CWP-222589-2026 (O&M) -1- IIN THE HIGH COURT OF PUUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGGARH 112 CWWP-22589-2026 (O&M) Datte of Decision: 27.07.2026 MUKESHH PRASAD ... Petitioner VS M/S BELLCO PHARMA AND ANOTHEER ... Respondents CORAMM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE KIIRTI SINGH Present: Mr. Kunal Bharati, Advocate for the petitioner. **** KIRTI SIINGH, J. (ORAL) 1. The instant petition has been filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitutiion of India for setting aside the impugned award dated 25.10.20023 (Annexurre P-1), passed by learned Induustrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Rohtak, wwhereby the claim settlement of tthe petitioner was dismissed. 2. The case of the petitioner beefore the Labour Court was that the petitionerr worked with the respondent-mmanagement from 01.01.2010 till 24.03.20220. He had been illegally termminated from service during the COVID-119 lockdown, without compliancce with the mandatory provisionss of the Industtrial Disputes Act, 1947. Aggrieeved therefrom, the petitioner aloong with otheer co-workers filed a complaaint before the Labour Inspecctor, Bahadurggarh, on 12.05.2020, wherein the management appeared anda meetings were held, but no satisfactoryy reply was given. Thereafter on 18/22.05.22020, the petitioner filed a deemand notice before the Assisttant Labour C ommissioner, Bahadurgarh, folloowed by a claim before the learnned SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.28 16:32

I attest to the accuracy andintegrity of this documentIndustrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, RRohtak. Upon appreciation of the CWP-222589-2026 (O&M) -2- evidence, the Labour Court accepted thee defence of the management anda declined tthe relief claimed by the petitiooner, giving rise to the present writw petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petiitioner submits the services of the petitionerr were illegally terminated dduring the COVID-19 lockdowwn, without c ompliance with the mandatory rrequirements of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. No noticce, retrenchment compensationn or opportuniity of hearing was afforded priorr to dispensing with his servicess. It is arguedd that the Labour Court has failed to properly appreciate the evidence on record and has erroneously aaccepted the management's pleaa of abandonmment, despite there being no material to establish a volunttary intention on the part of the petitionner to sever the relationship of employmeent. The findings recorded are stated to be perverse, warrantting interferennce by this Court. 4. Having heard learned counseel for the petitioner and perused the record, thhis Court finds no ground to interrfere with the impugned award.

5. At the outset, it deserves notiice that the present writ petition has been instiituted after an unexplained and substantial delay from the datee of the awardd. The petition is conspicuouslly silent as regards any sufficiient cause for not approaching this Court withhin a reasonable period. Trite to say that a litiigant invoking the discretionaryy and equitable jurisdiction unnder Articles 2226 and 227 of the Constituttion is expected to act with dued diligence.. In the absence of any satisfacctory explanation for the delay, the petitionerr cannot, as a matter of course, seeek re examination of an award thatt SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.28 16:32 has otherwwise attained finality. I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-222589-2026 (O&M) -3- 6. It is well settled that althhough no period of limitationn is prescribedd for invoking the writ jurisdicttion of this Court, delay and lacches remain a relevant, and in appropriate caases a decisive, factor guiding the exercise oof discretion under Articles 226 aand 227 of the Constitution. 7. In State of Madhya Pradessh v. Bhailal Bhai, AIR 1964 SC 1006, the Constitution Bench held that thhe period ordinarily prescribed foor a suit claimming similar relief furnishes a reasonable yardstick for assesssing delay in aa writ petition, absent a satisfactoory explanation.

8. In Karnataka Power Corpporation Ltd. v. K. Thangapppan, (2006) 4 SSCC 322, the Supreme Court heeld that the High Court may declline to invoke its extraordinary jurisdiction whhere there is negligence or omisssion on the paart of the applicant to assert his right, reiterating, with referencee to State of MM.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986)) 4 SCC 566, that a writ court doesd not ordinaarily assist the tardy, the indolentt, the acquiescent or the lethargicc. 9. In Tridip Kumar Dingal v. SState of West Bengal, (2009) 1 SCCS 768, it waas held that inordinate delay in approaching the writ court is goood ground foor refusing to exercise discretiionary jurisdiction, the underlyying object off the principle being to discourrage agitation of stale claims anda exhumatioon of matters already settled or in which the rights of third partties have accruued. 10. In Chennai Metropolitan WWater Supply & Sewerage Boardd v. T.T. Muraali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108, itt was held that a writ court, whhile bound to protect the rights of citizenss, is equally obliged to scrutinnise whether aa belated lis ought to be entertaained at all, since the law does not SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.28 16:32 permit a l itigant to sleep over his rights annd rise, as it were, like a phoenixx. I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-222589-2026 (O&M) -4-

11. More recently, in Mrinmoyy Maity v. Chhanda Koley, 20024 INSC 3144, the Supreme Court reiteratedd that an applicant who approacches the writ court belatedly, having slept oover his rights for a consideraable period, ouught not to be granted extraordinnary relief, and that where delay anda laches aree made out, the writ petition is li able to be dismissed on that grouund alone. 12. Applying the aforesaid prinnciples to the facts of the pressent case, the petitioner has neither pleadedd nor demonstrated any sufficiient cause forr the delay in assailing the awaard, nor has any explanation been prefered tthat would appeal to the consciennce of this Court. The award havving attained ffinality on account of this unexxplained delay, the writ petitionn is liable to ffail on this ground alone.

