[2017] 3 S.C.R. 681 M/S. BRAKEWEL AUTOMOTIVE COMPONENTS (INDIA) A PVT. LTD. v. P. R. SELVAM ALAGAPPAN (Civil Appeal Nos. 4313- 4314of2017) B MARCH21,2017 [ARUN MISHRA AND AMITAVA ROY, JJ.] Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: s.47 - Scope and ambit of scrutiny under - Suit for recovery c by appellant-plaintiff - Decreed by trial court - Execution application by appellant - s.47 application by respondent-defendant objecting to executability of the decree - Appellant questioned the maintainability of such application by respondent - Executing Court held the application to be maintainable - Order affirmed by High Court - On appeal, held: The purview of scrutiny u!s. 47 qua a D decree is limited to objections to its executability on the ground of iurisdictional infirmity or voidness - Only a decree which is a nullity can be the subject matter of objection u/s.47 and not one which is erroneous either in !all' or on facts - Having regard to the contextual facts and the objections raised by the respondent, no case made E out to entertain the application u!s. 47 - Both the Executing Court and the High Court, not only erred in construing the scope and ambit of scrutiny u/s. 47 CPC, but also overlooked the fact that the decree did not suffer either from any jurisdictional error or was otherwise invalid in law. F s.47 - Executing Court - Power of - Discussed. ··Allowing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1.1 An Executing Court can neither travel behind the decree nor sit in appeal· over the same or pass any order jeopardizing the rights of the parties thereunder. It is only.in the G limited cases where the decree is by a court lacking inherent jnrisdiction or is a nullity that the same is rendered 11011 est and is thus inexecutable. An erroneous decree cannot be equaled with one which is a nul!ity. In the present case, the objections raised by the appellant even if considered to exist did not infest the decree with any jurisdictional infirmity or reduce it to a nullity. H 681 682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 3 S.C.R. A There are no intervening developments as well to render the decree inexecutable. [Para 19] [688-G-HJ 1.2 Section 47 of CPC mandates determination by an executing court, of questions arising between the parties or their representatives relating to the execution, discharge or B satisfaction of the decree and does not contemplate any adjudication beyond the same. A decree of court of law being sacrosanct in nature, the execution thereof ought not to be thwarted on mere asking and on untenable and purported grounds having no bearing on the validity or the executability thereof. (Para 20] (689-A-BJ · c

1.3 The purview of scruti.ny under Section 47 qua a decree is limited to obje.ctions to its executability on the ground of jurisdictional infirmity or voidness. Only a decree which is a nullity can be the subject matter of objection under Section 47 and not one which is erroneous either in law or on facts. [Para D 21) (689-C] Vasudev Dha11jibhai Modi vs. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman and Ors. [1971) 1 SCR 66 - relied on. 1.4 The powers of the Court under Section 47 are quite different and much narrower than those in appeal/revision or E review. The exercise of power thereunder is microscopic and lies in a very nurow inspection hole and an executing court can allow objection to the executabilty of the decree if it is found that the same is void ab initio and is a nullity, apart from the ground that it is not. capable of .execution under the law, either because . F the same was passed in ignorance of such provision of law or the law was promulgated making a decree inexecutable after its passing. None of the above eventualities as recognised in law for rendering a decree inexecutable, exists iu the case in hand. [~ara 22] [690-B-C] G Dhurandhar Prasad Singh vs. Jai Prakash University and Ors. AIR 2001 SC 2552 : [2001) 3 SCR 1129 -relied on. Case Law Reference (1971) 1 SCR 66 relied on Para 21 H [2001] 3 SCR 1129 relied on Para 22 MIS. BRAKEWEL AUTOMOTIVE COM~ONENTS (INDIA) 683 PVT. LTD. v. P. R. SELVAM ALAGAPPAN

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 4313- A 4314 of2017. From the Judgment and Order dated 03.06.2016 of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in C.R.P. (NPD) No. 1499 of20I6 and CMP No. 8225 of2016. B . J. S. Bakshi, Saurabh Ajay Gupta, Advs. for the Appellant. M. P. Parthiban, T. R. B. Sivakumar, Advs. for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by AMITAVA ROY, J. I. Leave granted. c 2. The subject matterof impeachment is the order dated 3.6.2016 rendered in CRP (NPD) 1499 of2016 and CMP No. 8225 of2016 by the High Court of Judicature at Madras, thereby rejecting the prayer of the appellant/plaintiff/decree-holder (for short, hereinafter to be referred l_ . ' to as "the appellant") to eschew evidence of the respondent/defendant/ judgment-debtor (for short, hereinafter to be referred to as "the D respondent") in a proceeding under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (as amended) (hereinafter to be referred to as "CPC/ Code"), as well as to dismiss such application as not maintainable. By the order impugned, the High Court has affirmed the determination made to the same effect by the Executing Court. E 3. We have he·ard Mr. J .S. Bakshi, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. M.P. Parthiban, learned counsel for the respondent.

