[2013] 17 S.C.R. 327 CHENOA @ CHANDA RAM A v. STATE OF CHHATISGARH (Criminal Appeal No. 1285 of 2013) AUGUST 27, 2013 B [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD AND KURIAN JOSEPH, JJ.] Penal Code, 1860 - ss.300 Exception 4 and 304 (Part 8) - Prosecution under s.302 - Conviction by courts below - c Held: The evidence shows that there was no previous enmity between the parties - There was also no premeditation and it was a case of sudden fight and a result of immediate provocation - The fatal blow was in the course of a scuffle between two persons - The accused also did not take D advar;tage of the situation or behave in a cruel and unusual manner - Hence, the case is covered under Exception 4 to s.300 - In view of the facts the case would fall uls. 304 (Part II) - Punishment of the accused is altered from life imprisonment to imprisonment for a period of 10 years with E fine of Rs. 50, 0001- - The fine amount to be paid as compensation to the widow and child of the deceased. The appellant-accused was prosecuted alongwith another accused for having killed one person. Appellant-accused was convicted uls.302 IPC and sentenced him F to life imprisonment. However the other accused was acquitted. High Court confirmed the judgment of trial court. Hence the present appeal.

Appellant-accused contended that the case would G come under Exception 4 of s. 300 IPC as there was only a single blow with a stick and there was no previous enmity and as such the act was done in the spur of the moment without any premeditation. 327 H 328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013) 17 S.C.R. 1A Partly allowing the appeal, the Court ' HELD: 1. Exception 4 to s.300 IPC can be invoked if death is caused (i) without premeditation; (ii) in a sudden fight; (iii) without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acting in a cruel or unusual manner; and8 (iv) the fight must have been with the person killed. All the four ingredients must be found in order to apply Exception 4. [Para 13] [338-E, F]

2. There is no evidence in the present case that there C ·was previous enmity between parties though PW2 has attempted for such a version of the case, she has been disbelieved on that account because of contradictions within her own statement under Section 161. The available evidence would show that there was no o premeditation on the part of the appellant and that it was a case of sudden fight. It has to be noted that the deceased was called by his wife to the spot to settle the disputes once for all and that the ensuing sudden scuffle with the first accused was in the presence of his wife. It E has come out in the evid.ence of PW11 that the injury inflicted by the appellant was during the scuffle between the deceased and the first accused A-1 and that after the lone strike on the head of the deceased by the appellant, both the deceased and A-1 had fallen down and it was PW2 who separated A-1 and the deceased as they hadF become entangled with each other. That only means that the deceased had overpowered A-1 or else the deceased alone would have fallen down and not the first accused A-1. The said conduct of the deceased overpowering A-1 during the scuffle was the immediate provocation for G the appellant to take the weapon, the tekani which was available in the vicinity to hit the deceased. There is no evidence at all as to whether the appellant intended to hit on the head only or elsewhere on the body. The scuffling parties being in motion, it could easily have H

CHENOA @ CHANDA RAM v. STATE OF 329 CHHATISGARH happened that the blow fell on the head unintentionally. A No doubt the scuffle of the deceased was with the A-1 but the entire fight was with the deceased on one side, and the appellant and other accused A-1 on the other side. It is not required that the fight must be between the main accused and deceased. The fight can as well be B between two parties, the deceased on one side and all the other accused on the other side. There is only one hit. There is nothing to show that there was any cruelty involved by inflicting any other injury or by any other conduct on the part of the appellant so as to hold that c the appellant was taking any undue advantage of the situation or that he behaved in a cruel or unusual · manner. Thus, all the four ingredients required for treating the case under Exception 4 to Section 300 of the Code are satisfied in the instant case. [Para 16] [342-H; 0 343-A-H; 344-A]

3. The offence in the present case, seems to fall under the second part of s.304 IPC. There is no evidence of motive or previous enmity. The incident has taken place on the spur of the moment. There is no evidence E regarding the intention behind the fatal consequence of the blow. There was only one blow. The accused is young. There was no premeditation. The evolution of the incident would show that it was in the midst of a sudden fight. There is no criminal background or adverse history F of the appellant. It was a trivial quarrel among the villagers on account of a simple issue. The fatal blow was in the course of a scuffle between two persons. There has been no other act of cruelty or unusual conduct on the part of the appellant. The deceased was involved in the G scuffle in the presence of his wife and he had actually been called upon by her to the spot so as to settle the score with the accused persons. The deceased had, in the scuffle, overpowered the first accused. That first accused was acquitted. Thus, considering all these H 330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 17 S.C.R. A aspects, it is a fit case to alter the punishment of imprisonment for life to imprisonment for a period of 10 years with fine of Rs.50,000/-. [Para 17] [344-B-F]

4. Since the deceased has been left with a young widow and one child, the amount of fine thus recovered8 shall be paid as compensation to the widow and the child. In the event of the appellant defaulting to pay the fine, he shall undergo imprisonment for a further period of two years. [Para 17] [344-F, G] C Virsa Singh vs. State of Punjab (1958) 1 SCR 1495; State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Rayavarapu Punnayya and Anr (1976) 4 SCC 382: 1977 (1) SCR 601; Pappu vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2006) 7 SCC 391: 2006 (3) Suppl. SCR 394; Jagriti Devi vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (2009) 14 D SCC 771: 2009 (10) SCR 167; Gurmukh Singh vs. State of Haryana (2009) 15 SCC 635: 2009 (13) SCR 548 - relied on. Case Law Reference : E (1958) 1 SCR 1495 relied on Para 11 1977 (1) SCR 601 relied on Para 12 2006 (3) Suppl. SCR 394 relied on Para 13 2009 (10) SCR 167 relied on Para14F 2009 (13) SCR 548 relied on Para 15 CRIMINAL AP PELLA TE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 1285 of 2013 G From the Judgment and Order dated 18.06.2010 of the High Court of Chhatisgarh at Bilaspur in Criminal Appeal No. 505 of 1994. Anup Kumar, Venkita Subramaniam (For Devvrat) for the H Appellant. CHENOA @ CHANDA RAM v. STA1E OF 331 CHHATISGARH Atul Jha, Sandeep Jha, Dharmendra Kumar Sinha for the A Respondent. ' The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KURIAN, J.: 1. Leave granted.' B

