tribunals -Constitution of - Discussed. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, I 996 - Object of enactment c - Discussed. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Arbitral Tribunals -· Procedural review - Power of - Held: A quasi-judicial authority is vested with the power to invoke procedural review.

D Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Termination of proceedings u!s. 25(a), if covered u!s.32(2)(c) - Held: Cl. (c) of sub.sec.(2) of s.32 contemplates two grounds for termination, i.e.,(i) where arbitral tribunal find~ that the continuation of proceedings has become unnecessary or (ii) impossible- Howeve1~ s.25 contemplates a situation where arbitration proceedings have not E been started as the claimant fails to file his statement of claim -Thus, the eventuality as contemplated uls.32 shall arise only when the claim is not terminated u!s.25(a) and proceeds further -There.fore, the words 'unnecessary' or 'impossible' as used in s.32(2)(c) cannot be said to be covering a situation where F proceedings are terminated in de.fault of the claimant uls.25(a). Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Or.9, 1'.l 3- Setting aside decree ex-parte against defendant - Applicability of, to arbitration proceedings - Arbitral tribunal appointed with the consent of the parties - On the first sitting of the arbitral tribunal, it directed the G respondent-claimant to file its statement of claim - Respondent neither present on the next date nor filed the statement of claim -Further time granted by arbitral tribunal - Respondent did not appear on the next date as well nor filed the statement of claim -Arbitral tribunal terminated the proceedings uls.25(a) - Held: Principles underlying Or.9, d 3 can be invoked by the arbitrator -H SREI INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE LIMITED v. TUFF 935

DRILLING PRIVATE LIMITED Further. in the instant case, there is nothing on record to indicate A that parties agreed to the contrary - Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - s.19. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - s.19 - Interpretation of- Held: S.19 provides that arbitral tribunal shall not be bound by the rules of procedure as contained in Civil Procedure Code, B however, it cannot be read to mean that arbitral tribunal is incapacitated in drawing sustenance from any provisions of Civil Procedure Code - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1 The arbitration is a quasi judicial proceeding, C equitable in nature or character which differs from a litigation in a Court. The power and functions of arbitral tribunal arc statutorily regulated. Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code vests into the Civil Court jurisdiction to entertain and determine any civil dispute. The constitution of tribunals has been with intent and D purpose to take out different categories of litigation into the special tribunal for speedy and effective determination of disputes in the interest of the society. Whenever, by a legislative enactment jurisdiction exercised by ordinary civil court is transferred or entrusted to tribunals such tribunals are entrusted with statutory power. The arbitral tribunals in the Arbitration and Conciliation E Act, 1996 arc no different, they decide the lis between the parties, follows Rules and procedure conforming to the principle of natural justice, the adjudication has finality subject to remedy provided under the 1996 Act. Section 8 of the 1996 Act obliges a judicial authority in a matter which is a subject of an agreement to refer F the parties to arbitration. The reference to arbitral tribunal thus can be made by judicial authority or an arbitrator can be appointed in accordance with the arbitration agreement under Section 11 of the 1996 Act. [Para 12) [944-G-H, A-CJ

1.2 Section 25 contemplates a situation when the claimant G fails to communicate his statement of claim within the time as envisaged by Section 23, the arbitral tribunal has to terminate the proceedings. This section thus contemplates a situation where arbitration proceeding has not been started. The most important words contained in Section 25 are "where without showing H 936 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 12 S.C.R.

A · sufficient cause - the claimant fails to communicate his statement of claim". Under Section 23(1), the claimant is to state the facts supporting his claim within the period of time agreed upon by the parties or determined by the arbitral tribunal. The question of termination of proceedings thus arises only after the time agreed B upon between the parties or determined by the arbitral tribunal comes to an end. When the time as contemplated under Section 23(1) expires and no sufficient cause is shown by the claimant the arbitral tribunal shall terminate the proceedings. The question of showing sufficient cause will arise only when the claimant is asked to show cause as to why he failed to submit his claim within C the time as envisaged under Section 23(1) or the claimant, on his own, before the order is passed under Section 25(a) to terminate the proceedings comes before the arbitral tribunal showing sufficient cause for not being able to submit his claim within the time. In both the circumstances, i.e. when a show-cause notice is issued to the claimant or claimant of his own shows cause for o· non-filing the claim within the time the, arbitral tribunal shall take a call on terminating the proceedings. In the event, the claimant shows a sufficient cause, the arbitral tribunal can accept the statement of claim even after expiry of the time as envisaged under Section 23(1) or grant further time to the claimant to file a E claim. Thus, on sufficient cause being shown by a claimant even though time has expired under Section 23(1), it is not obligatory for the arbitral tribunal to terminate the proceedings. The conjunction of the wording "where without showing sufficient cause" and "the claimant fails to communicate his statement of claim" would indicate that it is a duty of the arbitral tribunal to F inform the claimant that he has failed to communicate his claim on the date fixed for that and requires him to show-cause why the arbitral proceedings should not be terminated? Opportunity to show sufficient cause for his failure to communicate his claim statement can only be given after he has actually failed to do so. G · [Para 19] [947-B-H; 948-A)

