1 SUMITsigned DigitallybyKUMARSUMIT KUMAR Date:2026.06.2911:10:20+0530 2026:CGHC:25461 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WP227 No. 628 of 2026 Rajkumar Saraf S/o Nanku Prasad Saraf Aged About 69 Years R/o Pital Karkhana, Gaurav Path, Balodabazar, Tahdil - Balodabazar, District Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - Yuvraj Sahu S/o Chudamani Sahu Aged About 40 Years R/o Aryan Borewell, Behind The New Bus Stand, Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh 2 - Ghasiram Sahu S/o Jhunau Sahu Aged About 70 Years R/o Village Rohansi, Tahsil Palari, Distt Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh 3 - Rohit Kumar Sahu S/o Jhunau Sahu Aged About 68 Years R/o Village Rohansi, Tahsil Palari, Distt Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh 4 - Mansingh Sahu (Died) Through Lrs Nil 4.1 - Shyamkunwar W/o Late Mansingh Sahu Aged About 67 Years R/o Village Rohansi, Tahsil Palari, Distt Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh 4.2 - Punita Sahu D/o Mansingh Sahukar Aged About 47 Years R/o Village Rohansi, Tahsil Palari, Distt Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh 2 4.3 - Ghanshyam Singh S/o Mansingh Sahu Aged About 45 Years R/o Village Rohansi, Tahsil Palari, Distt Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh 4.4 - Rupendra Kumar Sahu S/o Mansingh Sahu Aged About 43 Years R/o Village Rohansi, Tahsil Palari, Distt Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh 4.5 - Ashwani Kumar Sahu S/o Mansingh Sahu Aged About 41 Years R/o Village Rohansi, Tahsil Palari, Distt Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh

4.6 - Ashok Kumar Sahu S/o Mansingh Sahu Aged About 39 Years R/o Village Rohansi, Tahsil Palari, Distt Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh 4.7 - Sunita Sahu S/o Mansingh Sahu Aged About 35 Years R/o Village Rohansi, Tahsil Palari, Distt Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh 5 - Chudamani Sahu S/o Jhunau Sahu Aged About 64 Years R/o Behind The New Bus Stand, Balodabazar, Tahsil - Balodabazar, Distt Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh 6 - Mantram Sahu S/o Narayan Sahu Aged About 49 Years R/o Behind The New Bus Stand, Balodabazar, Tahsil - Balodabazar, Distt Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh 7 - Pramod Sahu S/o Raju Sahu Aged About 48 Years R/o Behind The New Bus Stand, Balodabazar, Tahsil - Balodabazar, Distt Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh 8 - Pushpanjali Sahu D/o Raju Sahu Aged About 44 Years R/o Behind The New Bus Stand, Balodabazar, Tahsil - Balodabazar, Distt Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh 9 - Yamini Sahu D/o Raju Sahu Aged About 47 Years R/o Behind The New Bus Stand, Balodabazar, Tahsil - Balodabazar, Distt Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh 10 - Babita Sahu D/o Raju Sahu Aged About 38 Years R/o Behind The New 3 Bus Stand, Balodabazar, Tahsil - Balodabazar, Distt Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh 11 - Anjali Sahu W/o Raju Sahu Aged About 65 Years R/o Behind The New Bus Stand, Balodabazar, Tahsil - Balodabazar, Distt Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh

12 - Mangtu Ram Prajapati S/o Onkarmal Prajapati Aged About 66 Years R/o Behind The Post Office, Balodabazar, Tahsil - Balodabazar, Distt Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh 13 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector - Balodabazar, Distt Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Suryapratap Yaddhaveer Singh, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Ms. Isha Jajodia, P.L. for the State (Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J.) Order on Board 22/06/2026 1. Heard. 2. Present is a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India filed by the petitioner against the order dated 08.10.2024 passed by learned Second Additional District Judge, Baloda-Bazar (C.G.) in Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No.16/2023 whereby the Miscellaneous Appeal filed by the petitioner has been dismissed. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner is 4