2. 'Homicide', as derived from Latin, literally means the act of killing a human being. Under Section 299 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code'), homicide become"s culpable when a human being terminates the life of another in a blameworthy manner. Culpability depends on the c knowledge, motive and the manner of the act of the accused. The offence is punishable under either Section 302, or Section 304 which consists of two parts. In the case before us, we are called upon to examine the nature of the offence of culpable homicide for which the appellant has been convicted by the Trial D Court under Section 302 and sentenced to life imprisonment. His appeal was dismissed by the High Court. 3. It is sad and unfortunate that the epicenter of the matter is a simple quarrel on a trivial issue - a cat was chased away Eby the child of the deceased and; in the process, it landed on the terrace of the first accused where some gram was kept for drying. The'app~llant before us is the second accused who inflicted the fatal blow. The first accused who initiated the quarrel was, however, acquitted of the charges under Section 302 read with Section 34, for want of evidence. F BRIEF FACTS

4. On 26.02.1~93 at about 04.00 P.M., one master Kishore Kumar, son· of the deceased Ramgulal, residing in a Gremote village Deori .Tola in district Durg, presently in Chhattisgarh State, threw a stone on a cat, which, while jumping, landed on the terrace of the first accused Anjoriram where he had kept his gram. The boy was scolded badly and one Chanda ,Ram beat him with a cane. Hearing his loud weeping, his ! H 332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 17 S.C.R. A mother Heminbai reached the spot and there was a verbal altercation between her and the accused. She told the child to call"his father Ramgulal. There was a scuffle between Ramgulal and Anjoriram and the appellant-Chenda alias Chanda Ram, in the meanwhile, struck the head of Ramgulal with a tekani B (piece of wood) used for supporting bullock carts. He fell down immediately. The neighbours shifted him to his house, thereafter to the District Hospital and, from there, to the hospital of the Bhilai Steel Plant at Bilaspur where he died at about

08.25 P.M., nearly four hours after the incident. Based on the c report from the District Hospital, the case was initially charged under Section 307 read with Section 34 and afterwards, it was converted to Section 302 read with Section 34. Anjoriram is the first accused and the appellant Chanda Ram, the second. Nineteen witnesses were examined of which four are eye witnesses including the wife and child of the deceased. The0 Sessions Court entered a finding that the appellant Chanda Ram had the intention of killing Ramgulal when he hit on his head with a weighted tekani due to which he suffered serious head injury involving five fractures and, hence, he was convicted E un~er Section 302. However, taking note of the age of the accused as twenty three years and other circumstances, the appellant was awarded life imprisonment. The first accused Anjoriram was acquitted for want of any evidence in relation to the act leading to the death. In appeal, as per the impugned judgment dated 18.06.2010, the High Court concurred with the F findings of the Sessions Court and held that:

"16. From the overall evidence available on record, we find that the quarrel started when the stone pelted by child Kishore Kumar for hitting the cat fell on the terrace of . G Anjoriram where gram was kept. While Anjoriram was engaged in scuffle with Ramgulal, who came much after the initial quarrel of beating of Kishore Kumar and quarrel with his mother Heminbai, the appellant picked up a heavy wodden plank use for support of bullock cart and assault H the deceased on his vital part head with such force that CHENOA @ CHANDA RAM v. STATE OF 333 CHHATISGARH [KURIAN, J.]

he sustained fracture of both parietal bones, fracture of A nose and fracture of occipital bones and died just four hours after the assault. We are unable to accept tHe argument of learned counsel for the appellant that the incident occurred as a result of sudden provocation, without premeditation on the spur of moment. From the B evidence available on record, we. have already pointed out that when the deceased and co-accused Anjoriram were involved in the scuffle, the appellant gave a fatal blow on the vital part head of the deceased without any provocation. Intention of the appellant is to be gathered c from the weapon of offence used for assault, the force with which and the part on which the assault was made. In the instant case, the assault was made by a heavy wooden ' plank with a force on the vit~I part head of the deceased resulting in multiple fractures of both parietal bones, nose 0 bone and occipital bones. 17. On the basis 'of afore9aid discussions, we are of the opinion that the trial court has rightly convicted the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced him for life imprisonment. There is no illegality or infirmity in the E impugned judgment. The appeal is without any substance and deserves to be dismissed."

5. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that the evidence if properly appreciated would lead to only one F inference, that the appellant did not have any intention to commit murder. There was only a single blow with the stick, the same happened to be on the head, it was done qn the spur of the moment, it was without any premeditation and that it was in the process of a fight qetween the parties. There is no G evidence regarding any previous enmity between the parties and, thus, the case would ·come under Exception 4 of Section . 300 of the Code. 6. On behalf of the respondent State, it is submitted that on the only ground that there was a mere single blow, the H 334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 17 S.C.R. A offence cannot be roped in under Exception 4 since, admittedly, the fight was not with the accused. It is further contended that the fatal blow was on a vital organ, i.e., the head, with great force resulting in serious injury to the head causing five fractures, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death B and, thus, both intention and knowledge are decipherable from the conduct of the accused appellant and, hence, the conviction under Section 302 is to be upheld.

7. The crucial aspect to be analysed in this case is whether C the conduct of the appellant in inflicting the fatal blow is intentional and with knowledge or with knowledge only. The medical report given by PW14 shows that the injury caused by the weapon used by the appellant is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Hence, we have to analyse the evidence in the light of Section 300 clause "Thirdly" and D examine whether Exception 4 to Section 300 is applicable. Section 300 "Thirdly" reads as follows: "300. Murder.-Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, ifthe act by which the death E is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or-xxx xxx xxx xxx Thirdly.- If it is done with the intention of causing bodilv injury to anv person and the bodily injury intended to be F inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or-" (Emphasis supplied) Exception 4 to Section 300 of the Code, reads as follows: G "Exception 4.- Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and wifhout the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a H cruel or unusual manner. CHENOA @ CHANDA RAM v. STATE OF 335 CHHATISGARH [KURIAN, J.] Explanation.-lt is immaterial in such cases which party_, A offers the provocation or commits th.e first assault. " (Emphasis supplied)

8. If the case falls under Exception 4, then the further inquiry should be as to whether the case falls under the first part of B Section 304 or the second part, which reads as follows: "304-Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder.-Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder shall be punished with c imprisonment for life . . or imprisonment of either · description for a term which may extent to ten years. and shall also be liable to fine. if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death. or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. 0 or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years. or with fine. or with both. if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention· to cause death. or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death." E (Emphasis supplied)

9. All the eye witnesses have narrated the evolution of the quarrel and about the conduct of the appellant inflicting the injury with tekani used for supporting buflock carts. PW2- F Heminbai, wife of deceased, reached the spot.on finding her child weeping on account of a cane beating by Ar:ijoriram. There was verbal altercation between herself and Anjoriram. She asked her son PW5-Kishore Kumar to call her husband Ramgulal (deceased). During, the scuffle that followed, Chanda G Ram hit Ramgulal on his head once and sh~ caught hold of Ramgulal when he fell down .. Ac;cording to her, there was previous enmity with the accused persons. PW5-child Kishore Kumar is the second eyewitness. He depolied thaf he had H 336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 17 S.C.R.