Whether in a case, as in the present case, where claimant failed to file a statement of claim and has failed also to show-cause before an order of termination of proceedings is passed, claimant is entitled to show-cause subsequent to the termination of H proceedings? SREI INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE LIMITED v. TUFF 937 DRILLING PRIVATE LIMITED 1.3 When the arbitral tribunal without sufficient cause being A shown by the claimant to file the claim statement can terminate the proceedings, subsequent to termination of proceedings, if the sufficient cause is shown, there is no impediment in the power of the arbitral tribunal to accept the show-cause and permit the claimant to file the claim. The Scheme of Section 25 of the Act Bclearly indicates that on sufficient cause being shown, the statement of claim can be permitted to be filed even after the time as fixed by Section 23(1) has expired. Thus, even after passing the order of terminating the proceedings, if sufficient cause is shown, the claims of statement can be accepted by the arbitral tribunal by accepting the show-cause and there is no lack C of the jurisdiction in the arbitral tribunal to recall the earlier order on sufficient cause being shown. [Para 20)948-C-D)

1.4 After terminating the proceedings under Section 25(a), the arbitral tribunal can recall the said order on sufficient cause being shown and the arbitral tribunal docs not become functus D officio after passing an order under Section 25(a). The arbitral tribunal can recall the order terminating the proceedings under Section 25(a) and re-commence the proceedings. [Paras 30, 32] [954-B-C, D-E) Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited v. Jyothi Turbopower E Services Private Limited & Ors. 2017 (1) Arb. LR 289 (Madras); Awasthi Construction Co. v. Govt. Of NCT of Delhi & Am: 2013 (l) Arb. LR 70 (Delhi)(DB); ATV Projects India Ltd. v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. & Am: 200 (2013) DLT 553 (DB) - approved. F Whether termination of proceedings, in the present case, under Section 25(a) can be treated to be covered bv Section 32(2)(c) ? 2.1 Section 32 contains a heading "Termination of Proceedings". Sub-section(2) enumerates the circumstances when the arbitral tribunal shall issue an order for the termination Gof the arbitral proceedings. Sub-clause(c) contemplates two grounds for termination, i.e.; (i) the arbitral tribunal finds that the continuation of the proceedings has for any other reason become unnecessary or (ii) impossible. The eventuality as contemplated under Section 32 shall arise only when the claim is H 938 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A not terminated under Section 25(a) and proceeds further. The word 'unnecessary' or 'impossible' as used in clause (c) of Section . 32(2) cannot be said to be covering a situation where proceedings are terminated in default of the claimant. The word unnecessary or impossible has been used in different contexts than to one of default as contemplated under Section 25(a). Sub-section (3) of B Section 32 further provides that the mandate of the arbitral tribunal shall terminate with the termination of the arbitral proceedings subject to Section 33 and sub-section (4) of Section

34. Section 33 is the power of the arbitral tribunal to correct any computation errors, any clerical or typographical errors or any c other errors of a similar nature or to give an interpretation af a specific point or part of the award. Section 34(4) reserves the power of the Court to adjourn the proceedings in order to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings or to take such other action as in the opinion of arbitral tribunal will eliminate the grounds for setting aside the D arbitral award. On the termination of proceedings under Sections 32(2) and 33(1), Section 33(3) further contemplates termination of the mandate of the arbitral tribunal, whereas the aforesaid words are missing in Section 25. When the legislature has used the phrase "the mandate of the arbitral tribunal shall terminate" E in Section 32(3), non-use of such phrase in Section 25(a) has to be treated with a purpose and object. The purpose and object can only be that if the claimant shows sufficient cause, the proceedings can be re-commenced. [Para 21) [948-E-H; 949-A-C) Power of procedural review of arbitral tribunals. Applicabilitv of F Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to arbitration proceedings.

3.1 When a review is sought due to a procedural defect, such power inheres in every tribunal. A quasi-judicial authority is vested with the power to invoke procedural review. There cannot be a dispute that the power exercised by the arbitral G tribunal is quasi-judicial. In view of the provisions of the 1996 Act, which confers various statutory powers and obligations on the arbitral tribunal, no distinction is found between the statutory tribunal constituted under the statutory provisions or Constitution in so far as the power of procedural review is concerned. Section 19 provides that arbitral tribunal shall not be bound by the rules H of procedure as contained in Civil Procedure Code. The words SREI INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE LIMITED v. TUFF 939 DRILLING PRIVATE LIMITED

"arbitral tribunal shall not be bound" are the words of amplitude A and not of a restriction. These words do not prohibit the arbitral tribunal from drawing sustenance from the fundamental principles underlining the Civil Procedure Code or Indian Evidence Act but the tribunal is not bound to obsen·e the provisions of Code with all of its rigour. Section 19 cannot be read to mean that B arbitral tribunal is incapacitated in drawing sustenance from any provisions of Code of Civil Procedure. Arbitral tribunal has power to review on sufficient cause being shown. As per sub-clause (2) of Section 19 the parties arc free to agree on the procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal in conducting its proceedings. Principles underlying Order 9 Rule 13, Code of Civil Procedure, C 1908 can very well be invoked by the arbitrator. There is nothing on record to indicate that parties agreed to the contrary. [Paras 14, 23-26) [950-A-D; 951-E-F; 952-A; 945-F-G] Mis. Senbo Engineering Ltd. v. State of Bihar & Ors. AIR 2004 Patna 33 - approved. D Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal & Ors., (1980) Supp SCC 420; Kapra Mazdoor Ekta Union v. Bir/a Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. & Am: (2005) 13 sec 777; Nahar Industrial Enterprises Limited v. Hong Kong and E Shanghai Banking Corporation (2009) 8 SCC 646 -relied on.

