[2010) 7 S.C.R. 667 SHIVJEE SINGH A V. NAGENDRA TIWARY AND ORS. (Criminal Appeal No. 1158 of 2010) JULY 6, 2010 B [G.S. SINGHVI AND ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, JJ.] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.202(2), proviso-Interpretation of - Whether examination of all witnesses cited in the complaint is sine qua non for taking cognizance by a C Magistrate in a case exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions - Held, No - Even though in terms of the proviso to s.202(2), the Magistrate is required to direct the. complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath, failure or inability of the complainant or omission on D his part to examine one or some of the witnesses cited in the complaint or whose names are furnished in compliance of the direction issued by the Magistrate, will not preclude the latter from taking cognizance and issuing process or passing committal order if he is satisfied that there exists sufficient E ground for doing so - Examination of all the witnesses cited in the complaint or whose names are disclosed by the complainant in furtherance of the direction given by the Magistrate in terms of proviso to s. 202(2) is not a· condition precedent for taking cognizance and issue of process against F the persons named as accused in the complaint -Consequence of such non-examination is to be considered at the trial and not at the stage of issuing process. Words and Phrases - "shall" - Meaning of - In context to proviso to s.202(2) CrPC. G

The appellant's son was said to have been killed by respondent nos.1 to 4. After conducting investigation, the police submitted final form with the finding that they had 667 H 668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 7 S.C.R. A no clue about the culprits. Thereupon, the appellant filed a protest petition, which, at the instance of the Judicial Magistrate, was converted into a complaint. The appellant examined himself and two out of the four witnesses cited in the protest petition-cum-8 complaint. After considering the statements of the appellant and the said two witnesses, the Judicial Magistrate took cognizance against respondent Nos.1 to 4 for offence under Section 302 read with Section 1208 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act and directed issue C of non-bailable warrants against them.

Respondents challenged the order of the Judicial Magistrate by filing petition under Section 482 CrPC. The High Court held that the Judicial Magistrate could not D have taken cognizance against the respondents without requiring the appellant to examine all the four witnesses named by him and remitted the matter to the concerned court for passing appropriate order after making further inquiry in the light of proviso to Section 202(Z) CrPC. E Before this Court, it was contended by the appellant that the proviso to s.20~(2) Cr.P.C. is not mandatory in character and the High Court committed serious error by remitting the matter to the Judicial Magistrate for further F enquiry only on the ground that all the witnesses named by the appellant had not been examined. The appellant contended that non-examination of two witnesses cited in the protest petition-cum-complaint did not preclude the Judicial Magistrate from taking cognizance against respondent nos.1 to 4 since he felt satisfied that a prima G facie case was made out against them. The question which thus arose for consideration in the present appeal was whether examination of all witnesses cited in the complaint is sine qua non for H SHIVJEE SINGH v. NAGENDRATIWARY AND ORS. 669 taking cognizance by a Magistrate in a case exclusively A triable by the Court of Sessions. Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD:1.1. By its very nomenclature, Cr.P.C. is a compendium of law relating to criminal procedure. The B provisions contained therein are required to be interpreted keeping in view the well recognized rule of construction that procedural prescriptions are meant for doing substantial justice. If violation of the procedural provision does not result in denial of fair hearing or C causes prejudice to the parties, the same has to be · treated as directory notwithstanding the use of word 'shall'. (Para 6] [676-D]

· 1.2. Chapter XIV of CrPC enumerates the conditions o· for initiation of proceedings. Chapters XV and XVI contain various procedural provisions which are required . to be followed by the Magistrate for taking cognizance, issuing of process/summons, dismissal of the complaint, supply of copies of documents and statements to the E accused and commitment of case to the Court of Sessions when the offence is triable exclusively by that · Court. An analysis of Sections 200, 202, 203, 204, 207, 208 · and 209 Cr.P.C. which form part of these Chapters shows that when a complaint is presented before a Magistrate, F he can, after examining the complainant and his witnesses on oath, take cognizance of an offence. This procedure is not required to be followed when a written complaint is made by a public servant, acting or purporting to act in discharge of his official duties or when a Court has made the complaint or if the Magistrate G makes over the case for inquiry/trial to another Magistrate under Section 192. Section 202(1) empowers the · Magistrate to postpone the issue of proces~ against the accused and either inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such H 670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 7 S.C.R.

A other person which he thinks fit for the purpose of deciding whether or not there exists sufficient ground for proceeding. By Amending Act No.25 of 2005, the postponement of the issue of process has been made mandatory where the accused is residing in an area beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the concerned8 Magistrate. Proviso to Section 202(1) lays down that direction for investigation shall not be made where it appears to the Magistrate that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions or where C the complaint has not been made by a Court unless the complainant and the witnesses have been examined on oath under Section 200. Under Section 202(2), the Magistrate making an inquiry under sub-section (1) can take evidence of the witnesses on oath. If the Magistrate thinks that the offence complained of is triable exclusively D by the Court of Sessions then in terms of proviso to Section 202, he is required to call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath [Paras 6, 7] [676-G-H; 681-G-H; 682-A-C] E 1.3. The object of examining the complainant and the witnesses is to ascertain the truth or falsehood of the complaint and determine whether there is a prima facle case against the person who, according to the complainant has committed an offence. If upon F examination of the complainant and/or witnesses, the Magistrate is prima facie satisfied that a case is made out against the person accused of committing an offence then he is required to issue process. Section 202 empowers the Magistrate to postpone the issue of G process and either inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or such other person as he may think fit for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. Under Section 203, the Magistrate can H

SHIVJEE SINGH v. NAGENDRA TIWARY AND ORS. 671 dismiss the complaint if, after taking into consideration A the statements of the complainant and his witnesses and the result of the inquiry/investigation, if any, done under Section 202, he is of the view that there does not exist sufficient ground for proceeding. On the other hand, Section 204 provides for issue of process if the Magistrate B is satisfied that there is sufficient ground for doing so. The expression "sufficient ground" used in Sections 203, 204 and 209 means the satisfaction that a prima facie case is made out against the person accused of committing an offence and not sufficient ground for the c purpose of conviction. [Para 8) [683-E-H; 684-A-B]

1.4. The use of the word 'shall' in proviso to Section 202(2) is prima facie indicative of mandatory character of the provision contained therein, but a close and critical analysis thereof along with other provisions contained in D Chapter XV and Sections 226 and 227 and Section 465 would clearly show that non-examination on oath of any or some of the witnesses cited by the complainant is, by itself, not sufficient to denude the concerned Magistrate of the jurisdic;tion to pass an ~order for taking cognizance E and issue of process provided he is satisfied that prima facie case is made out for doing so. Significantly the word 'all' appearing in proviso to Section 202(2) is qualified by the word 'his'. This implies that the complainant is not bound to examine all the witnesses named in the F complaint or whose names are disclosed in response to the order passed by the Magistrate. In other words, only those witnesses are required to be examined whom the complainant considers material to make out a prima facie case for issue of process. The choice being of the G complainant, he may choose not to examine other witnesses. Consequence of such non-examination is to be considered at the trial and not at the stage of issuing process when the Magistrate is not required to enter into H 672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 7 S.C.R.

A detailed discussions on the merits or demerits of the case, that is to say whether or not the allegations contained in the complaint, if proved, would ultimately end in conviction of the accused. He is only to see whether there exists sufficient ground for proceeding B against the accused. [Para 12] [685-H; 686-A-E]

1.5. Even though in terms of the proviso to Section 202(2), the Magistrate is required to direct the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine C them on oath, failure or inability of the complainant or omission on his part to examine one or some of the witnesses cited in the complaint or wh.ose names are furnished in compliance of the direction issued by the Magistrate, will not preclude the latter ,from taking cognizance and issuing process or passing committal D order if he is satisfied that there exists sufficient ground for doing so. Such an order passed by the Magistrate cannot be nullified only on the ground of non~ompliance of proviso to Section 202(2). [Para 14] [692-A-D] E 1.6. Examination of all the witnesses cited in the complaint or whose names are disclosed by the complainant in furtherance of the direction ·given, by the Magistrate in terms of proviso to Section 202(2) Iis not a condition precedent for taking cognizance and Issue of F process against the persons named as accused in the complaint. In the present case, the High Court committed serious error in directing the Judicial Magistrate to conduct further inquiry and pass fresh order in the light of proviso to Section 202(2). Since the matter is more than G 12 years old, the concerned Magistrate is directed to pass appropriate order in terms of Section 209. It is further directed that after committal of the case, the Sessions _ Judge, to whom the matter is assigned, shall conduct and complete the trial within a period of 9 months. [Paras 16 H and 17] [692-G-H; 693-A-C]

SHIVJEE SINGH v. NAGENDRA TIWARY AND ORS. 673 Birendra K. Singh v. State of Bihar (2000) 8 SCC 498, A held inapplicable. Rosy v. State of Kera/a (2000) 2 SCC 230, explained R.C. Ruia v. State of Bombay 1958 SCR 618; Vadi/a/ 8 Panchal v. Duftatraya Dulaji Ghadigaonkar (1961) 1 SCR 1; Chandra Deo Singh v. Prokash Chandra Bose (1964) 1 SCR 639; Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. State of West Bengal (1973) 3 . SCC 753; Kewal Krishan v. Suraj Bhan (1980) Supp SCC · 4$9; Mohinder Singh v. Gu/want Singh (1992) 2 SCC 213 and Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International Ltd. C (2008) 2 sec 492, relied on. I Ranjit Singh v. State of Pepsu AIR 1959 SC 843; Moideenkutty Haji v. Kunhikoya (1987) 1 KLT 635; M. Govindaraja Pillai v. Thangavelu Pillai 1983 Cri LJ 917 and o I Abdul Wahab Ansari v. State of Bihar (2000) 8 SCC 500, · referred to. . Case Law Reference: (2000) 2 sec 230 explained Para 5 E (2000) 8 sec 498 held inapplicable Para 5 1958 SCR 618 relied on Para 8 (1961) 1 SCR 1 relied on Para 8 F (1964) 1 SCR 639 relied on Para 8 (1973) 3 sec 753 relied on Para 8 (1980) Supp sec 499 relied on Para 8 G (1992) 2 sec 213 relied on Para 8 (2008) 2 sec 492 relied on Para 8 · AIR 1959 SC 843 referred to Para 13 H 674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 7 S.C.R. A (1987) 1 KLT 635 referred to Para 13 1983 Cri LJ 917 referred to Para 13 (2000) 8 sec 500 referred to Para 15 B CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION ; Criminal Appeal No. 1158 of 2010.

