[2017] I S.C.R. 389 ALLAHABAD BANK & ORS. A v. KRISHNA NARAYAN TEWARl (Civil Appeal No. 7600 of20 14) B JANUARY 02,2017 [T.S. THAKUR, CJI AND A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.J

Service Law : Disciplinary enquiry - High Court~ power to interfere - Respondent-employee removed from service by Disciplinary Authority - Departmental appeal by respondent cdismissed by Appe//ate Authority - High Court noted that neither Disciplinary Authority nor Appellate Authority applied their mind nor recorded reasons in support of their conclusions - It quashed the order of punishment and directed release of service benefits -On appeal, held: 11 is true that a writ court is very slow in illlerfering with the findings offacts recorded by a Departmental Authority on D the basis of evidence on record - But, it is equally true that in a case where Disciplinary Authority records a finding unsupported by any evidence or a finding which no reasonable person could arrive at, the writ court is justified to examine·the matler and grant relief.,.. In the instant case, Disciplinary Authority did not appreciate Ethe evidence properly or recorded reasons in· support of its conclusion - Appellate Authority instead of recording its own reasons and independently appreciating the material on record, simply reproduced the findings of Disciplinary Authority- Therefore, High Court was right in interfering with order of dismissal -Respondent elllitled to continuity of service till the date of his F superannuation, however with only 500A of the salary for the period between the date of his removal till the dale of superannuation -Writ jurisdiction- Constitution of India- Art.226.

Practice and Procedure: Procedural lapse i11 conducting enquiry ill service matters - Held: Proper course is to remand the G molters bock Jo concerned authority for fresh enquiry - However, such a course is not justified in situatiolls where due to Jo11g time lag or such other supervening circumstances directing.fr.esh enquiry would be unfair. harsh or othenvise un11ecessary. , · . . ., . · H 389 390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 7] I S.C.R.

A Partly allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: I. lt is true that a writ court is very slow in interfering with the findings of facts recorded by a Departmental Authority on the basis of evidem:e available on record. But it is equally true that in a case where the Disciplinary Authority B records a ftndlng that is unsupponed by any evidence whatsoever or a finding which no reasonable person could have arrived at, the writ court would be justified if not duty bound to examine the matter and grant relief in appropriate cases. The writ court will certainly interfere with disciplinary enquiry or the resultant orders passed by the competent authority on that basis if the enquiry c itself was vitiated on account of violation of principles of natural justice, as is alleged to be the position in the present case. Non-application of mind by the Enquiry Officer or the Disciplinary Authority, non-recording of reasons in support of the conclusion arrived at by them are also grounds on which the writ courts are D justified in interfering with the orders of punishment. The High Court, in tbe present case, found all these infirmities in the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority. The respondent's case that the enquiry was conducted without giving a fair and reasonable opportunity for leading evidence in defense has not been effectively rebutted by the appellant. More E importantly the Disciplinary Authority did not properly appreciate the evidence nor recorded reasons in support of his conclusion. The Appellate Authority instead of recording its own reasons and independently appreciating the material un record, simply reproduced the findings of the Disciplinary Authority. The Enquiry F Officer, the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority faltered in the disdtarge of their duties resulting in miscarriage of justice. The High Court was in that view right in interfering with the orders pa~sed hy the Discirlinary Authority and the Appellate Authority. (Para 7) (394·G·H; 395-A·D) l. In cases where High Court finds the enquiry to be G deficient either procedurally or otherwise the proper course always is to remand the matter back to the concerned authority. But that course may not be the only course open in a given situation. There may be situations where because of a long time lag or such other supervening circumstances the writ court H

