2026:HHC:27593 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 341 of 2026 Reserved on: 26.05.2026 Date of Decision 08 .07.2026 Ashish Sharma ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. & another ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? No. For the petitioner : In person. For the respondent : Mr Jitender K. Sharma, Additional Advocate General, for respondent No.1. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for setting aside the order dated 20.12.2025, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge (CBI Court), Shimla, District Shimla, H.P. (learned revisional Court), vide which the order dated 16.04.2025, passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-II, Shimla, District Shimla, H.P. (learned Trial Court) was upheld. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to _____________________________ 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:27593 in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned trial Court for convenience)

2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the complainant filed a complaint before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 406, 420, 463, 468-471, etc. of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It has been asserted that the accused is employed in Dayanand Public School, The Mall, Shimla, H.P. She was involved in unfair recruitment to the post of PGT (IP) in the year 2018. The complainant brought this fact to the notice of higher authorities. However, they did not take any action against the accused; rather, they suspended the complainant vide letter dated 07.12.2019. A list of witnesses was provided to the complainant, which contained the name of Shalni Sharma as witness No.11, but no document signed by her was placed in the memorandum dated 02.01.2020. An inquiry was conducted, but Shalini Sharma was not cross-examined; therefore, the inquiry is not proper as is understood in law. The complainant was removed from his services on 7.12.2021. The accused issued an experience certificate 3 2026:HHC:27593 mentioning, ‘suspension and removal from service after holding a proper inquiry’. This is a false recital because no proper inquiry was conducted. A fake document was created to harass and defame the complainant; hence, the complaint was filed to take action as per the law.

3. The learned Trial Court held that the complainant should have complied with the provisions of Section 154 (1) and 154 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) before filing the complaint as per the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Priyanka Srivastava vs State of UP Cr.A. no. 781 of 2012, but he had failed to do so; hence, the complaint was dismissed. 4. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Trial Court, the complainant filed a revision, which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (CBI Court). Shimla, District Shimla (learned revisional Court). The learned revisional Court held that the complainant was removed from service after a disciplinary inquiry. The allegations made in the complaint are to be adjudicated by the competent authority examining the validity of the enquiry and not by the Criminal Court. The Criminal Court 4 2026:HHC:27593 cannot sit over the findings of the departmental proceedings. Learned Trial Court had dismissed the complaint after affording a proper opportunity to the complainant. Therefore, the revision preferred by the complainant was dismissed.

5. Being aggrieved by the orders passed by the learned Courts below, the complainant has filed the present petition asserting that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material placed on record. The accused had created a fake experience certificate, containing false information. The document was created to harass and defame the complainant’s reputation. Therefore, it was prayed that the orders passed by the learned Courts below be set aside and the action be taken against the accused. 6. I have heard the petitioner, who appeared in person. 7. The petitioner submitted that Ms Shalini Sharma was mentioned as a witness in the memorandum, but she was not cross-examined. An inquiry conducted without examining all the witnesses is not a proper inquiry. A fake experience certificate was issued, mentioning that a proper 5 2026:HHC:27593 inquiry was conducted. Learned Courts below failed to properly appreciate the material placed before them; hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the orders passed by learned Courts below be set aside. 8. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

9. The complainant filed the complaint on the assumption that Ms Shalini Sharma was not examined, and the inquiry was not proper. Learned Revisional Court had rightly held that the remedy of the complainant was to approach a proper forum to set aside the inquiry report submitted by an Inquiry Officer, and a criminal Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by an Inquiry Officer. 10. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Kerala v. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth, (1996) 1 SCC 435, that a decision rendered between the parties cannot be said to be non-existent, and such an order has to be avoided by challenging it in a higher forum. It was observed: - 6 2026:HHC:27593

7….In our opinion, even a void order or decision rendered between parties cannot be said to be non-existent in all cases and in all situations. Ordinarily, such an order will, in fact, be effective inter partes until it is successfully avoided or challenged in a higher forum. Mere use of the word ‘void’ is not determinative of its legal impact. The word ‘void’ has a relative rather than an absolute meaning. It only conveys the idea that the order is invalid or illegal. It can be avoided. There are degrees of invalidity depending upon the gravity of the infirmity, as to whether it is, fundamental or otherwise and in this case, the only complaint about the initiation of the suo motu proceedings by the Board was, that it was not initiated on intimation by the State Land Board about the non-filing of the statement as required by Section 85(7) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. In our opinion, this is not a case where the infirmity is fundamental. It is unnecessary to consider the matter further.

8. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., (Re-issue) Vol. 1(1) in para 26, p. 31, it is stated, thus: “If an act or decision, or an order or other instrument is invalid, it should, in principle, be null and void for all purposes; and it has been said that there are no degrees of nullity. Even though such an act is wrong and lacking in jurisdiction, however, it subsists and remains fully effective unless and until it is set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction. Until its validity is challenged, its legality is preserved.” In the Judicial Review of Administrative Action, De Smith, Woolf and Jowell, 1995 Edn., at pp. 259-60, the law is stated thus: “The erosion of the distinction between jurisdictional errors and non-jurisdictional errors has, as we have seen, correspondingly eroded the distinction between 7 2026:HHC:27593 void and voidable decisions. The courts have become increasingly impatient with the distinction, to the extent that the situation today can be summarised as follows: (1) All official decisions are presumed to be valid until set aside or otherwise held to be invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction.” Similarly, Wade and Forsyth in Administrative Law, Seventh Edn., 1994, have stated the law thus at pp. 341-342:

“… every unlawful administrative act, however invalid, is merely voidable. But this is no more than the truism that in most situations the only way to resist unlawful action is by recourse to the law. In a well-known passage, Lord Radcliffe said: ‘An order, even if not made in good faith, is still an act capable of legal consequences. It bears no brand of invalidity upon its forehead. Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders.’ This must be equally true even where the brand of invalidity is plainly visible: for there also the order can effectively be resisted in law only by obtaining the decision of the court. The necessity of recourse to the court has been pointed out repeatedly in the House of Lords and Privy Council without distinction between patent and latent defects.” The above statement of the law supports our view that the order of the Board dated 28-6-1977, declining to implead Respondents 3 and 4 (which stood confirmed in revision), concludes the matter against Respondents 3 and 4.” 8 2026:HHC:27593 11. This position was reiterated in Nagar Parishad, Ratnagiri v. Gangaram Narayan Ambekar, (2020) 7 SCC 275, wherein it was observed: -

