1 CGHC010272552026 2026:CGHC:32777-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 1979 of 2026 State of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Station -Ranchirai, District Balod Chhattisgarh ... Applicant versus ROHIT KUMAR CHANDRA Durvasha Yadu S/o Late Shri Madan Lal Yadu Aged About 42 Years R/o Digitally signed by ROHIT KUMAR CHANDRA Village - Dongitarai, Thana Ranchirai, District Balod Chhattisgarh ... Respondent For State/Applicant : Mr. Ashish Shukla, Additional Advocate General Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 30. 07 .2026 1. Heard Mr. Ashish Shukla, learned Additional Advocate General for the State/applicant on I.A. No. 01 of 2026, which is an application for condonation of delay of 181 days in preferring the application for grant of leave to appeal under Section 419(3) of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. 2. Learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State/applicant submits that the order of acquittal dated 15.10.2025 has 2

been passed by the learned Sessions Judge, FTC, Balod, District Balod (C.G.) in Sessions Trial No.53/2022, whereby the respondent has been acquitted from charges punishable under Sections 457, 354 of IPC and Section 7/8 of the POCSO Act and Section 3(1)(w)(i) of Scheduled Caste & Scheduled Tribe (Preventionof Atrocities) Act, 1989 and thereafter, the Law & Legislative Affairs Department, Government of Chhattisgarh, Mantralaya, Naya Raipur sent a proposal to the office of the Advocate General to file a acquittal against the impugned judgment dated 15.10.2025. Thereafter, the case was placed before the Advocate General and then the case was marked for drafting and as per the above proposal, the office has initiated proceeding and certified copy of the impugned order and other relevant exhibited documents have been received from the concerned Department and thereafter, the instant petition was prepared and filed before this Court.

3. It has been contended that the State, after obtaining necessary documents and information with respect to the case, however, some delay was occurred due to fulfillment of various departmental formalities and working of the Government machinery because the State Government is a multi functioning body, hence, at times the fulfillment of departmental formalities takes unexpected long time. Therefore, in some cases the State is prevented from filing the case within the prescribed period of limitation, which is bonafide and not deliberate. The instant appeal is, therefore, being filed after a delay of 181 days from the prescribed period of limitation. Reliance has been placed upon the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of 3 Haryana v. Chandra Mani and others, reported in (1996) 3 SCC 132, to buttress his submissions. As such, the learned State counsel prays that the delay of 181 days in preferring the petition may be condoned. 4. The question for determination before this Court is whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (i.e. Act 9 of 1908 i.e. the old Limitation Act) would apply to an application for leave to appeal from an order of acquittal. 5. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Postmaster General and others v. Living Media India Limited and another, reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, has dealt with the limitation issue and held as under:-

“27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were wellawareorconversantwiththeissuesinvolvedincluding the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent personsfamiliarwithcourtproceedings. Intheabsenceof plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wingoftheGovernmentisapartybeforeus. 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of 4 impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly bindseverybodyincludingtheGovernment.

29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exceptionandshouldnotbeusedasananticipatedbenefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefitofafew. 30. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanationofferedbytheDepartment for thedelayexcept mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissed onthegroundofdelay.” 6. Recently, a Division Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary, reported in 2024 INSC 932, while considering the delay, issued some directions and observed as follows:-“5. The legal position is that where a case has been presented in the Court beyond limitation, the petitioner has 5

to explain the Court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court within limitation. In Majji Sannemma v. Reddy Sridevi, 2021 SCC Online SC 1260, it was held by this Court that even though limitation may harshly affect the rights of a party, it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. A reference was also made to the decision of this Court in Ajay Dabra v.PyareRam,2023SCCOnline92wherein,itwasheldas follows: "13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v. SpecialLandAcquisitionOfficer[(2013)14SCC 81] while rejecting an application for condonation of delay for lack of sufficient cause hasconcludedinParagraph15asfollows: “15.Thelawontheissuecanbesummarisedto the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decidedonlywithintheparameterslaiddownby this Court in regard to the condonation of delay.

Incasetherewas no sufficient causetoprevent 6 a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregardtothelegislature.” 14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court did not commit any mistake in dismissing the delay condonation application ofthepresentappellant." Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case and that, the expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributedtotheparty. 5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir, 2024 INSC262, wherein,oneof us(J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a member, after referring to various decisions on the issue, it was in unequivocal terms observed by this Court that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity and rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The relevant passage of the same is profitably extracted below: “24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very clear that we are not going to look into the merits of the matter as long as we are not convinced that sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of such a long and 7 inordinatedelay.