ALLAHARAD BANK & ORS. v. KRISHNA NARAYAN 391 TEWARl considers directing fresh e~quiry to be unfair, harsh or otherwise A unnecessary. That is prccis'ely what the High Court has don~··in present case. The High Court took note of the fact the respondent was placed under suspension in the year 2004 and dis~issed• f •'in• 2005 and the dismissal order was challenged in the High Court in 2006 till it was finally decided in 2013. During the intervening Bperiod the respondent superannuated on 30'h November; .ZOlL Not only that he suffered a heart attack and ~stroke tha~ rendered hini physically disabied. The respondent may by now ha-ve turned 65 yearS of age. Any remand for a fresh enquiry or orde~ would thus be very harsh and deny the respondent any relief whatsoever. [Para 8] [395-E-.H; 396-A-8] c

3. The High Court is ambivalent with regard to the fact whether the respondent would be entitled to claim arrears of salary as part of service/retiral benefits in full or in pa'rt. While the High Court directed release of sertice/retirafbene.fit~, it is not dear whether the· same included salary for the period between · 0 the date· of removal arid the date of superannuation. It is assumed that the High ·court's' direttion for release of service benefits included the release of his salaries also for the period mentioned . above, however, grant of full salary for the period between the date of dismissal and· the date of superannuation would not be Ejustified. (Para·9J [396-D-E] ·' Roop· Singh Negi v. Punjab Nationai Bank & Or.~. (2009) . I 2 set S70': "[2008J17 SCR 147~; Kuldeep SiJ,7gh v. . Commissioner of Police' & Or.~. (1999) 2 SCC 10.: [1998] J Suppl. SCR 594; Nand KfshoJ.'e '~ State ofBihar F (1978) 3· SCC 366 : (1978] 3 SCR 708; Kai/ash Nath Gupta v. Enquiry :Officer. ·Allahabad Bank & Ors. (2003) 9. SCG 480; State Bank of Bikcmer & Jaipur v. ·Ncmi Ghand Nalwaya (lOll) 4 SCC 584 : (2011] 3 . SCR 589; Mohd; Yimus Khwn~ ·Staie of U.P & Ors. · -,~2010) 10 SCC 539 : lliOIO] 12 SCR 448 .:.. refe'rred G . , to. .. · Case Law Reference [2008}17 SCR 147.6 referred to · Pa•·a 4· [1998] 3 Suppl. SCR 594 referred to Para4 H 392. SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 1 S.C.R. A f 197~1 3 SCR 708 referred to Para4 (lOO~) 9 sec 480 referred to Para4 JlOUJ 3 SCR 589 rererred to Para4

flOlOI 1l SCR 448 referred to Para4 B CIVIL APPELlATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 7600 . of2014. from the Order dated 28.1 0.2013 by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lu~know Bench in Service Single No. 2867 of2006. c Rajesh Kumar, Gaurav Kumar Singb, Rakesh Chaurasia, Anant Gautam, Vashraj Singh Deora, Advs. for the Appellants. Pranab Prakash, Chandra Prakash, Advs. for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by T. S. THAKUR, .cJI I. In this appeal by special leave the D ai)P.ellant tails in question the correctness of a judgment and order dated 28th October, 2013 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow bench, whereby Writ Petition No.2867 of2006 filed by the respondent has been allowed and an order dated 29th July, 2005 passed by the Disciplinary Authority and that dated 5th January, 2006 passed by the Appellate Authority directing removal of the respondent from the service of the appellant-bank quashed. The High Court has as a result directed the appellant bank to provide all service/retiral benefits to the petitioner within ninety days ofthe order. The challenge mounted by the appellant arises.in the following circumstances:

2. The respondent was employed with the appellant-bank and F was during the relevant period posted as Officer in-charge at the appellant-bank's Sultanpur branch in District Sultanpur in the State of Uttar . Pradesh. He was, by an order dated 1oth December, 2004, placed urider suspension in contemplation of a disciplinary enquiry which was initiate~ against him with the service of a charge-sheet dated 10th G February, 2005. The respondent pleaded not guilty but the Enquiry Officer .concluded the enquiry proceedings rather quickly within a span . of just about forty-five days and submitted a report dated 27th May, 2005 holding that the respondent was guilty on all counts except two which were -~eld proved but only partially. The Disciplinary Authority H ALLAHABAD BANK & ORS. v. KRISHNA NARAYAN 393 TEWARI fT.S. THAKUR, CJJ] accepted the findings and passed an order imposing upon the respondent A the major penalty of removal from service. 3. Aggrieved, the respondent preferred a departmental appeal which was dismissed by the Appellate Authority by its order dated sth January, 2006. The respondent then questioned the said two orders before the High Court in a writ petition which as noticed earlier has B been allowed by the High Court in terms of the order impugned in this appeal.

