- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:50236 CRL.P No. 110 of 2024 CNR: KAHC010003292024 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 15TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH RAI K CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 110 OF 2024 BETWEEN: SRI BASAVARAJU KALI S/O SHIVANNA KALI AGED ABOUT 28 YEARS R/O POLICE QUARTERS BEHIND OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE TUMAKURU-572 101 …PETITIONER (BY SRI. RAMESH K.R, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. STATE OF KARNATAKA Digitally signed by BY TUMAKURU WOMEN POLICE PANKAJA S TUMAKURU Location: HIGH BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTROCOURT OF KARNATAKA HIGH COURT BUILDINGS BENGALURU-560 001 2. MS SHRUTI KADAM D/O RAJKUMAR, AGE MAJOR R/O OM SAI LADIES P.G SARJAPUR MAIN ROAD KAIKONDARAHALLI, BENGALURU-560 035 …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. MAHESHA P, HCGP FOR R1, SRI. PRAVEEN KUMAR, ADVOCATE FOR SRI. D.S. MALIPATIL, ADVOCATE FOR R2) - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:50236 CRL.P No. 110 of 2024 CNR: KAHC010003292024 THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S.482 OF CR.P.C PRAYING TO QUASH THE IMPUGNED FIR REGISTERED AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN CR.NO.186/2023 OF TUMAKURU WOMEN POLICE STATION FOR THE OFFENCE P/ U/S 354, 417, 506 OF IPC AT ANNEXURE-A PENDING ON THE FILE OF II ADDITIONAL SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND J.M.F.C., TUMAKURU. THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH RAI K ORAL ORDER

This petition is filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings against the petitioner/accused in Crime No.186/2023 registered by Tumakuru Women Police Station, for the offences punishable under Sections 354, 417 and 506 of IPC, pending on the file of II Addl. Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Tumakuru. 2. The facts of the case, as borne out from the records, are that respondent No.2 lodged a complaint before respondent No.1-Police on 21.09.2023, alleging that when the petitioner was working as a Police Constable at Tumakuru, respondent No.2, being a native of the same place as the petitioner and working in TCS Software Company, was acquainted with the petitioner. Since she knew the petitioner, - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:50236 CRL.P No. 110 of 2024 CNR: KAHC010003292024 their acquaintance gradually developed into friendship, and respondent No.2 used to visit Tumakuru to meet him. In the course of time, they became intimate.

3. It is further alleged that the petitioner, on the promise of marrying respondent No.2, had sexual relations with her for a period of about four years. It is also alleged that they resided together for about four months in the Police Quarters at Tumakuru. Thereafter, when respondent No.2 insisted upon the petitioner marrying her, he kept postponing the marriage and eventually started avoiding her. Subsequently, when respondent No.2 came to know that the petitioner was making arrangements to marry another girl, she lodged the complaint before respondent No.1-Police. 4. Based on the said complaint, respondent No.1-Police registered FIR in Crime No.186/2023. Aggrieved by the registration of the said FIR, the petitioner is before this Court seeking quashing of the same. - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:50236 CRL.P No. 110 of 2024 CNR: KAHC010003292024 5. Heard the counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for respondent No.2 so also learned HCGP for respondent No.1.

6. The primary contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that, on a plain reading of the averments made in the complaint, respondent No.2 was admittedly aged 26 years at the relevant point of time and had voluntarily accompanied the petitioner without being under any misconception of fact. It is contended that the relationship between the parties was consensual and that they had been sexually intimate for a considerable period. In such circumstances, learned counsel submits that the essential ingredients of the alleged offence are not made out against the petitioner. Accordingly, he seeks to allow the petition and quash the proceedings. 7. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.2 opposed the prayer of the petitioner, contending that the petitioner has challenged the registration of the FIR at a stage when the investigation is still in progress. It is further contended that, despite being aware of his inability to marry - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:50236 CRL.P No. 110 of 2024 CNR: KAHC010003292024 respondent No.2, the petitioner continued to have sexual relations with her on the promise of marriage, thereby attracting the alleged offences. Learned counsel would also contend that the allegations involve disputed questions of fact, which require to be examined on the basis of the evidence to be collected during investigation and tested in a full-fledged trial. Accordingly, he seeks dismissal of the petition.