3.2 In the present case, the arbitral tribunal had rejected the application of the claimant seeking recall of order terminating the proceedings taking the view that after an order is passed by F him terminating the proceedings, he cannot pass the order recommencing the arbitration proceedings. The arbitral tribunal committed an error in holding that it has no jurisdiction to recall an order terminating the proceedings under Section 25(a). [Para 33) (954-E-F] G PMA Shukkur v. Muthoot Vehicle (2010) Arb. LR 121 (Kcrala) - not ap1>roved. Anil Sood v. Presiding Office1; Labour Court II (2001) 10 sec 534; La/it Kumar V. Sanghavi v. Dharamdas V. Sanghavi & Ors. (2014) 7 SCC 255 - referred to. H 940 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R. A Case Law Reference AIR 2004 Patna 33 approved Para 26 c2014) 7 sec 255 referred to Para 7 (1980) Supp sec 420 relied on Para 21 B· (2005) 13 sec 111 relied on Para 24 (2009) 8 sec 646 relied on Para 25 AIR 2004 Patna 33 approved Para 26 c2001) 10 sec 534 referred to Para 27 c 2013 (I) Arb. LR 70 (Dclhi)(DB) approved Para 28 2007 (2013) D LT 553 (DB) approved Para 9 2017 (1) Arb. LR 289 (Madras) approved Para 30 (2010) Arb. LR 121 (Kerala) not approved Para 30 D CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 15036 of2017. From the final Judgment and Order dated 13.02.2015 of the High Court at Calcutta in C.O. No. 3190 of 2012. E. Jayant Bhushan, Sr. Adv., Shantanu Ghosh, Raghunath Ghosh, S.K. Verma, Advs. for the Appellant.

Rakesh Dwivedi, Sr. Adv.( AC), Ms. Sansriti Pathak, Adv. for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by F ASHOK BHUSHAN, J. Leave granted. I. This appeal has been filed against the judgment dated 13.02.2015 of the Calcutta High Court by which the High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution oflndia has set aside G the Order passed by the arbitral tribunal by which the arbitral tribunal had refused to recall its Order dated 12.12.20 l l terminating the arbitration proceedings on account of non filing of the claim by the claimant. 2. The undisputed facts of the case are: -The respondent filed an application under Section 11 of the H · Arbitration and Conciliation Act, I 996 (hereinafter referred to as "the SREI INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE LIMITED v. TUFF 941 DRILLING PRIVATE LIMITED [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.] 1996 Act") for referring the dispute to arbitrator on the strength of contract A entered with appellant. Dw·ing pcndency of the application under Section 11 with consent of the parties, Sri Baskar Sen, Senior Advocate, Bar-at-Law was appointed as Arbitrator. The application under Section 11 of the 1996 Act was thus dismissed as not pressed. One-man arbitral tribunal entered into reference and called for the first sitting of the arbitral tribunal 8on 27.08.2011. Both the parties appeared on 27.08.20 l l on which date m:bitral tribunal had directed the respondent to file the statement of claim.

3. Subsequently, 19th November was fixed on which date the claimant was absent. The arbitral tribunal directed for filing statement of claim by 9th December. On 9th December, the claim could not be filed by respondent and by order dated 12.12.2011, tribunal terminated C the proceedings under Section 25(a) by making the following observations: - ·· ... It appears that the claimant is not interested to proceed with the reference. No cause has been shown as to why they have not filed their Statement of Claim in spite of repeated D opportunities being given to them. ]11 view of Section 25(a) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 the Arbitrator, therefore, has 110 alternative but to terminate the proceedings. The arbitration proceedings in respect of the dispute in which Tuff Drilling Private Limited is the claimant which arose out E of the agreement dated 21st January, 2008 pertaining to 1500 HP diesel electric rig is thus terminated. .. "

4. The Claimant filed an application dated 20.01.2012 praying for recall of the order dated 12.12.2011 with further prayer to condone the delay in filing the statement of claim by granting necessary extension of time. In the application, reasons for non-filing of the statement of the F claim and for non-appearance of the claimant on 19.11.2011 and 12.12.2011 were stated in detail. The application filed by the claimant was objected by the appellant. The appellant questioned the maintainability of the application dated 20.01.2012 on the ground that arbitral tribunal has become functus officio in view of termination of the proceedings G under Section 25(a), hence the arbitral tribunal cannot recall its order terminating the proceedings. The arbitral tribunal heard both the parties and by an order dated 26.04.2012 accepted the preliminary objections of the appellant holding that in view of order terminating the proceedings, he cannot pass an order recommencing the arbitration proceedings. The application of the respondent claimant was thus rejected. Aggrieved by H 942 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R.

A the order of the arbitral tribunal dated 26.04.2012, the claimant approached the Calcutta High Court in its revisionary jurisdiction by filing C.0.No.3190 of2012. The appellant before the High Court objected the maintainability of the application under Article 227 of the Constitution. It was further contended before the High Court that after terminating B the proceedings arbitral tribunal had become fimctus officio and had no power to recall the order dated 12.12.201 l. The High Court after considering the submissions of parties came to the conclusion that arbitral tribunal enjoys the power to recall its own order relying on the Patna High Court judgment reported in Mis S11ebo E11gi11eering Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar and Ors., AIR 2004 Patna 33. The High Court also overruled C the objections of appellant that application under Article 227 by the claimant challenging the order dated 12.12.2011 was not maintainable. The High Court after entertaining the application under Article 227 held that arbitral tribunal has power to recall its own order. The High Court set aside the order of the arbitral tribunal and remitted the matter back D to the arbitral tribunal to decide the application dated 20.01.2012 filed by the respondent on merits. The appellant aggrieved by the judgment of Calcutta High Cow"t has come up in this appeal.