4. The High Court came to the conclusion that neither the Disciplinary Authority nor the Appellate Authority had applied their mind or recorded reasons in support of their conclusions. Relying upon the c decisions of this coun in Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank & Ors. (2009) 2 SCC 570, Kuldeep Singh l( Commissioner of Police & Ors. ( 1999) 2 SCC I 0, Ndnd Kishore '~ State of Bihar ( 1978) 3 -SCC 366, Kai/ash Nath Gupt~ v_ Enqu~ry Officer, Allahabad Bank & Ors. (2003) 9 SCC 480, Slate Bank of Bikcmer & Jaiptw '~ Nemi Chand Nalwaya (20 II) 4 SCC 584 and Mohd Ytmus Kha, ·v. State of D U.P. & Ors. (2010) 10 SCC 539. the High Court held that the order passed by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority were unsustainable in Jaw. The High Court found that the findings recorded by the Disciplinary Autbority and affirmed by the Appellate Authority were perverse and were based on no evidence whatsoever. The High E Court observed that the Appellate Authority had not applied its mind independently and's imply cut and pasted the findings of the Disciplinary Authority while dismissing the appeal.

5. On behalf of the appellant-bank it was contended before us that the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction in re-apprcciating the F evidence and holding the respondent not guilty. It was argued that so long as there was some evidence on which the Disciplinary Authority could rest its findings, sufficiency or insufficiency of such evidence could not be gone into by a Writ Court. Alternatively, it was submitted that even ifthere was any infirmity in the orders passeCJ by the Disciplinary Authority or the Appetlate Authority, on account of absence or G insufficiency of the reasons in support of the. findings recorded by them, the proper course for the High Court was to remand the matter back to the Appellate Authority or the Disciplinary Authority as the case may be for doing the needful afresh. The High Court could not, on account of H 394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017)1 S.C.R. A absence of reasons or unsatisfactory appraisal of the evidence by them, quash the order of punishment and direct release of the service benefits due to the respondent.

6. On behalf of the respondent it was on the other hand contended that the enquiry conducted against the respondent and the conclusion B arrived at by the Enquiry Officer, Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority suffered from fatal defects. Firstly, because the enquiry conducted by the Enquiry Officer was unfair and had resulled in gross miscarriage ofjustice on account of the failure of the Enquiry Officer to provide a reasonable opportunity to the respondent to lead evidence in his defense. In the second place the findings recorded by the Enquiryc Officer and so also the Disciplinary Authority were unsupported by any evidence whatsoever and were perverse to say the least. ln the third place, the orders were unsustainable also for the reason that the same did not disclose due and proper application of mind by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority. The order passed by the Appellate D Authority was, in particular, bad in law as the same did not examine the material on record independently and had simply relied upon the findings of the Disciplinary Authority without adverting to the points which the respondent had raised in support ofhis challenge. It was lastly submitted that the respondent has since superannuated and was a physical wreck having suffered a heart attack and a debilitating stroke which had confined E him to bed. Any remand of the proceedings to the Appellate Authority to pass a fresh order or the Disciplinary Authority for re--examination and fresh determination of the respondent's guilt would not only be harsh but would tantamount to denial ofjustice to him. The High Court was in that view justified in taking a pragmatic view of the matter and in directing F continuity of service to the respondent and release of all service and retiral benefits to him upto the date of his superannuation.