8. Learned HCGP also opposed the prayer contending that the petitioner being a Police Constable, ought not have indulged in such kind of heinous offences. Accordingly, he prays to dismiss the petition. 9. I have given my anxious consideration on the submissions of the respective parties and perused the documents placed on record. 10. As could be gathered from the records, admittedly, respondent No.2 was a major, aged about 26 years, at the relevant point of time. On perusal of the averments made in the complaint, she has categorically stated that the petitioner was a native of Bijapur District and that, as they were already - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:50236 CRL.P No. 110 of 2024 CNR: KAHC010003292024 acquainted with each other, their acquaintance gradually developed into close friendship and thereafter into a love relationship. It is further alleged that they had sexual relations for a considerable period of time. According to respondent No.2, initially, the petitioner had promised to marry her; however, subsequently, he started avoiding her.

11. It is also relevant to take note of the documents produced by learned counsel for the petitioner. The said documents disclose that respondent No.2 had earlier lodged a similar complaint against one Mahesh on 14.01.2020, alleging that he was acquainted with her, that they had sexual relations and that he had promised to marry her, but subsequently failed to do so. It is further borne out from the said documents that the parties thereafter entered into a compromise, pursuant to which Mahesh paid a sum of Rs.2,50,000/- to respondent No.2. In such circumstances, it could be gathered that respondent No.2 has indulged in similar kind of activities. 12. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shiva Prathap Singh Rana V/s State of Madhya Pradesh and - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:50236 CRL.P No. 110 of 2024 CNR: KAHC010003292024 Another reported in (2024) 8 SCC 313 in paragraph Nos.26 to 33 has held as under:

“26. We have carefully gone through the definition of “rape” provided under Section 375 IPC. We have also gone through the provisions of Section 376(2)(n) IPC, which deals with the offence of rape committed repeatedly on the same woman. Section 375 IPC defines “rape” by a man if he does any of the acts in terms of clauses (a) to (d) under the seven descriptions mentioned therein. As per the second description, a man commits rape if he does any of the acts as mentioned in clauses (a) to (d) without the consent of the woman. Consent has been defined in Explanation 2 to mean an unequivocal voluntary agreement when the woman by words, gestures or any form of verbal or nonverbal communication, communicates willingness to participate in the specific sexual act. However, the proviso thereto clarifies that a woman who does not physically resist to the act of penetration shall not by the reason only of that fact, be regarded as consenting to the sexual activity. 27. Having regard to the above and in the overall conspectus of the case, we are of the view that the physical relationship between the prosecutrix and the appellant cannot be said to be against her will and without her consent. On the basis of the available materials, no case of rape or of criminal intimidation is made out. - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:50236 CRL.P No. 110 of 2024 CNR: KAHC010003292024

28. The learned counsel for the respondents had placed considerable reliance on the provisions of Section 90IPC, particularly on the expression “under a misconception of fact”. Section 90IPC reads thus: “90. Consent known to be given under fear or misconception.—A consent is not such a consent as it intended by any section of this Code, if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception; or Consent of insane person.—if the consent is given by a person who, from unsoundness of mind, or intoxication, is unable to understand the nature and consequence of that to which he gives his consent; or Consent of child.—unless the contrary appears from the context, if the consent is given by a person who is under twelve years of age.” 29. Section 90 IPC says that a consent is not such a consent as it is intended by any section of IPC, if the consent is given by a person under the fear of injury or under a misconception of fact. 30. In Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra [Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 18 SCC 191 : - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:50236 CRL.P No. 110 of 2024 CNR: KAHC010003292024