From the Judgment & Order dated 18.4.2007 of the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Crl. Misc. No. 1778 of 2007. C Gaurav Agrawal for the Appellant. Gopal Singh, Akhilesh Kumar Pandey, Sudarsh Saran, Shalini Chandra, Swati Chandra for the ResponderitSi. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by D G.S. SINGHVI, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. Whether examination of all witnesses cited in the complaint is sine qua non for taking cognizance by a Magistrate in a case exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions E is the question which arises for consideration in this appeal filed against order dated 18.4.2007 passed by the learned Single :Judge of Patna High Court in Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No.1778 of 2007 whereby he remitted the case to Chief Judicial Magistrate, Saran with the direction to make further inquiry and F pass appropriate order in the light of proviso to Section 202(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.). 3. The appellant's son, Ajay Kumar Singh is said to have been killed by respondent Nos.1 to 4 on 1 /2.1.1997. The G appellant lodged First Information Report on the same day at Police Station, lsuapur. After conducting investigation, the police submitted final form on 3.9.1998 with the finding that they had no clue about the culprits. Thereupon, the appellant filed a protest petition accusing the police of not conducting the H investigation properly due to political pressure and prayed that SHIVJEE SINGH v. NAGEr:.IDRA TIWARY AND ORS. 675

[G.S. SINGHVI, J.] thf? accused persons be summoned and punished. By an order A gated 3.9.2802, t~e learned Judicial Magistrate accepted the final form §ubmitted by the police but, at the same time, directed that the prot@§t petiti~ll !:>@ rt;i~ist~red as a separate complaint. He also c:llreeted t~e gprnpla.inant (appell;:iflt h@rein) to produce his witnesses. The app~ll~nt eX9rnin!?d himself and two out of B four witnesses cited in the i:in~test petition-cµrn"§Qmg!aint ·but gave up the remaining two witnesses because he thought that . they had been won over by the accused. After considering.the statements of the appellant and two witnesses, Chief Judicial Magistrate, Saran passed an ·order dated 13.12.2006 whereby c h~ tE>E>~ gogriizance against respondent Nos.1 .to 4 for offence Yflder ~~i::;tlq11 902 reaq with Section 1208 Indian Penal Code and ~~cti9n ~7 gf the Arms Act and directed issue of non bailable w;;irrants a~J<~inst them.

4. The respgnc:!ents Ghcillen~~d tne qrder of the Chief D Judicial Magistrate by filing ~ p,E!tition unqer Section 482 Cr.P.C. The learned Single Judge aGcepteq their contention . that the Chief Judicial Magistrate could not have taken cognizance against them without requiring the appellant to examine all the witnesses and remitted the matter to the E concerned court for passing appropriate order after making fYrther inquiry in the light of proviso to Section 202(2) Cr.P.C. !), ~hri gqyrnv Agrawal, learned counsel for the appellant argued that prgyj§g tg §ection 202(2) Cr.P.C. is not mandatory F in character and the High Court committed serious error by remitting the matter to the Chief Judicial Magistrate for further inquiry only on the ground that all the witnesses named by the • appellant had not been examined. Learned counsel further argued that non-examination of two witnesses cited in the G protest petition-cum-complaint did not preclude the Chief Judicial Magistrate from taking Gognizance against respondent Nos.1 to 4 because he felt satisfied that a prima facie case was made out against them. In support of his arguments, learned counsel relied upon the judgment of this Court in Rosy v. State H 676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 7 S.C.R.

A of Kera/a (2000) 2 SCC 230. Shri Gopal Singh, learned counsel for the respondents argued that proviso to Section 202(2) Cr.P._C. is mandatory and the Chief Judicial Magistrate committed a serious error in taking cognizance against respondent Nos.1 to 4 and issuing non-bailable warrants B against them without insisting on the examination of remaining two witnesses named in the complaint. He relied upon the observations made by Thomas, J. in Rosy v. State of Kera/a (supra) and the judgment in Birendra K. Singh v. State of Bihar (2000) 8 sec 498 in support of his submission that proviso to c S(~ction 202(2) Cr.P.C. is mandatory.

6. We have considered the respective submissions. By its very nomenclature, Cr.P.C. is a compendium of law relating to criminal procedure. The provisions contained therein are required to be interpreted keeping in view the well recognized D rule of construction that procedural prescriptions are meant for doing substantial justice. If violation of the procedural provision does not result in denial of fair hearing or causes prejudice to the parties, the same has to be treated as directory notwithstanding the use of word 'shall'. Chapter XIV of Cr.P .C. E enumerates conditions for initiation of proceedings. Under Section 190, which forms part of the scheme of that chapter, a Magistrate can take cognizance of any offence either pn receiving a complaint of facts which constitute an offence or a police report of such facts or upon receipt of information from F any person other than a police officer or upon his own knowledge, that such an offence has been committed. Chapters XV and XVI contain various procedural provisions which are required to be followed by the Magistrate for taking cognizance, issuing of process/summons, dismissal of the complaint, G sypply of copies of documents and statements to the accused and commitment of case to the Court of Sessions when the offence is triable exclusively by that Court. Sections 200, 202, 203, 204, 207, 208 and 209 Cr.P.C. which form part of these chapters and which have bearing on the question raised in this H appeal read as under:

SHIVJEE SINGH v. NAGENDRA TIWARY AND ORS. 677 [G.S. SINGHVI, J.] "200. Examination of complainant.- A Magistrate taking A cognizance of an offence on complaint shall examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, and the substance of such examination shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed by the complainant and the witnesses, and also by the Magistrate: B -- -Br.mtLded that, when the complaint is made in writing, the Magistrate-need not examine the complainant and the witnesses- (a) if a public servant acting or purporting to act in the C discharge of his official duties or a Court has made the complaint; or (b) if the Magistrate makes over the case for inquiry or trial to another Magistrate under section 192: D Provided further that if the Magistrate makes over the case ;to another Magistrate under section 192 after examining the complainant and the witnesses, the latter Magistrate need not re-examine them. E

202. Postponement of issue of process.-(1) Any Magistrate, on receipt of a complaint of an offence df which he is authorised to take cognizance or which has been made over to him under section 192, may, if he thinks fit, and shall, in a case where the accused is residing at a F place beyon'"' the area in which he exercises his jurisdiction postpone the issue of process against the accused, and either inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit, for the purpose of deciding G whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding: Provided that no such direction for investigation shall be made- (a) where it appears to the Magistrate that the offence H 678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS !2010] 7 S.C.R. A coltlplalned of Is triable exclusively by the Court of Sessiohsi ot {b) where tHe comptaitit has not been made by a Court, unless the complainant and the Witnesses present (if any) have been examined on oath-underB section 200. (2) In an inquiry under sub-section (1), the Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, take evidence of witness on oath: Provided that if it appears to the Magistrate that thec offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, he shall call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath.

(3) If an investigation under sub-section (1) is madeD by a person not being a police officer, he shall have for that investigation all the powers conferred by this Code on an officer in charge of a police station except the power to arrest without warrant. E 203. Dismissal of complaint.- If, after considering the statements on oath (if any) of the complainant and of the witnesses and the result of the inquiry or investigation (if any) under Section 202, the Magistrate is of opinion that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding, he shall F dismiss the complaint, and in every such case he shall record his reasons for so doing. 204. Issue of process.- (1) If in the opinion of a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence there is sufficient ground for proceeding, and the case appears to be-G (a) a summons-case, he shall issue his summons for the attendance of the accused, or (b) a warrant-case, he may issue a warrant, or, if he thinks H fit, a summons, for causing the accused to be brought or SHIVJEE SINGH v. NAGENDRA TiWARY AND ORS. 679 [G.S. SINGHVI, J,J to appear at a certain time before such Magistrate or (if A he has no jurisdictiotl hitnselO some other Magistrates having jurisdiction. (2) No surnmons ot warrant shall be issued against the accused under sub-section (1) until a list of the prosecution B witnesses has been filed.

(3) In a proceeding instituted upon a complaint made in writing, every summons or warrant issued under sub-. section (1) shall be accompanied by a copy of such complaint. c (4) When by any law for the time being in force any process-fees or other fees are payable, no process shall ,be issued until the fees are paid and, if such fees are not paid within a reasonable time, the Magistrate may dismiss D the complaint. (5) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the provisions of section 87. 207. Supply to the accused of copy of police report and E other documents. - In any case where the proceeding has been. instituted on a police report, the Magistrate shall without delay furnish to. the accused, free of cost, a copy of each of the following:- F (i) the police report; (ii) the first information report recorded under section 154; (iii) the statements recorded under sub-section (3) of section 161 of all persons whom the prosecution proposes G to examine as its witnesses, excluding there from any part in regard to which a request for such exclusion has been made by the police officer under sub-section (6) of section · 173; H 680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 7 S.C.R. A (iv) the confessions and statements, if any, recorded under section 164;

(v) any other document or relevant extract thereof forwarded to the Magistrate with the police report under sub-section (5) of section 173:B Provided that the Magistrate may, after perusing any such part of a statement as is referred to in clause (iii) and considering the reasons given by the police officer for the request, direct that a copy of that part of the statement or c of such portion thereof as the Magistrate thinks proper, shall be furnished to the accused: Provided further that if the Magistrate is satisfied that any document referred to in clause (v) is voluminous, he shall. instead of furnishing the accused with a copy thereof, directD that he will only be allowed to inspect it either personally or through pleader in Court. 208. Supply of copies of statements and documents to accused in other cases triable by Court of Session.-E Where, in a case instituted otherwise than on a police report, it appears to the Magistrate issuing process under section 204 that the offence is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, the Magistrate shall without delay furnish to the accused, free of cost, a copy of each of the F following:- (i) the statements recorded under section 200 or section 202, or all persons examined by the Magistrate; (ii) the statements and confessions, if any, recorded under G section 161 or section 164; (iii) any documents produced before the Magistrate on which the prosecution proposes to rely:

Provided that if the Magistrate is satisfied that any suchH SHIVJEE SINGH v. NAGENDRA TIWARY AND ORS. 681 [G.S. SINGHVI, J.] document is voluminous, he shall, instead of furnishing the A accused with a copy thereof, direct that he will only be allowed to inspect it either personally or through pleader in Court. 209. Commitment of case to Court of Session when 8 offence is triable exclusively by it.-When in a case instituted on a police report or otherWise, the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate and it appears to the Magistrate that the offence is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, he shall- c (a) commit, after complying with the provisions of section 207 or section 208, as the case may be, the case to the Court of Session, and subject to the provisions of this Code relating to bail, remand the accused to custody until such commitment has D been made; (b) subject to the provisions of this Code relating to bail, remand the accused to custody during, and until the conclusion of, the trial; E (c) send to that Court the record of the case and the documents and articles, if any, which are, to b~ . produced in evidence; (d) . notify the Public Prosecutor of the commitment of F the case to the Court of Session."

