2026:HHC:37622 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP(M) No. 1447 of 2026 Reserved on: 31.08.2026 Decided on: 07.09.2026 Sohan Singh …. Petitioner Versus State of HP …. Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioner : Mr Rakesh Kumar, Legal Aid Counsel. For the Respondent/State : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition seeking regular bail in FIR No. 106 of 2025 dated 05.12.2025 registered at Police Station Kihar, District Chamba, H.P. for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 69, 351(2), 352 and 238 (b) of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023. 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:37622

2. It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the victim had obtained a divorce from her husband. She came in contact with the petitioner, who represented that he was unmarried and promised to marry the informant. They entered into a sexual relationship. The informant asked the petitioner to marry her, and he revealed that he was already married. He promised to keep the informant as his second wife and continued the relationship for about 10 years. The petitioner left without informing anyone and switched off his mobile phone. The informant somehow contacted the petitioner, but the petitioner abused and threatened her. Hence, the informant reported the matter to the police. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. The allegations against the petitioner are false. The police have completed the investigation, and the petitioner's custodial interrogation is not required. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. The allegations in the FIR, even if accepted to be correct, do not constitute the commission of any offence. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the victim had taken a divorce from her husband. She 3 2026:HHC:37622

came in contact with the petitioner. The petitioner promised to marry her and entered into a sexual relationship with her. The informant asked the petitioner to marry her, and he revealed that he was already married. The petitioner promised to keep her as his second wife and continued the relationship. The petitioner switched off the mobile phone about 1 month before reporting the matter to the police. The informant contacted the petitioner, but the petitioner abused and threatened her. The informant reported the matter to the police. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. The victim was medically examined, and no injuries were found on her person. However, the possibility of sexual violence could not be ruled out. The police collected the samples and sent them to RFSL, but no semen or blood was found in them, and no DNA profile was conducted. The charge sheet was filed before the Court on 29.01.2026. The prosecution has cited 22 witnesses, out of whom one witness has been examined. The allegations against the petitioner are heinous, and he would intimidate the witnesses upon his release on bail. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 4 2026:HHC:37622 4. I have heard Mr Rakesh Kumar, learned Legal Aid counsel for the petitioner and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/state.

5. Mr Rakesh Kumar, learned Legal Aid counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. As per the averments in the FIR, the informant knew about the petitioner’s marriage and was aware of the petitioner’s inability to marry her. The allegations in the FIR do not show that the relationship between the parties was based upon a falsehood. The victim was major and capable of consenting. The police have filed the charge sheet before the Court, and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 6. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the allegations against the petitioner are heinous. The material witnesses are yet to be examined, and the petitioner would influence the witnesses in case 5 2026:HHC:37622 of his release on bail. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380: (i) Broad principles for the grant of bail

56. In Gudikantis Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9) “7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.] 9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on 6 2026:HHC:37622

bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, based on evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied) 57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)

“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied)

58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3) “3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of 7 2026:HHC:37622 any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While the placement of the accused in society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied)

59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail. 60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9) “9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are:

(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; 8 2026:HHC:37622 (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied) xxxxxxx 62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35)

“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis supplied) 9 2026:HHC:37622 9. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v. Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308: 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC 261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests otherwise. It was observed at page 308:

2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative. 3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and must weigh with us when considering the question of jail. So also, the heinousness of the crime….” 10. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 11. The allegations in the FIR show that the victim was aware of the fact that the petitioner was married and could not have married her. Thus, the very premises of the FIR that she was allured to marry and the petitioner entered into a sexual relationship with the petitioner based on such allurement is prima facie not acceptable. 10 2026:HHC:37622 12. It is undisputed that the police have filed the charge sheet before the Court. Therefore, no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody.

13. The status report shows that the police have cited 22 witnesses out of whom the statement of only one witness has been recorded. The matter is listed for recording the statements of witnesses on 07.10.2026 and 14.08.2026. Thus, it is apparent that the learned Trial Court has not even summoned all the prosecution witnesses, which supports the submission made on behalf of the petitioner that the trial is not likely to conclude soon. 14. The petitioner asserted that he is a permanent resident of District Tarn Taran, Punjab. This was not stated to be incorrect in the status report filed by the police. Therefore, the petitioner has roots in the society, and there is no likelihood of his absconding. 15. It was submitted that the petitioner would abscond and intimidate the witnesses in case of his release on bail. This apprehension is not sufficient to deny bail to the petitioner as it can be removed by imposing the conditions. 16. In view of the above, the present petition is allowed, and the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail, subject to his 11 2026:HHC:37622 furnishing bail bonds in the sum of ₹1,00,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court. While on bail, the petitioner will abide by the following conditions: - (I) The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses, nor will he influence any evidence in any manner whatsoever.

(II) The petitioner shall attend the trial on each and every hearing and will not seek unnecessary adjournments. (III) The petitioner will not leave the present address for a continuous period of seven days without furnishing the address of the intended visit to the SHO concerned, the Police Station concerned and the Trial Court. (IV) The petitioner will surrender his passport, if any, to the Court; and (V) The petitioner will furnish his mobile number and social media contact to the Police and the Court and will abide by the summons/notices received from the Police/Court through SMS/WhatsApp/Social Media Account. In case of any change in the mobile number or social media accounts, the same will be intimated to the Police/Court within five days from the date of the change. 17. It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of any of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to file a petition for cancellation of the bail. 18. The petition stands accordingly disposed of. A copy of this order be sent to the Jail Superintendent, District-cum-Open Air Jail, Chamba and the learned Trial Court by FASTER. 12 2026:HHC:37622 19. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 7th September, 2026 (Nikita) Digitally signed by CHANDER CHANDER SHEKHAR SHEKHAR Date: 2026.09.07 12:46:49 +0000