7. We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions at the bar. It is true that a writ court is very slow in interfering with the findings of facts recorded by a Departmental Authority on the basis of evidence available on record. But it is equally true that in a case whereG the Disciplinary Authority records a finding that is unsupported by any evidence whatsoever or a finding which no reasonable person could have arrived at, the writ court would be justified if not duty bound to examine the matter and grant relief in appropriate cases. The writ court will certainly interfere with disciplinary enquiry or the resultant H ALLAHABAD BANK & ORS. v. KRISHNA NARAYAN 395 TEWARI [T.S. THAKUR, CJI]

orders passed by the competent authority on that basis if the enquiry A itse If was vitiated on account of violation of principles of natural justice, as is alleged to be the position in the present case. Non-application of mind by the Enquiry Officer.orthe Disciplinary Authority, non-recording of reasons in support of the conclusion arrived at by them are also grounds on which the writ courts are justified in interfering with the orders of Bpunishment. The High Court has, in the case at hand, found all these infirmities in the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority. The respondent's case that the enquiry was conducted without giving a fair and reasonable opportunity for leading evidence in defense has not been effectively rebutted by the appellant. More importantly the Disciplinary Authority does not appear to have c properly appreciated the evidence nor recorded reasons in support of his conclusion. To add insult to injury the Appellate Authority instead of recording its own reasons and independently appreciating the material on record, simply reproduced the findings of the Disciplinary Authority. All told the Enquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate DAuthority have faltered in the discharge of their duties resulting in miscarriageofjustice. The High Court was in that view right in interfering with the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority.

8. There is no quarrel with the proposition that in cases where Ethe High Court finds the enquiry to be deficient either procedurally or otherwise the proper course always is to remand the matter back to the concerned authority to redo the same afresh. That course could have been followed even in the present case. The matter could be remanded back to the Disciplinary Authority or to the Enquiry Officer for a proper enquiry and a fresh report and order. But that course may not have been F the only course open in a given situation. There may be situations where because of a long time lag or such other supervening circumstances the writ court considers it unfair, harsh or otherwise unnecessary to direct a fresh enquiry or fresh order by the competent authority. That is precisely what the High Court has done in the case at hand. The High Court has Gtaken note of the fact that the respondent had been placed under suspension in the year 2004 and dismissed in the year 2005. The dismissal order was challenged in the High Court in the year 2006 but the writ petition remained pending in the High Coun for nearly seven years till 2013. During the intervening period the respondent superannuated on H 396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 1 S.C.R.

A 30•" November, 20 ll. Not only that he had suffered a heart attack and a stroke that has rendered him physically disabled and confined to bed. The respondent may by now have turned 65 years of age. Any remand either to the Enquiry Officer for a fresh enquiry or to the Disciplinary Authority for a fresh order or even to the Appellate Authority would thus be very harsh and would practically deny to the respondent any B relief whatsoever. Superadded to all this is the fact that the High Court has found, that there was no allegation nor any evidence to show the extent of loss, if any, suffered by the bank on account of the alleged misconduct of the respondent. The discretion vested in the High Court· in not remanding the matter back was, therefore, properly exercised. c 9. The next question is whether the respondent would be entitled to claim arrears of salary as part of scrvice/rctiral benefits in full or part. The High Court has been rather ambivalent in that regard. We say so because while the High Court has directed release of service/ rctiral benefits, it is not clear whether the same would include salary for D the period between the date of removal and tbe date of superannuation. Taking a liberal view of the matter, we assume that the High Court's direction tor release of service henefits would include the release of his salaries also for the period mentioned above. We are, however, of the opinion that while proceedings need not be remanded for a fresh sta·rt from the beginning, grant of full salary for the period between the date E of dismissal and the date of superannuation would not also be justified. We, therefore. allow this appeal but only in part and to the extent that. while orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority shall stand quashed, and the respondent entitled to continuity of service till the date of his superannuation with all service benefits on F that basis, he shall be entitled to only 50% of the salary for the period between the date of his removal from service ti 11 the date of superannuation. Retiral benefits shall also be released in his favour." The order passed by the High Court shall, to the extent indicated above, stand modified. The parties shall bear their own costs.

G Divya Pandey Appl!~l panh· allowed.