4. The genesis of the present lis is traceable to Civil Suit (OS) No. 1690 of 20 I 0 instituted before the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi by the appellant against the respondent arrayed as the proprietor F of M/s. Kargaappa Auto Products and M/s Paans Auto Products for recovery of Rs. 20,94,953/- arising from business transactions between the parties. While the appellant described itself to be a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956 and engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of auto components/parts, the respondent G was introduced as the proprietor of the afore-named proprietorship firms. . According to the appellant, the respondent approached it in the month of November, 2002 for a business deal and on the basis of the bargain entered into, it supplied auto components and parts to the respondent, . 1 as per the specifications mentioned and raised bills in connection therewith. H 684 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 3 S.C.R.

A 5. As per the books of account maintained in the regular course of business, at the relevant time i.e. 15.10.2007, Rs. 8,01,7081- was due and outstanding against the respondent in the accounts of Mis. Kargaappa Auto Products and Rs. 4,93,9521- as on 6.6.2008, in the account of Ml s. Paans Auto Products, thus totalling Rs. 12,95,6601-. As this amount was not paid inspite of repeated demands, and the ultimate notice datedB 28.12.2009, addressed by the appellant to the respondent, the suit was filed for realisation of the aforementioned amount together with interest @ 24% p.a. for an aggregate sum of Rs. 20, 94,9531-. 6. Though on the receipt of the summons in the suit, the respondent arranged for his representation, he eventually failed to submit his written c statement and accordingly, his defence was struck off vi de order dated 20.10,2011, in view of his persistent default to that effect. Subsequent thereto, the appellant filed the affidavit of one of its directors in endorsement of its pleaded case, who proved, amongst others, the copies of various invoices authenticating the supply of goods to the D respondent and also the statement of accounts pertaining thereto. This witness too was not cross-examined on behalf of the respondent, though _opportunity was granted and eventually the Trial Court, on a consideration of materials on record, decreed the suit for Rs. 18,95,077 I- by allowing the interest@ 18% p.a. in lieu of24%, as claimed.

E 7. As the records would reveal, a defective appeal was filed on behalf of the respondent thereafter only to be withdrawn in due course. The appellant launched the execution and the application in connection thereto was registered as E.P. No. 11787 of 2014 to execute the decree as aforementioned. It was thereafter that an application for review was filed by the respondent before the High Court seeking to F recall the judgment and order dated 16.12.2011. It was pleaded by the respondent that the suit was not maintainable on account of non-joinderl mis-joinder of proper and necessary parties. Though he had admitted that he was the proprietor of Paans Auto products, he asserted that he was not so of Mis. Kargaappa Auto Products and that instead his wife G Mrs. A. Kamalla being so was the proper and necessary party and that in view of this-defect, the suit was liable to be dismissed. He also pointed out that the name of this firm is Mis. Karpaga Auto Products and not Mis. KargaappaAuto Products, as recited in the plaint. The respondent alleged fraud as well and contended that the appellant was guilty of suppression of material facts of rejection of its goods. Further, he also H M/S. BRAKEWEL AUTOMOTIVE COMPONENTS (INDIA) 685 PVT. LTD. v. P. R. SELVAM ALAGAPPAN [AMITAVA ROY, J.]

alleged collusion and connivance between his counsel and the appellant A for which the former deliberately abstained from taking necessary steps to ensure his effective representation in the suit, thus resulting in the ex-parte decree. 8. He pleaded that on receiving the summons in the suit, necessary instructions were conveyed to his counsel at Delhi to appropriately contest B the proceeding, but the latter refrained from either filing the written statement or frt>m taking necessary steps resulting in his default for which ultimately, the suit was decreed. According to him, though he was in touch with his counsel at Delhi through his counterpart at Chennai, he was being given the impression that there was no progress in the suit c and that he would be duly infon11ed about any substantial developme.~t therein whenever the same would oq:ur. The respondent contended that it was in February/March, 2014, when he and his local counsel grew suspicious of the evasive replies given by his counsel at Delhi, that the records of the suit were consulted, which revealed that his defence had been struck off on 20.10.2011 and the suit had been decreed on D 16.12.2011. The records of the suit also divulged thatthough an opportunity to him for cross-examination of the witnesses by appellant had been afforded, it was not availed of due to the sheer dereliction of the ·professional duties of his counsel.

9. -Noticeably, the respondent in his review application _disclosed E that his said counsel however did prefer an appeal against the ex-parte decree, which eventually was returned in view of the attendant defects. " The appeal was however not re-filed and that in the meanwhile, a complaini had been lodged against the counsel with the Bar Councilof Tamil Nadu at Channai, was mentioned as well. F 10. It is worthwhile to note that no interim order was passed on . this review application, which eventually was dismissed on 15.4.2015 on account of unexplained delay of three years. · 11. Meanwhile, however the respondent filed his counter-affidavit in the execution proceedings and also followed it up with an application G under Section 47 ofCPC to resist the execution of the decree. Suffice it would be to state that the demurrals in these pleadings are in suJistance a replication of those narrated in the review application and, therefore· are not being re-traversed. , 12. In refutatioi1, the appellant did file a ~ommon countei~nffidavit H ., .... 686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] 3 S.C.R.