A thrown a stone on a cat and in the process, ii ran away and landed on the roof of the accused persons due to which some gram kept on the terrace fell down. Infuriated, the appellant Chanda Ram beat him on his leg with a cane. He started to weep and his mother came to the spot. She questioned the B appellant as to why he beat the child and she told Kishore Kumar to call his father so as to have a final decision about the ongoing fights. He went weeping to his father to call him to the spot immediately. A scuffle between the father Ramgulal and Anjoriram followed. Anjoriram hit Ramgulal with a screwdriver c on his nose while the appellant hit Ramgulal on the head with ·,1~ani. Resultantly, his father fell down. He was shifted to the i<l1,ouse and thereafter to the hospital. PW9-Latabai, resides adjacent to the house of the deceased. She has also slated that during the scuffle between Anjoriram and the deceased, ii was Chanda Ram who hit the head of Ramgulal with the tekani.0 According to PW11-Kartikram, during the verbal altercation between the first accused Anjoriram and PW2-Heminbai, Ramgulal (deceased) came to the spot and there was a scuffle between Anjoriram and Ramgulal. During the scuffle, the "J.Ccused Chanda Ram hit Ramgulal once on the head with E tekani and consequently, Ramgulal fell down. Anjoriram also fell down, the hands of Anjoriram and Ramgulal were tied to each other and it is PW2-l'-leminbai who separated Anjoriram. PW14-Dr. R. N. Pandey who conducted the autopsy has stated that he had noted the following injuries:

F (1) Cut wound on the head of size 4inch x 3inch bone deep. (2) Floated swelling on head and nose and on both the eyes.G (3) There was~ fracture in skull on both sides of cuttlebone, in bell up skull and also in the bone of nose. H (4) Fractures were also found in the left parietal and CHENDA @ CHANDA RAM v. STATE OF 337 CHHATISGARH [KURIAN, J.] occipital bone of the Skull, there were to.ta! 5 A fractures in the skull. 10. According to Dr. Pandey, those injuries can be caused by one blow with the weapon of offence and that the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. B 11. The landmark judgment in Virsa Singh vs. State of =>unjab' draws a distinction between "Thirdly" of Section 300 and Exception 4 thereunder. The following are the four steps ')f inquiry involved: c i. first, whether bodily injury is present; ii. second, what is the nature of the injury; iii. third, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular injury, that is to say, that it D was not accidental or unintentional or that some other kind of injury was intended; and iv. fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the' three elements set E out above was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.

12. In State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Rayavarapu Punnayya ·1d Anothef, it was held that culpable homicide without the F Jecial characteristics of murder is culpable homicide not nounting to murder, falling under Section 304 of the Code. It as further held that there are three degrees of culpable ')micide. The first is murder under Section 300; second, Jlpable homicide not amounting to murder falling under the first 3rt of Section 304; and third is culpable homicide not G nounting to murder falling under the second part of Section J4. To quote: - (1958) 1 SCR 1495. (1976) 4 sec 382. H 338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013) 17 S.C.R.

A "12. In the scheme of the Penal Code, 'culpable homicide' is genus and 'murder' its specie. All 'murder' is 'culpable homicide' but not vice-versa. Speaking generally, 'culpable homicide' sans 'special characteristics of murder', is 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder'. For the B purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of this generic offence, the Code practically recognises three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, what may be called, 'culpable homicide of the first degree'. This is the greatest form of culpable homicide which is defined c in Section 300 as 'murder'. The second may be termed as 'culpable homicide of the second degree'. This is punishable under the first part of Section 304. Then, there is 'culpable homicide of the third degree'. This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is, also, the lowest among the punishments provided forD the three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under the second Part of Section 304."

13. In Pappu vs. State of Madhya Pradesh3 the Court almost exhaustively dealt with the parameters of Exception 4 E to Section 300 of the Code. It was held that the said Exception can be invoked if death is caused (i) without premeditation; (ii) in a sudden fight; (iii) without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acting in a cruel or unusual manner; and (iv) the fight must have been with the person killed. It was further held F that all the four ingredients must be found in order to apply Exception 4. To quote: "13 .... The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) v.ithout premeditation; (b) in a ·sudden fight; (c) without the offender's having taken undue advantage orG acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the "fight" occurring in Exception H 3. (2006) 7 sec 391. CHENOA @ CHANDA RAM v. STATE OF 339 CHHATISGARH [KURIAN, J.]

4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in IPC. It taKes two to A make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties have worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two and more persons whether with or without B weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarr~I is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case . . For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to c. show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The expression "undue advantage" as used in the provision means "unfair advantage". D 14. It cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever one blow is given, Section 302 IPC is ruled out. It would depend upon the weapon used, the size of it in some cases, force with which the blow was given, part of the body on which it was given and several such relevant E factors."

14. In Jagriti Devi vs. State of Himachal Pradesh4 , it was held that the expressions "intention" and "knowledge" postulate the existence of a positive mental attitude. It was further held F that when and if there is intent and knowledge, then the same would be a case under first part of Section 304 and if it is only a case of knowledge and not intention to cause murder by bodily injury, then the same would be a case of second part of Section 304. To quote: G "26. Section 299 and Section 300 /PC deal with the definition of "culpable homicide" and "murder" 4. (2009) 14 sec 771. H 340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013) 17 S.C.R. · A respectively. Section 299 defines "culpable homicide" as the act of causing death: (i) with the intention of causing death, or (ii) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as B is likely to cause death, or (iii) with the knowledge that such act is likely to cause death.