5. This court on 07.07.2015 issued notice and in the meantime stayed the operation of the order passed by the Calcutta High Court. Although, the respondent was served but none appeared on behalf of E the respondent. While hearing the matteron 29 .08.2017, this court noticed that question oflaw raised in this case is important one and since no one has appeared on behalf of respondent, this court requested Shri Rakesh · Dwivedi, Senior Advocate, to assist the court in deciding the issue. 6. We have heard Shri Jayant Bhushan, learned senior counsel, F assisted by Shri Santanu Ghosh, learned counsel for the appellant. Shri Rakesh Dwivedi, learned senior counsel assisted by Ms. Sansriti Pathak, learned counsel, has been heard as amicus curiae. 7. Learned Counsel for the appellant submits that the arbitral tribunal had terminated the proceedings on 12.12.2011 due to non-filing G of claim by the claimant in spite ofopportunities having been granted to it. The arbitral tribunal had becomejimctus officio and had no jurisdiction to recall the order dated 12.12.2011 on the application filed by the respondent claimant to recall the said order. It is further contended that against the order dated 12.12.2011 terminating the proceeding application H under Article 227 of the Constitution of India was not maintainable. SREI INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE LIMITED v. TUFF 943 DRILLING PRIVATE LIMITED [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

Learned counsel for the appellant has relied on judgment of this Court A reported in La/it Kumar V. Sanghavi Vs. Dharamdas V. Sanghavi & Ors., 2014(7) SCC 255 in support of the submissions that Writ Petition was not maintainable against the order of arbitral tribunal. It is further submitted by the appellant that remedy if any available to claimant was to file an application under Section 34 of 1996 Act for setting aside the Border dated 12.12.2011.

8. Shri Rakcsh Dwivedi, learned amicus curiae, submits that the termination of proceedings under Section 25(a) and termination of proceedings under Section 32(2) arc two different eventualities. When the proceedings are terminated under Section 32(2), the mandate of the carbitral tribunal also terminates whereas no such consequence can be read in termination of proceedings tmder section 25(a). Under section 25(a), proceedings arc terminated on default of the claimant to file the statement of claim. Section 32(3) would not apply to case falling under section 25(a) of the 1996 Act. The Arbitration Act, 1996 docs not provide for remedy against the order wider section 25(a). He contends the remedy D under Section 34 is not available against such an order unless the order under Section 25(a) is also treated as an award. Learned amicus curiae submits that there seems to be legislative gap with respect to 25(a) and 32(2)(c ). He submits that it is more appropriate that Order under Section 25(a) be treated as an award so as to make it amenable under Section E34. On the submissions that whether arbitral tribunal can exercise the power akin to principle underlying under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C. Learned amicus curiae submits that arbitral tribunal can recall an order passed under Section 25(a) on the principles underlying Order IX Ruic 13 C.P.C. Learned amicus curiae in support of above submissions has also referred to j udgmcnts of Patna High Court, Delhi High Court, Madras High Court F & Bombay High Court which shall be referred to while considering the submissions in detail.

9. Referring to this court's judgment in SPP Vs. Patet E11gi11eeri11g, it is submitted that the said case has no applicability when Section 34 and 3 7 of the 1996 Act are not applicable. It was pointed out G by learned amicus curiae that La/it Kumar was a case where proceedings were terminated under Section 32(2)(c). Learned amicus curiae has lastly submitted that legislative gap as is apparent in context of provisions of Section 25(a), 32 and 34 need to be stitched up in light of the object of the legislation. H 944 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R. A 10. We have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the appellant and learned amicus curiae and have perused the record. From the submissions, following issues arise for consideration in this Civil Appeal:- !) Whether arbitral tribunal which has terminated the proceeding B under Section 25( a) due to non filing of claim by claimant has jurisdiction to consider the application for recall of the order terminating the proceedings on sufficient cause being shown by the claimant? 2) Whether the order passed by the arbitral tribunal under Section 25(a) terminating the proceeding is amenable to jurisdiction of High Court c . under Article 227 of the Constitution ofindia'! 3) Whether the Order passed under Section 25( a) terminating the proceeding is an award under the 1996 Act so as to amenable to the remedy under Section 34 of the Act?

11. The law of Arbitration was earlier governed by the Arbitration D Act, l 940. The Law Commission ofindia and several other organisations expressed opinion that the 1940 Act needs extensive amendments to make it more responsive to contemporary requirements. In the wake of rise in commercial litigation both at domestic and international level, a need was felt for a comprehensive law to deal the subject. The United E Nations Organisation on International Trade Law (UNCILTRAL) adopted a Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration in the year 1985. Taking into consideration domestic arbitration as well as international commercial arbitration, Parliament enacted the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Main objective for introducing the legislation was to make provision for an arbitral procedure which is fair, efficient F and capable of meeting the needs of the specific arbitration. In Section 2 of the Act, arbitral tribunal has been defined to mean a sole arbitrator or a panel ofarbitrators. The arbitral tribunal was entrusted with various statutory functions, obligations by the enactment.