A asserting that the respondent had placed orders for automobile components, which were accordingly dispatched and as on the date of the institution of the suit, the payments in connection therewith were outstanding, a suit was filed to recover the same and eventually, it was decreed on 16.12.2011 for a sum of Rs. 18,95,077/- along with pendente . B lite and future interest @ 18% p.a. Apart from high Iighting that the respondent had after the receipt of the summons/notices in the suit, continuously abstained himself from contesting the same by filing his written statement or taking further initiatives and that, therefore the decree passed was val.id in law, the appellant maintained that the suit had been filed against the respondent, as he represented both the firms C ·and had participated in the transactions in that capacity for which either the mistake in the name ofM/s. Kargaappa Auto Products instead of Mis Karpaga Auto Products or non-impleadment of his wife as the sole proprietress thereof was wholly inconsequential qua the aspect of executability of the decree. The allegation of suppression ofany material fact, as alleged was denied. The accusation of collusion between the D learned counsel for the respondent and the appellant was stoutly denied as well. It was pointed out that the fact of filing of appeal preferred by the same counsel against the decree belied the allegation of dereliction of duty as unfounded. Underlining the inexplicable delay and inaction of three years on the part of the respondent in filing the review petition, it E was contended that the resistance to the executing proceedings was only with the objective of protracting the proceeding~to his advantage on flimsy and frivolous grounds.

· 13. The respondent next filed an affidavit on the same Iin es as narrated in his counter and the application under Section 47 CPC and F sought to supplement the same by producing documents to that effect by way of oral and documentary testimony of the pleaded facts. The appellant in its rejoinder did object to this initiative on the part of the respondent as impermissible, being beyond the purview of Section 47 CPC and prayed for obliteration of such evidence. The appellant pleaded that after the counter-affidavit had been filed by the respondent in the G execution proceedings, arguments on behalf of the decree-holder were heard and though the proceedings were deferred for the arguments on behalf of the respondent, an application by him under Section 47 CPC was filed, the maintainabilify whereof was questioned by the appellant and that it was at that belated stage that the respondent sought to introduce the documentary evidence. H M/S. BRAKEWEL AUTOMOTIVE COMPONENTS (INDIA) 687 PVT. LTD. v. P. R. SELVAM ALAGAPPAN [AMITAVA ROY, J.] . 14. The Executing Court however by its order dated 8.2.2016, A dismissed the objection of the appellant by taking note principally of tlie fact that the respondent was not the proprietor~ofKarpagaAuto Products and that it was necessary to examine as tbhow he was related to the said proprietorship firm, a question to be decided in the proceedings under Section 4 7 CPC. B

, IS. By the impugned order, the High Court has affirmed th.is determination of the Executing Court by observing that though the issue of maintainability of the application under Section 47 CPC had been raised by.the appellant, it was within the right of the respondent to lead evidence, both oral and documentary pertaining to all questions arising_ C between the parties to the suit. It was of the view that the question of maintainability of the application under Section 47 CPC ought to be decided along with the objections raised with regard to the executability of the decree. '' 16. Learned counsel for the appellant, in the above backdrop, has Dargued that the impugned order is clearly unsustainable in law and on fac.:ts having regard to the established contours of scrutiny under Section 47 CPC and is thus indefensible. Not only the grounds urged in the counter-affidavit to the execution petition and the application under Section 47 CPC do have any factual foundation and are thus non-existent, these are liable to be rejected in Ii mini and do not warrant any verification E thereof. Not only are these objections frivolous on the face ofrecord, these have been resorted to only for protracting the execution proceedings. He urged that the impugned order has the effect of going heh.ind and reopening the decree, which is impermissible in law. According to him, neither the decree suffers from any jurisdictional ' Ferror nor is a nullity and is thus executable in law.

17. In reply, the learned counsel for the respondent has insisted that in the teeth of incorrect name of one of the firms and non-representation thereof by its rightful proprietor, the decree which is composite in nature, has been rendered inexecutable. He further argued that as the decree is an yield of fraud and collusion between the learned G counsel for the respondent and the appellant, it is non est in law and thus the impugned order which only permits an inquiry in these aspects, is well within the purview ofSection 47 CPC and therefor no interference therewith is called for. H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 3 S.C.R.

A 18. The materials on record and the arguments based thereon have received our due consideration. To recapitulate, the plaint discloses that the respondent had represented before the appellant to be authorised to act on behalf of both the firms and in that capacity had participated in the transactions that_followed. In that perspective, even assuming that the name of one of the firms was wrongly mentioned and that in fact, B it is the wife of the respondent, who is the proprietress thereof, with whom there is no conflict ofinterest, these in our comprehension per se, would not render the decree void or inexecutable. Such errors, even if exist, would not infest the decree with any jurisdictional infirmity or reduce it to a nullity. Noticeably, there is no dispute with regard to the c identity of the firms involved and their representation by the respondent in the suit transactions. The allegation of fraud and collusion between the learned counsel for the respondent and the appellant is visibly self-serving, omnibus, speculative and unauthentic and cannot therefore, after so many years: ipso facto render the decree invalid on account thereof. Visibly, the respondent had been the center figure in all the·D transactions between the parties on behalf of the firms, as stand proved in the suit and the resistance to the execution of the decree is neither QI! , behalf of Mis. Kargaappa Auto Products/Mis. Karpaga Auto Products nor its proprietress, his wife contending that the decree is neither binding on the firm nor on her. For all practical purposes, the said firm is still E being represented by the respondent in the subsisting proceedings. The sequence of events disclose that the suit had been instituted in the year 20 I 0 and was decreed on 16.10.2011. The persistent default on the part of the respondent has been adverted to hereinabove. Though a defective appeal had been filed on his behalf in the year 2012, it was withdrawn and was not re-filed by removing the defects. The Execution Petition F though lodged in the year 2014 has not seen the fruit of the decree as on da!e. The Review Petition filed by the respondent has also been dismissed. Significantly, in all the proceedings initiated by the respondent to stall · the execution of the decree, the same pleas have been reiterated.