7. An analysis of the above reproduced provisions shows that when a complaint is presented before a Magistrate, he can, after examining the complainant and his witnesses on oath, take cognizance of an offence. This procedure is not required to be G followed when a written complaint is made by a public servant, acting or purporting to act in discharge of his official duties or when a Court has made the complaint or if the Magistrate makes over the case for inquiry/trial to another Magistrate under Section 192. Section 202(1) empowers the Magistrate to H 682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 7 S.C.R.

A postpone the issue of process against the accused and either inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person which he thinks fit for the purpose of deciding whether or not there exists sufficient ground for proceeding. By Amending Act No.25 of B 2005, the postponement of the issue of process has been made mandatory where the accused is residing in an area beyond the territorial jurisdictiori of the concerned Magistrate. Proviso to Section 202(1) lays down that direction for investigation shall not be made where it appears to the c Magistrate that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions or where the complaint has not been made by a Court unless the complainant and the witnesses have been examined on oath under Section 200. Under Section 202(2), the Magistrate making an inquiry under sub-section (1) can take evidence of the witnesses on oath. If the Magistrate0 thinks that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions then in terms of proviso to Section 202, he is required to call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath. Section 203 empowers E the Magistrate to dismiss the complaint if, after considering the statements made by the complainant and the witnesses on oath and the result of the inquiry or investigation, if any, made under Section 202(1 ), he is satisfied that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding. The exercise of this power is hedged with the condition that the Magistrate should record brief reasons for F dismissing the complaint. Section 204, which talks of issue of process lays down that if the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence is of the view that there is sufficient ground for proceeding then he may issue summons for attendance of the accused in a summons-case. If it is a warrant-case, then the G Magistrate can issue warrant for causing attendance of accused. Section 207 casts a duty on the Magistrate to supply to the accused, copies of the police report, the first information report recorded under Section 154, the statements recorded under Section 161 (3), the confessions and statements, if any, H recorded under Section 164 and any other document or SHIVJEE SINGH v. NAGENDRA TIWARY AND ORS. 683

[G.S. SINGHVI, J.] relevant extract thereof, which is forwarded to the Magistrate A along with polic~ report. Section 208 provides for supply of copies of statement and documents to accused in the cases triable by the Court of Sessions. It lays down that if the case, instituted otherwise t~an on a police report, is triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions, the Magistrate shall furnish to the B accused, free of cost, copies of the statements recorded under Section 200 or Section 202, statements and confessions recorded under Section 161 or Section 164 and any other document on which prosecution proposes to rely. Section 209 speaks of commitment of case to the Court of Sessions when c offence is triable exclusively by it. This section casts a duty on the Magistrate to commit the case to the Court of Sessions after complying with the provisions of Section 208. Once the case is committed, the trial is to be conducted by the Court of Sessions in accordance with the provisions contained in 0 Chapter XVIII.

8. The object of examining the complainant and the witnesses is to ascertain the truth or falsehood of the complaint . and determine whether there is a prima facie case against the = person who, according to the complainant has committed an E offence. If upon examination of the complainant and/or witnesses, the Magistrate is prima facie satisfied that a case is made out against the person accused of committing an offence then he is required to issue process. Section 202 empowers the Magistrate to postpone the issue of process and F either inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or such other person as he may think fit for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. Under Section 203, the Magistrate can dismiss the complaint if, after taking into G consideration the statements of the complainant and his witnesses and the result of the inquiry/investigation, if any, done under Section 202, he is of the view that there does not exist sufficient ground for proceeding. On the other hand, Section 204 provides for issue of process if the Magistrate is satisfied H 684 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 7 S.C.R.

A that there is sufficient ground for doing so. The expression "sufficient ground" used in Sections 203, 204 and 209 means the satisfaction that a prima facie case is made out against the person accused of committing an offence and not sufficient ground for the purpose of conviction. This interpretation of the B provisions contained in Chapters XV and XVI of Cr.P.C. finds adequate support from the judgments of this Court in R. C. Ruia v. State of Bombay, 1958 SCR 618, Vadilal Panchal v. Duttatraya Dulaji Ghadigaonkar (1961) 1 SCR 1, Chandra Deo Singh v. Prakash Chandra Bose (1964) 1 SCR 639, c Nirmaif it Singh Hoon v. State of West Bengal (1973) 3 SCC 753, Kewal Krishan v. Sura} Bhan (1980) Supp SCC 499, Mohinder Singh v. Gu/want Singh (1992) 2 SCC 213 and Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International Ltd. (2008) 2 sec 492. D 9. In Chandra Deo Singh v. Prakash Chandra Bose (supra), it was held that where there was prima facie evidence, the Magistrate was bound to issue process and even though the person charged of an offence in the complaint might have a defence, the matter has to be left to be decided by an E appropriate forum at an appropriate stage. It was further held that the issue of process can be refused only when the Magistrate finds that the evidence led by the complainant is self contradictory or intrinsically untrustworthy.

F 10. In Kewal Krishan v. Sura} Bhan (supra}, this Court examined the scheme of Sections 200 to 204 and held: "At the stage of Sections 203 and 204 of the Criminal Procedure Code in a case exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, all that the Magistrate has to do is to see G whether on a cursory perusal of the complaint and the evidence recorded during the preliminary inquiry under Sections 200 and 202 of the Criminal Procedure Code, there is prima facie evidence in support of the charge leveled against the accused. All that he has to see is H whether or not there is "sufficient ground for proceeding" SHIVJEE SINGH v. NAGENDRA TIWARY AND ORS. 685 [G.S. SINGHVI, J.] against the accused. At this stage, the Magistrate is not A to weigh the evidence meticulously as if he w~re the trial court. The standard to be adopted by the Magistrate in scrutinizing the evidence is not the same as the one which is to be kept in view at the stage of framing charges." B 11. The aforesaid view was reiterated in Mohinder Singh v. Gu/want Singh (supra) in the following words:

"The scope of enquiry under Section 202 is extremely restricted only to finding out the truth or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint in order to determine C whether process should issue or not under Section 204 of the Code or whether the complaint should be dismissed by resorting to Section 203 of the Code on the footing that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding on the basis of the statements of the complainant and of his witnesses, D if any. But the enquiry at that stage does not partake the character of a full dress trial which can only take place after process is issued under Section 204 of the Code calling upon the proposed accused to answer the accusation made against him for adjudging the guilt or otherwise of E the said accused person. Further, the question whether the evidence is adequate for supporting the conviction can be determined only at the trial and not at the stage of the enquiry contemplated under Section 202 of the Code. To say in other words, during the course of the enquiry under F Section 202 of the Code, the enquiry officer has to satisfy himself simply on the evidence adduced by the prosecution whether prima facie case has been made out so as to put the proposed accused on a regular trial and that no detailed enquiry is called for during the course of G such enquiry." (emphasis supplied) 12. The use of the word 'shall' in proviso to Section 202(2) is prima facie indicative of mandatory character of the provision H

686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 7 S.C.R.

A contained therein, but a close and critical analysis thereof along with other provisions contained in Chapter XV and Sections 226 and 227 and Section 465 would clearly show that non examination on oath of any or some of the witnesses cited by the complainant is, by itself, not sufficient to denude the B concerned Magistrate of the· jurisdiction to pass an order for taking cognizance and issue of process provided he is satisfied that prima facie case is made out for doing so. Here it is significant to note that the word 'all' appearing in proviso to Section 202(2) is qualified by the word 'his'. This implies that C the complainant is not bound to examine all the witnesses named in the complaint or whose names are disclosed in response to the order passed by the Magistrate. In other words, only those witnesses are required to be examined whom the complainant considers material to make out a prima facie case for issue of process. The choice being of the complainant, he0 may choose not to examine other witnesses. Consequence of such non-examination is to be considered at the trial and not at the stage of issuing process when the Magistrate is not required to enter into detailed discussions on the merits or , demerits of the case, that is to say whether or not the E allegations contained in the complaint, if proved, would ultimately end in conviction of the accused. He is only to see whether there exists sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