the plaintiff before the learned trial Court who is prosecuting a suit for permanent injunction against the defendants from interference with the suit property with the pleading that the plaintiff is in possession of the suit land whereas the defendants are encroaching the land by raising construction over there. He would further submit that though the plaintiff have no objection in raising the construction by the defendants over their land of Khasra No. 1200/2, however, in the garb of land bearing Khasra No. 1200/2, the defendants are encroaching the land of the plaintiff which is numbered as 1138/10. He would also submit that the defendants are intended to alienate the property after raising construction over there and if they would succeeded in doing so, it would be irreparable loss to plaintiff, therefore, he has filed an application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of the CPC in the suit for restraining the defendants from alienating the suit property till the pendency of the suit. However, the application filed by the plaintiff has been rejected by the learned trial Court and the appeal has also been dismissed. He would further submit that the dispute in the present suit is with respect to the demarcation of the property and if the defendants could raise construction over the land of the plaintiff, the plaintiff would be deprived from his property, therefore, the interim protection may be granted to the plaintiff and the impugned orders rejecting application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of the CPC may be set aside.

4. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the material annexed with the petition. 5. From perusal of the orders passed by learned trial Court (Annexure P- 4) as well as order passed by learned Appellate Court (Annexure P-1), 5

it transpires that the learned trial Court has considered that the land bearing Khasra No. 1200/2 is in the ownership of the defendants over which the defendants are raising construction. It has also been observed that the plaintiff could not impute any evidence or document with respect to the construction of the defendants over his land of Khasra No. 1201 or 1138/10 as he has claimed, the learned trial Court has also observed that it is for the plaintiff to get his land demarcated first and then claim the relief, if it is found that the defendants are raising construction over his land and at this stage, it can not be said that the defendants are encroaching the land of the plaintiff, therefore, the learned trial Court has held that there is no prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss in favour of the plaintiff and has rejected the application. Concurring the finding recorded by the learned trial Court, the learned Appellate Court has also dismissed the appeal filed by the plaintiff holding that there is no evidence on record that the construction of the defendants is over the land of Khasra No. 1138/10 which has been claimed by the plaintiff. The application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of CPC filed by the plaintiff has been rejected by both the Courts below concurrently and from the pleadings, it has been found that it is the disputed question of fact involved in the case about its identification and demarcation of the land.

6. When the learned trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court concurrently rejected the application filed by the plaintiff, the interference of this Court by invoking the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is very limited as the Hon’ble Supreme 6 Court dealt in the case of “Shalini Shyam Shetty and another v. Rajendra Shankar Patil” 2010 (8) SCC 329 held that: 42. Same views have been taken by this Court in respect of the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227 in the case of Sarpanch, Lonand Grampanchayat vs. Ramgiri Gosavi and another, reported in AIR 1968 SC 222, (see para 5 page 222-234 of the report) and the decision of this Court in Jijabai Vithalrao Gajre vs. Pathankhan and others reported in (1970) 2 SCC 717. The Constitution Bench ratio in Waryam Singh (supra) about the scope of Article 227 was again followed in Ahmedabad Manufacturing & Calico Ptg. Co. Ltd. vs. Ram Tahel Ramnand and others reported in (1972) 1 SCC 898.