c A bare reading of the section makes it crystal clear that the first and the second clauses of the section refer to intention apart from the knowledge and the third clause refers to knowledge alone and not intention. Both the expressions "intent" and "knowledge" postulate the existence of a positive mental attitude which is of different D degrees. The mental element in culpable homicide i.e. mental attitude towards the consequences of conduct is one of intention and knowledge. If that is caused in any of the aforesaid three circumstances, the offence of culpable homicide is said to have been committed. E 27. Section 300 IPC, however, deals with murder although there is no clear definition of murder provided in Section 300 IPC. It has been repeatedly held by this Court that culpable homicide is the genus and murder is species and that all murders are culpable homicide but not vice versa. F 28. Section 300 IPC further provides for the exceptions which will constitute culpable homicide not amounting to murder and punishable under Section 304. When and if there is intent and knowledge, then the same would be a G case of Section 304 Part I and if it is only a case of knowledge and not the intention .to cause murder and bodily injury, then the same would be a case of Section 304 Part II. The aforesaid distinction between an act amounting to murder and an act not amounting to murder H CHENOA@ CHANDA RAM v. STATE OF 341 CHHATISGARH [KURIAN, J.]

has been brought out in the numerous decisions of this A Court." 15. In Gurmukh Singh vs. State of Haryana5 after scanning all the previous decisions where the death was caused by a single blow, this Court indicated, though not exhaustively, a few B factors to be taken into consideration while awarding the sentence. To quote: "23. These are some factors which are reqaired to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused. These factors are only C illustrative in character and not exhaustive. Each case has to be seen from its special perspective. The relevant factors are as under: (a) Motive or previous enmity; D (b) Whether the incident had taken place on the spur of the moment; (c) The intention/knowledge of the accused while inflicting the blow or injury; E (d) Whether the death ensued instantaneously or the victim died after several days; (e) The gravity, dimension and nature of injury; F (f) The age and general health condition of the accused; (g) Whether the injury was caused without premeditation in a sudden fight; G (h) The nature and size of weapon used for inflicting the injury and the force with which the blow was inflicted; 5. (2009) 15 sec 635. H 342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 17 S.C.R A (i) The criminal background and adverse history of the accused; (j) Whether the injury inflicted was not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death but the death was because of shock;B

(k) Number of other criminal cases pending against the accused; (I) Incident occurred within the family members or close relations;c (m) The conduct and behaviour of the accused after the incident. Whether the accused had taken the injured/the deceased to the hospital immediately to ensure that he/she gets proper medical trea.tment? D These are some of the factors which can be taken into consideration while granting an appropriate sentence to the accused. 24. The list of circumstances enumerated above is onlyE illustrative and not exhaustive. In our considered view, proper and appropriate sentence to the accused is the bounded obligation and duty of the court. The endeavour of the court must be to ensure that the accused receives appropriate sentence, in other words, sentence should beF according to the gravity of the offence. These are some of the relevant factors which are required to be kept in view while convicting and sentencing the accused." 16. In the light of the principles which have been discussed G fairly exhaustively, we have to analyse the factual position as to whether the appellant had the intention to cause death, or whether he only had the knowledge about the injury which is likely to cause death. We have to also analyse the manner in which the injury is caused and the provocation for the same. H There is no evidence in the case that there was previous enmity CHENOA @ CHANDA RAM v. STATE OF 343 CHHATISGARH [KURIAN, J.]

between parties though PW2 has attempted for such a version A of the case. She has been disbelieved on th111t account because of contradictions within her own statement under Section 161. The available evidence would show that there was no premeditation on the part of the appellant and that it was a case of sudden fight. It has to be noted while appreciating the B evidence that Ramgulal (deceased) was called by his wife to the spot to settle the disputes once for all and that the ensuing sudden scuffle with the first accused was in the presence of his wife. It has come out in the evidence of PW11-Kartikram that the injury inflicted by the appellant was during the scuffle c between the"deceased and the first accused Anjoriram and that after the lone strike on the head of the deceased by the appellant, both the deceased and Anjoriram had fallen down and it was PW2-Heminbai who separated Anjoriram and Ramgulal as they had become entangled with each other. That 0only means that Ramgulal had overpowered Anjoriram or else the deceased alone would have fallen down and not the first accused A("ljoriram. The said conduct of the deceased overpowering Anjoriram during the scuffle was the immediate provocation for the appellant to take the weapon, the tekani which was available in the vicinity to hit the deceased. There E is no evidence at all as to whether the appellant intended to hit on the head only or elsewhere on the body. The scuffling parties being in motion, it could easily have happened that the blow fell on the head unintentionally. No doubt the scuffle of the deceased was with the Anjoriram but th·e entire fight was with F the deceased on one side, and the appellant and other accused Anjoriram on the other side. It is not required that the fight must be between the main accused and deceased. The fight can as well be between two parties, the deceased on one side and all the other. accused on the other side. There is only one hit. G There is nothing to show that there was any cruelty involved by inflicting any other injury or by any other conduct on the part of the appellant so as to hold that the appellant was taking any undue advantage of the situation. or that he behaved in a cruel or unusual manner. Thus, all the four ingredients required for H

344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 17 S.C.R. A treating the case under Exception 4 to Section 300 of the Code as stated in Pappu's case (supra) are satisfied in the instant case.

17. The next inquiry is w~ether the offence falls under first part of Section 304 or the second part. Having regard to theB parameters indicated in Gurmukf! Singh's case ·(supra), the offence seems to fall under the second part. There is no evidence of motive or previous enm.ity. The incident has taken place on the ~pur of the moment. There is no evidence C regarding the i11tention behind the Jatal consequence of the blow. There was only one blow. The:accused is young. There was no premeditation. The evolution of the incident would show that it was in the midst of a sudden fight. There is no criminal background or adverse history of the appellant. It was a trivial quarrel among the villagers on account of a simple issue. The D fatal blow was in the course of a scuffle between two persons. There has been no other act of cruelty or unusual conduct on the part of the appella11t. The deceased was involved in the scuffle in the presence of his wife and he had actually been called upon by her to the spot so as to settle the score with the E accused persons. The deceased had, in the scuffle, overpowered the first accused. That first accused was acquitted. Thus, considering all these aspects, we are of the view that it is a fit case to alter the punishment of imprisonment for life to imprisonment for a period of 1O years with fine of F Rs.50,000/-. Ordered accordingly. Since the deceased has been left with a young widow and one child, the amount of fine thus recovered shall be paid as compensation to the widow and the child. In the event of the appellant defaulting to pay the fine, he shall undergo imprisonment for a further period of two years. G In case the appellant has already served the term as above, he shall be released forthwith, if not required to be detained in connection with any other case. The appeal is allowed as above.

Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeal partly allowed. H

[2013] 17 S.C.R. 327 CHENOA @ CHANDA RAM A v. STATE OF CHHATISGARH (Criminal Appeal No. 1285 of 2013) AUGUST 27, 2013 B [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD AND KURIAN JOSEPH, JJ.] Penal Code, 1860 - ss.300 Exception 4 and 304 (Part 8) - Prosecution under s.302 - Conviction by courts below - c Held: The evidence shows that there was no previous enmity between the parties - There was also no premeditation and it was a case of sudden fight and a result of immediate provocation - The fatal blow was in the course of a scuffle between two persons - The accused also did not take D advar;tage of the situation or behave in a cruel and unusual manner - Hence, the case is covered under Exception 4 to s.300 - In view of the facts the case would fall uls. 304 (Part II) - Punishment of the accused is altered from life imprisonment to imprisonment for a period of 10 years with E fine of Rs. 50, 0001- - The fine amount to be paid as compensation to the widow and child of the deceased. The appellant-accused was prosecuted alongwith another accused for having killed one person. Appellant-accused was convicted uls.302 IPC and sentenced him F to life imprisonment. However the other accused was acquitted. High Court confirmed the judgment of trial court. Hence the present appeal.

Appellant-accused contended that the case would G come under Exception 4 of s. 300 IPC as there was only a single blow with a stick and there was no previous enmity and as such the act was done in the spur of the moment without any premeditation. 327 H 328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013) 17 S.C.R. 1A Partly allowing the appeal, the Court ' HELD: 1. Exception 4 to s.300 IPC can be invoked if death is caused (i) without premeditation; (ii) in a sudden fight; (iii) without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acting in a cruel or unusual manner; and8 (iv) the fight must have been with the person killed. All the four ingredients must be found in order to apply Exception 4. [Para 13] [338-E, F]

2. There is no evidence in the present case that there C ·was previous enmity between parties though PW2 has attempted for such a version of the case, she has been disbelieved on that account because of contradictions within her own statement under Section 161. The available evidence would show that there was no o premeditation on the part of the appellant and that it was a case of sudden fight. It has to be noted that the deceased was called by his wife to the spot to settle the disputes once for all and that the ensuing sudden scuffle with the first accused was in the presence of his wife. It E has come out in the evid.ence of PW11 that the injury inflicted by the appellant was during the scuffle between the deceased and the first accused A-1 and that after the lone strike on the head of the deceased by the appellant, both the deceased and A-1 had fallen down and it was PW2 who separated A-1 and the deceased as they hadF become entangled with each other. That only means that the deceased had overpowered A-1 or else the deceased alone would have fallen down and not the first accused A-1. The said conduct of the deceased overpowering A-1 during the scuffle was the immediate provocation for G the appellant to take the weapon, the tekani which was available in the vicinity to hit the deceased. There is no evidence at all as to whether the appellant intended to hit on the head only or elsewhere on the body. The scuffling parties being in motion, it could easily have H

CHENOA @ CHANDA RAM v. STATE OF 329 CHHATISGARH happened that the blow fell on the head unintentionally. A No doubt the scuffle of the deceased was with the A-1 but the entire fight was with the deceased on one side, and the appellant and other accused A-1 on the other side. It is not required that the fight must be between the main accused and deceased. The fight can as well be B between two parties, the deceased on one side and all the other accused on the other side. There is only one hit. There is nothing to show that there was any cruelty involved by inflicting any other injury or by any other conduct on the part of the appellant so as to hold that c the appellant was taking any undue advantage of the situation or that he behaved in a cruel or unusual · manner. Thus, all the four ingredients required for treating the case under Exception 4 to Section 300 of the Code are satisfied in the instant case. [Para 16] [342-H; 0 343-A-H; 344-A]

3. The offence in the present case, seems to fall under the second part of s.304 IPC. There is no evidence of motive or previous enmity. The incident has taken place on the spur of the moment. There is no evidence E regarding the intention behind the fatal consequence of the blow. There was only one blow. The accused is young. There was no premeditation. The evolution of the incident would show that it was in the midst of a sudden fight. There is no criminal background or adverse history F of the appellant. It was a trivial quarrel among the villagers on account of a simple issue. The fatal blow was in the course of a scuffle between two persons. There has been no other act of cruelty or unusual conduct on the part of the appellant. The deceased was involved in the G scuffle in the presence of his wife and he had actually been called upon by her to the spot so as to settle the score with the accused persons. The deceased had, in the scuffle, overpowered the first accused. That first accused was acquitted. Thus, considering all these H 330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 17 S.C.R. A aspects, it is a fit case to alter the punishment of imprisonment for life to imprisonment for a period of 10 years with fine of Rs.50,000/-. [Para 17] [344-B-F]

4. Since the deceased has been left with a young widow and one child, the amount of fine thus recovered8 shall be paid as compensation to the widow and the child. In the event of the appellant defaulting to pay the fine, he shall undergo imprisonment for a further period of two years. [Para 17] [344-F, G] C Virsa Singh vs. State of Punjab (1958) 1 SCR 1495; State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Rayavarapu Punnayya and Anr (1976) 4 SCC 382: 1977 (1) SCR 601; Pappu vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2006) 7 SCC 391: 2006 (3) Suppl. SCR 394; Jagriti Devi vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (2009) 14 D SCC 771: 2009 (10) SCR 167; Gurmukh Singh vs. State of Haryana (2009) 15 SCC 635: 2009 (13) SCR 548 - relied on. Case Law Reference : E (1958) 1 SCR 1495 relied on Para 11 1977 (1) SCR 601 relied on Para 12 2006 (3) Suppl. SCR 394 relied on Para 13 2009 (10) SCR 167 relied on Para14F 2009 (13) SCR 548 relied on Para 15 CRIMINAL AP PELLA TE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 1285 of 2013 G From the Judgment and Order dated 18.06.2010 of the High Court of Chhatisgarh at Bilaspur in Criminal Appeal No. 505 of 1994. Anup Kumar, Venkita Subramaniam (For Devvrat) for the H Appellant. CHENOA @ CHANDA RAM v. STA1E OF 331 CHHATISGARH Atul Jha, Sandeep Jha, Dharmendra Kumar Sinha for the A Respondent. ' The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KURIAN, J.: 1. Leave granted.' B