2026:HHC:37622 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP(M) No. 1447 of 2026 Reserved on: 31.08.2026 Decided on: 07.09.2026 Sohan Singh …. Petitioner Versus State of HP …. Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioner : Mr Rakesh Kumar, Legal Aid Counsel. For the Respondent/State : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition seeking regular bail in FIR No. 106 of 2025 dated 05.12.2025 registered at Police Station Kihar, District Chamba, H.P. for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 69, 351(2), 352 and 238 (b) of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023. 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:37622

2. It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the victim had obtained a divorce from her husband. She came in contact with the petitioner, who represented that he was unmarried and promised to marry the informant. They entered into a sexual relationship. The informant asked the petitioner to marry her, and he revealed that he was already married. He promised to keep the informant as his second wife and continued the relationship for about 10 years. The petitioner left without informing anyone and switched off his mobile phone. The informant somehow contacted the petitioner, but the petitioner abused and threatened her. Hence, the informant reported the matter to the police. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. The allegations against the petitioner are false. The police have completed the investigation, and the petitioner's custodial interrogation is not required. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. The allegations in the FIR, even if accepted to be correct, do not constitute the commission of any offence. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the victim had taken a divorce from her husband. She 3 2026:HHC:37622

came in contact with the petitioner. The petitioner promised to marry her and entered into a sexual relationship with her. The informant asked the petitioner to marry her, and he revealed that he was already married. The petitioner promised to keep her as his second wife and continued the relationship. The petitioner switched off the mobile phone about 1 month before reporting the matter to the police. The informant contacted the petitioner, but the petitioner abused and threatened her. The informant reported the matter to the police. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. The victim was medically examined, and no injuries were found on her person. However, the possibility of sexual violence could not be ruled out. The police collected the samples and sent them to RFSL, but no semen or blood was found in them, and no DNA profile was conducted. The charge sheet was filed before the Court on 29.01.2026. The prosecution has cited 22 witnesses, out of whom one witness has been examined. The allegations against the petitioner are heinous, and he would intimidate the witnesses upon his release on bail. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 4 2026:HHC:37622 4. I have heard Mr Rakesh Kumar, learned Legal Aid counsel for the petitioner and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/state.

5. Mr Rakesh Kumar, learned Legal Aid counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. As per the averments in the FIR, the informant knew about the petitioner’s marriage and was aware of the petitioner’s inability to marry her. The allegations in the FIR do not show that the relationship between the parties was based upon a falsehood. The victim was major and capable of consenting. The police have filed the charge sheet before the Court, and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 6. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the allegations against the petitioner are heinous. The material witnesses are yet to be examined, and the petitioner would influence the witnesses in case 5 2026:HHC:37622 of his release on bail. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380: (i) Broad principles for the grant of bail

56. In Gudikantis Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9) “7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.] 9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on 6 2026:HHC:37622

bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, based on evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied) 57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)

“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied)

58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3) “3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of 7 2026:HHC:37622 any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While the placement of the accused in society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied)

59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail. 60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9) “9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are:

(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; 8 2026:HHC:37622 (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied) xxxxxxx 62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35)

“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis supplied) 9 2026:HHC:37622 9. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v. Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308: 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC 261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests otherwise. It was observed at page 308:

2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative. 3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and must weigh with us when considering the question of jail. So also, the heinousness of the crime….” 10. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 11. The allegations in the FIR show that the victim was aware of the fact that the petitioner was married and could not have married her. Thus, the very premises of the FIR that she was allured to marry and the petitioner entered into a sexual relationship with the petitioner based on such allurement is prima facie not acceptable. 10 2026:HHC:37622 12. It is undisputed that the police have filed the charge sheet before the Court. Therefore, no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody.

13. The status report shows that the police have cited 22 witnesses out of whom the statement of only one witness has been recorded. The matter is listed for recording the statements of witnesses on 07.10.2026 and 14.08.2026. Thus, it is apparent that the learned Trial Court has not even summoned all the prosecution witnesses, which supports the submission made on behalf of the petitioner that the trial is not likely to conclude soon. 14. The petitioner asserted that he is a permanent resident of District Tarn Taran, Punjab. This was not stated to be incorrect in the status report filed by the police. Therefore, the petitioner has roots in the society, and there is no likelihood of his absconding. 15. It was submitted that the petitioner would abscond and intimidate the witnesses in case of his release on bail. This apprehension is not sufficient to deny bail to the petitioner as it can be removed by imposing the conditions. 16. In view of the above, the present petition is allowed, and the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail, subject to his 11 2026:HHC:37622 furnishing bail bonds in the sum of ₹1,00,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court. While on bail, the petitioner will abide by the following conditions: - (I) The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses, nor will he influence any evidence in any manner whatsoever.

(II) The petitioner shall attend the trial on each and every hearing and will not seek unnecessary adjournments. (III) The petitioner will not leave the present address for a continuous period of seven days without furnishing the address of the intended visit to the SHO concerned, the Police Station concerned and the Trial Court. (IV) The petitioner will surrender his passport, if any, to the Court; and (V) The petitioner will furnish his mobile number and social media contact to the Police and the Court and will abide by the summons/notices received from the Police/Court through SMS/WhatsApp/Social Media Account. In case of any change in the mobile number or social media accounts, the same will be intimated to the Police/Court within five days from the date of the change. 17. It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of any of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to file a petition for cancellation of the bail. 18. The petition stands accordingly disposed of. A copy of this order be sent to the Jail Superintendent, District-cum-Open Air Jail, Chamba and the learned Trial Court by FASTER. 12 2026:HHC:37622 19. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 7th September, 2026 (Nikita) Digitally signed by CHANDER CHANDER SHEKHAR SHEKHAR Date: 2026.09.07 12:46:49 +0000