13. Even otherwise, no case for interference on merits is made out.o The Laboour Court recorded a categorical finding, on appreciation of the oralo and docummentary evidence, that the respoondent-management, being engagged in the maanufacture of essential goods, ccontinued its operations during the lockdownn and had repeatedly called upoon the petitioner to resume dutties through WWhatsApp messages and telephoonic communications, a fact whhich could not be contradicted by the petitioneer before the learned Labour Court, by way oof any cogent evidence. It furth er noticed material inconsistenccies between the petitioner's pleadings annd his testimony regarding the circumstaances under which he allegedly ffailed to report for work, besides his inability tto substantiate material assertioons regarding his appointment anda service. AAnother factor that weighed beforre the Court concerned was that the SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.28 16:32 petitionerr had not approached any authorrity concerned, including the labbour I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-222589-2026 (O&M) -5- inspector,, soon after 25.03.2020, whenn he was allegedly stopped frrom resuming his responsibilities by thee officials of the managemeent. Accordinggly, on a cumulative circumspeection of the facts of the case, the Labour CCourt concluded that the petitionner had voluntarily abandoned his employmeent, and that no case of illegal teermination stood established.

14. In the considered opinion of tthis Court, the findings recordedd by the Labouur Court are founded on evidennce. No perversity, patent illegallity, jurisdictioonal error or violation of the priinciples of natural justice has b een demonstraated which would warrant interrference in the limited supervissory jurisdictioon of this Court. 15. Needless to reiterate that thhis Court, while exercising powwers under Artticles 226 and 227 of the Consttitution, does not sit in appeal overo findings oof fact recorded by the Labour Court and cannot re-appreciate the evidence mmerely because another view maay also be possible. 16. For the foregoing reasons, tthe writ petition, being barred by delay andd laches and being also devoid off merit, is dismissed. 17. Pending application(s), if anyy, stand disposed of. (KIRTI SINGH) JUDGE 27.07.20226 SwarnjitS Whether sppeaking/reasoned : Yes/N/No Whether repportable : Yes/N/No SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.28 16:32 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document

CWP-222589-2026 (O&M) -1- IIN THE HIGH COURT OF PUUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGGARH 112 CWWP-22589-2026 (O&M) Datte of Decision: 27.07.2026 MUKESHH PRASAD ... Petitioner VS M/S BELLCO PHARMA AND ANOTHEER ... Respondents CORAMM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE KIIRTI SINGH Present: Mr. Kunal Bharati, Advocate for the petitioner. **** KIRTI SIINGH, J. (ORAL) 1. The instant petition has been filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitutiion of India for setting aside the impugned award dated 25.10.20023 (Annexurre P-1), passed by learned Induustrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Rohtak, wwhereby the claim settlement of tthe petitioner was dismissed. 2. The case of the petitioner beefore the Labour Court was that the petitionerr worked with the respondent-mmanagement from 01.01.2010 till 24.03.20220. He had been illegally termminated from service during the COVID-119 lockdown, without compliancce with the mandatory provisionss of the Industtrial Disputes Act, 1947. Aggrieeved therefrom, the petitioner aloong with otheer co-workers filed a complaaint before the Labour Inspecctor, Bahadurggarh, on 12.05.2020, wherein the management appeared anda meetings were held, but no satisfactoryy reply was given. Thereafter on 18/22.05.22020, the petitioner filed a deemand notice before the Assisttant Labour C ommissioner, Bahadurgarh, folloowed by a claim before the learnned SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.28 16:32

I attest to the accuracy andintegrity of this documentIndustrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, RRohtak. Upon appreciation of the CWP-222589-2026 (O&M) -2- evidence, the Labour Court accepted thee defence of the management anda declined tthe relief claimed by the petitiooner, giving rise to the present writw petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petiitioner submits the services of the petitionerr were illegally terminated dduring the COVID-19 lockdowwn, without c ompliance with the mandatory rrequirements of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. No noticce, retrenchment compensationn or opportuniity of hearing was afforded priorr to dispensing with his servicess. It is arguedd that the Labour Court has failed to properly appreciate the evidence on record and has erroneously aaccepted the management's pleaa of abandonmment, despite there being no material to establish a volunttary intention on the part of the petitionner to sever the relationship of employmeent. The findings recorded are stated to be perverse, warrantting interferennce by this Court. 4. Having heard learned counseel for the petitioner and perused the record, thhis Court finds no ground to interrfere with the impugned award.