43. In a rather recent decision of the Supreme Court in case of Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai and others, reported in (2003) 6 SCC 675, a two judge Bench of this Court discussed the principles of interference by High Court under Article 227. Of course in Surya Dev Rai (supra) this Court held that a writ of Certiorari is maintainable against the order of a civil Court, subordinate to the High Court (para 19, page 668 of the report). The correctness of that ratio was doubted by another Division Bench of this Court in Radhey Shyam and another vs. Chhabi Nath and others [(2009) 5 SCC 616] and a request to the Hon'ble Chief Justice for a reference to a larger Bench is pending. But in so far as the formulation of the principles on the scope of interference by the High Court under Article 227 is concerned, there is no divergence of views. 44. In paragraph 38, sub-paragraph (4) at page 695 of the report, the following principles have been laid down in Surya Dev Rai (supra) and they are set out:

"38 (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction." 45. Sub-paras (5), (7) and (8) of para 38 are also on the same lines and extracted below (Surya Dev Rai Case (Supra), SCC pp. 695-96): 7 "38.(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (6) xxx xxx

(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred thereagainst and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not covert itself into a Court of Appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character."

49. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is 8 substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court.

(d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, `within the bounds of their authority'. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.

(h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. 9 (i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India & others, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu.

(l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest 10 this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.”

7. In the case of Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel, 2022 (4) SCC 181, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that:-“15. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are clearly of the view that the impugned order is contrary to law and cannot be sustained for several reasons, but primarily for deviation from the limited jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal. The jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of correctional jurisdiction to set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, violation of fundamental principles of law or justice. The power under Article 227 is exercised sparingly in appropriate cases, like when there is no evidence at all to justify, or the finding is so perverse that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion that the court or tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that such discretionary relief must be exercised to ensure there is no miscarriage of justice.”

16. Explaining the scope of jurisdiction under Article 227, this Court in Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd, (2001) 8 SCC 97 has observed: (SCC pp. 101-102, para 6) "6. The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is examined and explained in a number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power under this article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do the duty expected or required of them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the subordinate courts or tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunals is 11

restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if the High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of an inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or tribunal has come to.” 8. In view of the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner and concurrently rejection of the application of the plaintiff by the learned trial Court as well the Appellate Court and also considering the law laid down by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the matter of Shalini Shyam Shetty (supra) and Garment Craft (supra), I do not find any scope of interference in the present writ petition filed by the plaintiff in the impugned order. 9. Accordingly, the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) JUDGE Sumit

1 SUMITsigned DigitallybyKUMARSUMIT KUMAR Date:2026.06.2911:10:20+0530 2026:CGHC:25461 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WP227 No. 628 of 2026 Rajkumar Saraf S/o Nanku Prasad Saraf Aged About 69 Years R/o Pital Karkhana, Gaurav Path, Balodabazar, Tahdil - Balodabazar, District Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - Yuvraj Sahu S/o Chudamani Sahu Aged About 40 Years R/o Aryan Borewell, Behind The New Bus Stand, Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh 2 - Ghasiram Sahu S/o Jhunau Sahu Aged About 70 Years R/o Village Rohansi, Tahsil Palari, Distt Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh 3 - Rohit Kumar Sahu S/o Jhunau Sahu Aged About 68 Years R/o Village Rohansi, Tahsil Palari, Distt Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh 4 - Mansingh Sahu (Died) Through Lrs Nil 4.1 - Shyamkunwar W/o Late Mansingh Sahu Aged About 67 Years R/o Village Rohansi, Tahsil Palari, Distt Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh 4.2 - Punita Sahu D/o Mansingh Sahukar Aged About 47 Years R/o Village Rohansi, Tahsil Palari, Distt Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh 2 4.3 - Ghanshyam Singh S/o Mansingh Sahu Aged About 45 Years R/o Village Rohansi, Tahsil Palari, Distt Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh 4.4 - Rupendra Kumar Sahu S/o Mansingh Sahu Aged About 43 Years R/o Village Rohansi, Tahsil Palari, Distt Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh 4.5 - Ashwani Kumar Sahu S/o Mansingh Sahu Aged About 41 Years R/o Village Rohansi, Tahsil Palari, Distt Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh

4.6 - Ashok Kumar Sahu S/o Mansingh Sahu Aged About 39 Years R/o Village Rohansi, Tahsil Palari, Distt Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh 4.7 - Sunita Sahu S/o Mansingh Sahu Aged About 35 Years R/o Village Rohansi, Tahsil Palari, Distt Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh 5 - Chudamani Sahu S/o Jhunau Sahu Aged About 64 Years R/o Behind The New Bus Stand, Balodabazar, Tahsil - Balodabazar, Distt Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh 6 - Mantram Sahu S/o Narayan Sahu Aged About 49 Years R/o Behind The New Bus Stand, Balodabazar, Tahsil - Balodabazar, Distt Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh 7 - Pramod Sahu S/o Raju Sahu Aged About 48 Years R/o Behind The New Bus Stand, Balodabazar, Tahsil - Balodabazar, Distt Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh 8 - Pushpanjali Sahu D/o Raju Sahu Aged About 44 Years R/o Behind The New Bus Stand, Balodabazar, Tahsil - Balodabazar, Distt Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh 9 - Yamini Sahu D/o Raju Sahu Aged About 47 Years R/o Behind The New Bus Stand, Balodabazar, Tahsil - Balodabazar, Distt Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh 10 - Babita Sahu D/o Raju Sahu Aged About 38 Years R/o Behind The New 3 Bus Stand, Balodabazar, Tahsil - Balodabazar, Distt Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh 11 - Anjali Sahu W/o Raju Sahu Aged About 65 Years R/o Behind The New Bus Stand, Balodabazar, Tahsil - Balodabazar, Distt Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh

12 - Mangtu Ram Prajapati S/o Onkarmal Prajapati Aged About 66 Years R/o Behind The Post Office, Balodabazar, Tahsil - Balodabazar, Distt Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh 13 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector - Balodabazar, Distt Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Suryapratap Yaddhaveer Singh, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Ms. Isha Jajodia, P.L. for the State (Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J.) Order on Board 22/06/2026 1. Heard. 2. Present is a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India filed by the petitioner against the order dated 08.10.2024 passed by learned Second Additional District Judge, Baloda-Bazar (C.G.) in Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No.16/2023 whereby the Miscellaneous Appeal filed by the petitioner has been dismissed. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner is 4

the plaintiff before the learned trial Court who is prosecuting a suit for permanent injunction against the defendants from interference with the suit property with the pleading that the plaintiff is in possession of the suit land whereas the defendants are encroaching the land by raising construction over there. He would further submit that though the plaintiff have no objection in raising the construction by the defendants over their land of Khasra No. 1200/2, however, in the garb of land bearing Khasra No. 1200/2, the defendants are encroaching the land of the plaintiff which is numbered as 1138/10. He would also submit that the defendants are intended to alienate the property after raising construction over there and if they would succeeded in doing so, it would be irreparable loss to plaintiff, therefore, he has filed an application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of the CPC in the suit for restraining the defendants from alienating the suit property till the pendency of the suit. However, the application filed by the plaintiff has been rejected by the learned trial Court and the appeal has also been dismissed. He would further submit that the dispute in the present suit is with respect to the demarcation of the property and if the defendants could raise construction over the land of the plaintiff, the plaintiff would be deprived from his property, therefore, the interim protection may be granted to the plaintiff and the impugned orders rejecting application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of the CPC may be set aside.

4. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the material annexed with the petition. 5. From perusal of the orders passed by learned trial Court (Annexure P- 4) as well as order passed by learned Appellate Court (Annexure P-1), 5

it transpires that the learned trial Court has considered that the land bearing Khasra No. 1200/2 is in the ownership of the defendants over which the defendants are raising construction. It has also been observed that the plaintiff could not impute any evidence or document with respect to the construction of the defendants over his land of Khasra No. 1201 or 1138/10 as he has claimed, the learned trial Court has also observed that it is for the plaintiff to get his land demarcated first and then claim the relief, if it is found that the defendants are raising construction over his land and at this stage, it can not be said that the defendants are encroaching the land of the plaintiff, therefore, the learned trial Court has held that there is no prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss in favour of the plaintiff and has rejected the application. Concurring the finding recorded by the learned trial Court, the learned Appellate Court has also dismissed the appeal filed by the plaintiff holding that there is no evidence on record that the construction of the defendants is over the land of Khasra No. 1138/10 which has been claimed by the plaintiff. The application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of CPC filed by the plaintiff has been rejected by both the Courts below concurrently and from the pleadings, it has been found that it is the disputed question of fact involved in the case about its identification and demarcation of the land.