12. The arbitration is a quasi judicial proceeding, equitable in nature G or character which differs from a litigation in a Court. The power and functions of arbitral tribunal arc statutorily regulated. The tribunals are special arbitration with institutional mechanism brought into existence by or under statute to decide dispute arising with reference to that particular statute or to determine controversy referred to it. The tribunal H may be a statutory tribunal or tribunal constituted under the provisions of SREI INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE LIMITED v. TUFF 945 DRILLING PRIVATE LIMITED [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

the Constitution ofindia. Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code vests A into the Civil Court jurisdiction to entertain and determine any civil dispute. The constitution of tribunals has been with intent and purpose to take out different categories oflitigation into the special tribunal for speedy and effective determination of disputes in the interest of the society. Whenever, by a legislative enactment jurisdiction exercised by ordinary ci vii court is Btransferred or entrusted to tribunals such tribunals are entrusted with statutory power. The arbitral tribunals in the statute of 1996 are no different, they decide the !is between the parties, follows Rules and procedure conforming to the principle ofnaturaljustice, the adjudication has finality subject to remedy provided under the 1996 Act. Section 8 of the 1996 Act obliges a judicial authority in a matter which is a subject of C an agreement to refer the parties to arbitration. The reference to arbitral tribunal thus can be made by judicial authority or an arbitrator can be appointed in accordance with the arbitration agreement under Section 11 of the 1996 Act. 13. After noticing the objective of the enactment, we now reve1t D to issues which have arisen in these appeals. Issue No. I

14. Chapter V of the Act deals with the conduct of arbitral proceedings. Section 18 provides "the parties shall be treated with equality and each party shall be given a full opportunity to present his E case. Section 18 contains the principle of natural justice to give full opportunity to paities to present their case. 15. Section 19 of the Act provides for determination of rules of procedure. Sub-clause (1) of Section 19 provides that the arbitral tribunal shall not be bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or the Indian F Evidence Act, 1872. The words "arbitral tribunal shall not be bound" arc the words of amplitude and not of a restriction. These words do not prohibit the arbitral tribunal from drawing sustenance from the fundamental principles underling the Civil Procedure Code or Indian Evidence Act but the tribunal is not.bound to observe the provisions of G Code with all of its rigour. As per sub-clause (2) of Section 19 the parties are free to agree on the procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal in conducting its proceedings. 16. Section 23 deals with claim and defence. Section 24 deals with hearing and written proceedings. H 946 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 12 S.C.R. A 17. Section 25 deals with default of a party which provision is up for interpretation in this case and is as follows: "25. Default of a party.-Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, where, without showing St!fJlcient cause,-

(a) the claimant faifs to communicate his statement of claim B in accordance with sub-section (1) of section 23, the arbitral tribunal shall terminate the proceedings; (b) the respondent fails to communicate his statement of defence in accordance with sub-section (1) of section 23, the arbitral tribunal shall continue the proceedings without c treating that failure in itself as an admission of the allegations by the claimant and shall have the discretion to treat the right of the respondent to file such statement of defence as having been forefeited; (c) a party fails to appear at an oral hearing or to produce D documentary evidence. the arbitral tribunal may continue the proceedings and make the arbitral award on the evidence before it." 18. Chapter VI deals with Making of Arbitral Award and Termination of Proceedings. Section 32 deals with Termination of E Proceedings which is quoted as below:-"32. Termination of proceedings.-( 1) The arbitral proceedings shall be terminated by the final arbitral award or by an order. of the arbitral tribunal under sub- section (2). (2) The arbitral tribunal shall issue an order for the termination of F the arbitral proceedings where-

( a) the claimant withdraws his claim, unless the respondent objects to the order and the arbitral tribunal recognises a legitimate interest on his part in obtaining a final settlement of the dispute, G (b) the parties agree on the termination of the proceedings, or ( c) the arbitral tribunal finds that the continuation ofthe proceedings has for any other reason become unnecessary or impossible. (3) Subject to section 33 and sub-section (4) of section 34, the mandate of the arbitral tribunal shall tenninate with the termination H of the arbitral proceedings." SREI INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE LIMITED v. TUFF 947 DRILLING PRNATE LIMITED [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

19. In the present case, proceedings were terminated vide Order A dated 12.12.2011 under Section 25(a). After termination of proceedings, application to recall the said order was filed by claimant on 20.01.2012, which was rejected by arbitral tribunal on the ground that it has no jurisdiction to re-commence the arbitration proceedings. Section 25 contemplates a situation when the claimant fails to communicate his Bstatement of claim within the time as envisaged by Section 23, the arbitral tribunal has to terminate the proceedings. This section thus contemplates a situation where arbitration proceeding has not been started. The most important words contained in Section 25 are "where without showing sufficient cause - the claimant fails to communicate his statement of claim''. Under Section 23(1), the claimant is to state the facts supporting c his claim within the period of time agreed upon by the parties or determined by the arbitral tribunal. The question of termination of proceedings thus arises only after the time agreed upon between the parties or determined by the arbitral tribunal comes to an end. When the time as contemplated w1der Section 23( 1) expires and no sufficient cause Dis shown by the claimant the arbitral tribunal shall terminate the proceedings. The question of showing sufficient cause will arise only when the claimant is asked to show cause as to why he failed to submit his claim within the time as envisaged under Section 23( I) or the claimant, on his own, before the order is passed under Section 25(a) to terminate the proceedings comes before the arbitral tribunal showing sufficient E cause for not being able to submit his claim within the time. In both the circumstances, i.e. when a show-cause notice is issued to the claimant as observed above or claimant ofhis own shows cause for non-filing the claim within the time the arbitral tribunal shall take a call on terminating the proceedings. It is easy to comprehend that in the event, the claimant Fshows a sufficient cause, the arbitral tribunal can accept the statement of claim even after expiry of the time as envisaged under Section 23( 1) or grant further time to the claimant to file a claim. Thus, on sufficient cause being shown by a claimant even though time has expired under Section 23(1), it is not obligatory for the arbitral tribunal to terminate the proceedings. The conjunction of the wording "where without showing G sufficient cause" and "the claimant fails to communicate his statement of claim" would indicate that it is a duty of the arbitral tribunal to inform the claimant that he has failed to communicate his claim on the date fixed for that and requires him to show-cause why the arbitral proceedings should not be terminated'? Opportunity to show sufficient cause for his H