(2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 672] , this Court after examining Section 90IPC held as follows : (SCC p. 198, para 17) “17. Thus, Section 90 though does not define “consent”, but describes what is not “consent”. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit. If the consent is given by the complainant under misconception of fact, it is vitiated. Consent for the purpose of Section 375 requires voluntary participation not only after the exercise of intelligence based on the knowledge of the significance and moral quality of the act, but also after having fully exercised the choice between resistance and assent. Whether there was any consent or not is to be ascertained only on a careful study of all relevant circumstances.” 31. This Court also examined the interplay between Section 375IPC and Section 90IPC in the context of consent in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra [Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 903] , and held that consent with respect to Section 375IPC involves an active understanding of the circumstances, actions and consequences of the proposed act. An individual who makes a reasoned choice to act after evaluating various alternative actions (or inaction) as well as the various possible consequences flowing from such action (or inaction), consents to such action. After deliberating upon the various case laws, this Court summed up the legal position as under :

(SCC p. 620, para 18) - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:50236 CRL.P No. 110 of 2024 CNR: KAHC010003292024 “18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act.” 32. The learned counsel for the respondents had relied heavily on the expression “misconception of fact”. However, according to us, there is no misconception of fact here. Right from the inception, it is the case of the prosecution that while the appellant was insisting on having a relationship with the prosecutrix, the later had turned down the same on the ground that the appellant was the friend of her younger brother and a distant relative of her jijaji. That apart, according to the prosecutrix, the appellant was younger to her. Nonetheless, the prosecutrix had accompanied the appellant to a temple, where she had voluntarily taken bath under a waterfall. Her allegation that the appellant had - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:50236 CRL.P No. 110 of 2024

CNR: KAHC010003292024 surreptitiously taken photographs of her while she was bathing and later on changing clothes and was blackmailing her with such photographs remain unfounded in the absence of seizure of such photographs or the mobile phone on which such photographs were taken by the appellant. If, indeed, she was under some kind of threat from the appellant, it defies any logic, when the prosecutrix accompanied the appellant to Gwalior from Dabra, a journey which they had made together by train. On reaching Gwalior, she accompanied the appellant on a scooter to a rented premises at Anupam Nagar, where she alleged that the appellant had forced himself upon her. But she did not raise any alarm or hue and cry at any point of time. Rather, she returned back to Dabra along with the appellant. The relationship did not terminate there. It continued even thereafter. It is the case of the prosecutrix herself that at one point of time the family members of the two had met to discuss about their marriage but nothing final could be reached regarding their marriage. It was only thereafter that the FIR was lodged.

33. As already pointed out above, neither the affidavit nor stamp papers have been recovered or seized by the police; so also the jewellery. The alleged cheque of the prosecutrix's mother given to the appellant or the bank statement to indicate transfer of such money have not been gathered by the police. In the absence of such materials, the entire substratum of the prosecutrix's case collapses. Thus, there is hardly any possibility of conviction of the appellant. As a matter of fact, it is not even a - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:50236 CRL.P No. 110 of 2024 CNR: KAHC010003292024 case which can stand trial. It appears to be a case of a consensual relationship which had gone sour leading to lodging of FIR. In the circumstances, the Court is of the view that compelling the appellant to face the criminal trial on these materials would be nothing but an abuse of the process of the court, result of the trial being a foregone conclusion.”

13. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Deepak Gulati vs. State of Haryana reported in 2013 Crl. Law Journal 2990, has held in para Nos.18 and 21 as under: “18. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly, understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:50236 CRL.P No. 110 of 2024 CNR: KAHC010003292024

on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of mis-representation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives. 21. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time, i.e. at initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The “failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term misconception of fact, the fact must have an immediate relevance.” Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her.” - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:50236

CRL.P No. 110 of 2024 CNR: KAHC010003292024 14. Collocating the above findings of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the above judgments to the facts and circumstances of the case, in my considered view, even if the entire allegations in the complaint are taken on its face value, no such offences under Sections 354, 417, 506 of IPC attracts against the petitioner. As such, continuation of proceedings against the petitioner is abuse of process of law. Accordingly, I proceed to pass the following: ORDER i. The petition is allowed. ii. The proceedings against the petitioner/accused in Crime No.186/2023 registered by Tumakuru Women Police Station, for the offence punishable under Sections 354, 417 and 506 of IPC, pending on the file of II Addl. Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Tumakuru, are hereby quashed. SD/- (RAJESH RAI K) JUDGE HKV List No.: 1 Sl No.: 17

- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:50236 CRL.P No. 110 of 2024 CNR: KAHC010003292024 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 15TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH RAI K CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 110 OF 2024 BETWEEN: SRI BASAVARAJU KALI S/O SHIVANNA KALI AGED ABOUT 28 YEARS R/O POLICE QUARTERS BEHIND OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE TUMAKURU-572 101 …PETITIONER (BY SRI. RAMESH K.R, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. STATE OF KARNATAKA Digitally signed by BY TUMAKURU WOMEN POLICE PANKAJA S TUMAKURU Location: HIGH BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTROCOURT OF KARNATAKA HIGH COURT BUILDINGS BENGALURU-560 001 2. MS SHRUTI KADAM D/O RAJKUMAR, AGE MAJOR R/O OM SAI LADIES P.G SARJAPUR MAIN ROAD KAIKONDARAHALLI, BENGALURU-560 035 …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. MAHESHA P, HCGP FOR R1, SRI. PRAVEEN KUMAR, ADVOCATE FOR SRI. D.S. MALIPATIL, ADVOCATE FOR R2) - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:50236 CRL.P No. 110 of 2024 CNR: KAHC010003292024 THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S.482 OF CR.P.C PRAYING TO QUASH THE IMPUGNED FIR REGISTERED AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN CR.NO.186/2023 OF TUMAKURU WOMEN POLICE STATION FOR THE OFFENCE P/ U/S 354, 417, 506 OF IPC AT ANNEXURE-A PENDING ON THE FILE OF II ADDITIONAL SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND J.M.F.C., TUMAKURU. THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH RAI K ORAL ORDER

This petition is filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings against the petitioner/accused in Crime No.186/2023 registered by Tumakuru Women Police Station, for the offences punishable under Sections 354, 417 and 506 of IPC, pending on the file of II Addl. Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Tumakuru. 2. The facts of the case, as borne out from the records, are that respondent No.2 lodged a complaint before respondent No.1-Police on 21.09.2023, alleging that when the petitioner was working as a Police Constable at Tumakuru, respondent No.2, being a native of the same place as the petitioner and working in TCS Software Company, was acquainted with the petitioner. Since she knew the petitioner, - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:50236 CRL.P No. 110 of 2024 CNR: KAHC010003292024 their acquaintance gradually developed into friendship, and respondent No.2 used to visit Tumakuru to meet him. In the course of time, they became intimate.

3. It is further alleged that the petitioner, on the promise of marrying respondent No.2, had sexual relations with her for a period of about four years. It is also alleged that they resided together for about four months in the Police Quarters at Tumakuru. Thereafter, when respondent No.2 insisted upon the petitioner marrying her, he kept postponing the marriage and eventually started avoiding her. Subsequently, when respondent No.2 came to know that the petitioner was making arrangements to marry another girl, she lodged the complaint before respondent No.1-Police. 4. Based on the said complaint, respondent No.1-Police registered FIR in Crime No.186/2023. Aggrieved by the registration of the said FIR, the petitioner is before this Court seeking quashing of the same. - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:50236 CRL.P No. 110 of 2024 CNR: KAHC010003292024 5. Heard the counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for respondent No.2 so also learned HCGP for respondent No.1.

6. The primary contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that, on a plain reading of the averments made in the complaint, respondent No.2 was admittedly aged 26 years at the relevant point of time and had voluntarily accompanied the petitioner without being under any misconception of fact. It is contended that the relationship between the parties was consensual and that they had been sexually intimate for a considerable period. In such circumstances, learned counsel submits that the essential ingredients of the alleged offence are not made out against the petitioner. Accordingly, he seeks to allow the petition and quash the proceedings. 7. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.2 opposed the prayer of the petitioner, contending that the petitioner has challenged the registration of the FIR at a stage when the investigation is still in progress. It is further contended that, despite being aware of his inability to marry - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:50236 CRL.P No. 110 of 2024 CNR: KAHC010003292024 respondent No.2, the petitioner continued to have sexual relations with her on the promise of marriage, thereby attracting the alleged offences. Learned counsel would also contend that the allegations involve disputed questions of fact, which require to be examined on the basis of the evidence to be collected during investigation and tested in a full-fledged trial. Accordingly, he seeks dismissal of the petition.