“16. Arguendo, the plaint as filed by Respondents 1 to 19 also suffers from another fundamental deficiency. Indeed, it is a cleverly drafted plaint, so as to give an impression that the competent authority had not taken any decision in exercise of statutory powers until the filing of the suit. However, in the written statement, a clear assertion has been made by the defendants (appellant and Respondent 20) that the decision to allot suit land to the appellant and for setting up the Project was taken after due deliberation and consultation with the Expert Committee, including the exercise of statutory powers of the authority concerned in that regard. None of these decisions of the competent authority has been assailed by the plaintiffs, nor has any declaratory relief been sought in that regard. In such a case, it would not be enough to ask for a permanent injunction simpliciter, and the suit so filed ought to have been rejected at the threshold on that count alone. We may usefully advert to the exposition of this Court in Kandla Port v. Hargovind Jasraj [Kandla Port v. Hargovind Jasraj, (2013) 3 SCC 182: (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 1]. In paras 26 to 31, the Court observed thus: (SCC pp. 193-95)

“26. Mr Ahmadi next argued that the termination of the lease being illegal and non est in law, the respondent-plaintiffs could ignore the same, and so long as they or any one of them remained in possession, a decree for injunction restraining the Port Trust from interfering with their possession could be passed by the court competent to do so. We are not impressed by that submission. 9 2026:HHC:27593 27. The termination of the lease deed was by an order which the plaintiffs ought to get rid of by having the same set aside, or declared invalid for whatever reasons; it may be permissible to do so. No order bears a label of its being valid or invalid on its forehead. Anyone affected by any such order ought to seek redress against the same within the period permissible for doing so. We may, in this regard, refer to the following oft-quoted passage in Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council [Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council, 1956 AC 736: (1956) 2 WLR 888 (HL)]. The following are the observations regarding the necessity of recourse to the Court for establishing the invalidity of an order established:

‘… An order, even if not made in good faith, is still an act capable of legal consequences. It bears no brand of invalidity on its forehead. Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders.’ [Smith case [Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council, 1956 AC 736: (1956) 2 WLR 888 (HL)], AC pp. 769-70] This must be equally true even where the brand of invalidity is plainly visible: for there also the order can effectively be resisted in law only by obtaining the decision of the court. The necessity of recourse to the court has been pointed out repeatedly in the House of Lords and Privy Council without distinction between patent and latent defects. [Ed.: Wade and Forsyth in Administrative Law, 7th Edn., 1994.] 28. The above case was approved by this Court in Krishnadevi Malchand Kamathia v. Bombay Environmental Action Group [Krishnadevi Malchand Kamathia v. Bombay Environmental Action Group, 10 2026:HHC:27593 (2011) 3 SCC 363], wherein this Court observed: (SCC pp. 369-70, para 19)

‘19. Thus, from the above, it emerges that even if the order/notification is void/voidable, the party aggrieved by the same cannot decide that the said order/notification is not binding upon it. It has to approach the court for seeking such a declaration. The order may be hypothetically a nullity, and even if its invalidity is challenged before the court in a given circumstance, the court may refuse to quash the same on various grounds, including the standing of the petitioner, on the ground of delay or on the doctrine of waiver or any other legal reason. The order may be void for one purpose or for one person, it may not be so for another purpose or another person.’ 29. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Pune Municipal Corpn. v. State of Maharashtra [Pune Municipal Corpn. v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 5 SCC 211] wherein this Court discussed the need for determination of invalidity of an order for public purposes : (SCC pp. 225-26, paras 36 & 38-39) ‘36. It is well settled that no order can be ignored altogether unless a finding is recorded that it was illegal, void or not in consonance with law. As Prof. Wade states: “The principle must be equally true even where the 'brand of invalidity' is plainly visible: for there also the order can effectively be resisted in law only by obtaining the decision of the court.” [H.W.R. Wade, Administrative Law (6th Edn., Clarendon Press, Oxford 1988) 352]. He further states: 11 2026:HHC:27593

“The truth of the matter is that the court will invalidate an order only if the right remedy is sought by the right person in the right proceedings and circumstances. The order may be hypothetically a nullity, but the court may refuse to quash it because of the plaintiff's lack of standing, because he does not deserve a discretionary remedy, because he has waived his rights, or for some other legal reason. In any such case, the “void” order remains effective and is, in reality, valid. It follows that an order may be void for one purpose and valid for another; and that it may be void against one person but valid against another.” [H.W.R. Wade, Administrative Law (6th Edn., Clarendon Press, Oxford 1988) 352-53] *** 38. A similar question came up for consideration before this Court in State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh [State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh, (1991) 4 SCC 1: 1991 SCC (L&S) 1082]. … 39. Setting aside the decree passed by all the courts and referring to several cases, this Court held that if the party aggrieved by the invalidity of the order intends to approach the court for a declaration that the order against him was inoperative, he must come before the court within the period prescribed by limitation. “If the statutory time of limitation expires, the court cannot give the declaration sought for.” ’

30. Reference may also be made to the decisions of this Court in R. Thiruvirkolam v. Labour Court [R. Thiruvirkolam v. Labour Court, (1997) 1 SCC 9: 1997 SCC (L&S) 65], State of Kerala v. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth [State of Kerala v. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth, (1996) 1 SCC 435] and Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla v. Hind 12 2026:HHC:27593 Rubber Industries (P) Ltd. [Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla v. Hind Rubber Industries (P) Ltd., (1997) 3 SCC 443], where this Court has held that an order will remain effective and lead to legal consequences unless the same is declared to be invalid by a competent court.” 12. Therefore, the order of the removal passed by the competent authority is valid unless set aside. In the present case, the order has not been set aside by the competent authority and the very basis of the complaint that the inquiry was fake because Shalini Sharma was not cross-examined is legally incorrect; hence, the complaint filed by the complainant that a certificate containing a wrong mention of the proper inquiry is a forged document created to cheat and harm the complainant’s reputation is also without any basis.