25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a privatepartyoraStateorUnionofIndiawhenit comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that noprejudicewouldbecausedtoeither side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024.Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legalproceedings. 26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While 8

considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoningthedelay. 27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of therespondentforindefiniteperiodoftimetobe determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants. xxxxxxxxx 34.Inviewoftheaforesaid,wehavereachedto the conclusion that the High Court committed no error much less any error of law in passing the impugned order. Even otherwise, the High Court was exercising its supervisory jurisdiction underArticle227oftheConstitutionofIndia. 35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused asamatter of generosity. Renderingsubstantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matterandthisvitaltestforcondoningthedelay 9 isnotsatisfiedinthiscase.

36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.There shall be no orderastocosts.” Applying the above legal proposition to the facts of the present case, we are of the opinion that the High Court correctly refused to condone the delay and dismissed the appeal by observing that such inordinate delay was not explained satisfactorily, no sufficient cause was shown for the same, and no plausible reason was put forth by the State. Therefore, we are inclined to reject this petition at thethreshold.

6.At the same time, we cannot simply brush aside the delay occurred in preferring the second appeal, due to callous and lackadaisical attitude on the part of the officials functioning in the State machinery. Though the Government adopts systematic approach in handling the legal issues and preferring the petitions/applications/appeals well within the time, due to the fault on the part of the officials in merely communicating the information on time, huge revenue loss will be caused to the Government exchequer. The present case is one such case, wherein, enormous delay of 1788 days occasioned in preferring the second appeal due to the lapses on the part of the officials functioning under the State, though valuable Government lands were involved. Therefore, we direct the State to streamline the machinery touching the legal issues, offering legal opinion, filing of cases before the Tribunal / Courts, etc., fix the responsibility ontheofficer(s)concerned,and penalizetheofficer(s), who is/are responsible for delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the value of the loss caused to the 10 Government. Such direction will have to be followed byalltheStatesscrupulously.

7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we havenoticedthat whenever there isapleafor condonation of delay be it at the instance of a private litigant or State the delay is sought to be explained right from the time, the limitation starts and if there is a delay of say 2 years or 3 yearsor4yearstilltheendofthesame.Forexampleifthe period of limitation is 90 days then the party seeking condonation has to explain why it was unable to institute the proceedings within that period of limitation. What events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence.The court is required to consider what came in the way of the party that it was unable to file it between the 1st day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficientcausemustestablishthatbecauseofsomeevent or circumstance arising before the limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and Anotherv.StateofGujarat,AIR1981SC733).”

7. Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the present case, in the light of aforementioned judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Postmaster General (supra) and Ramkumar 11 Choudhary (supra), it is evident that Government departments are under a special obligation to discharge their duties with due diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception, not the rule, and cannot be claimed as a matter of right or anticipated privilege by Government entities. The law casts its protection equally upon all litigants and cannot be distorted to confer undue advantage upon a select few. 8. Upon considering the matter in its entirety, we find that the State has failed to provide any proper or satisfactory explanation for the delay in filing the present petition. The only reason cited is that the Law & Legislative Affairs Department, Government of Chhattisgarh, Mantralaya, Naya Raipur, had sent a proposal to the Office of the Advocate General for initiating an appeal against the impugned acquittal order dated 15.10.2025. Thereafter, the case was processed, and the present petition was ultimately filed. However, this sequence of events, lacking in specificity or justifiable cause, does not amount to a cogent or acceptable explanation. Thus, the State has miserably failed to demonstrate sufficient cause warranting the condonation of an inordinate delay of 181 days.

9. Consequently, we are not inclined to exercise our discretionary jurisdiction to condone such an extraordinary delay. The learned State counsel has failed to assign any cogent, satisfactory, or bona fide explanation for the delay of 181 days in filing the petition against acquittal. In the absence of any sufficient cause, no justification exists for condoning such inordinate delay. Even otherwise, upon a prima 12 facie consideration of the record and the impugned judgment, we find that no case for interference is made out on merits. The findings recorded by the trial Court do not suffer from any perversity, illegality, or manifest error warranting appellate interference, and no substantial or compelling ground has been demonstrated to take a view different from that adopted by the trial Court. 10. Accordingly, the petition is liable to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed both on the ground of limitation as well as on merits. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Chandra