[2017] I S.C.R. 389 ALLAHABAD BANK & ORS. A v. KRISHNA NARAYAN TEWARl (Civil Appeal No. 7600 of20 14) B JANUARY 02,2017 [T.S. THAKUR, CJI AND A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.J

Service Law : Disciplinary enquiry - High Court~ power to interfere - Respondent-employee removed from service by Disciplinary Authority - Departmental appeal by respondent cdismissed by Appe//ate Authority - High Court noted that neither Disciplinary Authority nor Appellate Authority applied their mind nor recorded reasons in support of their conclusions - It quashed the order of punishment and directed release of service benefits -On appeal, held: 11 is true that a writ court is very slow in illlerfering with the findings offacts recorded by a Departmental Authority on D the basis of evidence on record - But, it is equally true that in a case where Disciplinary Authority records a finding unsupported by any evidence or a finding which no reasonable person could arrive at, the writ court is justified to examine·the matler and grant relief.,.. In the instant case, Disciplinary Authority did not appreciate Ethe evidence properly or recorded reasons in· support of its conclusion - Appellate Authority instead of recording its own reasons and independently appreciating the material on record, simply reproduced the findings of Disciplinary Authority- Therefore, High Court was right in interfering with order of dismissal -Respondent elllitled to continuity of service till the date of his F superannuation, however with only 500A of the salary for the period between the date of his removal till the dale of superannuation -Writ jurisdiction- Constitution of India- Art.226.

Practice and Procedure: Procedural lapse i11 conducting enquiry ill service matters - Held: Proper course is to remand the G molters bock Jo concerned authority for fresh enquiry - However, such a course is not justified in situatiolls where due to Jo11g time lag or such other supervening circumstances directing.fr.esh enquiry would be unfair. harsh or othenvise un11ecessary. , · . . ., . · H 389 390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 7] I S.C.R.

A Partly allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: I. lt is true that a writ court is very slow in interfering with the findings of facts recorded by a Departmental Authority on the basis of evidem:e available on record. But it is equally true that in a case where the Disciplinary Authority B records a ftndlng that is unsupponed by any evidence whatsoever or a finding which no reasonable person could have arrived at, the writ court would be justified if not duty bound to examine the matter and grant relief in appropriate cases. The writ court will certainly interfere with disciplinary enquiry or the resultant orders passed by the competent authority on that basis if the enquiry c itself was vitiated on account of violation of principles of natural justice, as is alleged to be the position in the present case. Non-application of mind by the Enquiry Officer or the Disciplinary Authority, non-recording of reasons in support of the conclusion arrived at by them are also grounds on which the writ courts are D justified in interfering with the orders of punishment. The High Court, in tbe present case, found all these infirmities in the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority. The respondent's case that the enquiry was conducted without giving a fair and reasonable opportunity for leading evidence in defense has not been effectively rebutted by the appellant. More E importantly the Disciplinary Authority did not properly appreciate the evidence nor recorded reasons in support of his conclusion. The Appellate Authority instead of recording its own reasons and independently appreciating the material un record, simply reproduced the findings of the Disciplinary Authority. The Enquiry F Officer, the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority faltered in the disdtarge of their duties resulting in miscarriage of justice. The High Court was in that view right in interfering with the orders pa~sed hy the Discirlinary Authority and the Appellate Authority. (Para 7) (394·G·H; 395-A·D) l. In cases where High Court finds the enquiry to be G deficient either procedurally or otherwise the proper course always is to remand the matter back to the concerned authority. But that course may not be the only course open in a given situation. There may be situations where because of a long time lag or such other supervening circumstances the writ court H