13. Learned Trial Court had rightly held that the complainant was required to file a complaint before the Station House Officer of the Police Station before approaching the Court. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ranjit Singh Bath Vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh, 2025 SCC OnLine 1479 that Section 154(1) requires that the information regarding the commission of a cognizable offence has to be furnished to an officer in charge of the Police Station. When the complaint was not made to 13 2026:HHC:27593 the officer in charge of the Police Station but to some other officer, there is no compliance with Section 154(1), and it is not permissible for him to approach the learned Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC. It was observed: 7. The requirement of sub-Section (1) of Section 154 is that information regarding the commission of a cognizable offence has to be furnished to an officer Incharge of a Police Station. In this case, obviously, the said compliance was not made. It is stated that the Inspector General of Police forwarded a complaint to the Economic Offences Wing. Sub-Section (3) of Section 154 comes into picture only when, after a complaint is submitted to the Officer In-Charge of Police Station or information is provided to the Officer In-Charge of Police Station regarding the commission of a cognizable offence, the Officer In-Charge refuses or neglects to register a First Information Report.

8. Sub-Sections (1) and (3) of Section 154 of the CrPC are the two remedies available for setting the criminal law in motion. Therefore, this Court held that before a complainant chooses to adopt a remedy under Section 156(3) of the CrPC, he must exhaust his remedies under sub-Sections (1) and (3) of Section 154 of the CrPC, and he must make those averments in the complaint and produce the documents in support. However, in this case, the second respondent did not exhaust the remedies. In this view of the matter, we find that both the learned Magistrate and the High Court have completely ignored the binding decision of this Court in the case of Priyanka Srivastava (2015) 6 SCC 287. 14 2026:HHC:27593 9. We, therefore, quash and set aside both the impugned orders and quash and set aside all the further steps taken on the basis of the order dated 14th June, 2017, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate. 14. It was submitted that the judgment of Priyanka Srivastava (supra) does not apply to the present case because the complaint was filed under Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023. This submission is only stated to be rejected. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Om Prakash Ambadkar v. State of Maharashtra, (2026) 2 SCC 622: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 238 that the requirements of Priyanka Srivastava (supra) have been codified under BNSS. It was observed at page 637:

34. A comparison of Section 175(3) BNSS with Section 156(3) CrPC indicates three prominent changes that have been introduced by the enactment of BNSS as follows: (a) First, the requirement of making an application to the Superintendent of Police upon refusal by the officer in charge of a police station to lodge the FIR has been made mandatory, and the applicant making an application under Section 175(3) is required to furnish a copy of the application made to the Superintendent of Police under Section 173(4), supported by an affidavit, while making the application to the Magistrate under Section 175(3). (b) Secondly, the Magistrate has been empowered to conduct such an enquiry as he deems necessary before making an order directing registration of FIR. 15 2026:HHC:27593 (c) Thirdly, the Magistrate is required to consider the submissions of the officer in charge of the police station as regards the refusal to register an FIR before issuing any directions under Section 175(3).

35. The introduction of these changes by the legislature can be attributed to the judicial evolution of Section 156CrPC undertaken by a number of decisions of this Court. In Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P. [Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P., (2015) 6 SCC 287: (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 294: (2015) 4 SCC (Cri) 153], this Court held that prior to making an application to the Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC, the applicant must necessarily make applications under Sections 154(1) and 154(3). It was further observed by the Court that applications made under Section 156(3) CrPC must necessarily be supported by an affidavit sworn by the applicant. The reason given by the Court for introducing such a requirement was that applications under Section 156(3) CrPC were being made in a routine manner and in a number of cases only with a view to causing harassment to the accused by registration of FIR. 36. It was further observed in Priyanka Srivastava [Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P., (2015) 6 SCC 287: (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 294: (2015) 4 SCC (Cri) 153] that the requirement of supporting the complaint with an affidavit would ensure that the person making the application is conscious and also to see that no false affidavit is made. Once an affidavit is found to be false, the applicant would be liable for prosecution in accordance with the law. This would deter him from casually invoking the authority of the Magistrate under Section 156(3).

37. The relevant observations made by the Court are reproduced hereinbelow: (Priyanka Srivastava case [Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P., (2015) 6 SCC 287: (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 294: (2015) 4 SCC (Cri) 153], SCC pp. 305-306, paras 27-31) 16 2026:HHC:27593 “27. Regard being had to the aforesaid enunciation of law, it needs to be reiterated that the learned Magistrate has to remain vigilant with regard to the allegations made and the nature of the allegations and not to issue directions without proper application of mind. He has also to bear in mind that sending the matter would be conducive to justice, and then he may pass the requisite order. The present is a case where the accused persons are serving in high positions in the Bank. We are absolutely conscious that the position does not matter, for nobody is above the law. But the learned Magistrate should take note of the allegations in entirety, the date of the incident and whether any cognizable case is remotely made out. It is also to be noted that when a borrower of the financial institution covered under the SARFAESI Act invokes the jurisdiction under Section 156(3) CrPC, and also there is a separate procedure under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, an attitude of more care, caution, and circumspection has to be adhered to.