F 13. We may now refer to the judgment in Rosy v. State of Kera/a (supra) on which reliance has been placed by both the learned counsel. The factual matrix of that case reveals that the Excise Inspector filed a complaint before Judicial Magistrate, Thrissur for offences punishable under Section 57-A and 56(b) G of the Kerala Abkari Act. As the offences were exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the learned Magistrate committed the case to the Court of Sessions, Thrissur. After the prosecution examined witnesses, the accused were questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The public prosecutor H then filed an application for recalling two witnesses, who were SHIVJEE SINGH v. NAGENDRA TIWARY AND ORS. 687 [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

recalled and examined. Thereafter, further statements of the A accused under Section 313 were recorded. The accused examined four witnesses. At that stage, an argument was raised that the committal order was bad because the Magistrate did not follow the procedure prescribed in the proviso to Section 202(2). The learned Sessions Judge opined B that there was.breach of the mandatory provision but made a reference to the High Court under Section 395(2) because he found it difficult to decide the course to be adopted in the matter. The High Court held that the order of committal was vitiated due to violation of the mandate of proviso to Section 202(2). Before . c this Court, the issue was considered by a two-Judge Bench. M.B. Shah, J., referred to Sections 200 and 202, the judgment of this Court in Ranjit Singh v. State of Pepsu AIR 1959 SC 843 and held:

"Further, it is settled law that the inquiry under Section 202 D is of a limited nature. Firstly, to find out whether there is a prima facie case in issuing process against the person accused of the offence in the complaint and secondly, to prevent the issue of process in the complaint which is either false or vexatious or intended only to harass such a E person. At that stage, the evidence is not to be meticulously appreciated, as the limited purpose being of finding out "whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused". The standard to be adopted by the Magistrate in scrutinising the evidence is F also not the same as the one which is to be kept in view at the stage of framing charges. At the stage of inquiry under Section 202 CrPC the accused has no right to intervene and that it is the duty of the Magistrate while making an inquiry to elicit all facts not merely with view G a to protect the interests of an absent accused person, but also with a view to bring to book a person or persons against whom grave allegations are made." H 688 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 7 S.C.R. A Shah, J. then referred to the ratio of the judgment in Kewal Krishan v. Suraj Bhan (supra) and observed:

"In this view of the matter it is apparent that the High Court erred in holding that there was breach of the mandatory provisions of the proviso to Section 202(2) of the CodeB and the order of committal is vitiated and, therefore, requires to be set aside. The High Court failed to consider th~ proviso to Section 200, particularly proviso (a) to the said section and also the fact that inquiry under Section c 202 is discretionary for deciding whether to issue process (under Section 204) or to dismiss the complaint (under Section 203). Under Section 200, on receipt of the complaint, the Magistrate can take cognizance and issue process to the accused. If the case is exclusively triable by the Sessions Court, he is required to commit the case D to the Court of Session." Shah, J. also referred to the judgment of the Full Bench of Kerala High Court in Moideenkutty Haji v. Kunhikoya (1987) 1 KLT 635 and of Madras High Court in M. Govindaraja Pillai E v. Thangavelu Pillai 1983 Cri LJ 917, approved the ratio of the latter decision that Section 202 is an enabling provision and it is the discretion of the Magistrate depending upon the facts of each case, whether to issue process straightaway or to hold the inquiry and held:

F "We agree with the conclusion of the Madras High Court to the effect (sic extent) that Section 202 is an enabling provision and it is the discretion of the Magistrate depending upon the facts of each case, whether to issue process straight away or to hold the inquiry. However, in G case where inquiry is held, failure to comply with the statutory direction to examine all the witnesses would not vitiate further proceeding in all cases for the reasons that (a) in a complaint filed by a public servant acting or H SHIVJEE SINGH v. NAGENDRA TIWARY AND ORS. 689 [G.S. SINGHVI, J.] purporting to act in discharge of his official duties, the A question of holding inquiry may not arise, (b) whether to hold inquiry or not is the discretionary jurisdicticm of the Magistrate, 8 (c) even if he has decided to hold an inquiry it is his further discretion to examine the witnesses on oath. If he decides to examine witnesses on oath in a case triable exclusively by the Court of Session, he shall call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine tliem on oath, c (d) it would also depend upon the fa~ts of each case depending upon the prejudice caused to the accused by non-compliance with the said proviso (Section 465), and \ (e) that the objection witti regard to non-compliance with 0 the proviso should be taken at the earlier stage when the , charge is framed by the Sessions Court." (emphasis supplied)

K.T. Thomas, J. adopted a different approach regarding E interpretation of Section 202. He referred to the scheme of Chapters XIV, XV and XVI Cr.P.C. and observed: "Three categories of documents are mentioned in the aforesaid section the copies of which the Magistrate, who F proceeds from the stage in Section 204, has to supply to the accused free of cost (in a complaint case involving an offence triable exclusively by a Court of Session). As the words used here are "shall furnish", it is almost a compelling duty on the Magistrate to supply the said documents to the accused. How can the Magistrate supply G such documents? [In t·he present context the documents referred to in the third category mentioned in clause (iit) are not important.] The first category delineated in clause (1) of Section 208 consists of "statements recorded under Section 200 or Section 202, of all persons examined by H 690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 7 S.C.R. A the Magistrate". (emphasis supplied) It is now important to note that the words "if any" have been used in the second category of documents which is delineated in clause (i1) of Section 208, but those words a~ absent while delineating the first category. In my view those two B words have been thoughtfully avoided by Parliament in clause (1).

If a Magistrate is to comply with the aforesaid requirements in Section 208 of the Code (which he cannot obviate if the c language used in the sub-section is of any indication) what is the manner in which he can do it in a case where he failed to examine the witnesses before issuing process to the accused? The mere fact that the word "or" is employed in clause (1) of Section 208 is not to be understood as an indication that the Magistrate is given the freedom to D dispense with the inquiry if he has already examined the complainant under Section 200. A case can be visualised in which the complainant is the only eyewitness or in which all the eyewitnesses were also present when the complaint was filed and they were all examined as required in Section E 200. In such a case the complainant, when asked to produce all his witnesses under Section 202 of the Code, is at liberty to report to the Magistrate that he has no other witness than those who were already examined under Section 200 of the Code. When such types of cases are F borne in mind it is quite possible to grasp the utility of the word "or" which is employed in the first clause of Section 208 of the Code. So the intention is not to indicate that the inquiry is only optional in the cases mentioned in Section 208.

G If a case instituted on a complaint is committed to the Court of Session without complying with the requirements in clause (1) of Section 208 of the Code how is it possible for the Public Prosecutor to know in advance what evidence he can adduce to prove the guilt of the accused? H If no inquiry under Section 202 is to be conducted a SHIVJEE SINGH v. NAGENDRA TIWARY AND ORS. 691 [G.S. SINGHVI, J.] Magistrate who decides to proceed only on the averments A contained in the complaint filed by a public servant (who is not a witness to the core allegation) and such a case is committed to the Court of Session, its inevitable consequence would be that the Sessions Judge has to axe down the case at the stage of Section 226 itself as the B Public Prosecutor would then be helpless to state "by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of the accused". If the offence is of a serious nature or is of public importance the consequence then would be a miscarriage of justice." c Thomas, J. then referred to the recommendations made by the Law Commission in its 41st Report and held:

I ''Thus I have no doubt that the proviso incorporated in sub-section (2) of .Section 202 of the Code is not merely to o confer a discretion on the Magistrate, but a compelling duty on himJo perform in such cases. I wish to add that the Magist~e\in such a situation is not obliged to exami(1e witnesse~vyho could not be produced by the complainant when asked to produce such witnesses. Of course if the E complainant requires the help of the court to summon such witnesses it is open to the Magistrate to issue such summons, for, there is nothing in the Code which prevents the Magistrate from issuing such summons to the witnesses. F I reiterate that if the Magistrate omits to comply with the above requirement that would not, by itself, vitiate the proceedings. If no objection is taken at the earlier stage regarding such omission the court can consider how far such omission would have led to a miscarriage of justice, G when such objection is taken at a later stage. A decision on such belated objection can be taken by bearing in mind the principles adumbrated in Section 465 of the Code." (emphasis supplied) H 692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 7 S.C.R.

A 14. Although, Shah, J. and Thomas, J. appear to have expressed divergent views on the interpretation of proviso to Section 202(2) but there is no discord between them that non examination of all the witnesses by the complainant would not vitiate the proceedings. With a view to clarify legal position on B the subject, we deem it proper to observe that even though in terms of the proviso to Section 202(2). the Magistrate is required to direct the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath, failure or inability of the complainant or omission on his part to examine one or some of the C witnesses cited in the complaint or whose names are furnished in compliance of the direction issued by the Magistrate, will not preclude the latter fro[ll taking cognizance and issuing process or passing committal order if he is satisfied that there exists sufficient ground for doing so. Such an order passed by the Ma~iistrate cannot be nullified only on the ground of non-D compliance of proviso to Section 202(2).

15. In Birendra K. Singh v. State of Bihar (supra), the only question considered by this Court was whether non-compliance of Section 197 Cr.P.C. was fatal to the prosecution. While E holding that an objection regarding non-compliance of Section 197 can be raised only after the case is committed to the Court of Sessions, this Court observed that it was not made aware of the fact whether process was issued after complying with the provisions of Section 202. Therefore, that judgment cannot be F read as laying down a proposition of law on interpretation of proviso to Section 202(2). That apart, it is important to mention that in Abdul Wahab Ansari v. State of Bihar (2000) 8 SCC 500, a three-Judge Bench held that the decision in Birendra K. Singh's case does not lay down the correct law. G 16. As a sequel to the above discussions, we hold that examination of all the witnesses cited in the complaint or whose names are disclosed by the complainant in furtherance of the direction given by the Magistrate in terms of proviso to Section 202(2) is not a condition precedent for taking cognizance and H SHIVJEE SINGH v. NAGENDRA TIWARY AND ORS. 693 [G.S. SINGHVI, J.] issue of process against the persons named as accused in the A complaint and the High Court committed serious error in directing the Chief Judicial Magistrate to conduct further inquiry and pass fresh order in the light of proviso to Section 202(2).

17. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned B order is set aside. Since the matter is more than 12 years old, we direct the concerned Magistrate to pass appropriate order in terms of Section 209 within one month from the date of receipUproduction of copy of this order. We further direct that after committal of the case, the Sessions Judge to whom the matter is assigned shall conduct and complete the trial within C a period of 9 months. A copy of this order be forwarded to the Registrar General, Patna High Court, who shall place the same before Hon'ble the Chief Justice of that High Court. B.B.B. Appeal allowed.