19. It is no longer res integra that an Executing Court can neither G travel behind the decree nor sit in appeal over the same or pass any order jeopardizing the rights of the parties thereunder. It is only in the limited cases where the decree is by a court lacking inherent jurisdiction or is a nullity that the same is rendered non est and is thus inexecutable. An erroneous decree cannot be equaled with one which is a nullity. There are no intervening developments as well as to render the decree inexecutable. MIS. BRAKEWEL AUTOMOTIVE COMPONENTS (INDIA) 689 PVT. LTD. v. P. R. SELVAM ALAGAPPAN [AMITAVA ROY, J.] 20. As it is, Section 47 of the Code mandates determination by A an executing court, questions arising between the parties or their representatives relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree and does not contemplate any adjudication beyond the same. A decree of court of law being sacrosanct in nature, the execution thereof ought not to be thwarted on mere asking and on untenable Band purported grounds having no bearing on the validity or the executability thereof.

21. Judicial precedents to the effect that the purview of scrutiny under Section 4 7 of the Code qua a decree is limited to objections to its executability on the ground of jurisdictional infirmity or voidness are cplethoric. This Court, amongst others in Vasudev Dlumjib//{/i Modi vs. Rajabhai Abdul Re/mum and others 197 l (I) SCR 66 in essence enunciated that only a decree which is a nullity can be the subject matter of objection under Section 47 of the Code and not one which is erroneous either in law or on facts. The following extract from this decision seems apt: D "A Court executing a decree cannot go behind the decree between the parties or their representatives; it must take the decree according to its tenor, and cannot entertain any objection that the decree was incorrect in law or on facts. Until it is set aside by an appropriate proceeding in appeal or revision, a decree E even ifit be erroneous is still binding between the parties.

When a decree which is a nullity, for instance, where it is passed without bringing the legal representatives on the record of a person who was dead at the date of the decree, or against a ruling prince without a certificate, is sought to be executed an F objection in that behalf may be raised in a proceeding for execution. Again, when the decree is made by a Court which has no inherent jurisdiction to make it, objection as to it.s validity may be raised in an execution proceeding ifthe objection appears on the face of the record: where the objection as to the jurisdiction of the Court to pass the decree does not appear on the face of G the record and requires examination of the questions raised and decided at the trial or which could have been but have not been raised, the executing Court will have no jurisdiction to entertain an objection as to the validity of the decree even on the ground ofabsence of jurisdiction." H 690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 3 S.C.R.

A 22. Though this view has echoed time out of number in similar pronouncements of this Court, in Dhurandlwr Prasad Singh vs. Jai Prakash University and otlters, AIR 200 I SC 2552, while dwelling on the scope of Section 47 of the Code, it was ruled that the powers of the court thereunder are quite different and much narrower than those in appeal/revision or review. It was reiterated that the exercise of powerB under Section 47 of the Code is microscopic and lies in a very narrow inspection hole and an executing court can allow objection to the executabilty of the decree if it is found that the same is void ab initlo and is a nullity, apart from the ground that it is not capable of execution under the law, either because the same was passed in ignorance of such provision c of law or the law was promulgated making a decree inexecutable after its passing. None of the above eventualities as recognised in law for rendering a decree inexecutable, exists in the case in hand. For obvious reasons, we do not wish to burden this adjudication by multiplying the decisions favouring the same view.

D 23. Having regard to the contextual facts and the objections raised by the respondent, we ai'e of the unhesitant opinion that no case has been made out to entertain the remonstrances against the decree or the application under Section 47 CPC. Both the Executing Court and the High Court, in our comprehension, have not only erred in construing the scope and ambit of scrutiny under Section 47 CPC, but have also E overlooked the fact that the decree. does not suffer either from any jurisdictional error or is otherwise invalid in law. The objections to the execution petition as well as to the application under Section 47 CPC filed by the respondent do not either disclose any substantial defence to the decree or testify the same to be suffering from any jurisdictional F infirmity or invalidity. These are therefore rejected. 24. On a consideration of all relevant aspects in the entirety, we are thus disinclined to sustain the impugned orders and hereby set-aside the.same. The appeals are allowed. The Executing Court would proceed with the execution proceedings and take it to the logical end G with utmost expedition. No costs. Divya Pandey Appeals allowed.