948 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 12 S.C.R. A failure to communicate his claim statement can only be given after he has actually failed to do so. Whether in a case where claimant failed to file a statement of claim and has failed also to show-cause before an order of termination of proceedings· is passed, claimant is entitled to show-cause subsequent to the termination is the question which has fallen for consideration. B 20. When the arbitral tribunal without sufficient cause being shown by the claimant to file the claim statement can terminate the proceedings, subsequent to termination of proceedings, ifthe sufficient cause is shown, wc see no impediment in the power of the arbitral tribunal to accept the c show-cause and permit the claimant to file the claim. The Scheme of Section 25 of the Act clearly indicates that on sufficient cause being shown, the statement of claim can be permitted to be filed even after the time as fixed by Section 23( 1) has expired. Thus, even after passing the order of terminating the proceedings, if sufficient cause is shown. the claims of statement can be accepted by the arbitral tribunal by accepting D the show-cause and there is no lack of the jurisdiction in the arbitral tribunal to recall the earlier order on sufficient cause being shown.

21. Section 32 contains a heading "Termination of Proceedings". Sub-section ( 1) provides that the arbitral proceedings shall be terminated by the final arbitral award or by an order of the arbitral tribunal under E sub-section(2). Sub-section(2) enumerates the circumstances when the arbitral tribunal shall issue an order for the termination of the arbitral proceedings. The situation as contemplated under Section 32(2)(a) and 32(2)(b) are not attracted in the facts of this case. Whether termination of proceedings in the present case can be treated to be covered by Section 32(2)(c) is the question to be considered. Sub-clause(c) F contemplates two grounds for termination, i.e.: (i) the arbitral tribunal finds that the continuation of the proceedings has for any other reason become unnecessary or (ii) impossible. The eventuality as contemplated under Section 32 shall arise only when the claim is not terminated under Section 25(a) and proceeds further. The word 'unnecessary' or G 'impossible' as used in sub-clause (c) of Section 32(2) cannot be said to be covering a situation where proceedings are terminated in default of the claimant. The word unnecessary or impossible has been used in different contexts than to one of default as contemplated under Section 25(a). Sub-section (3) of Section 32 fm1her provides that the mandate of the arbitral tribunal shall terminate with the termination of the arbitral H SREI INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE LIMITED v. TUFF 949

DRILLING PRIVATE LIMITED [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.] proceedings subject to Section 33 and sub-section (4) of Section 34. A Section 33 is the power of the arbitral tribunal to correct any computation errors, any clerical or typographical errors or any other errors of a similar nature or to give an interpretation of a specific point or part of the award. Section 34(4) reserves the powerofthe Court to adjourn the proceedings in order to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral Bproceedings or to take such other action as in the opinion of arbitral tribunal will eliminate the grounds for setting aside the arbitral award. On the termination of proceedings under Sections 32(2) and 33(1 ), Section 33(3) fu1iher contemplates termination of the mandate of the arbitral tribunal, whereas the aforesaid words are missing in Section 25. When the legislature has used the phrase "the mandate of the arbitral tribunal c shall terminate" in Section 32(3 ), non-use of such phrase in Section 25(a) has to be treated with a purpose and object. The purpose and object can only be that if the claimant shows sufficient cause, the proceedings can be re-commenced.

22. Learned amicus curiae has referred to judgment of this Court D in Grindl<tys B"'ik Ltd. Vs. Central Government Industrial Trib1111al & Ors., 1980 (Supp) SCC 420. In that case this Court was considering the power of industrial tribunal to set aside its cx-parte award on being satisfied that there was sufficient cause. The Comi also noticed that there was no specific express provision in the Act or the Rules giving Ethe tribunal jurisdiction to do so. In Para 6, following was held:-"6. We are of the opinion that the Tribunal had the power to pass the impugned order if it thought fit in the interest of justice. It is true that there is no express provision in the Act or the rules framed thereumler giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to do so. But it is a well F known rule of statutory construction that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as arc necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. In a case of this nature, we are of the view that the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there G is any indication in the statute to the contrary. We do not find any such statutory prohibition. On the other hand, there are indications to the contrary." 23. It is true that power of review has to be expressly conferred by a Statute. This Court in Paragraph 13 has also stated that the word H