5. At the outset, it deserves notiice that the present writ petition has been instiituted after an unexplained and substantial delay from the datee of the awardd. The petition is conspicuouslly silent as regards any sufficiient cause for not approaching this Court withhin a reasonable period. Trite to say that a litiigant invoking the discretionaryy and equitable jurisdiction unnder Articles 2226 and 227 of the Constituttion is expected to act with dued diligence.. In the absence of any satisfacctory explanation for the delay, the petitionerr cannot, as a matter of course, seeek re examination of an award thatt SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.28 16:32 has otherwwise attained finality. I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-222589-2026 (O&M) -3- 6. It is well settled that althhough no period of limitationn is prescribedd for invoking the writ jurisdicttion of this Court, delay and lacches remain a relevant, and in appropriate caases a decisive, factor guiding the exercise oof discretion under Articles 226 aand 227 of the Constitution. 7. In State of Madhya Pradessh v. Bhailal Bhai, AIR 1964 SC 1006, the Constitution Bench held that thhe period ordinarily prescribed foor a suit claimming similar relief furnishes a reasonable yardstick for assesssing delay in aa writ petition, absent a satisfactoory explanation.

8. In Karnataka Power Corpporation Ltd. v. K. Thangapppan, (2006) 4 SSCC 322, the Supreme Court heeld that the High Court may declline to invoke its extraordinary jurisdiction whhere there is negligence or omisssion on the paart of the applicant to assert his right, reiterating, with referencee to State of MM.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986)) 4 SCC 566, that a writ court doesd not ordinaarily assist the tardy, the indolentt, the acquiescent or the lethargicc. 9. In Tridip Kumar Dingal v. SState of West Bengal, (2009) 1 SCCS 768, it waas held that inordinate delay in approaching the writ court is goood ground foor refusing to exercise discretiionary jurisdiction, the underlyying object off the principle being to discourrage agitation of stale claims anda exhumatioon of matters already settled or in which the rights of third partties have accruued. 10. In Chennai Metropolitan WWater Supply & Sewerage Boardd v. T.T. Muraali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108, itt was held that a writ court, whhile bound to protect the rights of citizenss, is equally obliged to scrutinnise whether aa belated lis ought to be entertaained at all, since the law does not SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.28 16:32 permit a l itigant to sleep over his rights annd rise, as it were, like a phoenixx. I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-222589-2026 (O&M) -4-

11. More recently, in Mrinmoyy Maity v. Chhanda Koley, 20024 INSC 3144, the Supreme Court reiteratedd that an applicant who approacches the writ court belatedly, having slept oover his rights for a consideraable period, ouught not to be granted extraordinnary relief, and that where delay anda laches aree made out, the writ petition is li able to be dismissed on that grouund alone. 12. Applying the aforesaid prinnciples to the facts of the pressent case, the petitioner has neither pleadedd nor demonstrated any sufficiient cause forr the delay in assailing the awaard, nor has any explanation been prefered tthat would appeal to the consciennce of this Court. The award havving attained ffinality on account of this unexxplained delay, the writ petitionn is liable to ffail on this ground alone.

13. Even otherwise, no case for interference on merits is made out.o The Laboour Court recorded a categorical finding, on appreciation of the oralo and docummentary evidence, that the respoondent-management, being engagged in the maanufacture of essential goods, ccontinued its operations during the lockdownn and had repeatedly called upoon the petitioner to resume dutties through WWhatsApp messages and telephoonic communications, a fact whhich could not be contradicted by the petitioneer before the learned Labour Court, by way oof any cogent evidence. It furth er noticed material inconsistenccies between the petitioner's pleadings annd his testimony regarding the circumstaances under which he allegedly ffailed to report for work, besides his inability tto substantiate material assertioons regarding his appointment anda service. AAnother factor that weighed beforre the Court concerned was that the SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.28 16:32 petitionerr had not approached any authorrity concerned, including the labbour I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-222589-2026 (O&M) -5- inspector,, soon after 25.03.2020, whenn he was allegedly stopped frrom resuming his responsibilities by thee officials of the managemeent. Accordinggly, on a cumulative circumspeection of the facts of the case, the Labour CCourt concluded that the petitionner had voluntarily abandoned his employmeent, and that no case of illegal teermination stood established.

14. In the considered opinion of tthis Court, the findings recordedd by the Labouur Court are founded on evidennce. No perversity, patent illegallity, jurisdictioonal error or violation of the priinciples of natural justice has b een demonstraated which would warrant interrference in the limited supervissory jurisdictioon of this Court. 15. Needless to reiterate that thhis Court, while exercising powwers under Artticles 226 and 227 of the Consttitution, does not sit in appeal overo findings oof fact recorded by the Labour Court and cannot re-appreciate the evidence mmerely because another view maay also be possible. 16. For the foregoing reasons, tthe writ petition, being barred by delay andd laches and being also devoid off merit, is dismissed. 17. Pending application(s), if anyy, stand disposed of. (KIRTI SINGH) JUDGE 27.07.20226 SwarnjitS Whether sppeaking/reasoned : Yes/N/No Whether repportable : Yes/N/No SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.28 16:32 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document