[2017] 3 S.C.R. 681 M/S. BRAKEWEL AUTOMOTIVE COMPONENTS (INDIA) A PVT. LTD. v. P. R. SELVAM ALAGAPPAN (Civil Appeal Nos. 4313- 4314of2017) B MARCH21,2017 [ARUN MISHRA AND AMITAVA ROY, JJ.] Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: s.47 - Scope and ambit of scrutiny under - Suit for recovery c by appellant-plaintiff - Decreed by trial court - Execution application by appellant - s.47 application by respondent-defendant objecting to executability of the decree - Appellant questioned the maintainability of such application by respondent - Executing Court held the application to be maintainable - Order affirmed by High Court - On appeal, held: The purview of scrutiny u!s. 47 qua a D decree is limited to objections to its executability on the ground of iurisdictional infirmity or voidness - Only a decree which is a nullity can be the subject matter of objection u/s.47 and not one which is erroneous either in !all' or on facts - Having regard to the contextual facts and the objections raised by the respondent, no case made E out to entertain the application u!s. 47 - Both the Executing Court and the High Court, not only erred in construing the scope and ambit of scrutiny u/s. 47 CPC, but also overlooked the fact that the decree did not suffer either from any jurisdictional error or was otherwise invalid in law. F s.47 - Executing Court - Power of - Discussed. ··Allowing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1.1 An Executing Court can neither travel behind the decree nor sit in appeal· over the same or pass any order jeopardizing the rights of the parties thereunder. It is only.in the G limited cases where the decree is by a court lacking inherent jnrisdiction or is a nullity that the same is rendered 11011 est and is thus inexecutable. An erroneous decree cannot be equaled with one which is a nul!ity. In the present case, the objections raised by the appellant even if considered to exist did not infest the decree with any jurisdictional infirmity or reduce it to a nullity. H 681 682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 3 S.C.R. A There are no intervening developments as well to render the decree inexecutable. [Para 19] [688-G-HJ 1.2 Section 47 of CPC mandates determination by an executing court, of questions arising between the parties or their representatives relating to the execution, discharge or B satisfaction of the decree and does not contemplate any adjudication beyond the same. A decree of court of law being sacrosanct in nature, the execution thereof ought not to be thwarted on mere asking and on untenable and purported grounds having no bearing on the validity or the executability thereof. (Para 20] (689-A-BJ · c

1.3 The purview of scruti.ny under Section 47 qua a decree is limited to obje.ctions to its executability on the ground of jurisdictional infirmity or voidness. Only a decree which is a nullity can be the subject matter of objection under Section 47 and not one which is erroneous either in law or on facts. [Para D 21) (689-C] Vasudev Dha11jibhai Modi vs. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman and Ors. [1971) 1 SCR 66 - relied on. 1.4 The powers of the Court under Section 47 are quite different and much narrower than those in appeal/revision or E review. The exercise of power thereunder is microscopic and lies in a very nurow inspection hole and an executing court can allow objection to the executabilty of the decree if it is found that the same is void ab initio and is a nullity, apart from the ground that it is not. capable of .execution under the law, either because . F the same was passed in ignorance of such provision of law or the law was promulgated making a decree inexecutable after its passing. None of the above eventualities as recognised in law for rendering a decree inexecutable, exists iu the case in hand. [~ara 22] [690-B-C] G Dhurandhar Prasad Singh vs. Jai Prakash University and Ors. AIR 2001 SC 2552 : [2001) 3 SCR 1129 -relied on. Case Law Reference (1971) 1 SCR 66 relied on Para 21 H [2001] 3 SCR 1129 relied on Para 22 MIS. BRAKEWEL AUTOMOTIVE COM~ONENTS (INDIA) 683 PVT. LTD. v. P. R. SELVAM ALAGAPPAN

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 4313- A 4314 of2017. From the Judgment and Order dated 03.06.2016 of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in C.R.P. (NPD) No. 1499 of20I6 and CMP No. 8225 of2016. B . J. S. Bakshi, Saurabh Ajay Gupta, Advs. for the Appellant. M. P. Parthiban, T. R. B. Sivakumar, Advs. for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by AMITAVA ROY, J. I. Leave granted. c 2. The subject matterof impeachment is the order dated 3.6.2016 rendered in CRP (NPD) 1499 of2016 and CMP No. 8225 of2016 by the High Court of Judicature at Madras, thereby rejecting the prayer of the appellant/plaintiff/decree-holder (for short, hereinafter to be referred l_ . ' to as "the appellant") to eschew evidence of the respondent/defendant/ judgment-debtor (for short, hereinafter to be referred to as "the D respondent") in a proceeding under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (as amended) (hereinafter to be referred to as "CPC/ Code"), as well as to dismiss such application as not maintainable. By the order impugned, the High Court has affirmed the determination made to the same effect by the Executing Court. E 3. We have he·ard Mr. J .S. Bakshi, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. M.P. Parthiban, learned counsel for the respondent.