1 CGHC010272552026 2026:CGHC:32777-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 1979 of 2026 State of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Station -Ranchirai, District Balod Chhattisgarh ... Applicant versus ROHIT KUMAR CHANDRA Durvasha Yadu S/o Late Shri Madan Lal Yadu Aged About 42 Years R/o Digitally signed by ROHIT KUMAR CHANDRA Village - Dongitarai, Thana Ranchirai, District Balod Chhattisgarh ... Respondent For State/Applicant : Mr. Ashish Shukla, Additional Advocate General Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 30. 07 .2026 1. Heard Mr. Ashish Shukla, learned Additional Advocate General for the State/applicant on I.A. No. 01 of 2026, which is an application for condonation of delay of 181 days in preferring the application for grant of leave to appeal under Section 419(3) of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. 2. Learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State/applicant submits that the order of acquittal dated 15.10.2025 has 2

been passed by the learned Sessions Judge, FTC, Balod, District Balod (C.G.) in Sessions Trial No.53/2022, whereby the respondent has been acquitted from charges punishable under Sections 457, 354 of IPC and Section 7/8 of the POCSO Act and Section 3(1)(w)(i) of Scheduled Caste & Scheduled Tribe (Preventionof Atrocities) Act, 1989 and thereafter, the Law & Legislative Affairs Department, Government of Chhattisgarh, Mantralaya, Naya Raipur sent a proposal to the office of the Advocate General to file a acquittal against the impugned judgment dated 15.10.2025. Thereafter, the case was placed before the Advocate General and then the case was marked for drafting and as per the above proposal, the office has initiated proceeding and certified copy of the impugned order and other relevant exhibited documents have been received from the concerned Department and thereafter, the instant petition was prepared and filed before this Court.

3. It has been contended that the State, after obtaining necessary documents and information with respect to the case, however, some delay was occurred due to fulfillment of various departmental formalities and working of the Government machinery because the State Government is a multi functioning body, hence, at times the fulfillment of departmental formalities takes unexpected long time. Therefore, in some cases the State is prevented from filing the case within the prescribed period of limitation, which is bonafide and not deliberate. The instant appeal is, therefore, being filed after a delay of 181 days from the prescribed period of limitation. Reliance has been placed upon the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of 3 Haryana v. Chandra Mani and others, reported in (1996) 3 SCC 132, to buttress his submissions. As such, the learned State counsel prays that the delay of 181 days in preferring the petition may be condoned. 4. The question for determination before this Court is whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (i.e. Act 9 of 1908 i.e. the old Limitation Act) would apply to an application for leave to appeal from an order of acquittal. 5. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Postmaster General and others v. Living Media India Limited and another, reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, has dealt with the limitation issue and held as under:-

“27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were wellawareorconversantwiththeissuesinvolvedincluding the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent personsfamiliarwithcourtproceedings. Intheabsenceof plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wingoftheGovernmentisapartybeforeus. 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of 4 impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly bindseverybodyincludingtheGovernment.

29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exceptionandshouldnotbeusedasananticipatedbenefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefitofafew. 30. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanationofferedbytheDepartment for thedelayexcept mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissed onthegroundofdelay.” 6. Recently, a Division Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary, reported in 2024 INSC 932, while considering the delay, issued some directions and observed as follows:-“5. The legal position is that where a case has been presented in the Court beyond limitation, the petitioner has 5

to explain the Court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court within limitation. In Majji Sannemma v. Reddy Sridevi, 2021 SCC Online SC 1260, it was held by this Court that even though limitation may harshly affect the rights of a party, it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. A reference was also made to the decision of this Court in Ajay Dabra v.PyareRam,2023SCCOnline92wherein,itwasheldas follows: "13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v. SpecialLandAcquisitionOfficer[(2013)14SCC 81] while rejecting an application for condonation of delay for lack of sufficient cause hasconcludedinParagraph15asfollows: “15.Thelawontheissuecanbesummarisedto the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decidedonlywithintheparameterslaiddownby this Court in regard to the condonation of delay.

Incasetherewas no sufficient causetoprevent 6 a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregardtothelegislature.” 14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court did not commit any mistake in dismissing the delay condonation application ofthepresentappellant." Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case and that, the expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributedtotheparty. 5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir, 2024 INSC262, wherein,oneof us(J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a member, after referring to various decisions on the issue, it was in unequivocal terms observed by this Court that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity and rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The relevant passage of the same is profitably extracted below: “24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very clear that we are not going to look into the merits of the matter as long as we are not convinced that sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of such a long and 7 inordinatedelay.