2. 'Homicide', as derived from Latin, literally means the act of killing a human being. Under Section 299 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code'), homicide become"s culpable when a human being terminates the life of another in a blameworthy manner. Culpability depends on the c knowledge, motive and the manner of the act of the accused. The offence is punishable under either Section 302, or Section 304 which consists of two parts. In the case before us, we are called upon to examine the nature of the offence of culpable homicide for which the appellant has been convicted by the Trial D Court under Section 302 and sentenced to life imprisonment. His appeal was dismissed by the High Court. 3. It is sad and unfortunate that the epicenter of the matter is a simple quarrel on a trivial issue - a cat was chased away Eby the child of the deceased and; in the process, it landed on the terrace of the first accused where some gram was kept for drying. The'app~llant before us is the second accused who inflicted the fatal blow. The first accused who initiated the quarrel was, however, acquitted of the charges under Section 302 read with Section 34, for want of evidence. F BRIEF FACTS

4. On 26.02.1~93 at about 04.00 P.M., one master Kishore Kumar, son· of the deceased Ramgulal, residing in a Gremote village Deori .Tola in district Durg, presently in Chhattisgarh State, threw a stone on a cat, which, while jumping, landed on the terrace of the first accused Anjoriram where he had kept his gram. The boy was scolded badly and one Chanda ,Ram beat him with a cane. Hearing his loud weeping, his ! H 332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 17 S.C.R. A mother Heminbai reached the spot and there was a verbal altercation between her and the accused. She told the child to call"his father Ramgulal. There was a scuffle between Ramgulal and Anjoriram and the appellant-Chenda alias Chanda Ram, in the meanwhile, struck the head of Ramgulal with a tekani B (piece of wood) used for supporting bullock carts. He fell down immediately. The neighbours shifted him to his house, thereafter to the District Hospital and, from there, to the hospital of the Bhilai Steel Plant at Bilaspur where he died at about

08.25 P.M., nearly four hours after the incident. Based on the c report from the District Hospital, the case was initially charged under Section 307 read with Section 34 and afterwards, it was converted to Section 302 read with Section 34. Anjoriram is the first accused and the appellant Chanda Ram, the second. Nineteen witnesses were examined of which four are eye witnesses including the wife and child of the deceased. The0 Sessions Court entered a finding that the appellant Chanda Ram had the intention of killing Ramgulal when he hit on his head with a weighted tekani due to which he suffered serious head injury involving five fractures and, hence, he was convicted E un~er Section 302. However, taking note of the age of the accused as twenty three years and other circumstances, the appellant was awarded life imprisonment. The first accused Anjoriram was acquitted for want of any evidence in relation to the act leading to the death. In appeal, as per the impugned judgment dated 18.06.2010, the High Court concurred with the F findings of the Sessions Court and held that:

"16. From the overall evidence available on record, we find that the quarrel started when the stone pelted by child Kishore Kumar for hitting the cat fell on the terrace of . G Anjoriram where gram was kept. While Anjoriram was engaged in scuffle with Ramgulal, who came much after the initial quarrel of beating of Kishore Kumar and quarrel with his mother Heminbai, the appellant picked up a heavy wodden plank use for support of bullock cart and assault H the deceased on his vital part head with such force that CHENOA @ CHANDA RAM v. STATE OF 333 CHHATISGARH [KURIAN, J.]

he sustained fracture of both parietal bones, fracture of A nose and fracture of occipital bones and died just four hours after the assault. We are unable to accept tHe argument of learned counsel for the appellant that the incident occurred as a result of sudden provocation, without premeditation on the spur of moment. From the B evidence available on record, we. have already pointed out that when the deceased and co-accused Anjoriram were involved in the scuffle, the appellant gave a fatal blow on the vital part head of the deceased without any provocation. Intention of the appellant is to be gathered c from the weapon of offence used for assault, the force with which and the part on which the assault was made. In the instant case, the assault was made by a heavy wooden ' plank with a force on the vit~I part head of the deceased resulting in multiple fractures of both parietal bones, nose 0 bone and occipital bones. 17. On the basis 'of afore9aid discussions, we are of the opinion that the trial court has rightly convicted the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced him for life imprisonment. There is no illegality or infirmity in the E impugned judgment. The appeal is without any substance and deserves to be dismissed."

5. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that the evidence if properly appreciated would lead to only one F inference, that the appellant did not have any intention to commit murder. There was only a single blow with the stick, the same happened to be on the head, it was done qn the spur of the moment, it was without any premeditation and that it was in the process of a fight qetween the parties. There is no G evidence regarding any previous enmity between the parties and, thus, the case would ·come under Exception 4 of Section . 300 of the Code. 6. On behalf of the respondent State, it is submitted that on the only ground that there was a mere single blow, the H 334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 17 S.C.R. A offence cannot be roped in under Exception 4 since, admittedly, the fight was not with the accused. It is further contended that the fatal blow was on a vital organ, i.e., the head, with great force resulting in serious injury to the head causing five fractures, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death B and, thus, both intention and knowledge are decipherable from the conduct of the accused appellant and, hence, the conviction under Section 302 is to be upheld.

7. The crucial aspect to be analysed in this case is whether C the conduct of the appellant in inflicting the fatal blow is intentional and with knowledge or with knowledge only. The medical report given by PW14 shows that the injury caused by the weapon used by the appellant is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Hence, we have to analyse the evidence in the light of Section 300 clause "Thirdly" and D examine whether Exception 4 to Section 300 is applicable. Section 300 "Thirdly" reads as follows: "300. Murder.-Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, ifthe act by which the death E is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or-xxx xxx xxx xxx Thirdly.- If it is done with the intention of causing bodilv injury to anv person and the bodily injury intended to be F inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or-" (Emphasis supplied) Exception 4 to Section 300 of the Code, reads as follows: G "Exception 4.- Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and wifhout the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a H cruel or unusual manner. CHENOA @ CHANDA RAM v. STATE OF 335 CHHATISGARH [KURIAN, J.] Explanation.-lt is immaterial in such cases which party_, A offers the provocation or commits th.e first assault. " (Emphasis supplied)

8. If the case falls under Exception 4, then the further inquiry should be as to whether the case falls under the first part of B Section 304 or the second part, which reads as follows: "304-Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder.-Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder shall be punished with c imprisonment for life . . or imprisonment of either · description for a term which may extent to ten years. and shall also be liable to fine. if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death. or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. 0 or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years. or with fine. or with both. if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention· to cause death. or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death." E (Emphasis supplied)

9. All the eye witnesses have narrated the evolution of the quarrel and about the conduct of the appellant inflicting the injury with tekani used for supporting buflock carts. PW2- F Heminbai, wife of deceased, reached the spot.on finding her child weeping on account of a cane beating by Ar:ijoriram. There was verbal altercation between herself and Anjoriram. She asked her son PW5-Kishore Kumar to call her husband Ramgulal (deceased). During, the scuffle that followed, Chanda G Ram hit Ramgulal on his head once and sh~ caught hold of Ramgulal when he fell down .. Ac;cording to her, there was previous enmity with the accused persons. PW5-child Kishore Kumar is the second eyewitness. He depolied thaf he had H 336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 17 S.C.R.