6. When the learned trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court concurrently rejected the application filed by the plaintiff, the interference of this Court by invoking the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is very limited as the Hon’ble Supreme 6 Court dealt in the case of “Shalini Shyam Shetty and another v. Rajendra Shankar Patil” 2010 (8) SCC 329 held that: 42. Same views have been taken by this Court in respect of the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227 in the case of Sarpanch, Lonand Grampanchayat vs. Ramgiri Gosavi and another, reported in AIR 1968 SC 222, (see para 5 page 222-234 of the report) and the decision of this Court in Jijabai Vithalrao Gajre vs. Pathankhan and others reported in (1970) 2 SCC 717. The Constitution Bench ratio in Waryam Singh (supra) about the scope of Article 227 was again followed in Ahmedabad Manufacturing & Calico Ptg. Co. Ltd. vs. Ram Tahel Ramnand and others reported in (1972) 1 SCC 898.

43. In a rather recent decision of the Supreme Court in case of Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai and others, reported in (2003) 6 SCC 675, a two judge Bench of this Court discussed the principles of interference by High Court under Article 227. Of course in Surya Dev Rai (supra) this Court held that a writ of Certiorari is maintainable against the order of a civil Court, subordinate to the High Court (para 19, page 668 of the report). The correctness of that ratio was doubted by another Division Bench of this Court in Radhey Shyam and another vs. Chhabi Nath and others [(2009) 5 SCC 616] and a request to the Hon'ble Chief Justice for a reference to a larger Bench is pending. But in so far as the formulation of the principles on the scope of interference by the High Court under Article 227 is concerned, there is no divergence of views. 44. In paragraph 38, sub-paragraph (4) at page 695 of the report, the following principles have been laid down in Surya Dev Rai (supra) and they are set out:

"38 (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction." 45. Sub-paras (5), (7) and (8) of para 38 are also on the same lines and extracted below (Surya Dev Rai Case (Supra), SCC pp. 695-96): 7 "38.(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (6) xxx xxx

(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred thereagainst and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not covert itself into a Court of Appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character."

49. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is 8 substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court.

(d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, `within the bounds of their authority'. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.

(h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. 9 (i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India & others, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu.

(l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest 10 this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.”

7. In the case of Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel, 2022 (4) SCC 181, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that:-“15. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are clearly of the view that the impugned order is contrary to law and cannot be sustained for several reasons, but primarily for deviation from the limited jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal. The jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of correctional jurisdiction to set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, violation of fundamental principles of law or justice. The power under Article 227 is exercised sparingly in appropriate cases, like when there is no evidence at all to justify, or the finding is so perverse that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion that the court or tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that such discretionary relief must be exercised to ensure there is no miscarriage of justice.”

16. Explaining the scope of jurisdiction under Article 227, this Court in Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd, (2001) 8 SCC 97 has observed: (SCC pp. 101-102, para 6) "6. The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is examined and explained in a number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power under this article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do the duty expected or required of them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the subordinate courts or tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunals is 11

restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if the High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of an inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or tribunal has come to.” 8. In view of the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner and concurrently rejection of the application of the plaintiff by the learned trial Court as well the Appellate Court and also considering the law laid down by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the matter of Shalini Shyam Shetty (supra) and Garment Craft (supra), I do not find any scope of interference in the present writ petition filed by the plaintiff in the impugned order. 9. Accordingly, the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) JUDGE Sumit