950 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R. A review is used in two distinct senses. This Court further held that when a review is sought due to a procedural defect, such power inheres in every tribunal. In Paragraph 13, following was observed:-13 ..... The expression "'review'" is used in the two distinct senses, namely (I) a procedural review which is either inherent or implied B in a court or Tribunal to set aside a palpably erroneous order passed under a misapprehension by it, and (2) a review on merits when the error sought to be corrected is one of law and is apparent on the face of the record. It is in the latter sense that the comt in Patel Narshi Thakershi case held that no review lies on merits c unless a statute specifically provides for it. Obviously when a review is sought due to a procedural defect, the inadvertent error committed by the Tribunal must be corrected ex debito justitiae to prevent the abuse of its process, and such power inheres in every court or Tribunal." 24. In Kapra 11-fazdoor Ekta Union Vs. Bir/a Cotton Spinning D and Weaving Mills Ltd. & Am~, (2005) 13 SCC 777, this Court again held that a quasi-judicial authority is vested with the power to invoke procedural review. In Paragraph 19 of the judgment, following was laid down:-

" 19. Applying these principles it is apparent that where a court or E quasi-judicial authority havingjurisdiction to adjudicate on merit proceeds to do so, its judgment or order can be reviewed on merit only if the court or the quasi-judicial authority is vested with power of review by express provision or by necessary implication. The procedural review belongs to a different category. In such a review, the court or quasi-judicial authority havingjurisdiction to adjudicate F proceeds to do so, but in doing so commits (sic ascertains whether it has committed) a procedural illegality which goes to the root of the matter and invalidates the proceeding itself, and consequently the order passed therein. Cases where a decision is rendered by the court or quasi-judicial authority without notice to the opposite G party or under a mistaken impression that the notice had been served upon the opposite party, or where a matter is taken up for hearing and decision on a date other than the date fixed for its hearing, are some illustrative cases in which the power of procedural review may be invoked. In such a case the party seeking review or recall of the order does not have to substantiate the H SREI INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE LIMITED v. TUFF 951 DRILLING PRIVATE LIMITED [ASHOK BHUSHAN.• J.]

ground that the order passed suffers from an error apparent on A the face of the record or any other ground which may justify a review. He has to establish that the procedure followed by the court or the quasi-judicial authority suffered from such illegality that it vitiated the proceeding and invalidated the order made therein, inasmuch as the opposite party concerned was not heard B for no fault of his, or that the matter was heard and decided on a date other than the one fixed for hearing of the matter which he could not attend for no fault of his. In such cases, therefore, the matter has to be reheard in accordance with law without going into the merit of the order passed. The order passed is liable to be recalled and reviewed not because it is found to be erroneous, but c because it was passed in a proceeding which was itself vitiated by an error of procedure or mistake which went to the root of the matter and invalidated the entire proceeding. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal5 it was held that once it is established that the respondents were prevented from D appearing at the hearing due to sufficient cause, it followed that the matter must be reheard and decided again."

25. There cannot be a dispute that the power exercised by the arbitral tribunal is a quasi-judicial. In view of the provisions of the 1996 Act, which confers various statutory powers and obligations on the arbitral Etribunal, we do not find any such distinction between the statutory tribunal constituted under the statutory provisions or Constitution in so far as the power of procedural review is concerned. We have already noticed that Section 19 provides that arbitral tribunal shall not be bound by the rules of procedure as contained in Civil Procedure Code. Section 19 cannot be read to mean that arbitral tribunal is incapacitated in drawing F sustenance from any provisions of Code of Civil Procedure. This was clearly laid down in Nahar /11d11strial E11terprises Limited Vs. Ho11g Ko11g a11d Slumgltai Banking Corporatio11, (2009) 8 SCC 646. In Paragraph 98(n), following was state.d:-"(n) It is not bound by the procedure laid down under the Code. It G may however be noticed in this regard that just because the Tribunal is not bound by the Code, it does not mean that it would not have jurisdiction to exercise powers of a court as contained in the Code. "Rather, the Tribunal can travel beyond the Code of Civil Procedure and the only fetter that is put on its powers is to H 952 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 12 S.C.R. A observe the principles of natural justice." (See Industrial Credit and Investment Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Grapco Industries Ltd.)"

26. We thus are of the view that principles underlying Order 9 Rule 13 can very well be invoked by the arbitrator. There is nothing on · record to indicate that parties have agreed to the contrary. The issue, B which has arisen for consideration has engaged attention of different High Courts from time to time. Patna High Court in Mis. Senbo E11gineering Ltd. Vs. State of Biflar & Ors., AIR 2004 Patna 33, had occasion to consider the order terminating the proceeding.~ under Section 25(a). Patna High Court after considering the provision has held that arbitral tribunal has power to review on sufficient cause being C shown. In paragraph 32, following has been laid down:-"32. I find the submissions of Mr. Chatterjee well founded. Mr. Chatterjee has relied upon the provisions of the Act itself (that is to say, the internal aids to interpretation) in support of the point that on sufficient cause being shown, the arbitral tribunal has full D authority and power to recall an order under Section 25(a) of the Act. I think that one would arrive at the same conclusion on the basis of some extemal aids to interpretation." 27. Referring to judgment of this Coui1 in Gri11dlays Bank Ltd. (supm) t111dAnil Sood Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court II, (2001) E 10 SCC 534, Patna High Court fm1her laid down in Paragraph 39 as given below:-