[2010) 7 S.C.R. 667 SHIVJEE SINGH A V. NAGENDRA TIWARY AND ORS. (Criminal Appeal No. 1158 of 2010) JULY 6, 2010 B [G.S. SINGHVI AND ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, JJ.] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.202(2), proviso-Interpretation of - Whether examination of all witnesses cited in the complaint is sine qua non for taking cognizance by a C Magistrate in a case exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions - Held, No - Even though in terms of the proviso to s.202(2), the Magistrate is required to direct the. complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath, failure or inability of the complainant or omission on D his part to examine one or some of the witnesses cited in the complaint or whose names are furnished in compliance of the direction issued by the Magistrate, will not preclude the latter from taking cognizance and issuing process or passing committal order if he is satisfied that there exists sufficient E ground for doing so - Examination of all the witnesses cited in the complaint or whose names are disclosed by the complainant in furtherance of the direction given by the Magistrate in terms of proviso to s. 202(2) is not a· condition precedent for taking cognizance and issue of process against F the persons named as accused in the complaint -Consequence of such non-examination is to be considered at the trial and not at the stage of issuing process. Words and Phrases - "shall" - Meaning of - In context to proviso to s.202(2) CrPC. G

The appellant's son was said to have been killed by respondent nos.1 to 4. After conducting investigation, the police submitted final form with the finding that they had 667 H 668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 7 S.C.R. A no clue about the culprits. Thereupon, the appellant filed a protest petition, which, at the instance of the Judicial Magistrate, was converted into a complaint. The appellant examined himself and two out of the four witnesses cited in the protest petition-cum-8 complaint. After considering the statements of the appellant and the said two witnesses, the Judicial Magistrate took cognizance against respondent Nos.1 to 4 for offence under Section 302 read with Section 1208 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act and directed issue C of non-bailable warrants against them.

Respondents challenged the order of the Judicial Magistrate by filing petition under Section 482 CrPC. The High Court held that the Judicial Magistrate could not D have taken cognizance against the respondents without requiring the appellant to examine all the four witnesses named by him and remitted the matter to the concerned court for passing appropriate order after making further inquiry in the light of proviso to Section 202(Z) CrPC. E Before this Court, it was contended by the appellant that the proviso to s.20~(2) Cr.P.C. is not mandatory in character and the High Court committed serious error by remitting the matter to the Judicial Magistrate for further F enquiry only on the ground that all the witnesses named by the appellant had not been examined. The appellant contended that non-examination of two witnesses cited in the protest petition-cum-complaint did not preclude the Judicial Magistrate from taking cognizance against respondent nos.1 to 4 since he felt satisfied that a prima G facie case was made out against them. The question which thus arose for consideration in the present appeal was whether examination of all witnesses cited in the complaint is sine qua non for H SHIVJEE SINGH v. NAGENDRATIWARY AND ORS. 669 taking cognizance by a Magistrate in a case exclusively A triable by the Court of Sessions. Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD:1.1. By its very nomenclature, Cr.P.C. is a compendium of law relating to criminal procedure. The B provisions contained therein are required to be interpreted keeping in view the well recognized rule of construction that procedural prescriptions are meant for doing substantial justice. If violation of the procedural provision does not result in denial of fair hearing or C causes prejudice to the parties, the same has to be · treated as directory notwithstanding the use of word 'shall'. (Para 6] [676-D]

· 1.2. Chapter XIV of CrPC enumerates the conditions o· for initiation of proceedings. Chapters XV and XVI contain various procedural provisions which are required . to be followed by the Magistrate for taking cognizance, issuing of process/summons, dismissal of the complaint, supply of copies of documents and statements to the E accused and commitment of case to the Court of Sessions when the offence is triable exclusively by that · Court. An analysis of Sections 200, 202, 203, 204, 207, 208 · and 209 Cr.P.C. which form part of these Chapters shows that when a complaint is presented before a Magistrate, F he can, after examining the complainant and his witnesses on oath, take cognizance of an offence. This procedure is not required to be followed when a written complaint is made by a public servant, acting or purporting to act in discharge of his official duties or when a Court has made the complaint or if the Magistrate G makes over the case for inquiry/trial to another Magistrate under Section 192. Section 202(1) empowers the · Magistrate to postpone the issue of proces~ against the accused and either inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such H 670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 7 S.C.R.

A other person which he thinks fit for the purpose of deciding whether or not there exists sufficient ground for proceeding. By Amending Act No.25 of 2005, the postponement of the issue of process has been made mandatory where the accused is residing in an area beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the concerned8 Magistrate. Proviso to Section 202(1) lays down that direction for investigation shall not be made where it appears to the Magistrate that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions or where C the complaint has not been made by a Court unless the complainant and the witnesses have been examined on oath under Section 200. Under Section 202(2), the Magistrate making an inquiry under sub-section (1) can take evidence of the witnesses on oath. If the Magistrate thinks that the offence complained of is triable exclusively D by the Court of Sessions then in terms of proviso to Section 202, he is required to call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath [Paras 6, 7] [676-G-H; 681-G-H; 682-A-C] E 1.3. The object of examining the complainant and the witnesses is to ascertain the truth or falsehood of the complaint and determine whether there is a prima facle case against the person who, according to the complainant has committed an offence. If upon F examination of the complainant and/or witnesses, the Magistrate is prima facie satisfied that a case is made out against the person accused of committing an offence then he is required to issue process. Section 202 empowers the Magistrate to postpone the issue of G process and either inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or such other person as he may think fit for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. Under Section 203, the Magistrate can H

SHIVJEE SINGH v. NAGENDRA TIWARY AND ORS. 671 dismiss the complaint if, after taking into consideration A the statements of the complainant and his witnesses and the result of the inquiry/investigation, if any, done under Section 202, he is of the view that there does not exist sufficient ground for proceeding. On the other hand, Section 204 provides for issue of process if the Magistrate B is satisfied that there is sufficient ground for doing so. The expression "sufficient ground" used in Sections 203, 204 and 209 means the satisfaction that a prima facie case is made out against the person accused of committing an offence and not sufficient ground for the c purpose of conviction. [Para 8) [683-E-H; 684-A-B]

1.4. The use of the word 'shall' in proviso to Section 202(2) is prima facie indicative of mandatory character of the provision contained therein, but a close and critical analysis thereof along with other provisions contained in D Chapter XV and Sections 226 and 227 and Section 465 would clearly show that non-examination on oath of any or some of the witnesses cited by the complainant is, by itself, not sufficient to denude the concerned Magistrate of the jurisdic;tion to pass an ~order for taking cognizance E and issue of process provided he is satisfied that prima facie case is made out for doing so. Significantly the word 'all' appearing in proviso to Section 202(2) is qualified by the word 'his'. This implies that the complainant is not bound to examine all the witnesses named in the F complaint or whose names are disclosed in response to the order passed by the Magistrate. In other words, only those witnesses are required to be examined whom the complainant considers material to make out a prima facie case for issue of process. The choice being of the G complainant, he may choose not to examine other witnesses. Consequence of such non-examination is to be considered at the trial and not at the stage of issuing process when the Magistrate is not required to enter into H 672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 7 S.C.R.

A detailed discussions on the merits or demerits of the case, that is to say whether or not the allegations contained in the complaint, if proved, would ultimately end in conviction of the accused. He is only to see whether there exists sufficient ground for proceeding B against the accused. [Para 12] [685-H; 686-A-E]

1.5. Even though in terms of the proviso to Section 202(2), the Magistrate is required to direct the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine C them on oath, failure or inability of the complainant or omission on his part to examine one or some of the witnesses cited in the complaint or wh.ose names are furnished in compliance of the direction issued by the Magistrate, will not preclude the latter ,from taking cognizance and issuing process or passing committal D order if he is satisfied that there exists sufficient ground for doing so. Such an order passed by the Magistrate cannot be nullified only on the ground of non~ompliance of proviso to Section 202(2). [Para 14] [692-A-D] E 1.6. Examination of all the witnesses cited in the complaint or whose names are disclosed by the complainant in furtherance of the direction ·given, by the Magistrate in terms of proviso to Section 202(2) Iis not a condition precedent for taking cognizance and Issue of F process against the persons named as accused in the complaint. In the present case, the High Court committed serious error in directing the Judicial Magistrate to conduct further inquiry and pass fresh order in the light of proviso to Section 202(2). Since the matter is more than G 12 years old, the concerned Magistrate is directed to pass appropriate order in terms of Section 209. It is further directed that after committal of the case, the Sessions _ Judge, to whom the matter is assigned, shall conduct and complete the trial within a period of 9 months. [Paras 16 H and 17] [692-G-H; 693-A-C]

SHIVJEE SINGH v. NAGENDRA TIWARY AND ORS. 673 Birendra K. Singh v. State of Bihar (2000) 8 SCC 498, A held inapplicable. Rosy v. State of Kera/a (2000) 2 SCC 230, explained R.C. Ruia v. State of Bombay 1958 SCR 618; Vadi/a/ 8 Panchal v. Duftatraya Dulaji Ghadigaonkar (1961) 1 SCR 1; Chandra Deo Singh v. Prokash Chandra Bose (1964) 1 SCR 639; Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. State of West Bengal (1973) 3 . SCC 753; Kewal Krishan v. Suraj Bhan (1980) Supp SCC · 4$9; Mohinder Singh v. Gu/want Singh (1992) 2 SCC 213 and Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International Ltd. C (2008) 2 sec 492, relied on. I Ranjit Singh v. State of Pepsu AIR 1959 SC 843; Moideenkutty Haji v. Kunhikoya (1987) 1 KLT 635; M. Govindaraja Pillai v. Thangavelu Pillai 1983 Cri LJ 917 and o I Abdul Wahab Ansari v. State of Bihar (2000) 8 SCC 500, · referred to. . Case Law Reference: (2000) 2 sec 230 explained Para 5 E (2000) 8 sec 498 held inapplicable Para 5 1958 SCR 618 relied on Para 8 (1961) 1 SCR 1 relied on Para 8 F (1964) 1 SCR 639 relied on Para 8 (1973) 3 sec 753 relied on Para 8 (1980) Supp sec 499 relied on Para 8 G (1992) 2 sec 213 relied on Para 8 (2008) 2 sec 492 relied on Para 8 · AIR 1959 SC 843 referred to Para 13 H 674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 7 S.C.R. A (1987) 1 KLT 635 referred to Para 13 1983 Cri LJ 917 referred to Para 13 (2000) 8 sec 500 referred to Para 15 B CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION ; Criminal Appeal No. 1158 of 2010.