8. Learned HCGP also opposed the prayer contending that the petitioner being a Police Constable, ought not have indulged in such kind of heinous offences. Accordingly, he prays to dismiss the petition. 9. I have given my anxious consideration on the submissions of the respective parties and perused the documents placed on record. 10. As could be gathered from the records, admittedly, respondent No.2 was a major, aged about 26 years, at the relevant point of time. On perusal of the averments made in the complaint, she has categorically stated that the petitioner was a native of Bijapur District and that, as they were already - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:50236 CRL.P No. 110 of 2024 CNR: KAHC010003292024 acquainted with each other, their acquaintance gradually developed into close friendship and thereafter into a love relationship. It is further alleged that they had sexual relations for a considerable period of time. According to respondent No.2, initially, the petitioner had promised to marry her; however, subsequently, he started avoiding her.

11. It is also relevant to take note of the documents produced by learned counsel for the petitioner. The said documents disclose that respondent No.2 had earlier lodged a similar complaint against one Mahesh on 14.01.2020, alleging that he was acquainted with her, that they had sexual relations and that he had promised to marry her, but subsequently failed to do so. It is further borne out from the said documents that the parties thereafter entered into a compromise, pursuant to which Mahesh paid a sum of Rs.2,50,000/- to respondent No.2. In such circumstances, it could be gathered that respondent No.2 has indulged in similar kind of activities. 12. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shiva Prathap Singh Rana V/s State of Madhya Pradesh and - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:50236 CRL.P No. 110 of 2024 CNR: KAHC010003292024 Another reported in (2024) 8 SCC 313 in paragraph Nos.26 to 33 has held as under:

“26. We have carefully gone through the definition of “rape” provided under Section 375 IPC. We have also gone through the provisions of Section 376(2)(n) IPC, which deals with the offence of rape committed repeatedly on the same woman. Section 375 IPC defines “rape” by a man if he does any of the acts in terms of clauses (a) to (d) under the seven descriptions mentioned therein. As per the second description, a man commits rape if he does any of the acts as mentioned in clauses (a) to (d) without the consent of the woman. Consent has been defined in Explanation 2 to mean an unequivocal voluntary agreement when the woman by words, gestures or any form of verbal or nonverbal communication, communicates willingness to participate in the specific sexual act. However, the proviso thereto clarifies that a woman who does not physically resist to the act of penetration shall not by the reason only of that fact, be regarded as consenting to the sexual activity. 27. Having regard to the above and in the overall conspectus of the case, we are of the view that the physical relationship between the prosecutrix and the appellant cannot be said to be against her will and without her consent. On the basis of the available materials, no case of rape or of criminal intimidation is made out. - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:50236 CRL.P No. 110 of 2024 CNR: KAHC010003292024

28. The learned counsel for the respondents had placed considerable reliance on the provisions of Section 90IPC, particularly on the expression “under a misconception of fact”. Section 90IPC reads thus: “90. Consent known to be given under fear or misconception.—A consent is not such a consent as it intended by any section of this Code, if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception; or Consent of insane person.—if the consent is given by a person who, from unsoundness of mind, or intoxication, is unable to understand the nature and consequence of that to which he gives his consent; or Consent of child.—unless the contrary appears from the context, if the consent is given by a person who is under twelve years of age.” 29. Section 90 IPC says that a consent is not such a consent as it is intended by any section of IPC, if the consent is given by a person under the fear of injury or under a misconception of fact. 30. In Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra [Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 18 SCC 191 : - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:50236 CRL.P No. 110 of 2024 CNR: KAHC010003292024