"39. The two Supreme Court decisions under the Industrial Disputes Act are also a pointer in the direction that the arbitral tribunal must be held to have the power of procedural review and F the authority to recall, on sufficient cause being shown, an order terminating the proceeding under Section 25(a) of the Act. The second question too is, thus, answered in the affirmative and in favour of the petitioner." 28. Delhi High Court in Awtisthi Construction Co. Vs. Govt. Of G NCT ofDelhi & Anr., 2013 (I) Arb. LR 70 (Delhi)(DB) has elaborately considered this issue. In Paragraph 17 and 18, following has been held:-"17. We may in this regard also notice that the legislature, in Section 25, has not provided for termination of proceedings automatically on default by a party but has vested the discretion H SREI INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE LIMITED v. TUFF 953 DRILLING PRIVATE LIMITED [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

in the arbitral tribunal to, on sufficient cause being shown condone A such default. We are of the view that no distinction ought to be drawn between showing such sufficient cause before the proceedings are terminated and after the proceedings are terminated. If the arbitral tribunal is empowered to condone default on sufficient cause being shown, it matters not when the same is B shown. It may well nigh be possible that the sufficient cause itself is such which prevented the party concerned from showing it before the proceedings terminated. It would be a pedantic reading of the provision to hold that the arbitral tribunal in such cases also stands denuded. Once the legislature has vested the arbitral tribunal with such power, an order of termination cannot be allowed to c come in the way of exercise thereof.

18. There is another reason for us to hold so. The emphasis of the Arbitration Act is to provide an alternative dispute resolution mechanism. The provisions of the Act ought to be interpreted in a manner that would make such adjudication effective and not in a D manner that would make arbitration proceedings cumbersome. A view that the arbitral tribunal is precluded, even where sufficient cause exists, from reviving the arbitral proceedings and the only remedy available to a party is a writ petition and which remedy is available only in the High Court often situated at a distance from E the place where the parties are located, would be a deterrent to arbitration. It is also worth mentioning that Section 19(2) of the Act permits the parties to agree on the procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal. The parties may, while so laying down the procedure, provide for the remedy of review/revival of arbitral proceedings and which agreement would be binding on the arbitral F tribunal. If the arbitral tribunal in such a situation would be empowered to, on sufficient cause being shown, revive the arbitral proceedings, we see no reason to, in the absence of such an agreement hold the arbitral tribunal to be not empowered to do so. If it were to be held that such power of review/recall is not G available to an arbitral tribunal, the arbitral tribunal would not be competent to set aside an order wider Section 25(b) also, compelling the respondent against whom proceedings have been continued, to file a writ petition, making the continuation of proceedings before the arbitral tribunal a useless exercise." H

954 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 12 S.C.R. A 29. The Delhi High Court again reiterated the same principle in ATV Projects India Ltd. Vs. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. & Anr., 200(2013) Delhi Law Times 553 (DB). 30. The Madras High Court in Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited Vs. Jyothi Turbopower Services Private Limited & Ors., 2017(1) B Arb. LR 289 (Madras) again took the view that after terminating the proceedings under Section 25(a), the arbitral tribunal can recall the said · order on sufficient cause being shown and the arbitral tribunal does not become functus officio after passing an order under Section 25(a). The Madras High Court has agreed with the view expressed by the Division c Bench of the Delhi High Comt as noticed above. 31. A contrary view has also been expressed by certain High Courts. The Kerala High Court in PMA Shukkur v.:~.111uthoot Vehicle, (2010) Arb. LR 121 (Kera/a), held that the power to set aside an ex-partc award vests in the Court, and the arbitrator does not have any concurrent power to set aside an ex-parte award. D 32. We endorse the views of Patna High Court, Delhi High Court and Madras High Court as noted above, in so far as they have held that the arbitral tribunal after termination of proceedings under Section 25(a) on sufficient cause being shown can recall the order and re-commence the proceedings. E

33. In the present case, the arbitral tribunal has rejected the . application of the claimant by order dated 26.04.2012 taking the view that after an order is passed by him terminating the proceedings, he cannot pass the order recommencing the arbitration proceedings. In view of the above discussions, we are of the view that the arbitral tribunal F committed an error in holding that it has no jurisdiction to recall an order terminating the proceedings under Section 25(a). The arbitral tribunal having not considered the cause shown by the claimant in its application, it is in the ends of justice that the arbitrnl tribunal be asked to consider the application filed by the claimant dated 20.01.20 l Z·praying for recall G of the order dated 12.12.2011 and to grant extension for filing the statement of claim. 34. Coming to Issue No. 2 and 3, in view of what we have said regarding Issue No. 1 that arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction to consider an application for recall of order terminating the proceedings under Section H 25(a), it is not necessary for us to enter into Issue No. 2 and 3 for SREI INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE LIMITED v. TUFF 955 DRILLING PRIVATE LIMITED [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.] purposes of this case. For deciding the present Ci vii Appeal, our answer A to Issue No.l is sufficient to dispose of the matter.

35. In result, the appeal is dismissed. The interim order dated 07.07.2015, granting stay on the operation of order dated 13.02.2015 passed by the High Com1 stands discharged and the arbitral tribunal shall now proceed to decide the application of claimant-respondent dated B 20.01.2012 expeditiously. The parties shall bear their own costs. 36. We place on record our appreciations for the valuable assistance rendered by Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, Sr. Advocate appearing as amicus. Divya Pandey Appeal dismissed.