From the Judgment & Order dated 18.4.2007 of the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Crl. Misc. No. 1778 of 2007. C Gaurav Agrawal for the Appellant. Gopal Singh, Akhilesh Kumar Pandey, Sudarsh Saran, Shalini Chandra, Swati Chandra for the ResponderitSi. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by D G.S. SINGHVI, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. Whether examination of all witnesses cited in the complaint is sine qua non for taking cognizance by a Magistrate in a case exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions E is the question which arises for consideration in this appeal filed against order dated 18.4.2007 passed by the learned Single :Judge of Patna High Court in Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No.1778 of 2007 whereby he remitted the case to Chief Judicial Magistrate, Saran with the direction to make further inquiry and F pass appropriate order in the light of proviso to Section 202(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.). 3. The appellant's son, Ajay Kumar Singh is said to have been killed by respondent Nos.1 to 4 on 1 /2.1.1997. The G appellant lodged First Information Report on the same day at Police Station, lsuapur. After conducting investigation, the police submitted final form on 3.9.1998 with the finding that they had no clue about the culprits. Thereupon, the appellant filed a protest petition accusing the police of not conducting the H investigation properly due to political pressure and prayed that SHIVJEE SINGH v. NAGEr:.IDRA TIWARY AND ORS. 675

[G.S. SINGHVI, J.] thf? accused persons be summoned and punished. By an order A gated 3.9.2802, t~e learned Judicial Magistrate accepted the final form §ubmitted by the police but, at the same time, directed that the prot@§t petiti~ll !:>@ rt;i~ist~red as a separate complaint. He also c:llreeted t~e gprnpla.inant (appell;:iflt h@rein) to produce his witnesses. The app~ll~nt eX9rnin!?d himself and two out of B four witnesses cited in the i:in~test petition-cµrn"§Qmg!aint ·but gave up the remaining two witnesses because he thought that . they had been won over by the accused. After considering.the statements of the appellant and two witnesses, Chief Judicial Magistrate, Saran passed an ·order dated 13.12.2006 whereby c h~ tE>E>~ gogriizance against respondent Nos.1 .to 4 for offence Yflder ~~i::;tlq11 902 reaq with Section 1208 Indian Penal Code and ~~cti9n ~7 gf the Arms Act and directed issue of non bailable w;;irrants a~J<~inst them.

4. The respgnc:!ents Ghcillen~~d tne qrder of the Chief D Judicial Magistrate by filing ~ p,E!tition unqer Section 482 Cr.P.C. The learned Single Judge aGcepteq their contention . that the Chief Judicial Magistrate could not have taken cognizance against them without requiring the appellant to examine all the witnesses and remitted the matter to the E concerned court for passing appropriate order after making fYrther inquiry in the light of proviso to Section 202(2) Cr.P.C. !), ~hri gqyrnv Agrawal, learned counsel for the appellant argued that prgyj§g tg §ection 202(2) Cr.P.C. is not mandatory F in character and the High Court committed serious error by remitting the matter to the Chief Judicial Magistrate for further inquiry only on the ground that all the witnesses named by the • appellant had not been examined. Learned counsel further argued that non-examination of two witnesses cited in the G protest petition-cum-complaint did not preclude the Chief Judicial Magistrate from taking Gognizance against respondent Nos.1 to 4 because he felt satisfied that a prima facie case was made out against them. In support of his arguments, learned counsel relied upon the judgment of this Court in Rosy v. State H 676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 7 S.C.R.

A of Kera/a (2000) 2 SCC 230. Shri Gopal Singh, learned counsel for the respondents argued that proviso to Section 202(2) Cr.P._C. is mandatory and the Chief Judicial Magistrate committed a serious error in taking cognizance against respondent Nos.1 to 4 and issuing non-bailable warrants B against them without insisting on the examination of remaining two witnesses named in the complaint. He relied upon the observations made by Thomas, J. in Rosy v. State of Kera/a (supra) and the judgment in Birendra K. Singh v. State of Bihar (2000) 8 sec 498 in support of his submission that proviso to c S(~ction 202(2) Cr.P.C. is mandatory.

6. We have considered the respective submissions. By its very nomenclature, Cr.P.C. is a compendium of law relating to criminal procedure. The provisions contained therein are required to be interpreted keeping in view the well recognized D rule of construction that procedural prescriptions are meant for doing substantial justice. If violation of the procedural provision does not result in denial of fair hearing or causes prejudice to the parties, the same has to be treated as directory notwithstanding the use of word 'shall'. Chapter XIV of Cr.P .C. E enumerates conditions for initiation of proceedings. Under Section 190, which forms part of the scheme of that chapter, a Magistrate can take cognizance of any offence either pn receiving a complaint of facts which constitute an offence or a police report of such facts or upon receipt of information from F any person other than a police officer or upon his own knowledge, that such an offence has been committed. Chapters XV and XVI contain various procedural provisions which are required to be followed by the Magistrate for taking cognizance, issuing of process/summons, dismissal of the complaint, G sypply of copies of documents and statements to the accused and commitment of case to the Court of Sessions when the offence is triable exclusively by that Court. Sections 200, 202, 203, 204, 207, 208 and 209 Cr.P.C. which form part of these chapters and which have bearing on the question raised in this H appeal read as under:

SHIVJEE SINGH v. NAGENDRA TIWARY AND ORS. 677 [G.S. SINGHVI, J.] "200. Examination of complainant.- A Magistrate taking A cognizance of an offence on complaint shall examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, and the substance of such examination shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed by the complainant and the witnesses, and also by the Magistrate: B -- -Br.mtLded that, when the complaint is made in writing, the Magistrate-need not examine the complainant and the witnesses- (a) if a public servant acting or purporting to act in the C discharge of his official duties or a Court has made the complaint; or (b) if the Magistrate makes over the case for inquiry or trial to another Magistrate under section 192: D Provided further that if the Magistrate makes over the case ;to another Magistrate under section 192 after examining the complainant and the witnesses, the latter Magistrate need not re-examine them. E

202. Postponement of issue of process.-(1) Any Magistrate, on receipt of a complaint of an offence df which he is authorised to take cognizance or which has been made over to him under section 192, may, if he thinks fit, and shall, in a case where the accused is residing at a F place beyon'"' the area in which he exercises his jurisdiction postpone the issue of process against the accused, and either inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit, for the purpose of deciding G whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding: Provided that no such direction for investigation shall be made- (a) where it appears to the Magistrate that the offence H 678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS !2010] 7 S.C.R. A coltlplalned of Is triable exclusively by the Court of Sessiohsi ot {b) where tHe comptaitit has not been made by a Court, unless the complainant and the Witnesses present (if any) have been examined on oath-underB section 200. (2) In an inquiry under sub-section (1), the Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, take evidence of witness on oath: Provided that if it appears to the Magistrate that thec offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, he shall call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath.

(3) If an investigation under sub-section (1) is madeD by a person not being a police officer, he shall have for that investigation all the powers conferred by this Code on an officer in charge of a police station except the power to arrest without warrant. E 203. Dismissal of complaint.- If, after considering the statements on oath (if any) of the complainant and of the witnesses and the result of the inquiry or investigation (if any) under Section 202, the Magistrate is of opinion that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding, he shall F dismiss the complaint, and in every such case he shall record his reasons for so doing. 204. Issue of process.- (1) If in the opinion of a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence there is sufficient ground for proceeding, and the case appears to be-G (a) a summons-case, he shall issue his summons for the attendance of the accused, or (b) a warrant-case, he may issue a warrant, or, if he thinks H fit, a summons, for causing the accused to be brought or SHIVJEE SINGH v. NAGENDRA TiWARY AND ORS. 679 [G.S. SINGHVI, J,J to appear at a certain time before such Magistrate or (if A he has no jurisdictiotl hitnselO some other Magistrates having jurisdiction. (2) No surnmons ot warrant shall be issued against the accused under sub-section (1) until a list of the prosecution B witnesses has been filed.

(3) In a proceeding instituted upon a complaint made in writing, every summons or warrant issued under sub-. section (1) shall be accompanied by a copy of such complaint. c (4) When by any law for the time being in force any process-fees or other fees are payable, no process shall ,be issued until the fees are paid and, if such fees are not paid within a reasonable time, the Magistrate may dismiss D the complaint. (5) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the provisions of section 87. 207. Supply to the accused of copy of police report and E other documents. - In any case where the proceeding has been. instituted on a police report, the Magistrate shall without delay furnish to. the accused, free of cost, a copy of each of the following:- F (i) the police report; (ii) the first information report recorded under section 154; (iii) the statements recorded under sub-section (3) of section 161 of all persons whom the prosecution proposes G to examine as its witnesses, excluding there from any part in regard to which a request for such exclusion has been made by the police officer under sub-section (6) of section · 173; H 680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 7 S.C.R. A (iv) the confessions and statements, if any, recorded under section 164;

(v) any other document or relevant extract thereof forwarded to the Magistrate with the police report under sub-section (5) of section 173:B Provided that the Magistrate may, after perusing any such part of a statement as is referred to in clause (iii) and considering the reasons given by the police officer for the request, direct that a copy of that part of the statement or c of such portion thereof as the Magistrate thinks proper, shall be furnished to the accused: Provided further that if the Magistrate is satisfied that any document referred to in clause (v) is voluminous, he shall. instead of furnishing the accused with a copy thereof, directD that he will only be allowed to inspect it either personally or through pleader in Court. 208. Supply of copies of statements and documents to accused in other cases triable by Court of Session.-E Where, in a case instituted otherwise than on a police report, it appears to the Magistrate issuing process under section 204 that the offence is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, the Magistrate shall without delay furnish to the accused, free of cost, a copy of each of the F following:- (i) the statements recorded under section 200 or section 202, or all persons examined by the Magistrate; (ii) the statements and confessions, if any, recorded under G section 161 or section 164; (iii) any documents produced before the Magistrate on which the prosecution proposes to rely:

Provided that if the Magistrate is satisfied that any suchH SHIVJEE SINGH v. NAGENDRA TIWARY AND ORS. 681 [G.S. SINGHVI, J.] document is voluminous, he shall, instead of furnishing the A accused with a copy thereof, direct that he will only be allowed to inspect it either personally or through pleader in Court. 209. Commitment of case to Court of Session when 8 offence is triable exclusively by it.-When in a case instituted on a police report or otherWise, the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate and it appears to the Magistrate that the offence is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, he shall- c (a) commit, after complying with the provisions of section 207 or section 208, as the case may be, the case to the Court of Session, and subject to the provisions of this Code relating to bail, remand the accused to custody until such commitment has D been made; (b) subject to the provisions of this Code relating to bail, remand the accused to custody during, and until the conclusion of, the trial; E (c) send to that Court the record of the case and the documents and articles, if any, which are, to b~ . produced in evidence; (d) . notify the Public Prosecutor of the commitment of F the case to the Court of Session."