25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a privatepartyoraStateorUnionofIndiawhenit comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that noprejudicewouldbecausedtoeither side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024.Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legalproceedings. 26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While 8

considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoningthedelay. 27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of therespondentforindefiniteperiodoftimetobe determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants. xxxxxxxxx 34.Inviewoftheaforesaid,wehavereachedto the conclusion that the High Court committed no error much less any error of law in passing the impugned order. Even otherwise, the High Court was exercising its supervisory jurisdiction underArticle227oftheConstitutionofIndia. 35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused asamatter of generosity. Renderingsubstantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matterandthisvitaltestforcondoningthedelay 9 isnotsatisfiedinthiscase.

36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.There shall be no orderastocosts.” Applying the above legal proposition to the facts of the present case, we are of the opinion that the High Court correctly refused to condone the delay and dismissed the appeal by observing that such inordinate delay was not explained satisfactorily, no sufficient cause was shown for the same, and no plausible reason was put forth by the State. Therefore, we are inclined to reject this petition at thethreshold.

6.At the same time, we cannot simply brush aside the delay occurred in preferring the second appeal, due to callous and lackadaisical attitude on the part of the officials functioning in the State machinery. Though the Government adopts systematic approach in handling the legal issues and preferring the petitions/applications/appeals well within the time, due to the fault on the part of the officials in merely communicating the information on time, huge revenue loss will be caused to the Government exchequer. The present case is one such case, wherein, enormous delay of 1788 days occasioned in preferring the second appeal due to the lapses on the part of the officials functioning under the State, though valuable Government lands were involved. Therefore, we direct the State to streamline the machinery touching the legal issues, offering legal opinion, filing of cases before the Tribunal / Courts, etc., fix the responsibility ontheofficer(s)concerned,and penalizetheofficer(s), who is/are responsible for delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the value of the loss caused to the 10 Government. Such direction will have to be followed byalltheStatesscrupulously.

7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we havenoticedthat whenever there isapleafor condonation of delay be it at the instance of a private litigant or State the delay is sought to be explained right from the time, the limitation starts and if there is a delay of say 2 years or 3 yearsor4yearstilltheendofthesame.Forexampleifthe period of limitation is 90 days then the party seeking condonation has to explain why it was unable to institute the proceedings within that period of limitation. What events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence.The court is required to consider what came in the way of the party that it was unable to file it between the 1st day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficientcausemustestablishthatbecauseofsomeevent or circumstance arising before the limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and Anotherv.StateofGujarat,AIR1981SC733).”

7. Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the present case, in the light of aforementioned judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Postmaster General (supra) and Ramkumar 11 Choudhary (supra), it is evident that Government departments are under a special obligation to discharge their duties with due diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception, not the rule, and cannot be claimed as a matter of right or anticipated privilege by Government entities. The law casts its protection equally upon all litigants and cannot be distorted to confer undue advantage upon a select few. 8. Upon considering the matter in its entirety, we find that the State has failed to provide any proper or satisfactory explanation for the delay in filing the present petition. The only reason cited is that the Law & Legislative Affairs Department, Government of Chhattisgarh, Mantralaya, Naya Raipur, had sent a proposal to the Office of the Advocate General for initiating an appeal against the impugned acquittal order dated 15.10.2025. Thereafter, the case was processed, and the present petition was ultimately filed. However, this sequence of events, lacking in specificity or justifiable cause, does not amount to a cogent or acceptable explanation. Thus, the State has miserably failed to demonstrate sufficient cause warranting the condonation of an inordinate delay of 181 days.

9. Consequently, we are not inclined to exercise our discretionary jurisdiction to condone such an extraordinary delay. The learned State counsel has failed to assign any cogent, satisfactory, or bona fide explanation for the delay of 181 days in filing the petition against acquittal. In the absence of any sufficient cause, no justification exists for condoning such inordinate delay. Even otherwise, upon a prima 12 facie consideration of the record and the impugned judgment, we find that no case for interference is made out on merits. The findings recorded by the trial Court do not suffer from any perversity, illegality, or manifest error warranting appellate interference, and no substantial or compelling ground has been demonstrated to take a view different from that adopted by the trial Court. 10. Accordingly, the petition is liable to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed both on the ground of limitation as well as on merits. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Chandra