ALLAHARAD BANK & ORS. v. KRISHNA NARAYAN 391 TEWARl considers directing fresh e~quiry to be unfair, harsh or otherwise A unnecessary. That is prccis'ely what the High Court has don~··in present case. The High Court took note of the fact the respondent was placed under suspension in the year 2004 and dis~issed• f •'in• 2005 and the dismissal order was challenged in the High Court in 2006 till it was finally decided in 2013. During the intervening Bperiod the respondent superannuated on 30'h November; .ZOlL Not only that he suffered a heart attack and ~stroke tha~ rendered hini physically disabied. The respondent may by now ha-ve turned 65 yearS of age. Any remand for a fresh enquiry or orde~ would thus be very harsh and deny the respondent any relief whatsoever. [Para 8] [395-E-.H; 396-A-8] c

3. The High Court is ambivalent with regard to the fact whether the respondent would be entitled to claim arrears of salary as part of service/retiral benefits in full or in pa'rt. While the High Court directed release of sertice/retirafbene.fit~, it is not dear whether the· same included salary for the period between · 0 the date· of removal arid the date of superannuation. It is assumed that the High ·court's' direttion for release of service benefits included the release of his salaries also for the period mentioned . above, however, grant of full salary for the period between the date of dismissal and· the date of superannuation would not be Ejustified. (Para·9J [396-D-E] ·' Roop· Singh Negi v. Punjab Nationai Bank & Or.~. (2009) . I 2 set S70': "[2008J17 SCR 147~; Kuldeep SiJ,7gh v. . Commissioner of Police' & Or.~. (1999) 2 SCC 10.: [1998] J Suppl. SCR 594; Nand KfshoJ.'e '~ State ofBihar F (1978) 3· SCC 366 : (1978] 3 SCR 708; Kai/ash Nath Gupta v. Enquiry :Officer. ·Allahabad Bank & Ors. (2003) 9. SCG 480; State Bank of Bikcmer & Jaipur v. ·Ncmi Ghand Nalwaya (lOll) 4 SCC 584 : (2011] 3 . SCR 589; Mohd; Yimus Khwn~ ·Staie of U.P & Ors. · -,~2010) 10 SCC 539 : lliOIO] 12 SCR 448 .:.. refe'rred G . , to. .. · Case Law Reference [2008}17 SCR 147.6 referred to · Pa•·a 4· [1998] 3 Suppl. SCR 594 referred to Para4 H 392. SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 1 S.C.R. A f 197~1 3 SCR 708 referred to Para4 (lOO~) 9 sec 480 referred to Para4 JlOUJ 3 SCR 589 rererred to Para4

flOlOI 1l SCR 448 referred to Para4 B CIVIL APPELlATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 7600 . of2014. from the Order dated 28.1 0.2013 by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lu~know Bench in Service Single No. 2867 of2006. c Rajesh Kumar, Gaurav Kumar Singb, Rakesh Chaurasia, Anant Gautam, Vashraj Singh Deora, Advs. for the Appellants. Pranab Prakash, Chandra Prakash, Advs. for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by T. S. THAKUR, .cJI I. In this appeal by special leave the D ai)P.ellant tails in question the correctness of a judgment and order dated 28th October, 2013 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow bench, whereby Writ Petition No.2867 of2006 filed by the respondent has been allowed and an order dated 29th July, 2005 passed by the Disciplinary Authority and that dated 5th January, 2006 passed by the Appellate Authority directing removal of the respondent from the service of the appellant-bank quashed. The High Court has as a result directed the appellant bank to provide all service/retiral benefits to the petitioner within ninety days ofthe order. The challenge mounted by the appellant arises.in the following circumstances:

2. The respondent was employed with the appellant-bank and F was during the relevant period posted as Officer in-charge at the appellant-bank's Sultanpur branch in District Sultanpur in the State of Uttar . Pradesh. He was, by an order dated 1oth December, 2004, placed urider suspension in contemplation of a disciplinary enquiry which was initiate~ against him with the service of a charge-sheet dated 10th G February, 2005. The respondent pleaded not guilty but the Enquiry Officer .concluded the enquiry proceedings rather quickly within a span . of just about forty-five days and submitted a report dated 27th May, 2005 holding that the respondent was guilty on all counts except two which were -~eld proved but only partially. The Disciplinary Authority H ALLAHABAD BANK & ORS. v. KRISHNA NARAYAN 393 TEWARI fT.S. THAKUR, CJJ] accepted the findings and passed an order imposing upon the respondent A the major penalty of removal from service. 3. Aggrieved, the respondent preferred a departmental appeal which was dismissed by the Appellate Authority by its order dated sth January, 2006. The respondent then questioned the said two orders before the High Court in a writ petition which as noticed earlier has B been allowed by the High Court in terms of the order impugned in this appeal.