7. An analysis of the above reproduced provisions shows that when a complaint is presented before a Magistrate, he can, after examining the complainant and his witnesses on oath, take cognizance of an offence. This procedure is not required to be G followed when a written complaint is made by a public servant, acting or purporting to act in discharge of his official duties or when a Court has made the complaint or if the Magistrate makes over the case for inquiry/trial to another Magistrate under Section 192. Section 202(1) empowers the Magistrate to H 682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 7 S.C.R.

A postpone the issue of process against the accused and either inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person which he thinks fit for the purpose of deciding whether or not there exists sufficient ground for proceeding. By Amending Act No.25 of B 2005, the postponement of the issue of process has been made mandatory where the accused is residing in an area beyond the territorial jurisdictiori of the concerned Magistrate. Proviso to Section 202(1) lays down that direction for investigation shall not be made where it appears to the c Magistrate that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions or where the complaint has not been made by a Court unless the complainant and the witnesses have been examined on oath under Section 200. Under Section 202(2), the Magistrate making an inquiry under sub-section (1) can take evidence of the witnesses on oath. If the Magistrate0 thinks that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions then in terms of proviso to Section 202, he is required to call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath. Section 203 empowers E the Magistrate to dismiss the complaint if, after considering the statements made by the complainant and the witnesses on oath and the result of the inquiry or investigation, if any, made under Section 202(1 ), he is satisfied that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding. The exercise of this power is hedged with the condition that the Magistrate should record brief reasons for F dismissing the complaint. Section 204, which talks of issue of process lays down that if the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence is of the view that there is sufficient ground for proceeding then he may issue summons for attendance of the accused in a summons-case. If it is a warrant-case, then the G Magistrate can issue warrant for causing attendance of accused. Section 207 casts a duty on the Magistrate to supply to the accused, copies of the police report, the first information report recorded under Section 154, the statements recorded under Section 161 (3), the confessions and statements, if any, H recorded under Section 164 and any other document or SHIVJEE SINGH v. NAGENDRA TIWARY AND ORS. 683

[G.S. SINGHVI, J.] relevant extract thereof, which is forwarded to the Magistrate A along with polic~ report. Section 208 provides for supply of copies of statement and documents to accused in the cases triable by the Court of Sessions. It lays down that if the case, instituted otherwise t~an on a police report, is triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions, the Magistrate shall furnish to the B accused, free of cost, copies of the statements recorded under Section 200 or Section 202, statements and confessions recorded under Section 161 or Section 164 and any other document on which prosecution proposes to rely. Section 209 speaks of commitment of case to the Court of Sessions when c offence is triable exclusively by it. This section casts a duty on the Magistrate to commit the case to the Court of Sessions after complying with the provisions of Section 208. Once the case is committed, the trial is to be conducted by the Court of Sessions in accordance with the provisions contained in 0 Chapter XVIII.

8. The object of examining the complainant and the witnesses is to ascertain the truth or falsehood of the complaint . and determine whether there is a prima facie case against the = person who, according to the complainant has committed an E offence. If upon examination of the complainant and/or witnesses, the Magistrate is prima facie satisfied that a case is made out against the person accused of committing an offence then he is required to issue process. Section 202 empowers the Magistrate to postpone the issue of process and F either inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or such other person as he may think fit for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. Under Section 203, the Magistrate can dismiss the complaint if, after taking into G consideration the statements of the complainant and his witnesses and the result of the inquiry/investigation, if any, done under Section 202, he is of the view that there does not exist sufficient ground for proceeding. On the other hand, Section 204 provides for issue of process if the Magistrate is satisfied H 684 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 7 S.C.R.

A that there is sufficient ground for doing so. The expression "sufficient ground" used in Sections 203, 204 and 209 means the satisfaction that a prima facie case is made out against the person accused of committing an offence and not sufficient ground for the purpose of conviction. This interpretation of the B provisions contained in Chapters XV and XVI of Cr.P.C. finds adequate support from the judgments of this Court in R. C. Ruia v. State of Bombay, 1958 SCR 618, Vadilal Panchal v. Duttatraya Dulaji Ghadigaonkar (1961) 1 SCR 1, Chandra Deo Singh v. Prakash Chandra Bose (1964) 1 SCR 639, c Nirmaif it Singh Hoon v. State of West Bengal (1973) 3 SCC 753, Kewal Krishan v. Sura} Bhan (1980) Supp SCC 499, Mohinder Singh v. Gu/want Singh (1992) 2 SCC 213 and Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International Ltd. (2008) 2 sec 492. D 9. In Chandra Deo Singh v. Prakash Chandra Bose (supra), it was held that where there was prima facie evidence, the Magistrate was bound to issue process and even though the person charged of an offence in the complaint might have a defence, the matter has to be left to be decided by an E appropriate forum at an appropriate stage. It was further held that the issue of process can be refused only when the Magistrate finds that the evidence led by the complainant is self contradictory or intrinsically untrustworthy.

F 10. In Kewal Krishan v. Sura} Bhan (supra}, this Court examined the scheme of Sections 200 to 204 and held: "At the stage of Sections 203 and 204 of the Criminal Procedure Code in a case exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, all that the Magistrate has to do is to see G whether on a cursory perusal of the complaint and the evidence recorded during the preliminary inquiry under Sections 200 and 202 of the Criminal Procedure Code, there is prima facie evidence in support of the charge leveled against the accused. All that he has to see is H whether or not there is "sufficient ground for proceeding" SHIVJEE SINGH v. NAGENDRA TIWARY AND ORS. 685 [G.S. SINGHVI, J.] against the accused. At this stage, the Magistrate is not A to weigh the evidence meticulously as if he w~re the trial court. The standard to be adopted by the Magistrate in scrutinizing the evidence is not the same as the one which is to be kept in view at the stage of framing charges." B 11. The aforesaid view was reiterated in Mohinder Singh v. Gu/want Singh (supra) in the following words:

"The scope of enquiry under Section 202 is extremely restricted only to finding out the truth or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint in order to determine C whether process should issue or not under Section 204 of the Code or whether the complaint should be dismissed by resorting to Section 203 of the Code on the footing that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding on the basis of the statements of the complainant and of his witnesses, D if any. But the enquiry at that stage does not partake the character of a full dress trial which can only take place after process is issued under Section 204 of the Code calling upon the proposed accused to answer the accusation made against him for adjudging the guilt or otherwise of E the said accused person. Further, the question whether the evidence is adequate for supporting the conviction can be determined only at the trial and not at the stage of the enquiry contemplated under Section 202 of the Code. To say in other words, during the course of the enquiry under F Section 202 of the Code, the enquiry officer has to satisfy himself simply on the evidence adduced by the prosecution whether prima facie case has been made out so as to put the proposed accused on a regular trial and that no detailed enquiry is called for during the course of G such enquiry." (emphasis supplied) 12. The use of the word 'shall' in proviso to Section 202(2) is prima facie indicative of mandatory character of the provision H

686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 7 S.C.R.

A contained therein, but a close and critical analysis thereof along with other provisions contained in Chapter XV and Sections 226 and 227 and Section 465 would clearly show that non examination on oath of any or some of the witnesses cited by the complainant is, by itself, not sufficient to denude the B concerned Magistrate of the· jurisdiction to pass an order for taking cognizance and issue of process provided he is satisfied that prima facie case is made out for doing so. Here it is significant to note that the word 'all' appearing in proviso to Section 202(2) is qualified by the word 'his'. This implies that C the complainant is not bound to examine all the witnesses named in the complaint or whose names are disclosed in response to the order passed by the Magistrate. In other words, only those witnesses are required to be examined whom the complainant considers material to make out a prima facie case for issue of process. The choice being of the complainant, he0 may choose not to examine other witnesses. Consequence of such non-examination is to be considered at the trial and not at the stage of issuing process when the Magistrate is not required to enter into detailed discussions on the merits or , demerits of the case, that is to say whether or not the E allegations contained in the complaint, if proved, would ultimately end in conviction of the accused. He is only to see whether there exists sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