28. Issuing a direction stating “as per the application” to lodge an FIR creates a very unhealthy situation in society and also reflects the erroneous approach of the learned Magistrate. It also encourages unscrupulous and unprincipled litigants, like Respondent 3, namely, Prakash Kumar Bajaj, to take adventurous steps with courts to bring the financial institutions to their knees. As the factual exposition would reveal, Respondent 3 had prosecuted the earlier authorities, and after the matter is dealt with by the High Court in a writ petition recording a settlement, he does not withdraw the criminal case and wait for some kind of situation where he can take vengeance as if he is the emperor of all he surveys. It is interesting to note that during the tenure of Appellant 1, who is presently occupying the position of Vice-President, neither was the loan taken nor was the default made, nor was any action under the 17 2026:HHC:27593

SARFAESI Act taken. However, the action under the SARFAESI Act was taken on the second time at the instance of the present Appellant 1. We are only stating about the devilish design of Respondent 3 to harass the appellants with the sole intent to avoid the payment of the loan. When a citizen avails a loan from a financial institution, it is his obligation to pay back and not play truant or, for that matter, play possum. As we have noticed, he has been able to do such adventurous acts as he has the embedded conviction that he will not be taken to task because an application under Section 156(3) CrPC is a simple application to the court for the issue of a direction to the investigating agency. We have been apprised that a carbon copy of a document is filed to show compliance with Section 154(3), indicating it has been sent to the Superintendent of Police concerned. 29. At this stage, it is seemly to state that power under Section 156(3) warrants application of the judicial mind. A court of law is involved. It is not the police taking steps at the stage of Section 154 of the Code. A litigant at his own whim cannot invoke the authority of the Magistrate. A principled and really grieved citizen with clean hands must have free access to invoke the said power. It protects the citizens, but when pervert litigations takes this route to harass their fellow citizens, efforts are to be made to scuttle and curb the same.

30. In our considered opinion, a stage has come in this country where Section 156(3)CrPC applications are to be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the applicant who seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. That apart, in an appropriate case, the learned Magistrate would be well advised to verify the truth and also can verify the veracity of the allegations. This affidavit can make the applicant more responsible. We are compelled to say so as such kind of applications are being filed in a routine manner without taking any responsibility whatsoever, 18 2026:HHC:27593 only to harass certain persons. That apart, it becomes more disturbing and alarming when one tries to pick up people who are passing orders under a statutory provision which can be challenged under the framework of the said Act or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But it cannot be done to take undue advantage in a criminal court as if somebody is determined to settle the scores.

31. We have already indicated that there has to be prior applications under Sections 154(1) and 154(3) while filing a petition under Section 156(3). Both aspects should be clearly spelt out in the application, and the necessary documents to that effect shall be filed. The warrant for giving a direction that an application under Section 156(3) be supported by an affidavit is so that the person making the application should be conscious and also endeavour to see that no false affidavit is made. It is because once an affidavit is found to be false, he will be liable for prosecution in accordance with the law. This will deter him to casually invoke the authority of the Magistrate under Section 156(3). That apart, we have already stated that the veracity of the same can also be verified by the learned Magistrate, regard being had to the nature of the allegations of the case. We are compelled to say so as a number of cases pertaining to fiscal sphere, matrimonial dispute/family disputes, commercial offences, medical negligence cases, corruption cases and the cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, as are illustrated in Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] are being filed. That apart, the learned Magistrate would also be aware of the delay in lodging of the FIR.” (emphasis supplied)

38. In a recent pronouncement of this Court in Babu Venkatesh v. State of Karnataka [Babu Venkatesh v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 5 SCC 639 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 455], the observations made in Priyanka Srivastava [Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P., (2015) 6 SCC 287 : 19 2026:HHC:27593 (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 294 : (2015) 4 SCC (Cri) 153] were referred to and it was held as follows: (Babu Venkatesh case [Babu Venkatesh v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 5 SCC 639 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 455], SCC p. 646, paras 24-26) “24. This Court has clearly held that a stage has come where applications under Section 156(3) CrPC are to be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the complainant who seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. 25. This Court further held that, in an appropriate case, the learned Magistrate would be well advised to verify the truth and also verify the veracity of the allegations. The Court has noted that applications under Section 156(3) CrPC are filed in a routine manner without taking any responsibility, only to harass certain persons.

26. This Court has further held that, prior to the filing of a petition under Section 156(3) CrPC, there have to be applications under Sections 154(1) and 154(3) CrPC. This Court emphasises the necessity to file an affidavit so that the persons making the application should be conscious and not make a false affidavit. With such a requirement, the persons would be deterred from causally invoking the authority of the Magistrate, under Section 156(3) CrPC. Inasmuch as if the affidavit is found to be false, the person would be liable for prosecution in accordance with the law.” (emphasis supplied) 39. In light of the judicial interpretation and evolution of Section 156(3)CrPC by various decisions of this Court as discussed above, it becomes clear that the changes introduced by Section 175(3) BNSS to the existing scheme of Section 156(3) merely codify the procedural practices and safeguards which have been introduced by judicial decisions aimed at curbing the misuse of invocation of powers of a Magistrate by unscrupulous litigants for achieving ulterior motives. 20 2026:HHC:27593

40. Further, by requiring the Magistrate to consider the submissions made by the police officer concerned before proceeding to issue directions under Section 175(3), BNSS has affixed greater accountability on the police officer responsible for registering FIRs under Section 173. Mandating the Magistrate to consider the submissions of the police officer concerned also ensures that the Magistrate applies his mind judicially while considering both the complaint and the submissions of the police officer, thereby ensuring that the requirement of passing reasoned orders is complied with in a more effective and comprehensive manner. 15. In the present case, the complaint does not mention that the complainant had approached the police before filing the complaint, and the learned Trial Court was justified in not acting upon it. 16. It was submitted that the judgment of Priyanka Srivastava (supra) did not apply to the present case because the complaint was not filed under Section 156 (3) of CrPC or 175 of BNSS. This submission will not help the petitioner. He had made a specific prayer that the ‘complaint be registered for registering the FIR’, clearly showing that the intent was to get the FIR registered. 17. In view of the above, the orders passed by the learned Courts below do not suffer from any infirmity, and 21 2026:HHC:27593 there is no reason to exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction vested with this Court in the present case.