A thrown a stone on a cat and in the process, ii ran away and landed on the roof of the accused persons due to which some gram kept on the terrace fell down. Infuriated, the appellant Chanda Ram beat him on his leg with a cane. He started to weep and his mother came to the spot. She questioned the B appellant as to why he beat the child and she told Kishore Kumar to call his father so as to have a final decision about the ongoing fights. He went weeping to his father to call him to the spot immediately. A scuffle between the father Ramgulal and Anjoriram followed. Anjoriram hit Ramgulal with a screwdriver c on his nose while the appellant hit Ramgulal on the head with ·,1~ani. Resultantly, his father fell down. He was shifted to the i<l1,ouse and thereafter to the hospital. PW9-Latabai, resides adjacent to the house of the deceased. She has also slated that during the scuffle between Anjoriram and the deceased, ii was Chanda Ram who hit the head of Ramgulal with the tekani.0 According to PW11-Kartikram, during the verbal altercation between the first accused Anjoriram and PW2-Heminbai, Ramgulal (deceased) came to the spot and there was a scuffle between Anjoriram and Ramgulal. During the scuffle, the "J.Ccused Chanda Ram hit Ramgulal once on the head with E tekani and consequently, Ramgulal fell down. Anjoriram also fell down, the hands of Anjoriram and Ramgulal were tied to each other and it is PW2-l'-leminbai who separated Anjoriram. PW14-Dr. R. N. Pandey who conducted the autopsy has stated that he had noted the following injuries:

F (1) Cut wound on the head of size 4inch x 3inch bone deep. (2) Floated swelling on head and nose and on both the eyes.G (3) There was~ fracture in skull on both sides of cuttlebone, in bell up skull and also in the bone of nose. H (4) Fractures were also found in the left parietal and CHENDA @ CHANDA RAM v. STATE OF 337 CHHATISGARH [KURIAN, J.] occipital bone of the Skull, there were to.ta! 5 A fractures in the skull. 10. According to Dr. Pandey, those injuries can be caused by one blow with the weapon of offence and that the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. B 11. The landmark judgment in Virsa Singh vs. State of =>unjab' draws a distinction between "Thirdly" of Section 300 and Exception 4 thereunder. The following are the four steps ')f inquiry involved: c i. first, whether bodily injury is present; ii. second, what is the nature of the injury; iii. third, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular injury, that is to say, that it D was not accidental or unintentional or that some other kind of injury was intended; and iv. fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the' three elements set E out above was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.

12. In State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Rayavarapu Punnayya ·1d Anothef, it was held that culpable homicide without the F Jecial characteristics of murder is culpable homicide not nounting to murder, falling under Section 304 of the Code. It as further held that there are three degrees of culpable ')micide. The first is murder under Section 300; second, Jlpable homicide not amounting to murder falling under the first 3rt of Section 304; and third is culpable homicide not G nounting to murder falling under the second part of Section J4. To quote: - (1958) 1 SCR 1495. (1976) 4 sec 382. H 338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013) 17 S.C.R.

A "12. In the scheme of the Penal Code, 'culpable homicide' is genus and 'murder' its specie. All 'murder' is 'culpable homicide' but not vice-versa. Speaking generally, 'culpable homicide' sans 'special characteristics of murder', is 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder'. For the B purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of this generic offence, the Code practically recognises three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, what may be called, 'culpable homicide of the first degree'. This is the greatest form of culpable homicide which is defined c in Section 300 as 'murder'. The second may be termed as 'culpable homicide of the second degree'. This is punishable under the first part of Section 304. Then, there is 'culpable homicide of the third degree'. This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is, also, the lowest among the punishments provided forD the three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under the second Part of Section 304."

13. In Pappu vs. State of Madhya Pradesh3 the Court almost exhaustively dealt with the parameters of Exception 4 E to Section 300 of the Code. It was held that the said Exception can be invoked if death is caused (i) without premeditation; (ii) in a sudden fight; (iii) without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acting in a cruel or unusual manner; and (iv) the fight must have been with the person killed. It was further held F that all the four ingredients must be found in order to apply Exception 4. To quote: "13 .... The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) v.ithout premeditation; (b) in a ·sudden fight; (c) without the offender's having taken undue advantage orG acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the "fight" occurring in Exception H 3. (2006) 7 sec 391. CHENOA @ CHANDA RAM v. STATE OF 339 CHHATISGARH [KURIAN, J.]

4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in IPC. It taKes two to A make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties have worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two and more persons whether with or without B weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarr~I is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case . . For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to c. show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The expression "undue advantage" as used in the provision means "unfair advantage". D 14. It cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever one blow is given, Section 302 IPC is ruled out. It would depend upon the weapon used, the size of it in some cases, force with which the blow was given, part of the body on which it was given and several such relevant E factors."

14. In Jagriti Devi vs. State of Himachal Pradesh4 , it was held that the expressions "intention" and "knowledge" postulate the existence of a positive mental attitude. It was further held F that when and if there is intent and knowledge, then the same would be a case under first part of Section 304 and if it is only a case of knowledge and not intention to cause murder by bodily injury, then the same would be a case of second part of Section 304. To quote: G "26. Section 299 and Section 300 /PC deal with the definition of "culpable homicide" and "murder" 4. (2009) 14 sec 771. H 340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013) 17 S.C.R. · A respectively. Section 299 defines "culpable homicide" as the act of causing death: (i) with the intention of causing death, or (ii) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as B is likely to cause death, or (iii) with the knowledge that such act is likely to cause death.