F 13. We may now refer to the judgment in Rosy v. State of Kera/a (supra) on which reliance has been placed by both the learned counsel. The factual matrix of that case reveals that the Excise Inspector filed a complaint before Judicial Magistrate, Thrissur for offences punishable under Section 57-A and 56(b) G of the Kerala Abkari Act. As the offences were exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the learned Magistrate committed the case to the Court of Sessions, Thrissur. After the prosecution examined witnesses, the accused were questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The public prosecutor H then filed an application for recalling two witnesses, who were SHIVJEE SINGH v. NAGENDRA TIWARY AND ORS. 687 [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

recalled and examined. Thereafter, further statements of the A accused under Section 313 were recorded. The accused examined four witnesses. At that stage, an argument was raised that the committal order was bad because the Magistrate did not follow the procedure prescribed in the proviso to Section 202(2). The learned Sessions Judge opined B that there was.breach of the mandatory provision but made a reference to the High Court under Section 395(2) because he found it difficult to decide the course to be adopted in the matter. The High Court held that the order of committal was vitiated due to violation of the mandate of proviso to Section 202(2). Before . c this Court, the issue was considered by a two-Judge Bench. M.B. Shah, J., referred to Sections 200 and 202, the judgment of this Court in Ranjit Singh v. State of Pepsu AIR 1959 SC 843 and held:

"Further, it is settled law that the inquiry under Section 202 D is of a limited nature. Firstly, to find out whether there is a prima facie case in issuing process against the person accused of the offence in the complaint and secondly, to prevent the issue of process in the complaint which is either false or vexatious or intended only to harass such a E person. At that stage, the evidence is not to be meticulously appreciated, as the limited purpose being of finding out "whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused". The standard to be adopted by the Magistrate in scrutinising the evidence is F also not the same as the one which is to be kept in view at the stage of framing charges. At the stage of inquiry under Section 202 CrPC the accused has no right to intervene and that it is the duty of the Magistrate while making an inquiry to elicit all facts not merely with view G a to protect the interests of an absent accused person, but also with a view to bring to book a person or persons against whom grave allegations are made." H 688 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 7 S.C.R. A Shah, J. then referred to the ratio of the judgment in Kewal Krishan v. Suraj Bhan (supra) and observed:

"In this view of the matter it is apparent that the High Court erred in holding that there was breach of the mandatory provisions of the proviso to Section 202(2) of the CodeB and the order of committal is vitiated and, therefore, requires to be set aside. The High Court failed to consider th~ proviso to Section 200, particularly proviso (a) to the said section and also the fact that inquiry under Section c 202 is discretionary for deciding whether to issue process (under Section 204) or to dismiss the complaint (under Section 203). Under Section 200, on receipt of the complaint, the Magistrate can take cognizance and issue process to the accused. If the case is exclusively triable by the Sessions Court, he is required to commit the case D to the Court of Session." Shah, J. also referred to the judgment of the Full Bench of Kerala High Court in Moideenkutty Haji v. Kunhikoya (1987) 1 KLT 635 and of Madras High Court in M. Govindaraja Pillai E v. Thangavelu Pillai 1983 Cri LJ 917, approved the ratio of the latter decision that Section 202 is an enabling provision and it is the discretion of the Magistrate depending upon the facts of each case, whether to issue process straightaway or to hold the inquiry and held:

F "We agree with the conclusion of the Madras High Court to the effect (sic extent) that Section 202 is an enabling provision and it is the discretion of the Magistrate depending upon the facts of each case, whether to issue process straight away or to hold the inquiry. However, in G case where inquiry is held, failure to comply with the statutory direction to examine all the witnesses would not vitiate further proceeding in all cases for the reasons that (a) in a complaint filed by a public servant acting or H SHIVJEE SINGH v. NAGENDRA TIWARY AND ORS. 689 [G.S. SINGHVI, J.] purporting to act in discharge of his official duties, the A question of holding inquiry may not arise, (b) whether to hold inquiry or not is the discretionary jurisdicticm of the Magistrate, 8 (c) even if he has decided to hold an inquiry it is his further discretion to examine the witnesses on oath. If he decides to examine witnesses on oath in a case triable exclusively by the Court of Session, he shall call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine tliem on oath, c (d) it would also depend upon the fa~ts of each case depending upon the prejudice caused to the accused by non-compliance with the said proviso (Section 465), and \ (e) that the objection witti regard to non-compliance with 0 the proviso should be taken at the earlier stage when the , charge is framed by the Sessions Court." (emphasis supplied)

K.T. Thomas, J. adopted a different approach regarding E interpretation of Section 202. He referred to the scheme of Chapters XIV, XV and XVI Cr.P.C. and observed: "Three categories of documents are mentioned in the aforesaid section the copies of which the Magistrate, who F proceeds from the stage in Section 204, has to supply to the accused free of cost (in a complaint case involving an offence triable exclusively by a Court of Session). As the words used here are "shall furnish", it is almost a compelling duty on the Magistrate to supply the said documents to the accused. How can the Magistrate supply G such documents? [In t·he present context the documents referred to in the third category mentioned in clause (iit) are not important.] The first category delineated in clause (1) of Section 208 consists of "statements recorded under Section 200 or Section 202, of all persons examined by H 690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 7 S.C.R. A the Magistrate". (emphasis supplied) It is now important to note that the words "if any" have been used in the second category of documents which is delineated in clause (i1) of Section 208, but those words a~ absent while delineating the first category. In my view those two B words have been thoughtfully avoided by Parliament in clause (1).

If a Magistrate is to comply with the aforesaid requirements in Section 208 of the Code (which he cannot obviate if the c language used in the sub-section is of any indication) what is the manner in which he can do it in a case where he failed to examine the witnesses before issuing process to the accused? The mere fact that the word "or" is employed in clause (1) of Section 208 is not to be understood as an indication that the Magistrate is given the freedom to D dispense with the inquiry if he has already examined the complainant under Section 200. A case can be visualised in which the complainant is the only eyewitness or in which all the eyewitnesses were also present when the complaint was filed and they were all examined as required in Section E 200. In such a case the complainant, when asked to produce all his witnesses under Section 202 of the Code, is at liberty to report to the Magistrate that he has no other witness than those who were already examined under Section 200 of the Code. When such types of cases are F borne in mind it is quite possible to grasp the utility of the word "or" which is employed in the first clause of Section 208 of the Code. So the intention is not to indicate that the inquiry is only optional in the cases mentioned in Section 208.

G If a case instituted on a complaint is committed to the Court of Session without complying with the requirements in clause (1) of Section 208 of the Code how is it possible for the Public Prosecutor to know in advance what evidence he can adduce to prove the guilt of the accused? H If no inquiry under Section 202 is to be conducted a SHIVJEE SINGH v. NAGENDRA TIWARY AND ORS. 691 [G.S. SINGHVI, J.] Magistrate who decides to proceed only on the averments A contained in the complaint filed by a public servant (who is not a witness to the core allegation) and such a case is committed to the Court of Session, its inevitable consequence would be that the Sessions Judge has to axe down the case at the stage of Section 226 itself as the B Public Prosecutor would then be helpless to state "by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of the accused". If the offence is of a serious nature or is of public importance the consequence then would be a miscarriage of justice." c Thomas, J. then referred to the recommendations made by the Law Commission in its 41st Report and held:

I ''Thus I have no doubt that the proviso incorporated in sub-section (2) of .Section 202 of the Code is not merely to o confer a discretion on the Magistrate, but a compelling duty on himJo perform in such cases. I wish to add that the Magist~e\in such a situation is not obliged to exami(1e witnesse~vyho could not be produced by the complainant when asked to produce such witnesses. Of course if the E complainant requires the help of the court to summon such witnesses it is open to the Magistrate to issue such summons, for, there is nothing in the Code which prevents the Magistrate from issuing such summons to the witnesses. F I reiterate that if the Magistrate omits to comply with the above requirement that would not, by itself, vitiate the proceedings. If no objection is taken at the earlier stage regarding such omission the court can consider how far such omission would have led to a miscarriage of justice, G when such objection is taken at a later stage. A decision on such belated objection can be taken by bearing in mind the principles adumbrated in Section 465 of the Code." (emphasis supplied) H 692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 7 S.C.R.

A 14. Although, Shah, J. and Thomas, J. appear to have expressed divergent views on the interpretation of proviso to Section 202(2) but there is no discord between them that non examination of all the witnesses by the complainant would not vitiate the proceedings. With a view to clarify legal position on B the subject, we deem it proper to observe that even though in terms of the proviso to Section 202(2). the Magistrate is required to direct the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath, failure or inability of the complainant or omission on his part to examine one or some of the C witnesses cited in the complaint or whose names are furnished in compliance of the direction issued by the Magistrate, will not preclude the latter fro[ll taking cognizance and issuing process or passing committal order if he is satisfied that there exists sufficient ground for doing so. Such an order passed by the Ma~iistrate cannot be nullified only on the ground of non-D compliance of proviso to Section 202(2).

15. In Birendra K. Singh v. State of Bihar (supra), the only question considered by this Court was whether non-compliance of Section 197 Cr.P.C. was fatal to the prosecution. While E holding that an objection regarding non-compliance of Section 197 can be raised only after the case is committed to the Court of Sessions, this Court observed that it was not made aware of the fact whether process was issued after complying with the provisions of Section 202. Therefore, that judgment cannot be F read as laying down a proposition of law on interpretation of proviso to Section 202(2). That apart, it is important to mention that in Abdul Wahab Ansari v. State of Bihar (2000) 8 SCC 500, a three-Judge Bench held that the decision in Birendra K. Singh's case does not lay down the correct law. G 16. As a sequel to the above discussions, we hold that examination of all the witnesses cited in the complaint or whose names are disclosed by the complainant in furtherance of the direction given by the Magistrate in terms of proviso to Section 202(2) is not a condition precedent for taking cognizance and H SHIVJEE SINGH v. NAGENDRA TIWARY AND ORS. 693 [G.S. SINGHVI, J.] issue of process against the persons named as accused in the A complaint and the High Court committed serious error in directing the Chief Judicial Magistrate to conduct further inquiry and pass fresh order in the light of proviso to Section 202(2).

17. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned B order is set aside. Since the matter is more than 12 years old, we direct the concerned Magistrate to pass appropriate order in terms of Section 209 within one month from the date of receipUproduction of copy of this order. We further direct that after committal of the case, the Sessions Judge to whom the matter is assigned shall conduct and complete the trial within C a period of 9 months. A copy of this order be forwarded to the Registrar General, Patna High Court, who shall place the same before Hon'ble the Chief Justice of that High Court. B.B.B. Appeal allowed.