4. The High Court came to the conclusion that neither the Disciplinary Authority nor the Appellate Authority had applied their mind or recorded reasons in support of their conclusions. Relying upon the c decisions of this coun in Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank & Ors. (2009) 2 SCC 570, Kuldeep Singh l( Commissioner of Police & Ors. ( 1999) 2 SCC I 0, Ndnd Kishore '~ State of Bihar ( 1978) 3 -SCC 366, Kai/ash Nath Gupt~ v_ Enqu~ry Officer, Allahabad Bank & Ors. (2003) 9 SCC 480, Slate Bank of Bikcmer & Jaiptw '~ Nemi Chand Nalwaya (20 II) 4 SCC 584 and Mohd Ytmus Kha, ·v. State of D U.P. & Ors. (2010) 10 SCC 539. the High Court held that the order passed by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority were unsustainable in Jaw. The High Court found that the findings recorded by the Disciplinary Autbority and affirmed by the Appellate Authority were perverse and were based on no evidence whatsoever. The High E Court observed that the Appellate Authority had not applied its mind independently and's imply cut and pasted the findings of the Disciplinary Authority while dismissing the appeal.

5. On behalf of the appellant-bank it was contended before us that the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction in re-apprcciating the F evidence and holding the respondent not guilty. It was argued that so long as there was some evidence on which the Disciplinary Authority could rest its findings, sufficiency or insufficiency of such evidence could not be gone into by a Writ Court. Alternatively, it was submitted that even ifthere was any infirmity in the orders passeCJ by the Disciplinary Authority or the Appetlate Authority, on account of absence or G insufficiency of the reasons in support of the. findings recorded by them, the proper course for the High Court was to remand the matter back to the Appellate Authority or the Disciplinary Authority as the case may be for doing the needful afresh. The High Court could not, on account of H 394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017)1 S.C.R. A absence of reasons or unsatisfactory appraisal of the evidence by them, quash the order of punishment and direct release of the service benefits due to the respondent.

6. On behalf of the respondent it was on the other hand contended that the enquiry conducted against the respondent and the conclusion B arrived at by the Enquiry Officer, Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority suffered from fatal defects. Firstly, because the enquiry conducted by the Enquiry Officer was unfair and had resulled in gross miscarriage ofjustice on account of the failure of the Enquiry Officer to provide a reasonable opportunity to the respondent to lead evidence in his defense. In the second place the findings recorded by the Enquiryc Officer and so also the Disciplinary Authority were unsupported by any evidence whatsoever and were perverse to say the least. ln the third place, the orders were unsustainable also for the reason that the same did not disclose due and proper application of mind by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority. The order passed by the Appellate D Authority was, in particular, bad in law as the same did not examine the material on record independently and had simply relied upon the findings of the Disciplinary Authority without adverting to the points which the respondent had raised in support ofhis challenge. It was lastly submitted that the respondent has since superannuated and was a physical wreck having suffered a heart attack and a debilitating stroke which had confined E him to bed. Any remand of the proceedings to the Appellate Authority to pass a fresh order or the Disciplinary Authority for re--examination and fresh determination of the respondent's guilt would not only be harsh but would tantamount to denial ofjustice to him. The High Court was in that view justified in taking a pragmatic view of the matter and in directing F continuity of service to the respondent and release of all service and retiral benefits to him upto the date of his superannuation.