18. This is not the first instance when the petitioner has approached the Courts by filing these kinds of petitions. Therefore, it is necessary to take effective steps to prevent the petitioner from wasting the precious time of the Courts; hence, the present petition is dismissed with the cost of ₹10,000/-, which shall be deposited in the Chief Justice Disaster Relief Fund, within a period of four weeks, failing which steps will be taken to recover it as per the law. 19. The present petition stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms, so also the pending applications, if any. 20. Records of the learned Courts below be sent back forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 08th July, 2026. (ravinder)

2026:HHC:27593 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 341 of 2026 Reserved on: 26.05.2026 Date of Decision 08 .07.2026 Ashish Sharma ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. & another ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? No. For the petitioner : In person. For the respondent : Mr Jitender K. Sharma, Additional Advocate General, for respondent No.1. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for setting aside the order dated 20.12.2025, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge (CBI Court), Shimla, District Shimla, H.P. (learned revisional Court), vide which the order dated 16.04.2025, passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-II, Shimla, District Shimla, H.P. (learned Trial Court) was upheld. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to _____________________________ 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:27593 in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned trial Court for convenience)

2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the complainant filed a complaint before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 406, 420, 463, 468-471, etc. of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It has been asserted that the accused is employed in Dayanand Public School, The Mall, Shimla, H.P. She was involved in unfair recruitment to the post of PGT (IP) in the year 2018. The complainant brought this fact to the notice of higher authorities. However, they did not take any action against the accused; rather, they suspended the complainant vide letter dated 07.12.2019. A list of witnesses was provided to the complainant, which contained the name of Shalni Sharma as witness No.11, but no document signed by her was placed in the memorandum dated 02.01.2020. An inquiry was conducted, but Shalini Sharma was not cross-examined; therefore, the inquiry is not proper as is understood in law. The complainant was removed from his services on 7.12.2021. The accused issued an experience certificate 3 2026:HHC:27593 mentioning, ‘suspension and removal from service after holding a proper inquiry’. This is a false recital because no proper inquiry was conducted. A fake document was created to harass and defame the complainant; hence, the complaint was filed to take action as per the law.

3. The learned Trial Court held that the complainant should have complied with the provisions of Section 154 (1) and 154 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) before filing the complaint as per the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Priyanka Srivastava vs State of UP Cr.A. no. 781 of 2012, but he had failed to do so; hence, the complaint was dismissed. 4. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Trial Court, the complainant filed a revision, which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (CBI Court). Shimla, District Shimla (learned revisional Court). The learned revisional Court held that the complainant was removed from service after a disciplinary inquiry. The allegations made in the complaint are to be adjudicated by the competent authority examining the validity of the enquiry and not by the Criminal Court. The Criminal Court 4 2026:HHC:27593 cannot sit over the findings of the departmental proceedings. Learned Trial Court had dismissed the complaint after affording a proper opportunity to the complainant. Therefore, the revision preferred by the complainant was dismissed.

5. Being aggrieved by the orders passed by the learned Courts below, the complainant has filed the present petition asserting that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material placed on record. The accused had created a fake experience certificate, containing false information. The document was created to harass and defame the complainant’s reputation. Therefore, it was prayed that the orders passed by the learned Courts below be set aside and the action be taken against the accused. 6. I have heard the petitioner, who appeared in person. 7. The petitioner submitted that Ms Shalini Sharma was mentioned as a witness in the memorandum, but she was not cross-examined. An inquiry conducted without examining all the witnesses is not a proper inquiry. A fake experience certificate was issued, mentioning that a proper 5 2026:HHC:27593 inquiry was conducted. Learned Courts below failed to properly appreciate the material placed before them; hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the orders passed by learned Courts below be set aside. 8. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

9. The complainant filed the complaint on the assumption that Ms Shalini Sharma was not examined, and the inquiry was not proper. Learned Revisional Court had rightly held that the remedy of the complainant was to approach a proper forum to set aside the inquiry report submitted by an Inquiry Officer, and a criminal Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by an Inquiry Officer. 10. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Kerala v. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth, (1996) 1 SCC 435, that a decision rendered between the parties cannot be said to be non-existent, and such an order has to be avoided by challenging it in a higher forum. It was observed: - 6 2026:HHC:27593

7….In our opinion, even a void order or decision rendered between parties cannot be said to be non-existent in all cases and in all situations. Ordinarily, such an order will, in fact, be effective inter partes until it is successfully avoided or challenged in a higher forum. Mere use of the word ‘void’ is not determinative of its legal impact. The word ‘void’ has a relative rather than an absolute meaning. It only conveys the idea that the order is invalid or illegal. It can be avoided. There are degrees of invalidity depending upon the gravity of the infirmity, as to whether it is, fundamental or otherwise and in this case, the only complaint about the initiation of the suo motu proceedings by the Board was, that it was not initiated on intimation by the State Land Board about the non-filing of the statement as required by Section 85(7) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. In our opinion, this is not a case where the infirmity is fundamental. It is unnecessary to consider the matter further.

8. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., (Re-issue) Vol. 1(1) in para 26, p. 31, it is stated, thus: “If an act or decision, or an order or other instrument is invalid, it should, in principle, be null and void for all purposes; and it has been said that there are no degrees of nullity. Even though such an act is wrong and lacking in jurisdiction, however, it subsists and remains fully effective unless and until it is set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction. Until its validity is challenged, its legality is preserved.” In the Judicial Review of Administrative Action, De Smith, Woolf and Jowell, 1995 Edn., at pp. 259-60, the law is stated thus: “The erosion of the distinction between jurisdictional errors and non-jurisdictional errors has, as we have seen, correspondingly eroded the distinction between 7 2026:HHC:27593 void and voidable decisions. The courts have become increasingly impatient with the distinction, to the extent that the situation today can be summarised as follows: (1) All official decisions are presumed to be valid until set aside or otherwise held to be invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction.” Similarly, Wade and Forsyth in Administrative Law, Seventh Edn., 1994, have stated the law thus at pp. 341-342:

“… every unlawful administrative act, however invalid, is merely voidable. But this is no more than the truism that in most situations the only way to resist unlawful action is by recourse to the law. In a well-known passage, Lord Radcliffe said: ‘An order, even if not made in good faith, is still an act capable of legal consequences. It bears no brand of invalidity upon its forehead. Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders.’ This must be equally true even where the brand of invalidity is plainly visible: for there also the order can effectively be resisted in law only by obtaining the decision of the court. The necessity of recourse to the court has been pointed out repeatedly in the House of Lords and Privy Council without distinction between patent and latent defects.” The above statement of the law supports our view that the order of the Board dated 28-6-1977, declining to implead Respondents 3 and 4 (which stood confirmed in revision), concludes the matter against Respondents 3 and 4.” 8 2026:HHC:27593 11. This position was reiterated in Nagar Parishad, Ratnagiri v. Gangaram Narayan Ambekar, (2020) 7 SCC 275, wherein it was observed: -