(2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 672] , this Court after examining Section 90IPC held as follows : (SCC p. 198, para 17) “17. Thus, Section 90 though does not define “consent”, but describes what is not “consent”. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit. If the consent is given by the complainant under misconception of fact, it is vitiated. Consent for the purpose of Section 375 requires voluntary participation not only after the exercise of intelligence based on the knowledge of the significance and moral quality of the act, but also after having fully exercised the choice between resistance and assent. Whether there was any consent or not is to be ascertained only on a careful study of all relevant circumstances.” 31. This Court also examined the interplay between Section 375IPC and Section 90IPC in the context of consent in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra [Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 903] , and held that consent with respect to Section 375IPC involves an active understanding of the circumstances, actions and consequences of the proposed act. An individual who makes a reasoned choice to act after evaluating various alternative actions (or inaction) as well as the various possible consequences flowing from such action (or inaction), consents to such action. After deliberating upon the various case laws, this Court summed up the legal position as under :

(SCC p. 620, para 18) - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:50236 CRL.P No. 110 of 2024 CNR: KAHC010003292024 “18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act.” 32. The learned counsel for the respondents had relied heavily on the expression “misconception of fact”. However, according to us, there is no misconception of fact here. Right from the inception, it is the case of the prosecution that while the appellant was insisting on having a relationship with the prosecutrix, the later had turned down the same on the ground that the appellant was the friend of her younger brother and a distant relative of her jijaji. That apart, according to the prosecutrix, the appellant was younger to her. Nonetheless, the prosecutrix had accompanied the appellant to a temple, where she had voluntarily taken bath under a waterfall. Her allegation that the appellant had - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:50236 CRL.P No. 110 of 2024

CNR: KAHC010003292024 surreptitiously taken photographs of her while she was bathing and later on changing clothes and was blackmailing her with such photographs remain unfounded in the absence of seizure of such photographs or the mobile phone on which such photographs were taken by the appellant. If, indeed, she was under some kind of threat from the appellant, it defies any logic, when the prosecutrix accompanied the appellant to Gwalior from Dabra, a journey which they had made together by train. On reaching Gwalior, she accompanied the appellant on a scooter to a rented premises at Anupam Nagar, where she alleged that the appellant had forced himself upon her. But she did not raise any alarm or hue and cry at any point of time. Rather, she returned back to Dabra along with the appellant. The relationship did not terminate there. It continued even thereafter. It is the case of the prosecutrix herself that at one point of time the family members of the two had met to discuss about their marriage but nothing final could be reached regarding their marriage. It was only thereafter that the FIR was lodged.

33. As already pointed out above, neither the affidavit nor stamp papers have been recovered or seized by the police; so also the jewellery. The alleged cheque of the prosecutrix's mother given to the appellant or the bank statement to indicate transfer of such money have not been gathered by the police. In the absence of such materials, the entire substratum of the prosecutrix's case collapses. Thus, there is hardly any possibility of conviction of the appellant. As a matter of fact, it is not even a - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:50236 CRL.P No. 110 of 2024 CNR: KAHC010003292024 case which can stand trial. It appears to be a case of a consensual relationship which had gone sour leading to lodging of FIR. In the circumstances, the Court is of the view that compelling the appellant to face the criminal trial on these materials would be nothing but an abuse of the process of the court, result of the trial being a foregone conclusion.”

13. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Deepak Gulati vs. State of Haryana reported in 2013 Crl. Law Journal 2990, has held in para Nos.18 and 21 as under: “18. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly, understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:50236 CRL.P No. 110 of 2024 CNR: KAHC010003292024

on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of mis-representation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives. 21. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time, i.e. at initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The “failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term misconception of fact, the fact must have an immediate relevance.” Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her.” - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:50236

CRL.P No. 110 of 2024 CNR: KAHC010003292024 14. Collocating the above findings of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the above judgments to the facts and circumstances of the case, in my considered view, even if the entire allegations in the complaint are taken on its face value, no such offences under Sections 354, 417, 506 of IPC attracts against the petitioner. As such, continuation of proceedings against the petitioner is abuse of process of law. Accordingly, I proceed to pass the following: ORDER i. The petition is allowed. ii. The proceedings against the petitioner/accused in Crime No.186/2023 registered by Tumakuru Women Police Station, for the offence punishable under Sections 354, 417 and 506 of IPC, pending on the file of II Addl. Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Tumakuru, are hereby quashed. SD/- (RAJESH RAI K) JUDGE HKV List No.: 1 Sl No.: 17