4. The genesis of the present lis is traceable to Civil Suit (OS) No. 1690 of 20 I 0 instituted before the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi by the appellant against the respondent arrayed as the proprietor F of M/s. Kargaappa Auto Products and M/s Paans Auto Products for recovery of Rs. 20,94,953/- arising from business transactions between the parties. While the appellant described itself to be a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956 and engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of auto components/parts, the respondent G was introduced as the proprietor of the afore-named proprietorship firms. . According to the appellant, the respondent approached it in the month of November, 2002 for a business deal and on the basis of the bargain entered into, it supplied auto components and parts to the respondent, . 1 as per the specifications mentioned and raised bills in connection therewith. H 684 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 3 S.C.R.

A 5. As per the books of account maintained in the regular course of business, at the relevant time i.e. 15.10.2007, Rs. 8,01,7081- was due and outstanding against the respondent in the accounts of Mis. Kargaappa Auto Products and Rs. 4,93,9521- as on 6.6.2008, in the account of Ml s. Paans Auto Products, thus totalling Rs. 12,95,6601-. As this amount was not paid inspite of repeated demands, and the ultimate notice datedB 28.12.2009, addressed by the appellant to the respondent, the suit was filed for realisation of the aforementioned amount together with interest @ 24% p.a. for an aggregate sum of Rs. 20, 94,9531-. 6. Though on the receipt of the summons in the suit, the respondent arranged for his representation, he eventually failed to submit his written c statement and accordingly, his defence was struck off vi de order dated 20.10,2011, in view of his persistent default to that effect. Subsequent thereto, the appellant filed the affidavit of one of its directors in endorsement of its pleaded case, who proved, amongst others, the copies of various invoices authenticating the supply of goods to the D respondent and also the statement of accounts pertaining thereto. This witness too was not cross-examined on behalf of the respondent, though _opportunity was granted and eventually the Trial Court, on a consideration of materials on record, decreed the suit for Rs. 18,95,077 I- by allowing the interest@ 18% p.a. in lieu of24%, as claimed.

E 7. As the records would reveal, a defective appeal was filed on behalf of the respondent thereafter only to be withdrawn in due course. The appellant launched the execution and the application in connection thereto was registered as E.P. No. 11787 of 2014 to execute the decree as aforementioned. It was thereafter that an application for review was filed by the respondent before the High Court seeking to F recall the judgment and order dated 16.12.2011. It was pleaded by the respondent that the suit was not maintainable on account of non-joinderl mis-joinder of proper and necessary parties. Though he had admitted that he was the proprietor of Paans Auto products, he asserted that he was not so of Mis. Kargaappa Auto Products and that instead his wife G Mrs. A. Kamalla being so was the proper and necessary party and that in view of this-defect, the suit was liable to be dismissed. He also pointed out that the name of this firm is Mis. Karpaga Auto Products and not Mis. KargaappaAuto Products, as recited in the plaint. The respondent alleged fraud as well and contended that the appellant was guilty of suppression of material facts of rejection of its goods. Further, he also H M/S. BRAKEWEL AUTOMOTIVE COMPONENTS (INDIA) 685 PVT. LTD. v. P. R. SELVAM ALAGAPPAN [AMITAVA ROY, J.]

alleged collusion and connivance between his counsel and the appellant A for which the former deliberately abstained from taking necessary steps to ensure his effective representation in the suit, thus resulting in the ex-parte decree. 8. He pleaded that on receiving the summons in the suit, necessary instructions were conveyed to his counsel at Delhi to appropriately contest B the proceeding, but the latter refrained from either filing the written statement or frt>m taking necessary steps resulting in his default for which ultimately, the suit was decreed. According to him, though he was in touch with his counsel at Delhi through his counterpart at Chennai, he was being given the impression that there was no progress in the suit c and that he would be duly infon11ed about any substantial developme.~t therein whenever the same would oq:ur. The respondent contended that it was in February/March, 2014, when he and his local counsel grew suspicious of the evasive replies given by his counsel at Delhi, that the records of the suit were consulted, which revealed that his defence had been struck off on 20.10.2011 and the suit had been decreed on D 16.12.2011. The records of the suit also divulged thatthough an opportunity to him for cross-examination of the witnesses by appellant had been afforded, it was not availed of due to the sheer dereliction of the ·professional duties of his counsel.

9. -Noticeably, the respondent in his review application _disclosed E that his said counsel however did prefer an appeal against the ex-parte decree, which eventually was returned in view of the attendant defects. " The appeal was however not re-filed and that in the meanwhile, a complaini had been lodged against the counsel with the Bar Councilof Tamil Nadu at Channai, was mentioned as well. F 10. It is worthwhile to note that no interim order was passed on . this review application, which eventually was dismissed on 15.4.2015 on account of unexplained delay of three years. · 11. Meanwhile, however the respondent filed his counter-affidavit in the execution proceedings and also followed it up with an application G under Section 47 ofCPC to resist the execution of the decree. Suffice it would be to state that the demurrals in these pleadings are in suJistance a replication of those narrated in the review application and, therefore· are not being re-traversed. , 12. In refutatioi1, the appellant did file a ~ommon countei~nffidavit H ., .... 686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] 3 S.C.R.