“16. Arguendo, the plaint as filed by Respondents 1 to 19 also suffers from another fundamental deficiency. Indeed, it is a cleverly drafted plaint, so as to give an impression that the competent authority had not taken any decision in exercise of statutory powers until the filing of the suit. However, in the written statement, a clear assertion has been made by the defendants (appellant and Respondent 20) that the decision to allot suit land to the appellant and for setting up the Project was taken after due deliberation and consultation with the Expert Committee, including the exercise of statutory powers of the authority concerned in that regard. None of these decisions of the competent authority has been assailed by the plaintiffs, nor has any declaratory relief been sought in that regard. In such a case, it would not be enough to ask for a permanent injunction simpliciter, and the suit so filed ought to have been rejected at the threshold on that count alone. We may usefully advert to the exposition of this Court in Kandla Port v. Hargovind Jasraj [Kandla Port v. Hargovind Jasraj, (2013) 3 SCC 182: (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 1]. In paras 26 to 31, the Court observed thus: (SCC pp. 193-95)

“26. Mr Ahmadi next argued that the termination of the lease being illegal and non est in law, the respondent-plaintiffs could ignore the same, and so long as they or any one of them remained in possession, a decree for injunction restraining the Port Trust from interfering with their possession could be passed by the court competent to do so. We are not impressed by that submission. 9 2026:HHC:27593 27. The termination of the lease deed was by an order which the plaintiffs ought to get rid of by having the same set aside, or declared invalid for whatever reasons; it may be permissible to do so. No order bears a label of its being valid or invalid on its forehead. Anyone affected by any such order ought to seek redress against the same within the period permissible for doing so. We may, in this regard, refer to the following oft-quoted passage in Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council [Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council, 1956 AC 736: (1956) 2 WLR 888 (HL)]. The following are the observations regarding the necessity of recourse to the Court for establishing the invalidity of an order established:

‘… An order, even if not made in good faith, is still an act capable of legal consequences. It bears no brand of invalidity on its forehead. Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders.’ [Smith case [Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council, 1956 AC 736: (1956) 2 WLR 888 (HL)], AC pp. 769-70] This must be equally true even where the brand of invalidity is plainly visible: for there also the order can effectively be resisted in law only by obtaining the decision of the court. The necessity of recourse to the court has been pointed out repeatedly in the House of Lords and Privy Council without distinction between patent and latent defects. [Ed.: Wade and Forsyth in Administrative Law, 7th Edn., 1994.] 28. The above case was approved by this Court in Krishnadevi Malchand Kamathia v. Bombay Environmental Action Group [Krishnadevi Malchand Kamathia v. Bombay Environmental Action Group, 10 2026:HHC:27593 (2011) 3 SCC 363], wherein this Court observed: (SCC pp. 369-70, para 19)

‘19. Thus, from the above, it emerges that even if the order/notification is void/voidable, the party aggrieved by the same cannot decide that the said order/notification is not binding upon it. It has to approach the court for seeking such a declaration. The order may be hypothetically a nullity, and even if its invalidity is challenged before the court in a given circumstance, the court may refuse to quash the same on various grounds, including the standing of the petitioner, on the ground of delay or on the doctrine of waiver or any other legal reason. The order may be void for one purpose or for one person, it may not be so for another purpose or another person.’ 29. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Pune Municipal Corpn. v. State of Maharashtra [Pune Municipal Corpn. v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 5 SCC 211] wherein this Court discussed the need for determination of invalidity of an order for public purposes : (SCC pp. 225-26, paras 36 & 38-39) ‘36. It is well settled that no order can be ignored altogether unless a finding is recorded that it was illegal, void or not in consonance with law. As Prof. Wade states: “The principle must be equally true even where the 'brand of invalidity' is plainly visible: for there also the order can effectively be resisted in law only by obtaining the decision of the court.” [H.W.R. Wade, Administrative Law (6th Edn., Clarendon Press, Oxford 1988) 352]. He further states: 11 2026:HHC:27593

“The truth of the matter is that the court will invalidate an order only if the right remedy is sought by the right person in the right proceedings and circumstances. The order may be hypothetically a nullity, but the court may refuse to quash it because of the plaintiff's lack of standing, because he does not deserve a discretionary remedy, because he has waived his rights, or for some other legal reason. In any such case, the “void” order remains effective and is, in reality, valid. It follows that an order may be void for one purpose and valid for another; and that it may be void against one person but valid against another.” [H.W.R. Wade, Administrative Law (6th Edn., Clarendon Press, Oxford 1988) 352-53] *** 38. A similar question came up for consideration before this Court in State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh [State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh, (1991) 4 SCC 1: 1991 SCC (L&S) 1082]. … 39. Setting aside the decree passed by all the courts and referring to several cases, this Court held that if the party aggrieved by the invalidity of the order intends to approach the court for a declaration that the order against him was inoperative, he must come before the court within the period prescribed by limitation. “If the statutory time of limitation expires, the court cannot give the declaration sought for.” ’

30. Reference may also be made to the decisions of this Court in R. Thiruvirkolam v. Labour Court [R. Thiruvirkolam v. Labour Court, (1997) 1 SCC 9: 1997 SCC (L&S) 65], State of Kerala v. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth [State of Kerala v. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth, (1996) 1 SCC 435] and Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla v. Hind 12 2026:HHC:27593 Rubber Industries (P) Ltd. [Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla v. Hind Rubber Industries (P) Ltd., (1997) 3 SCC 443], where this Court has held that an order will remain effective and lead to legal consequences unless the same is declared to be invalid by a competent court.” 12. Therefore, the order of the removal passed by the competent authority is valid unless set aside. In the present case, the order has not been set aside by the competent authority and the very basis of the complaint that the inquiry was fake because Shalini Sharma was not cross-examined is legally incorrect; hence, the complaint filed by the complainant that a certificate containing a wrong mention of the proper inquiry is a forged document created to cheat and harm the complainant’s reputation is also without any basis.