7. We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions at the bar. It is true that a writ court is very slow in interfering with the findings of facts recorded by a Departmental Authority on the basis of evidence available on record. But it is equally true that in a case whereG the Disciplinary Authority records a finding that is unsupported by any evidence whatsoever or a finding which no reasonable person could have arrived at, the writ court would be justified if not duty bound to examine the matter and grant relief in appropriate cases. The writ court will certainly interfere with disciplinary enquiry or the resultant H ALLAHABAD BANK & ORS. v. KRISHNA NARAYAN 395 TEWARI [T.S. THAKUR, CJI]

orders passed by the competent authority on that basis if the enquiry A itse If was vitiated on account of violation of principles of natural justice, as is alleged to be the position in the present case. Non-application of mind by the Enquiry Officer.orthe Disciplinary Authority, non-recording of reasons in support of the conclusion arrived at by them are also grounds on which the writ courts are justified in interfering with the orders of Bpunishment. The High Court has, in the case at hand, found all these infirmities in the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority. The respondent's case that the enquiry was conducted without giving a fair and reasonable opportunity for leading evidence in defense has not been effectively rebutted by the appellant. More importantly the Disciplinary Authority does not appear to have c properly appreciated the evidence nor recorded reasons in support of his conclusion. To add insult to injury the Appellate Authority instead of recording its own reasons and independently appreciating the material on record, simply reproduced the findings of the Disciplinary Authority. All told the Enquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate DAuthority have faltered in the discharge of their duties resulting in miscarriageofjustice. The High Court was in that view right in interfering with the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority.

8. There is no quarrel with the proposition that in cases where Ethe High Court finds the enquiry to be deficient either procedurally or otherwise the proper course always is to remand the matter back to the concerned authority to redo the same afresh. That course could have been followed even in the present case. The matter could be remanded back to the Disciplinary Authority or to the Enquiry Officer for a proper enquiry and a fresh report and order. But that course may not have been F the only course open in a given situation. There may be situations where because of a long time lag or such other supervening circumstances the writ court considers it unfair, harsh or otherwise unnecessary to direct a fresh enquiry or fresh order by the competent authority. That is precisely what the High Court has done in the case at hand. The High Court has Gtaken note of the fact that the respondent had been placed under suspension in the year 2004 and dismissed in the year 2005. The dismissal order was challenged in the High Court in the year 2006 but the writ petition remained pending in the High Coun for nearly seven years till 2013. During the intervening period the respondent superannuated on H 396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 1 S.C.R.

A 30•" November, 20 ll. Not only that he had suffered a heart attack and a stroke that has rendered him physically disabled and confined to bed. The respondent may by now have turned 65 years of age. Any remand either to the Enquiry Officer for a fresh enquiry or to the Disciplinary Authority for a fresh order or even to the Appellate Authority would thus be very harsh and would practically deny to the respondent any B relief whatsoever. Superadded to all this is the fact that the High Court has found, that there was no allegation nor any evidence to show the extent of loss, if any, suffered by the bank on account of the alleged misconduct of the respondent. The discretion vested in the High Court· in not remanding the matter back was, therefore, properly exercised. c 9. The next question is whether the respondent would be entitled to claim arrears of salary as part of scrvice/rctiral benefits in full or part. The High Court has been rather ambivalent in that regard. We say so because while the High Court has directed release of service/ rctiral benefits, it is not clear whether the same would include salary for D the period between the date of removal and tbe date of superannuation. Taking a liberal view of the matter, we assume that the High Court's direction tor release of service henefits would include the release of his salaries also for the period mentioned above. We are, however, of the opinion that while proceedings need not be remanded for a fresh sta·rt from the beginning, grant of full salary for the period between the date E of dismissal and the date of superannuation would not also be justified. We, therefore. allow this appeal but only in part and to the extent that. while orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority shall stand quashed, and the respondent entitled to continuity of service till the date of his superannuation with all service benefits on F that basis, he shall be entitled to only 50% of the salary for the period between the date of his removal from service ti 11 the date of superannuation. Retiral benefits shall also be released in his favour." The order passed by the High Court shall, to the extent indicated above, stand modified. The parties shall bear their own costs.

G Divya Pandey Appl!~l panh· allowed.