A asserting that the respondent had placed orders for automobile components, which were accordingly dispatched and as on the date of the institution of the suit, the payments in connection therewith were outstanding, a suit was filed to recover the same and eventually, it was decreed on 16.12.2011 for a sum of Rs. 18,95,077/- along with pendente . B lite and future interest @ 18% p.a. Apart from high Iighting that the respondent had after the receipt of the summons/notices in the suit, continuously abstained himself from contesting the same by filing his written statement or taking further initiatives and that, therefore the decree passed was val.id in law, the appellant maintained that the suit had been filed against the respondent, as he represented both the firms C ·and had participated in the transactions in that capacity for which either the mistake in the name ofM/s. Kargaappa Auto Products instead of Mis Karpaga Auto Products or non-impleadment of his wife as the sole proprietress thereof was wholly inconsequential qua the aspect of executability of the decree. The allegation of suppression ofany material fact, as alleged was denied. The accusation of collusion between the D learned counsel for the respondent and the appellant was stoutly denied as well. It was pointed out that the fact of filing of appeal preferred by the same counsel against the decree belied the allegation of dereliction of duty as unfounded. Underlining the inexplicable delay and inaction of three years on the part of the respondent in filing the review petition, it E was contended that the resistance to the executing proceedings was only with the objective of protracting the proceeding~to his advantage on flimsy and frivolous grounds.

· 13. The respondent next filed an affidavit on the same Iin es as narrated in his counter and the application under Section 47 CPC and F sought to supplement the same by producing documents to that effect by way of oral and documentary testimony of the pleaded facts. The appellant in its rejoinder did object to this initiative on the part of the respondent as impermissible, being beyond the purview of Section 47 CPC and prayed for obliteration of such evidence. The appellant pleaded that after the counter-affidavit had been filed by the respondent in the G execution proceedings, arguments on behalf of the decree-holder were heard and though the proceedings were deferred for the arguments on behalf of the respondent, an application by him under Section 47 CPC was filed, the maintainabilify whereof was questioned by the appellant and that it was at that belated stage that the respondent sought to introduce the documentary evidence. H M/S. BRAKEWEL AUTOMOTIVE COMPONENTS (INDIA) 687 PVT. LTD. v. P. R. SELVAM ALAGAPPAN [AMITAVA ROY, J.] . 14. The Executing Court however by its order dated 8.2.2016, A dismissed the objection of the appellant by taking note principally of tlie fact that the respondent was not the proprietor~ofKarpagaAuto Products and that it was necessary to examine as tbhow he was related to the said proprietorship firm, a question to be decided in the proceedings under Section 4 7 CPC. B

, IS. By the impugned order, the High Court has affirmed th.is determination of the Executing Court by observing that though the issue of maintainability of the application under Section 47 CPC had been raised by.the appellant, it was within the right of the respondent to lead evidence, both oral and documentary pertaining to all questions arising_ C between the parties to the suit. It was of the view that the question of maintainability of the application under Section 47 CPC ought to be decided along with the objections raised with regard to the executability of the decree. '' 16. Learned counsel for the appellant, in the above backdrop, has Dargued that the impugned order is clearly unsustainable in law and on fac.:ts having regard to the established contours of scrutiny under Section 47 CPC and is thus indefensible. Not only the grounds urged in the counter-affidavit to the execution petition and the application under Section 47 CPC do have any factual foundation and are thus non-existent, these are liable to be rejected in Ii mini and do not warrant any verification E thereof. Not only are these objections frivolous on the face ofrecord, these have been resorted to only for protracting the execution proceedings. He urged that the impugned order has the effect of going heh.ind and reopening the decree, which is impermissible in law. According to him, neither the decree suffers from any jurisdictional ' Ferror nor is a nullity and is thus executable in law.

17. In reply, the learned counsel for the respondent has insisted that in the teeth of incorrect name of one of the firms and non-representation thereof by its rightful proprietor, the decree which is composite in nature, has been rendered inexecutable. He further argued that as the decree is an yield of fraud and collusion between the learned G counsel for the respondent and the appellant, it is non est in law and thus the impugned order which only permits an inquiry in these aspects, is well within the purview ofSection 47 CPC and therefor no interference therewith is called for. H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 3 S.C.R.

A 18. The materials on record and the arguments based thereon have received our due consideration. To recapitulate, the plaint discloses that the respondent had represented before the appellant to be authorised to act on behalf of both the firms and in that capacity had participated in the transactions that_followed. In that perspective, even assuming that the name of one of the firms was wrongly mentioned and that in fact, B it is the wife of the respondent, who is the proprietress thereof, with whom there is no conflict ofinterest, these in our comprehension per se, would not render the decree void or inexecutable. Such errors, even if exist, would not infest the decree with any jurisdictional infirmity or reduce it to a nullity. Noticeably, there is no dispute with regard to the c identity of the firms involved and their representation by the respondent in the suit transactions. The allegation of fraud and collusion between the learned counsel for the respondent and the appellant is visibly self-serving, omnibus, speculative and unauthentic and cannot therefore, after so many years: ipso facto render the decree invalid on account thereof. Visibly, the respondent had been the center figure in all the·D transactions between the parties on behalf of the firms, as stand proved in the suit and the resistance to the execution of the decree is neither QI! , behalf of Mis. Kargaappa Auto Products/Mis. Karpaga Auto Products nor its proprietress, his wife contending that the decree is neither binding on the firm nor on her. For all practical purposes, the said firm is still E being represented by the respondent in the subsisting proceedings. The sequence of events disclose that the suit had been instituted in the year 20 I 0 and was decreed on 16.10.2011. The persistent default on the part of the respondent has been adverted to hereinabove. Though a defective appeal had been filed on his behalf in the year 2012, it was withdrawn and was not re-filed by removing the defects. The Execution Petition F though lodged in the year 2014 has not seen the fruit of the decree as on da!e. The Review Petition filed by the respondent has also been dismissed. Significantly, in all the proceedings initiated by the respondent to stall · the execution of the decree, the same pleas have been reiterated.