13. Learned Trial Court had rightly held that the complainant was required to file a complaint before the Station House Officer of the Police Station before approaching the Court. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ranjit Singh Bath Vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh, 2025 SCC OnLine 1479 that Section 154(1) requires that the information regarding the commission of a cognizable offence has to be furnished to an officer in charge of the Police Station. When the complaint was not made to 13 2026:HHC:27593 the officer in charge of the Police Station but to some other officer, there is no compliance with Section 154(1), and it is not permissible for him to approach the learned Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC. It was observed: 7. The requirement of sub-Section (1) of Section 154 is that information regarding the commission of a cognizable offence has to be furnished to an officer Incharge of a Police Station. In this case, obviously, the said compliance was not made. It is stated that the Inspector General of Police forwarded a complaint to the Economic Offences Wing. Sub-Section (3) of Section 154 comes into picture only when, after a complaint is submitted to the Officer In-Charge of Police Station or information is provided to the Officer In-Charge of Police Station regarding the commission of a cognizable offence, the Officer In-Charge refuses or neglects to register a First Information Report.

8. Sub-Sections (1) and (3) of Section 154 of the CrPC are the two remedies available for setting the criminal law in motion. Therefore, this Court held that before a complainant chooses to adopt a remedy under Section 156(3) of the CrPC, he must exhaust his remedies under sub-Sections (1) and (3) of Section 154 of the CrPC, and he must make those averments in the complaint and produce the documents in support. However, in this case, the second respondent did not exhaust the remedies. In this view of the matter, we find that both the learned Magistrate and the High Court have completely ignored the binding decision of this Court in the case of Priyanka Srivastava (2015) 6 SCC 287. 14 2026:HHC:27593 9. We, therefore, quash and set aside both the impugned orders and quash and set aside all the further steps taken on the basis of the order dated 14th June, 2017, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate. 14. It was submitted that the judgment of Priyanka Srivastava (supra) does not apply to the present case because the complaint was filed under Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023. This submission is only stated to be rejected. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Om Prakash Ambadkar v. State of Maharashtra, (2026) 2 SCC 622: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 238 that the requirements of Priyanka Srivastava (supra) have been codified under BNSS. It was observed at page 637:

34. A comparison of Section 175(3) BNSS with Section 156(3) CrPC indicates three prominent changes that have been introduced by the enactment of BNSS as follows: (a) First, the requirement of making an application to the Superintendent of Police upon refusal by the officer in charge of a police station to lodge the FIR has been made mandatory, and the applicant making an application under Section 175(3) is required to furnish a copy of the application made to the Superintendent of Police under Section 173(4), supported by an affidavit, while making the application to the Magistrate under Section 175(3). (b) Secondly, the Magistrate has been empowered to conduct such an enquiry as he deems necessary before making an order directing registration of FIR. 15 2026:HHC:27593 (c) Thirdly, the Magistrate is required to consider the submissions of the officer in charge of the police station as regards the refusal to register an FIR before issuing any directions under Section 175(3).

35. The introduction of these changes by the legislature can be attributed to the judicial evolution of Section 156CrPC undertaken by a number of decisions of this Court. In Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P. [Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P., (2015) 6 SCC 287: (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 294: (2015) 4 SCC (Cri) 153], this Court held that prior to making an application to the Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC, the applicant must necessarily make applications under Sections 154(1) and 154(3). It was further observed by the Court that applications made under Section 156(3) CrPC must necessarily be supported by an affidavit sworn by the applicant. The reason given by the Court for introducing such a requirement was that applications under Section 156(3) CrPC were being made in a routine manner and in a number of cases only with a view to causing harassment to the accused by registration of FIR. 36. It was further observed in Priyanka Srivastava [Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P., (2015) 6 SCC 287: (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 294: (2015) 4 SCC (Cri) 153] that the requirement of supporting the complaint with an affidavit would ensure that the person making the application is conscious and also to see that no false affidavit is made. Once an affidavit is found to be false, the applicant would be liable for prosecution in accordance with the law. This would deter him from casually invoking the authority of the Magistrate under Section 156(3).

37. The relevant observations made by the Court are reproduced hereinbelow: (Priyanka Srivastava case [Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P., (2015) 6 SCC 287: (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 294: (2015) 4 SCC (Cri) 153], SCC pp. 305-306, paras 27-31) 16 2026:HHC:27593 “27. Regard being had to the aforesaid enunciation of law, it needs to be reiterated that the learned Magistrate has to remain vigilant with regard to the allegations made and the nature of the allegations and not to issue directions without proper application of mind. He has also to bear in mind that sending the matter would be conducive to justice, and then he may pass the requisite order. The present is a case where the accused persons are serving in high positions in the Bank. We are absolutely conscious that the position does not matter, for nobody is above the law. But the learned Magistrate should take note of the allegations in entirety, the date of the incident and whether any cognizable case is remotely made out. It is also to be noted that when a borrower of the financial institution covered under the SARFAESI Act invokes the jurisdiction under Section 156(3) CrPC, and also there is a separate procedure under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, an attitude of more care, caution, and circumspection has to be adhered to.