c A bare reading of the section makes it crystal clear that the first and the second clauses of the section refer to intention apart from the knowledge and the third clause refers to knowledge alone and not intention. Both the expressions "intent" and "knowledge" postulate the existence of a positive mental attitude which is of different D degrees. The mental element in culpable homicide i.e. mental attitude towards the consequences of conduct is one of intention and knowledge. If that is caused in any of the aforesaid three circumstances, the offence of culpable homicide is said to have been committed. E 27. Section 300 IPC, however, deals with murder although there is no clear definition of murder provided in Section 300 IPC. It has been repeatedly held by this Court that culpable homicide is the genus and murder is species and that all murders are culpable homicide but not vice versa. F 28. Section 300 IPC further provides for the exceptions which will constitute culpable homicide not amounting to murder and punishable under Section 304. When and if there is intent and knowledge, then the same would be a G case of Section 304 Part I and if it is only a case of knowledge and not the intention .to cause murder and bodily injury, then the same would be a case of Section 304 Part II. The aforesaid distinction between an act amounting to murder and an act not amounting to murder H CHENOA@ CHANDA RAM v. STATE OF 341 CHHATISGARH [KURIAN, J.]

has been brought out in the numerous decisions of this A Court." 15. In Gurmukh Singh vs. State of Haryana5 after scanning all the previous decisions where the death was caused by a single blow, this Court indicated, though not exhaustively, a few B factors to be taken into consideration while awarding the sentence. To quote: "23. These are some factors which are reqaired to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused. These factors are only C illustrative in character and not exhaustive. Each case has to be seen from its special perspective. The relevant factors are as under: (a) Motive or previous enmity; D (b) Whether the incident had taken place on the spur of the moment; (c) The intention/knowledge of the accused while inflicting the blow or injury; E (d) Whether the death ensued instantaneously or the victim died after several days; (e) The gravity, dimension and nature of injury; F (f) The age and general health condition of the accused; (g) Whether the injury was caused without premeditation in a sudden fight; G (h) The nature and size of weapon used for inflicting the injury and the force with which the blow was inflicted; 5. (2009) 15 sec 635. H 342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 17 S.C.R A (i) The criminal background and adverse history of the accused; (j) Whether the injury inflicted was not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death but the death was because of shock;B

(k) Number of other criminal cases pending against the accused; (I) Incident occurred within the family members or close relations;c (m) The conduct and behaviour of the accused after the incident. Whether the accused had taken the injured/the deceased to the hospital immediately to ensure that he/she gets proper medical trea.tment? D These are some of the factors which can be taken into consideration while granting an appropriate sentence to the accused. 24. The list of circumstances enumerated above is onlyE illustrative and not exhaustive. In our considered view, proper and appropriate sentence to the accused is the bounded obligation and duty of the court. The endeavour of the court must be to ensure that the accused receives appropriate sentence, in other words, sentence should beF according to the gravity of the offence. These are some of the relevant factors which are required to be kept in view while convicting and sentencing the accused." 16. In the light of the principles which have been discussed G fairly exhaustively, we have to analyse the factual position as to whether the appellant had the intention to cause death, or whether he only had the knowledge about the injury which is likely to cause death. We have to also analyse the manner in which the injury is caused and the provocation for the same. H There is no evidence in the case that there was previous enmity CHENOA @ CHANDA RAM v. STATE OF 343 CHHATISGARH [KURIAN, J.]

between parties though PW2 has attempted for such a version A of the case. She has been disbelieved on th111t account because of contradictions within her own statement under Section 161. The available evidence would show that there was no premeditation on the part of the appellant and that it was a case of sudden fight. It has to be noted while appreciating the B evidence that Ramgulal (deceased) was called by his wife to the spot to settle the disputes once for all and that the ensuing sudden scuffle with the first accused was in the presence of his wife. It has come out in the evidence of PW11-Kartikram that the injury inflicted by the appellant was during the scuffle c between the"deceased and the first accused Anjoriram and that after the lone strike on the head of the deceased by the appellant, both the deceased and Anjoriram had fallen down and it was PW2-Heminbai who separated Anjoriram and Ramgulal as they had become entangled with each other. That 0only means that Ramgulal had overpowered Anjoriram or else the deceased alone would have fallen down and not the first accused A("ljoriram. The said conduct of the deceased overpowering Anjoriram during the scuffle was the immediate provocation for the appellant to take the weapon, the tekani which was available in the vicinity to hit the deceased. There E is no evidence at all as to whether the appellant intended to hit on the head only or elsewhere on the body. The scuffling parties being in motion, it could easily have happened that the blow fell on the head unintentionally. No doubt the scuffle of the deceased was with the Anjoriram but th·e entire fight was with F the deceased on one side, and the appellant and other accused Anjoriram on the other side. It is not required that the fight must be between the main accused and deceased. The fight can as well be between two parties, the deceased on one side and all the other. accused on the other side. There is only one hit. G There is nothing to show that there was any cruelty involved by inflicting any other injury or by any other conduct on the part of the appellant so as to hold that the appellant was taking any undue advantage of the situation. or that he behaved in a cruel or unusual manner. Thus, all the four ingredients required for H

344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 17 S.C.R. A treating the case under Exception 4 to Section 300 of the Code as stated in Pappu's case (supra) are satisfied in the instant case.

17. The next inquiry is w~ether the offence falls under first part of Section 304 or the second part. Having regard to theB parameters indicated in Gurmukf! Singh's case ·(supra), the offence seems to fall under the second part. There is no evidence of motive or previous enm.ity. The incident has taken place on the ~pur of the moment. There is no evidence C regarding the i11tention behind the Jatal consequence of the blow. There was only one blow. The:accused is young. There was no premeditation. The evolution of the incident would show that it was in the midst of a sudden fight. There is no criminal background or adverse history of the appellant. It was a trivial quarrel among the villagers on account of a simple issue. The D fatal blow was in the course of a scuffle between two persons. There has been no other act of cruelty or unusual conduct on the part of the appella11t. The deceased was involved in the scuffle in the presence of his wife and he had actually been called upon by her to the spot so as to settle the score with the E accused persons. The deceased had, in the scuffle, overpowered the first accused. That first accused was acquitted. Thus, considering all these aspects, we are of the view that it is a fit case to alter the punishment of imprisonment for life to imprisonment for a period of 1O years with fine of F Rs.50,000/-. Ordered accordingly. Since the deceased has been left with a young widow and one child, the amount of fine thus recovered shall be paid as compensation to the widow and the child. In the event of the appellant defaulting to pay the fine, he shall undergo imprisonment for a further period of two years. G In case the appellant has already served the term as above, he shall be released forthwith, if not required to be detained in connection with any other case. The appeal is allowed as above.

Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeal partly allowed. H