19. It is no longer res integra that an Executing Court can neither G travel behind the decree nor sit in appeal over the same or pass any order jeopardizing the rights of the parties thereunder. It is only in the limited cases where the decree is by a court lacking inherent jurisdiction or is a nullity that the same is rendered non est and is thus inexecutable. An erroneous decree cannot be equaled with one which is a nullity. There are no intervening developments as well as to render the decree inexecutable. MIS. BRAKEWEL AUTOMOTIVE COMPONENTS (INDIA) 689 PVT. LTD. v. P. R. SELVAM ALAGAPPAN [AMITAVA ROY, J.] 20. As it is, Section 47 of the Code mandates determination by A an executing court, questions arising between the parties or their representatives relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree and does not contemplate any adjudication beyond the same. A decree of court of law being sacrosanct in nature, the execution thereof ought not to be thwarted on mere asking and on untenable Band purported grounds having no bearing on the validity or the executability thereof.

21. Judicial precedents to the effect that the purview of scrutiny under Section 4 7 of the Code qua a decree is limited to objections to its executability on the ground of jurisdictional infirmity or voidness are cplethoric. This Court, amongst others in Vasudev Dlumjib//{/i Modi vs. Rajabhai Abdul Re/mum and others 197 l (I) SCR 66 in essence enunciated that only a decree which is a nullity can be the subject matter of objection under Section 47 of the Code and not one which is erroneous either in law or on facts. The following extract from this decision seems apt: D "A Court executing a decree cannot go behind the decree between the parties or their representatives; it must take the decree according to its tenor, and cannot entertain any objection that the decree was incorrect in law or on facts. Until it is set aside by an appropriate proceeding in appeal or revision, a decree E even ifit be erroneous is still binding between the parties.

When a decree which is a nullity, for instance, where it is passed without bringing the legal representatives on the record of a person who was dead at the date of the decree, or against a ruling prince without a certificate, is sought to be executed an F objection in that behalf may be raised in a proceeding for execution. Again, when the decree is made by a Court which has no inherent jurisdiction to make it, objection as to it.s validity may be raised in an execution proceeding ifthe objection appears on the face of the record: where the objection as to the jurisdiction of the Court to pass the decree does not appear on the face of G the record and requires examination of the questions raised and decided at the trial or which could have been but have not been raised, the executing Court will have no jurisdiction to entertain an objection as to the validity of the decree even on the ground ofabsence of jurisdiction." H 690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 3 S.C.R.

A 22. Though this view has echoed time out of number in similar pronouncements of this Court, in Dhurandlwr Prasad Singh vs. Jai Prakash University and otlters, AIR 200 I SC 2552, while dwelling on the scope of Section 47 of the Code, it was ruled that the powers of the court thereunder are quite different and much narrower than those in appeal/revision or review. It was reiterated that the exercise of powerB under Section 47 of the Code is microscopic and lies in a very narrow inspection hole and an executing court can allow objection to the executabilty of the decree if it is found that the same is void ab initlo and is a nullity, apart from the ground that it is not capable of execution under the law, either because the same was passed in ignorance of such provision c of law or the law was promulgated making a decree inexecutable after its passing. None of the above eventualities as recognised in law for rendering a decree inexecutable, exists in the case in hand. For obvious reasons, we do not wish to burden this adjudication by multiplying the decisions favouring the same view.

D 23. Having regard to the contextual facts and the objections raised by the respondent, we ai'e of the unhesitant opinion that no case has been made out to entertain the remonstrances against the decree or the application under Section 47 CPC. Both the Executing Court and the High Court, in our comprehension, have not only erred in construing the scope and ambit of scrutiny under Section 47 CPC, but have also E overlooked the fact that the decree. does not suffer either from any jurisdictional error or is otherwise invalid in law. The objections to the execution petition as well as to the application under Section 47 CPC filed by the respondent do not either disclose any substantial defence to the decree or testify the same to be suffering from any jurisdictional F infirmity or invalidity. These are therefore rejected. 24. On a consideration of all relevant aspects in the entirety, we are thus disinclined to sustain the impugned orders and hereby set-aside the.same. The appeals are allowed. The Executing Court would proceed with the execution proceedings and take it to the logical end G with utmost expedition. No costs. Divya Pandey Appeals allowed.