28. Issuing a direction stating “as per the application” to lodge an FIR creates a very unhealthy situation in society and also reflects the erroneous approach of the learned Magistrate. It also encourages unscrupulous and unprincipled litigants, like Respondent 3, namely, Prakash Kumar Bajaj, to take adventurous steps with courts to bring the financial institutions to their knees. As the factual exposition would reveal, Respondent 3 had prosecuted the earlier authorities, and after the matter is dealt with by the High Court in a writ petition recording a settlement, he does not withdraw the criminal case and wait for some kind of situation where he can take vengeance as if he is the emperor of all he surveys. It is interesting to note that during the tenure of Appellant 1, who is presently occupying the position of Vice-President, neither was the loan taken nor was the default made, nor was any action under the 17 2026:HHC:27593

SARFAESI Act taken. However, the action under the SARFAESI Act was taken on the second time at the instance of the present Appellant 1. We are only stating about the devilish design of Respondent 3 to harass the appellants with the sole intent to avoid the payment of the loan. When a citizen avails a loan from a financial institution, it is his obligation to pay back and not play truant or, for that matter, play possum. As we have noticed, he has been able to do such adventurous acts as he has the embedded conviction that he will not be taken to task because an application under Section 156(3) CrPC is a simple application to the court for the issue of a direction to the investigating agency. We have been apprised that a carbon copy of a document is filed to show compliance with Section 154(3), indicating it has been sent to the Superintendent of Police concerned. 29. At this stage, it is seemly to state that power under Section 156(3) warrants application of the judicial mind. A court of law is involved. It is not the police taking steps at the stage of Section 154 of the Code. A litigant at his own whim cannot invoke the authority of the Magistrate. A principled and really grieved citizen with clean hands must have free access to invoke the said power. It protects the citizens, but when pervert litigations takes this route to harass their fellow citizens, efforts are to be made to scuttle and curb the same.

30. In our considered opinion, a stage has come in this country where Section 156(3)CrPC applications are to be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the applicant who seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. That apart, in an appropriate case, the learned Magistrate would be well advised to verify the truth and also can verify the veracity of the allegations. This affidavit can make the applicant more responsible. We are compelled to say so as such kind of applications are being filed in a routine manner without taking any responsibility whatsoever, 18 2026:HHC:27593 only to harass certain persons. That apart, it becomes more disturbing and alarming when one tries to pick up people who are passing orders under a statutory provision which can be challenged under the framework of the said Act or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But it cannot be done to take undue advantage in a criminal court as if somebody is determined to settle the scores.

31. We have already indicated that there has to be prior applications under Sections 154(1) and 154(3) while filing a petition under Section 156(3). Both aspects should be clearly spelt out in the application, and the necessary documents to that effect shall be filed. The warrant for giving a direction that an application under Section 156(3) be supported by an affidavit is so that the person making the application should be conscious and also endeavour to see that no false affidavit is made. It is because once an affidavit is found to be false, he will be liable for prosecution in accordance with the law. This will deter him to casually invoke the authority of the Magistrate under Section 156(3). That apart, we have already stated that the veracity of the same can also be verified by the learned Magistrate, regard being had to the nature of the allegations of the case. We are compelled to say so as a number of cases pertaining to fiscal sphere, matrimonial dispute/family disputes, commercial offences, medical negligence cases, corruption cases and the cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, as are illustrated in Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] are being filed. That apart, the learned Magistrate would also be aware of the delay in lodging of the FIR.” (emphasis supplied)

38. In a recent pronouncement of this Court in Babu Venkatesh v. State of Karnataka [Babu Venkatesh v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 5 SCC 639 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 455], the observations made in Priyanka Srivastava [Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P., (2015) 6 SCC 287 : 19 2026:HHC:27593 (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 294 : (2015) 4 SCC (Cri) 153] were referred to and it was held as follows: (Babu Venkatesh case [Babu Venkatesh v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 5 SCC 639 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 455], SCC p. 646, paras 24-26) “24. This Court has clearly held that a stage has come where applications under Section 156(3) CrPC are to be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the complainant who seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. 25. This Court further held that, in an appropriate case, the learned Magistrate would be well advised to verify the truth and also verify the veracity of the allegations. The Court has noted that applications under Section 156(3) CrPC are filed in a routine manner without taking any responsibility, only to harass certain persons.

26. This Court has further held that, prior to the filing of a petition under Section 156(3) CrPC, there have to be applications under Sections 154(1) and 154(3) CrPC. This Court emphasises the necessity to file an affidavit so that the persons making the application should be conscious and not make a false affidavit. With such a requirement, the persons would be deterred from causally invoking the authority of the Magistrate, under Section 156(3) CrPC. Inasmuch as if the affidavit is found to be false, the person would be liable for prosecution in accordance with the law.” (emphasis supplied) 39. In light of the judicial interpretation and evolution of Section 156(3)CrPC by various decisions of this Court as discussed above, it becomes clear that the changes introduced by Section 175(3) BNSS to the existing scheme of Section 156(3) merely codify the procedural practices and safeguards which have been introduced by judicial decisions aimed at curbing the misuse of invocation of powers of a Magistrate by unscrupulous litigants for achieving ulterior motives. 20 2026:HHC:27593

40. Further, by requiring the Magistrate to consider the submissions made by the police officer concerned before proceeding to issue directions under Section 175(3), BNSS has affixed greater accountability on the police officer responsible for registering FIRs under Section 173. Mandating the Magistrate to consider the submissions of the police officer concerned also ensures that the Magistrate applies his mind judicially while considering both the complaint and the submissions of the police officer, thereby ensuring that the requirement of passing reasoned orders is complied with in a more effective and comprehensive manner. 15. In the present case, the complaint does not mention that the complainant had approached the police before filing the complaint, and the learned Trial Court was justified in not acting upon it. 16. It was submitted that the judgment of Priyanka Srivastava (supra) did not apply to the present case because the complaint was not filed under Section 156 (3) of CrPC or 175 of BNSS. This submission will not help the petitioner. He had made a specific prayer that the ‘complaint be registered for registering the FIR’, clearly showing that the intent was to get the FIR registered. 17. In view of the above, the orders passed by the learned Courts below do not suffer from any infirmity, and 21 2026:HHC:27593 there is no reason to exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction vested with this Court in the present case.

18. This is not the first instance when the petitioner has approached the Courts by filing these kinds of petitions. Therefore, it is necessary to take effective steps to prevent the petitioner from wasting the precious time of the Courts; hence, the present petition is dismissed with the cost of ₹10,000/-, which shall be deposited in the Chief Justice Disaster Relief Fund, within a period of four weeks, failing which steps will be taken to recover it as per the law. 19. The present petition stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms, so also the pending applications, if any. 20. Records of the learned Courts below be sent back forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 08th July, 2026. (ravinder)